Other Crop Farming in the United States (NAICS 1119)

A Histometrics rollup primer for public-market and private investors. NAICS (the North American Industry Classification System — the standard code set U.S. statistical agencies use to group businesses) 2022 code 1119, "Other Crop Farming," is a four-digit industry group: the residual "everything else" bin of U.S. crop farming. It bundles five otherwise-unrelated child industries — 11191 Tobacco, 11192 Cotton, 11193 Sugarcane, 11194 Hay, and 11199 All Other Crop Farming. This page synthesizes the five child primers plus our federal ground-truth stats for this level; it does not re-research the crops from scratch.

1. Overview

NAICS 1119 is a filing cabinet, not a market. U.S. crop production (subsector 111) is split into four "coherent" industry groups — grain and oilseed (1111), vegetables and melons (1112), fruit and tree nuts (1113), and greenhouse/nursery (1114) — and then everything that fits none of them lands in 1119, "Other Crop Farming." [1] The result is a bin whose five members share a code and almost nothing else: a tobacco grower in Kentucky, a cotton farmer on the Texas High Plains, a sugarcane-and-mill operator in the Florida Everglades, a hay baler in the arid West, and a North Dakota sugar-beet or Georgia peanut co-op member are entirely different businesses — different crops, buyers, regions, policy regimes, and cycles.

For an investor, then, the value of looking at 1119 as a whole is not one thesis — it is the contrast. These five industries are five different answers to the same structural question that defines American specialty and industrial-crop farming: how does a mass of small, private growers make money selling a raw crop into a market dominated by a few buyers, usually with no liquid price to hedge against? Tobacco growers signed annual contracts with a two-merchant buy side. Cotton growers kept a real futures market and lean on the Farm Bill. Sugarcane and sugar-beet growers became the processors (vertically integrated mills and grower-owned cooperatives) behind a protective federal price program. Hay growers stayed a fragmented feed layer with no hedge at all. The "all other" bucket does a bit of each.

Three facts unify the whole group for an outside investor:

• There is no listed U.S. pure-play grower in any of the five (the lone exception: outdoor cannabis cultivators, which sit inside 11199). Public-market exposure is always indirect — input suppliers, downstream processors and brands, leaf/commodity merchants, farmland real-estate investment trusts (REITs — listed companies that own and lease land), or commodity futures.
• Standard federal business statistics do not count these farms. Crop production is excluded from the Census Bureau's business programs, so the authoritative source is the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which reports by crop, not by NAICS code (Section 3). [2][4]
• Every child is a "farm-gate" industry. The code covers growing the crop and stops at the first sale; the refining, branding, and manufacturing where most of the money is made sit in separate downstream codes. [1]

The rest of this primer leads with how the five differ, then treats the rolled-up group as a whole.

2. What's inside — the five children and how they differ

All five are farm-gate crop industries, and each is (with one exception) a "single-child" five-digit code that equals its lone six-digit national industry — tobacco = 111910, cotton = 111920, sugarcane = 111930, hay = 111940. The exception is 11199, which itself bundles three more crops (sugar beet 111991, peanut 111992, and a miscellaneous bin of hops, grass seed, maple, mint, ginseng, and outdoor cannabis, 111998). [1] The contrast across the five is the point:

(REIT = real-estate investment trust; ETF = exchange-traded fund; PLC/ARC = Price Loss Coverage / Agriculture Risk Coverage, the Farm Bill's two grower-income programs; STAX = Stacked Income Protection Plan, cotton-specific crop insurance; FDA = U.S. Food and Drug Administration.)

