Other Grain Farming (U.S.) — NAICS 11119

A rollup primer for both public-market and private investors. This level synthesizes its two child industries — 111191 and 111199 — plus federal statistics. Where an official figure for this exact level does not exist, we say so rather than estimate. Forward-looking statements are framed as judgments, not facts.

1. Overview

Under the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the U.S. government splits grain and oilseed farming into single-crop industries — soybeans, wheat, corn, rice, dry peas and beans — and then sweeps everything left over into one residual five-digit industry: 11119, "Other Grain Farming." It contains just two child industries, and they sit at opposite ends of American agriculture:

• 111191 — Oilseed and Grain Combination Farming: the balanced corn–soybean rotation farm of the Midwest Corn Belt, coded here (rather than to corn or soybeans) precisely because no single crop tops half its value. This is one of the largest categories of farm in the country. [1][2]
• 111199 — All Other Grain Farming: the catch-all for the minor cereals — grain sorghum (milo), barley, oats, rye, millet — crops too small to earn their own NAICS line. The whole category was worth roughly $2.73 billion at the farm gate in 2024, under 2% of U.S. crop cash receipts. [3][9]

So the distinctive fact about this level is its lopsidedness: it pairs the Corn Belt's signature rotation farm with a long tail of small grains. The value, the acreage, and nearly all of the investable interest sit on the 111191 side; 111199 is a rounding error next to it but carries some of the sharpest, most idiosyncratic demand stories in the complex.

What both children share matters for investors: they are commodity, price-taker farm businesses, overwhelmingly private and family-held, capital-heavy, seasonal, weather-exposed, thin-margined, and — in the current cycle — leaning heavily on federal support to stay in the black. There is no pure-play public "grain farm" stock in either child. Public investors reach this level indirectly (farmland real estate investment trusts, or REITs; grain merchants; seed/fertilizer/equipment suppliers; commodity funds); private investors reach it more directly (owning or leasing cropland, farmland funds, farm lending). Sections 4 and 10 lay out both routes.

2. What's inside — the two children and how they differ

The two child industries look alike at the level of farm economics but differ sharply in size, momentum, geography, and how (or whether) an outside investor can touch them.

The through-line: both are the same kind of business — a big asset (land and machinery) earning a thin spread on bushels sold at a price the farmer does not set — but 111191 is a large, structurally central industry with mainstream investment proxies, while 111199 is a small, cyclical, policy- and export-sensitive niche with almost no direct public access. An investor who "buys the level" is, in economic weight, overwhelmingly buying the corn–soybean rotation.

3. How big it is (this level's rollup)

We hold no ingested federal statistics for NAICS 11119 itself — our ground-truth file for this node is empty — and there is a structural reason the number is hard to state cleanly: the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) tabulates farming by crop, not by this five-digit code, so no agency publishes a tidy "11119 total." We assemble the picture from the two children honestly, and we do not sum them (one farm can grow several of these crops, so crop counts overlap).

A prior caution first: standard federal business statistics ignore this industry. County Business Patterns (CBP), Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB), Nonemployer Statistics, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) all exclude crop production (NAICS 111) and farm proprietors. [6] A low business-statistics count would not prove the farm economy is small — it reflects who those surveys are designed to skip. The only federal business figure in the record for either child is the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) size standard of $2.25 million in average annual receipts, which applies to both 111191 and 111199 — a government-contracting eligibility threshold, not a measure of industry revenue. [5] By that standard essentially the entire level is "small business."