Reading the contrast. Four patterns stand out for an investor:

• Size is inverted from visibility. Hay is by far the largest by value — the third most valuable U.S. field crop after corn and soybeans [10] — yet it is the most invisible (no futures, no pure-play, mostly grown as a secondary activity by ranches and dairies classified under other codes). Tobacco, the most famous and most regulated, is the smallest and shrinking fastest.
• Direction of travel splits three ways. Declining: tobacco (U.S. smoking is collapsing). Cyclical/flat: cotton and hay (commodity price and cattle-herd cycles, no secular growth). Stable/protected: sugarcane and sugar beets (a federal price program dampens the swings). None is a growth story.
• Ownership is the sharpest contrast. All five are privately grown, but the structure differs completely: tobacco growers are price-takers on contracts to a two-merchant buy side; cotton growers are independent operators who market through merchants and co-ops; sugarcane and sugar-beet growers own the processing (integrated mills; grower cooperatives) and so capture the downstream margin; hay is pure fragmentation; and only the "all other" bucket contains any listed operators at all (cannabis cultivators).
• Only cotton can hedge. Cotton is the one child with a deep, liquid futures market (ICE — Intercontinental Exchange — Cotton No. 2). Sugar has a world futures contract, but U.S. policy deliberately decouples the domestic price from it; tobacco, hay, peanuts, beets, and the niche crops have no usable hedge, so growers manage price risk through contracts, cooperative ownership, or government floors instead of a screen.

The one metric they share: the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) size standard — the receipts ceiling below which a farm counts as "small" for federal programs — is $2.5 million for tobacco, hay, and each 11199 crop; $3.25 million for cotton; and $5 million for sugarcane. [3] Effectively every farm in all five clears the bar, so the entire group is small-business by federal definition. That threshold is not a revenue estimate — it is the only firm-level federal business figure that exists for these codes (Section 3).

3. How big it is (this level's figures + undercount caveat)

Our ingested federal ground-truth file for NAICS 1119 contains no stat metrics — no establishment count, employment, payroll, or revenue for the four-digit code. We say so plainly rather than invent a figure, and we report no suppressed value. This is expected, for two reasons, neither a data error:

1. The business census excludes farming. The Census Bureau's County Business Patterns (CBP), the Economic Census, and Nonemployer Statistics all exclude Crop and Animal Production (NAICS 111–112), because most farms have no paid employees and are counted instead through USDA's separate Census of Agriculture. [2] So there is no CBP or Economic-Census total to roll up for 1119.
2. The only firm-level federal figure is the SBA size standard, a qualification threshold, not a measure of industry revenue. [3]

For actual scale you must roll up USDA commodity data from the five children — reported by crop, not by the 1119 code, and for mismatched recent years. The table below assembles the individually cited figures for orientation only; it is not an official Census total for the industry group.

(NASS = USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service; ERS = its Economic Research Service.)

Read the ~$35 billion only as an order of magnitude. The years do not line up; each figure is a farm-gate crop value (what growers received at first sale), not NAICS industry revenue or downstream product sales; and hay — ~60% of the total — is the least clean line, because "value of all hay" counts hay grown as a secondary activity by cattle and dairy operations classified under other codes, even as the 11194 code itself undercounts. Treat the shares in Section 2 as rough relative weights, not precise proportions.

The undercount caveat — read carefully. Two effects push the true economic footprint of this group well above the farm-gate rollup:

• Small/individual ownership. These are overwhelmingly small, family-owned, unincorporated farms (family operations are ~95% of all U.S. farms [4]) that are excluded from the business census. Any dataset built from employer statistics — CBP, Nonemployer Statistics — will read near-zero for 1119, which must not be mistaken for a small or absent industry. Missing employer data here is a coverage artifact, not a measure of size, and it is most severe in hay (mostly secondary/part-time) and the miscellaneous 11199 crops (outdoor cannabis and "combination" farms are largely uncaptured).
• Value realized downstream. Farm-gate value captures only the first sale. In sugarcane and sugar beets, growers own the mills and co-ops, so refining, byproducts, and the policy-protected margin over world sugar are booked one code downstream, not in farm value. [7] In cotton the ginning, merchandising, and textile chain dwarf the farm; in tobacco the ~$0.8B leaf crop underlies a multi-billion-dollar cigarette and smokeless business; in peanuts, branded peanut butter dwarfs the ~$1.78B farm value. Because the grower and the next link are often the same families (beet co-ops, farmer-owned peanut shellers), farm value understates what these operators actually earn.