The authoritative headcount comes from USDA's five-year Census of Agriculture, run by its National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS):

• 111191 side (the large one): the Census reports the combination code as one cell inside the 253,599 farms specializing in corn or soybeans in 2022; we do not have that exact combination-only cell in hand, so we report the pool figure and say so. For scale, all specialized grain-and-oilseed farms sold $168.7 billion in 2022 (31% of all U.S. farm sales, up 58% since 2017) and worked 69% of U.S. harvested cropland. [1] The corn–soybean rotation is one of the largest single categories in American agriculture, and it dominates this level's value.
• 111199 side (the small one): 2022 Census farm counts by crop were sorghum for grain 13,591 farms (4.69M acres), barley 9,112 (2.43M acres), and oats 15,538 (0.91M acres). [4] 2024 farm-gate value was ~$2.73 billion total — sorghum $1.45B, barley $0.90B, oats $0.24B, rye $0.09B, millet $0.05B — with sorghum and barley alone ~85% of it. [3] Against total U.S. crop cash receipts of $244.9 billion in 2024, the whole 111199 category is under 2%. [9]

Undercount caveat: because small and individually owned farms dominate both children — many are non-employer, family-labor operations — any business dataset that keys on payroll or incorporated establishments will miss most of the activity. Treat the Census-of-Agriculture crop figures, not any business-register count, as the real measure of scale.

4. The investable universe (where value concentrates across the children)

Value in this level concentrates overwhelmingly on the 111191 corn–soybean side — that is where the acreage, the dollars, and the mainstream investment proxies live. But because the land and operating cash flow of both children are private, the public universe is a menu of proxies rather than the thing itself. Tickers below are for identification, not recommendation.

Commodity-fund routes (own the price move, not a company): Teucrium Corn (CORN), Soybean (SOYB), Wheat (WEAT); Invesco DB Agriculture (DBA); and the agribusiness equity basket VanEck Agribusiness (MOO), an exchange-traded fund (ETF). [22] A key contrast between the children: the 111191 crops all have deep, listed futures (corn, soybeans, wheat), while on the 111199 side only oats has a U.S. contract (on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange / Chicago Board of Trade, CME/CBOT); sorghum has no dedicated futures (it is priced off corn), and barley and rye have no active U.S. contract. [22] So the minor-grains child is essentially un-hedgeable and un-buyable through liquid public instruments.

Private and "other" owners (they mostly buy from growers rather than own the operation): the operating farms themselves (overwhelmingly family-held); private merchants Cargill, Louis Dreyfus Company, and Scoular; the farmer-owned cooperative CHS Inc.; diversified private ag operators like J.R. Simplot and AgReserves; and institutional farmland managers such as Nuveen Natural Capital and Manulife Investment Management, which hold large U.S. row-crop portfolios leased to tenants. Retail platforms AcreTrader and FarmTogether let accredited investors buy fractional interests in specific fields. [28] Direct farmland ownership — buying acres and cash-renting them to an operator — is the oldest private route of all and gives the truest exposure to the land economics of Section 5.

5. How the money works

Both children run the same equation. A grain farm's profit is a thin spread on a big asset:

farm revenue ≈ harvested acres × yield per acre × realized price + crop-insurance proceeds + government payments + other farm income

The realized price depends on the local cash price, the futures price, basis (the local-vs-futures gap), quality discounts, freight, storage timing, and marketing decisions. The metrics that matter are yield per acre, cost per bushel, revenue and cash rent per acre, net return per acre, owned-vs-leased mix, working-capital adequacy, and the debt-to-asset ratio — not capacity utilization or retail margins.

Costs are dominated by a few inputs. Across specialized grain-and-oilseed farms in 2022, production costs ran $119.0 billion, led by fertilizer ($23.2B, 19% and the single biggest line), land rent, seed, and chemicals, then supplies/repairs, fuel, and hired labor. [1] Fertilizer tracks natural-gas prices; land (cash rent or the ownership equivalent) is the other heavyweight.

The margin is currently thin to negative — on both sides. On the 111191 side, the American Soybean Association projected growers would lose ~$89 per planted acre on the 2025 crop, a third straight year of market losses. [13] On the 111199 side, 2025 Sorghum-Belt bids fell as low as $2.35/bushel, below the cost of production, with some elevators not even posting a bid after Chinese demand vanished. [15] When the crop loses money at the elevator, farm income depends on two federal backstops.

Government payments and crop insurance are structural, not a footnote. Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) pay out when county revenue or prices fall below set levels; subsidized federal crop insurance (chiefly Revenue Protection) covers most planted acres. In 2025 these ballooned: USDA forecast direct government payments at $42.4 billion, up from $9.6 billion in 2024, accounting for most of the year's rise in net farm income. [10][12] These backstops reduce downside but do not turn an inefficient farm profitable.

Landowner vs. operator — the split that defines who profits. Two different returns hide inside "the industry." The operator earns the farming margin above (thin and volatile). The landowner earns cash rent plus land appreciation — and U.S. cropland hit a record $5,830 per acre in 2025, up 4.7% even as crop prices fell. [11] Because roughly a quarter to a third of farmed land is rented, rent is simultaneously a top cost for operators and the core yield for farmland REITs and private landowners. For an investor buying farmland, total return = cash rent (a low-single-digit yield) + appreciation: the crop is the coupon, the land is the bond. That split is why public investors (mostly landowners via REITs) and farm operators experience this level very differently.

6. What drives demand

Demand runs through four channels — feed, food, biofuel, and exports — but the mix differs sharply between the children, which is why the two do not move together.

On the 111191 (corn–soybean) side, demand is large, diversified, and biofuel-heavy: corn is the dominant U.S. feed grain and soybean meal the major protein source; ethanol consumes ~43% of the corn crop and ~45% of soybean-oil use goes to biodiesel/renewable diesel; and the U.S. supplies ~26% of world soybean trade, with China the swing buyer. [1][18] The federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is a direct demand lever — EPA set record biomass-based-diesel volumes for 2026–2027, pulling on soybean oil. [18]

On the 111199 (minor-grains) side, each crop has its own, more fragile engine:

• Sorghum — feed, ethanol, and (heavily) exports to China; in 2024 the U.S. exported ~5.24 million metric tons (MMT), most to China, plus growth niches in pet food, birdseed, and gluten-free food. [15]
• Barley — split between malting (beer/spirits) and feed, and beer is shrinking: malt-barley demand hit an all-time-low ~110.7 million bushels for 2024/25 as drinkers shift away. [16]
• Oats — food (oatmeal, granola, fast-growing oat milk) plus forage; demand is rising but U.S. supply isn't, so the U.S. now imports the majority of its oats from Canada. [17]
• Rye — cover cropping, distilling, and bread; small, with a cover-crop tailwind.

Long-run demand growth comes from global population, rising protein consumption, biofuel mandates, and yield-raising productivity — benefits that accrue first to efficient operators and their suppliers. Near-term demand is set by livestock margins, biofuel policy, beverage trends (barley), and export competition from Brazil, Argentina, and Australia.

7. Regulation

Farming is lightly regulated as a business but heavily shaped by federal farm and environmental policy, and the framework is essentially identical across both children:

• The Farm Bill safety net. ARC and PLC (run by USDA's Farm Service Agency, FSA) set price/revenue floors for covered commodities — corn, soybeans, sorghum, barley, oats, and more. A 2025 reconciliation law raised reference prices and strengthened ARC (lifting the ARC-County guarantee from 86% to 90% of benchmark revenue and the maximum payment rate from 10% to 12.5%), directly changing farm cash flow and planting decisions. [12]
• Federal crop insurance. USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA) runs the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation; private insurers sell subsidized policies covering corn, soybeans, and the small grains alike. It is the largest single farm-support mechanism. [12]
• Biofuel policy. The EPA's RFS mandates biofuel volumes, steering corn, soybean-oil, and sorghum demand. [18]
• Pesticides and worker safety. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) governs pesticide registration and use; the EPA's Worker Protection Standard (WPS) governs farmworker training and handling. [27]
• Grain quality. The U.S. Grain Standards Act, administered through USDA's Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS), sets official standards for corn, soybeans, sorghum, barley, and more. [27]
• Foreign land ownership. The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA) requires foreign holders of U.S. farmland to disclose them to USDA; several states add restrictions. [27]
• Conservation and organic. Highly-erodible-land and wetland "conservation compliance" rules condition most USDA benefits; the Conservation Reserve Program pays to idle sensitive acres; and USDA's National Organic Program certifies organic production. [27]

State and local rules on water rights (acute in the drier sorghum and barley regions), corporate-farming, zoning, labor, and property taxes vary widely. And trade policy — tariffs and Chinese purchasing — acts as a de facto demand regulator for both soybeans (111191) and sorghum (111199).