4. Investable universe — where value concentrates across the five

The single most important fact holds across the whole group: no U.S.-listed pure-play grower exists (again, outdoor cannabis in 11199 is the lone exception). Where public value does concentrate differs sharply by child, and mapping that is the investor's real work. Tickers and multiples are reserved to this section and Section 10.

• Hay (11194) — pure look-through. No pure-play at all. Public exposure is only as a slice inside broader firms: haying equipment (balers, mowers, forage harvesters — Deere (NYSE: DE), CNH (NYSE: CNH), AGCO (NYSE: AGCO)), seed genetics, and farmland REITs that own some hay ground. Value concentrates not in growing but in the processing/storage/export channel, dominated by a few private and foreign-owned firms.
• Cotton (11192) — the nearest thing to a listed farm, plus picks-and-shovels. The closest listed operator is J.G. Boswell (OTC: BWEL), a thinly traded, diversified California Pima grower/processor. Land exposure runs through Farmland Partners (NYSE: FPI); input/equipment/processing through Deere, CNH, AGCO, Corteva (NYSE: CTVA), Bayer (OTC: BAYRY), ADM (NYSE: ADM); and pure price exposure through ICE Cotton No. 2 futures (CT) or the BAL exchange-traded note (ETN — a debt security tracking an index).
• All Other (11199) — the only child with a listed cultivator. Outdoor cannabis is in-scope, so publicly traded cannabis growers — Green Thumb (GTBIF), Trulieve (TCNNF), Glass House (GLASF) — are the nearest listed cultivators anywhere in 1119 (though most production is indoor and outside the code, and all carry federal Schedule I legal risk). Peanut value sits in shellers and brands: ADM (owns Golden Peanut, the largest U.S. sheller), Olam Group (SGX: VC2), plus J.M. Smucker (SJM), Hormel (HRL), Hershey (HSY). Sugar-beet value sits in grower-owned cooperatives (no tickers) with only indirect proxies (seed firm KWS, Bayer, sugar ETF).
• Sugarcane (11193) — private millers; foreign and land proxies. The real operators (U.S. Sugar, Florida Crystals, the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida, Louisiana co-ops) are private. Public proxies: foreign cane-and-ethanol producers Adecoagro (NYSE: AGRO) and Cosan (NYSE: CSAN); diversified processors ADM and Bunge (NYSE: BG); land plays Alico (NASDAQ: ALCO) and Alexander & Baldwin (NYSE: ALEX); and the Teucrium Sugar ETF (NYSE Arca: CANE) for the world price.
• Tobacco (11191) — leaf merchants and manufacturers. Public exposure runs one link up (leaf merchants Universal Corporation (NYSE: UVV) and Pyxus International) and downstream (Altria (NYSE: MO), Philip Morris International (NYSE: PM), British American Tobacco (NYSE: BTI), Turning Point Brands (NYSE: TPB)).

The two cross-cutting vehicles. Only two things span the whole group. Farmland REITs — chiefly Gladstone Land (NASDAQ: LAND) and Farmland Partners (NYSE: FPI) — own row-crop and specialty acreage that touches cotton, peanut, and miscellaneous ground, though the link to any single crop is loose. And input/equipment names (Deere, Nutrien (NYSE: NTR), Corteva, Bayer) touch all five as broad agricultural-cycle plays. In every case the listed name is a diversified food, agribusiness, land, merchant, or manufacturing business in which the crop is a small slice — none should be valued as a pure-play. The right analysis is segment mix, procurement, and capital allocation, not crop acreage.

5. How the money works

Underneath the crop differences, the farm-level equation is the same everywhere: saleable yield per acre × realized price, minus input, land, labor, and financing costs, plus any government support and downstream margin the owner can capture. What differs — the defining contrast of this group — is how the price is set and who keeps the margin:

• Tobacco: contract pounds. Since the 2004 quota buyout, leaf is grown on annual production contracts, not auction. Grower economics are pounds × contract price, with cost dominated by hand labor (mostly H-2A seasonal guest-workers — the federal agricultural visa program). A concentrated buy side sets the price, so the margin lever is scale and yield, not price — which is why average farm size rose roughly ninefold as small growers exited. [8]
• Cotton: a price-cycle commodity, hedgeable. Revenue is (lint yield × lint price) + cottonseed byproduct + government/insurance payments. The world reference is ICE Cotton No. 2, in cents per pound; recent U.S. season-average farm prices ran ~76¢ (2023/24), ~63¢ (2024/25), and near 61¢ (2025/26) — near or below break-even for many growers, which puts the federal safety net (Section 7) at the center of profitability. [5][6]
• Sugarcane and sugar beets: the grower is the processor. Cane growers deliver to a mill and are paid a regulated minimum share of the sugar and molasses recovered; beet growers deliver to their cooperative and later receive a net beet payment (the factory's sugar revenue minus processing cost). Either way, the federal program caps the output price and so decouples this business from the wild swings of most commodities — a defensive, land-heavy, physical-asset model. Byproducts (bagasse power, molasses, beet pulp) add secondary revenue. [7]
• Peanuts: contract price, floored by policy. No futures market; growers price through option/marketing contracts with shellers plus the federal loan, backstopped by the PLC reference price ($630/ton for the 2025 crop). Quality grade (moisture, aflatoxin, kernel size) is decisive. [7]
• Hay and the niche crops: local price, no hedge, long assets. Hay has no futures market; because it is bulky and cheap per pound, price is set locally by supply, quality, and freight distance — margins are thin and cyclical (national alfalfa fell from ~$288/ton in 2023 to the low $170s by 2025). [10] Many miscellaneous crops are perennial (hop trellises, decades-long maple stands, multi-year ginseng), so front-loaded capital makes supply slow to respond and amplifies boom-bust; over long horizons much of the total return has been land appreciation, not operating profit.

Across every child, because none but cotton has a transparent, hedgeable farm-gate price, contract terms and buyer/processor access matter more than a generic revenue multiple. The metrics that travel: yield and quality per acre, realized price vs. break-even, irrigated-vs-dryland mix, input cost per acre, contracted-vs-uncommitted volume, and — for the co-ops, mills, merchants, and shellers — throughput, recovery/shell-out, inventory turnover, and leverage.

6. Demand drivers

Demand is crop-specific — a diversification benefit and a research burden — but sorts into three patterns, and none of the five is a demand-growth story:

• Derived from animals (hay). Hay demand tracks the U.S. cattle herd, which sits at a multi-decade low (~86.7 million head on January 1, 2025, the smallest since 1951), softening domestic demand; a future herd rebuild would be the main tailwind. Dairy cows and horses are the premium buyers; exports are only ~3% of U.S. hay but set the marginal price for Western premium alfalfa. [11]
• Derived from finished products, in secular decline (tobacco). Farm demand is derived from cigarettes and smokeless — and U.S. adult cigarette prevalence fell to 9.9% in 2024, the first single-digit reading on record. Exports (>$1B of unmanufactured leaf) and premium export grades are partial offsets. [9]
• Global textile demand, export-led (cotton). The U.S. exports ~80% of the cotton it grows; exports are >85% of demand for the crop. Headwinds: synthetic-fiber substitution and Brazil overtaking the U.S. as the top exporter. [6]
• Mature staples, policy-rationed (sugarcane, sugar beets, peanuts). Sugar is a large, slow-growth staple whose demand for U.S.-grown supply is set by marketing allotments and import quotas, not dinner tables; GLP-1 (glucagon-like peptide-1) weight-loss drugs and sugar-reduction reformulation are the watched structural headwinds. Peanut butter (>60% of U.S. food-peanut use) makes peanuts defensive and recession-resistant. [7]
• Narrow, volatile end-markets (the rest of 11199). Hops track beer volumes, grass seed tracks housing and lawns, maple rides premiumization, ginseng is an Asian export story. [1]

Across all five, weather and climate, input-cost inflation (fertilizer, fuel, hand labor, freight), and trade policy move results year to year.