8. Consolidation

This is a fragmented level consolidating steadily, and the pattern is the same across both children. No farm has pricing power over bushels, so the competitive game is cost per acre and scale, fought locally over land, tenants, labor, machinery, financing, and elevator access. The land is slowly moving into fewer, bigger hands: the midpoint corn farm — where half of corn acres are on bigger farms and half on smaller — grew from 200 acres in 1987 to 685 acres in 2017, and large farms' share of all cropland rose from 15% to 41%. [24] Machinery and technology favor scale, older operators exit (average age ~58), and neighbors with the lowest cost per acre outbid others for rented ground; record land values ($5,830/acre in 2025) reinforce the trend and raise the entry barrier for new farmers. [11]

The suppliers and buyers, by contrast, are highly concentrated — a handful of firms dominate seed and crop chemicals (top four ≈ 56% of seed) and grain trading/processing (ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus). [21][23] Farmers thus buy inputs from concentrated sellers and sell bushels to concentrated buyers, pressuring the farm from both ends. A crucial distinction for investors: consolidation of market channels (merchants/processors controlling the pipes) is not the same as consolidation of farm ownership (a landlord accumulating acres) or farm operation (an operator controlling more planting/harvest) — these are often three different parties.

9. Risks

• Price/margin cyclicality. Crop prices swing with global supply and demand; a big harvest can depress prices even when a farm yields well. Thin-to-negative operating margins are the base case across both children right now. [13][15]
• Trade/export shocks — the sharpest risk, and it hits both children. China is the pivotal buyer of both U.S. soybeans and sorghum. In 2025 sorghum exports to China fell ~97% as tariffs bit and Australia/Brazil took share; U.S. soybean exports to China also collapsed during a tariff standoff before a late-2025 deal restored purchases (U.S. beans still carry a 13% Chinese import duty). [15][25] Trade policy is a recurring tail risk.
• Input-cost squeeze. Fertilizer (19% of costs, and tied to natural gas), fuel, seed, rent, and interest can rise faster than crop prices, compressing margins from the cost side. [1]
• Secular demand erosion (concentrated on the 111199 side). Barley's malting demand is in structural decline with beer; U.S. oat production has ceded share to Canada. [16][17]
• Dependence on government payments. A large share of 2025 sector income is transfer payments, not market income; a weaker safety net or lapse in ad-hoc aid would expose the underlying weakness in crop margins. [10][12]
• Weather, water, and yield. Drought, flood, heat, frost, pests, and disease can wipe out a season — acute for the dryland/irrigation-constrained sorghum and barley regions; insurance softens but does not eliminate the hit.
• Basis and logistics risk. A strong crop can fetch a weak local price from elevator congestion, freight, storage limits, or quality discounts.
• Leverage and rate exposure. Expensive land and machinery plus seasonal cash flow make downturns severe; higher rates raise operating-loan and land-financing costs and can cool the record land values underpinning farm balance sheets and REIT valuations. [11]
• Succession and illiquidity. Many private farms hinge on a few family members, and farmland and private farm interests can take substantial time to buy or sell, with appraisal, tax, and financing complexity.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public and private investors should first decide which economic link they actually want — land, farming, or the supply chain — because they pay off differently, and often in opposite directions.