7. Regulation

Policy intensity is itself a contrast, and it does not line up with size:

• Sugarcane and sugar beets — the most administered crops in U.S. agriculture. The U.S. Sugar Program props up the domestic price well above world levels through price-support loans to processors (FY2026: 24.00¢/lb raw cane, 32.77¢/lb refined beet), marketing allotments (~54% beet / ~46% cane), and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs — import caps) plus the Mexico Suspension Agreements. It pays no cash subsidy; it manages supply. [7][13]
• Cotton and peanuts — heavily programmed Farm Bill commodities. Growers enroll base acres in PLC or ARC; the 2025 reconciliation law (the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, OBBBA) raised the seed-cotton reference price to 42.0¢/lb and the peanut reference price to $630/ton. Subsidized crop insurance (RMA, including cotton's STAX) and ad-hoc disaster aid fill weak years. [12]
• Hay — light product regulation, heavy resource fight. No target-price program; support runs through insurance and disaster programs. The structural issue is water: irrigated alfalfa is the single largest agricultural water user in the arid West and a lightning rod in Colorado River and groundwater politics, so Western hay land is effectively a water-rights position — and foreign ownership of export operations (the Saudi-owned Fondomonte groundwater dispute in Arizona) is now a live regulatory risk.
• Tobacco — light at the farm, among the most regulated products in the country. The farming is ordinary agriculture, but the product faces the FDA Center for Tobacco Products, the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, the 2004 quota buyout (FETRA — the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act), and a potential very-low-nicotine standard that could cut domestic leaf needs sharply — downstream regulation that sets the ceiling on leaf demand. [14]
• The niche 11199 crops — the thinnest support, with two crop-specific regimes standing out: American ginseng exports fall under CITES (the international endangered-species trade treaty) permits, and cannabis faces an unsettled federal picture (marijuana still Schedule I at the DEA, rescheduling pending).

Cutting across the co-op-heavy children is the Capper-Volstead Act (1922), which gives qualified farmer cooperatives a limited antitrust exemption for collective marketing — the legal basis for the sugar-beet co-ops, farmer-owned peanut and cotton co-ops, tobacco grower co-ops, and hop/ginseng/maple co-ops alike. [24] For every child, policy is both support and risk: any change to the sugar program, the cotton or peanut reference price, tobacco's FDA regime, Western water law, or cannabis scheduling would reprice the affected child directly.

8. Consolidation

The structural signature is identical across the group: fragmented at the farm, concentrated at the buyer/processor — a barbell. What differs is how far the farm side has consolidated and how growers responded:

• Tobacco and sugarcane have consolidated the hardest at the farm. Tobacco farms fell 95%+ since 2002 (56,977 → 2,987) as production concentrated into fewer, larger, mechanized operations; sugarcane is down to ~745 farms in two states behind ~a dozen mills, where the mill is the strategic bottleneck (cane must be processed within about a day of cutting). Both face a concentrated buy side — tobacco's two listed leaf merchants, sugarcane's handful of integrated millers. [4][8]
• Cotton is consolidating around scale, with large family farms already ~65% of value and active gins down from ~2,254 in 1980 to 419 in 2025 — but growers retain independence and market ~40% of the crop through cooperatives. [21][27]
• Sugar beets are fully grower-owned and consolidating downward (farms ~3,900 in 2012 → 3,257 in 2022 while output per farm rose), the most vertically integrated model in the group; peanuts show the classic monopsony tension (two shellers handle ~80% of the crop [22]) met by a counter-move of farmer-owned shellers. [23]
• Hay is close to perfectly fragmented at the farm — hundreds of thousands of growers, no pricing power, low entry barriers — with consolidation and stress instead in the processing/export channel (a large Pacific Northwest exporter filed Chapter 11 in late 2025).

The durable competitive advantage is the same everywhere: control of a scarce asset — land, water, genetics/varieties, processing or mill capacity, or contracted buyer access — plus local agronomic knowledge and specialized equipment. Scale spreads fixed cost but is not itself a moat. Layered on top is a slow financialization: farmland REITs and pension-backed funds are buying and leasing back cropland across the group, converting owner-operated farms into institutionally owned, leased assets.

9. Risks

The risks rhyme across the five, with different emphasis:

• Price cyclicality and oversupply — the central risk almost everywhere: soft cotton prices drove 2024–25 acreage to a decade low; alfalfa crashed from ~$288 to the low $170s; beet payments fell from ~$85/ton toward mid-$50s break-even. Sugarcane (policy-capped) is the exception. [5][6][10]
• Secular demand decline (tobacco specifically) — U.S. smoking is falling toward single digits, and a federal nicotine-reduction standard or revived menthol ban is a live regulatory-shock risk. [9]
• Buyer/processor concentration — few buyers set terms for many growers (most acute in tobacco's two merchants and peanuts' two shellers; also sugarcane's mills). [22]
• No liquid hedge — everything but cotton lacks a usable futures market, so growers cannot offload price risk on a screen; exposure is physical (land, crop, co-op equity).
• Policy and trade dependence — sugar, cotton, and peanut economics rest on federal floors, quotas, and reference prices; tobacco lives under FDA; export-heavy cotton, hay, and ginseng are hostage to tariffs, currency, and foreign demand. Any liberalization or Farm Bill change hits directly. [12][13]
• Weather, disease, and water — drought, freeze, hurricane, and crop-specific pathogens; the highest-value Western cotton and hay acreage carries acute water-rights risk (Ogallala, Colorado River).
• Regulatory/legal status (cannabis) — Schedule I risk is unique to 11199 and can change market access overnight; tobacco's FDA risk is its analog.
• Private-market opacity and illiquidity — co-op financials, member-capital accounts, contract terms, and specialty-farm valuations are hard to verify; beet "stock," tobacco contracts, and thin listings (BWEL) can be hard to exit; ESG (environmental, social, governance) screening limits capital into tobacco specifically.

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public routes (indirect in every child). Because no listed U.S. grower exists, public investors pick a proxy and accept dilution of the crop theme:

• Nearest to origination/processing: leaf merchants Universal (a "Dividend King") and Pyxus (tobacco); BWEL (cotton, thin); ADM and Olam (peanut shelling); Adecoagro and Cosan (foreign cane); listed cannabis cultivators GTBIF/TCNNF/GLASF (Schedule I risk).
• Downstream brands and manufacturers: Altria, PMI, BAT, Turning Point (tobacco — bets on nicotine consumption, not U.S. farming); Smucker, Hormel, Hershey, McCormick, Scotts, B&G (11199 food staples).
• Commodity/price proxies: ICE cotton futures (CT) or the BAL ETN — the group's one true price hedge; the Teucrium Sugar ETF (CANE) for world sugar (a weak proxy, since U.S. policy holds domestic sugar above it).
• Inputs/equipment: Deere, CNH, AGCO, Nutrien, Corteva, Bayer — broad agricultural-cycle exposure across all five.
• Land (the one cross-cutting vehicle): farmland REITs Gladstone Land (LAND) and Farmland Partners (FPI); land companies Alico (ALCO), Alexander & Baldwin (ALEX). Review net asset value (NAV), funds from operations (FFO — the REIT cash-flow measure), rent coverage, tenant quality, and — critically — water rights. The link to any single crop is loose.

None of these should be bought for this level; each describes a diversified parent, not the crop.

Private routes (where most real capital sits). Direct participation looks different in each child — tobacco farmland plus a buyer contract with a merchant or co-op; cotton or peanut belt farmland, equipment/working-capital finance, or equity in a grower-owned sheller/gin; sugarcane land in Florida's Everglades Agricultural Area or Louisiana's cane parishes plus mill access; sugar-beet farmland plus cooperative "beet stock" (delivery rights to a local factory); water-secure Western hay land; or specialty cropland and grower cooperatives for the niche crops. Diligence across all five should demand crop-level yield and price history, water rights, offtake/buyer contracts, insurance and loss records, debt maturities, succession plans, and a valuation that separates land, water, operations, processing, and brand.

Outlook — five mature stories under one code. Tobacco: continued slow contraction — fewer, larger, contract-bound farms and grinding domestic decline, cushioned by exports. Cotton: modestly constructive for efficient producers under the raised 42¢ reference price, but no growth, and structurally pressured by Brazil and synthetics. Sugarcane and sugar beets: policy-protected continuity — defensive, land-heavy, low organic growth, no clean public play. Hay: a foundational, out-of-favor crop after the 2023–25 price crash and a shrinking cattle herd, where the smartest exposure is water-secure, quality-differentiated, logistics-integrated land; a herd rebuild is the swing factor. The "all other" bucket: policy-cushioned beets and peanuts alongside cyclical niche crops and a cannabis-policy wild card.

The unifying investor lesson across NAICS 1119 is the same in all five: this is a group of mature, private, farm-gate crop industries with almost no direct public-market vehicle, where a liquid, transparent price is usually absent — so growers manage it through ownership, contracts, or government floors. The margin belongs to whoever controls the scarce asset — the leaf merchant, the vertically integrated mill or grower-owned co-op, the concentrated sheller, or the holder of land, water, genetics, and contracts. The right question for any deal is which scarce asset captures the margin, and whether you are being paid for the risk attached to it.

For the full analysis of any child — investable-universe tables, detailed economics, regulatory timelines, and complete sources — see the five child primers: 11191 Tobacco, 11192 Cotton, 11193 Sugarcane, 11194 Hay, and 11199 All Other Crop Farming.

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Sources

Drawn from the five child primers; numbering is this page's own. Our ingested federal ground-truth file for NAICS 1119 contained no stat metrics, so all figures below carry the cited federal source from the child that supplied them.

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definitions — 1119 Other Crop Farming and children (11191 Tobacco, 11192 Cotton, 11193 Sugarcane, 11194 Hay, 11199 All Other Crop Farming) (scope, examples, exclusions). https://www.census.gov/naics/
2. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns / Nonemployer Statistics — Methodology (Crop and Animal Production, NAICS 111–112, excluded from the business census). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
3. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards (NAICS 11191/11194/11199 = $2.5M; 111920 = $3.25M; 111930 = $5M average annual receipts), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
4. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2022 Census of Agriculture (farm counts, acreage, cotton/cottonseed value, sugarcane and sugar-beet farms; family operations ~95% of farms). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2022/
5. USDA NASS, Crop Production 2025 Summary and Crop Values 2025 Summary (tobacco pounds/acres/value; cotton season-average prices). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cpvl0226.pdf
6. USDA Economic Research Service, Cotton and Wool — Cotton Sector at a Glance (exports ~80% of crop; synthetics and Brazil competition). https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/cotton-and-wool/cotton-sector-at-a-glance
7. USDA Economic Research Service, Sugar and Sweeteners — Background / Outlook (cane ~44% of U.S. sugar; farm-gate values; peanut and sugar demand; GLP-1 headwind). https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/sugar-and-sweeteners/background
8. Southern Ag Today, Census Reveals Tobacco Farms Disappearing from Southern Agriculture (2,987 farms in 2022, down 95% from 56,977 in 2002; ninefold larger average size), 2024. https://southernagtoday.org/2024/03/27/census-reveals-tobacco-farms-disappearing-from-southern-agriculture/
9. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Tobacco Product Use Among U.S. Adults, 2023–2024 (9.9% adult cigarette prevalence, 2024). https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/php/data-statistics/adult-data-cigarettes/index.html
10. USDA NASS, Crop Values 2024 Summary and Crop Production 2024 Summary (all-hay value ~$21.3B in 2023, third among field crops; ~122M tons; ~49.4M acres; alfalfa price series). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cpvl0225.pdf
11. USDA NASS, Cattle inventory (~86.7M head on January 1, 2025, smallest since 1951). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/catl0125.pdf
12. American Farm Bureau Federation, One Big Beautiful Bill Act: Final Agricultural Provisions (seed-cotton reference price 36.7 → 42.0¢/lb; peanut reference price → $630/ton), and USDA Farm Service Agency, ARC/PLC, 2025. https://www.fb.org/market-intel/one-big-beautiful-bill-act-final-agricultural-provisions; https://www.fsa.usda.gov/resources/income-support/arc-plc
13. USDA Farm Service Agency / Congressional Research Service, U.S. Sugar Program (FY2026 loan rates 24.00¢/lb raw cane, 32.77¢/lb refined beet; marketing allotments; tariff-rate quotas; Mexico Suspension Agreements), 2025. https://www.fsa.usda.gov/news-events/news/09-26-2025/usda-announces-fiscal-year-2026-sugar-loan-rates-no-actions-feedstock
14. Congressional Research Service, Tobacco Quota Buyout (RS22046) / Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act, and U.S. Food and Drug Administration, About the Center for Tobacco Products. https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS22046.pdf; https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/about-center-tobacco-products-ctp
15. Universal Corporation, Fiscal Year and Fourth Quarter 2026 Results (leaf merchant), 2026. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20260528926072/en/Universal-Corporation-Reports-Fiscal-Year-and-Fourth-Quarter-2026-Results
16. Pyxus International, Form 10-K, fiscal year ended March 31, 2026 (leaf merchant). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000939930&type=10-K
17. J.G. Boswell Company / OTC Markets, BWEL Profile (near-direct listed cotton grower/processor). https://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/BWEL/profile
18. Farmland Partners Inc., Form 10-K for FY2025 (SEC) — row-crop and specialty acreage including cotton. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1591670/000110465926017533/fpi-20251231x10k.htm
19. Gladstone Land Corporation, Form 10-K for FY2025 (SEC) — 144 farms across 14 states. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1495240/000149524026000007/land-20251231.htm
20. Adecoagro S.A. and Cosan S.A. (SEC filings) — foreign cane-and-ethanol producers as listed sugar proxies. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&company=adecoagro&type=20-F
21. USDA Economic Research Service, Large-Scale Family Farms Lead in Value of Production for Many Commodities in 2022 (cotton ~65% of value), 2024. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/108249
22. Civil Eats, The Peanut Industry Has a Monopoly Problem — but Farmers Are Pushing Back (two shellers ~80% of the U.S. crop; farmer-owned shellers rising), 2021. https://civileats.com/2021/01/15/op-ed-the-peanut-industry-has-a-monopoly-problem-but-farmers-are-pushing-back/
23. U.S. Beet Sugar Association, About Us (farmer-owned processing; ~20 factories; cooperatives including American Crystal, Amalgamated, Michigan Sugar), 2026. https://beetsugar.org/about/
24. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives (Capper-Volstead Act, 1922, limited antitrust exemption for farmer cooperatives). https://www.justice.gov/atr/national-council-farmer-cooperatives-general
25. USDA NASS / Hop Growers of America, 2024 National Hop Report ($446M value; Yakima Valley ~75% of U.S. acreage), and Oregon State University Extension, Willamette Valley Grass Seed Production (~$639M value), 2024. https://www.usahops.org/news/2024-usda-nass-national-hop-report
26. USDA Economic Research Service, Cotton and Wool Outlook: July 2026 (2026/27 balance sheet, season-average farm price ~73¢/lb, 23.5% projected abandonment). https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/115080
27. USDA NASS, Cotton Ginnings 2025 Summary (419 active gins), and Cotton Grower, Ginning Report (~2,254 gins in 1980). https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/n583xt96p