Public routes (indirect, liquid), each with a different risk profile — match the security to the exposure:

1. Farmland REITs (Farmland Partners, FPI; Gladstone Land, LAND) — own the land, collect cash rent, ride appreciation. Closest to a landowner's return; driven by rent per acre, tenant quality, rates, and net asset value, not the farm operating margin. FPI is the more row-crop-diversified (best fit to 111191); LAND skews to specialty crops. [19][20]
2. Input & equipment suppliers (Corteva, Nutrien, Mosaic, CF, Deere, AGCO) — sell into planted acres; driven by farmer income, acreage, adoption, and the equipment replacement cycle. [21][23]
3. Grain merchants/processors (ADM, Bunge, The Andersons) — earn margins handling, crushing, and moving the crop; sensitive to crush margins and basis, and often counter-cyclical to farm margins. [21]
4. Commodity funds (CORN, SOYB, WEAT, DBA, MOO) for the 111191 crops; on the 111199 side only listed oats offers direct price exposure — sorghum, barley, and rye have no active U.S. contract. [22]

Private routes (direct, illiquid): owning cropland and leasing to an operator; farmland funds and fractional platforms (AcreTrader, FarmTogether); operating a farm; grain infrastructure; or secured farm lending. These capture the two returns that matter most here — cash rent plus land appreciation — and are how nearly all of the real land and operating cash flow is held. Diligence the farm itself: title and lease terms, soil and drainage, water rights, yield history, local basis, storage and transport, tenant concentration, crop insurance, operator succession, working capital, debt structure, and exit liquidity. [28]

Near-term outlook (forward-looking). The setup across this level is weak crop economics propped up by policy and offset by strong land values. USDA forecasts net farm income holding up in 2025–2026, but that strength leans on record cattle prices and heavy government payments; crop margins are the poorest in years, with ARC/PLC plus insurance doing much of the work of keeping row-crop farms in the black. [10][12][13] The medium-term backdrop favors the land owner over the crop grower: rents and land values kept rising even as prices fell. [11] Swing factors to watch: whether the China soybean deal holds and whether Chinese sorghum buying resumes or stays diverted to Australia/Brazil; [25][15] whether EPA's higher biofuel mandates lift soybean-oil and corn demand; [18] fertilizer and interest-rate trends on the cost side; beer volumes (barley) and oat-milk demand versus Canadian supply (oats); [16][17] and whether record land values hold. One caution across the whole complex: do not assume rising grain prices help every related name — merchants can benefit from volatility, processors from margins, input firms from farmer spending, and landlords from rents, sometimes in opposite directions. The best-positioned businesses — public or private, and on either side of this level — will be those with low unit costs, secure land and water, conservative leverage, reliable tenants, flexible marketing, and strong risk management.

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Sources

1. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), "2022 Census of Agriculture — Grain and Oilseed Production Highlights" (ACH22-13), 2024; and USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), farm-structure data. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2024/census22-grain-oilseed.pdf
2. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS — 11119 Other Grain Farming; 111191 Oilseed and Grain Combination Farming; 111199 All Other Grain Farming" (definitions and exclusions). https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=11119&year=2022
3. USDA NASS, "Crop Values 2024 Summary," February 2025 (111199 farm-gate values). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cpvl0225.pdf
4. USDA NASS, "2022 Census of Agriculture, Volume 1, Chapter 1: U.S. National Level Data," 2024 (farm/acre/bushel counts by crop). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2022/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/
5. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Small Business Size Standards Matched to NAICS Codes" (111191 and 111199 = $2.25 million, effective March 17, 2023). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
6. U.S. Census Bureau, "County Business Patterns Methodology," "Nonemployer Statistics FAQ," and "Statistics of U.S. Businesses"; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "QCEW Overview" (all document exclusion of NAICS 111 / farm proprietors). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
7. USDA ERS, "Soybeans & Oil Crops — Oil Crops Sector at a Glance" and market outlook, 2025–2026. https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/soybeans-and-oil-crops/oil-crops-sector-at-a-glance
8. USDA NASS, "Crop Production 2024 Summary," January 2025. https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/k3569432s/
9. USDA ERS, "Farming and Farm Income" (U.S. crop cash receipts $244.9 billion, 2024). https://ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/farming-and-farm-income
10. USDA ERS, "Farm Sector Income Forecast," 2025–2026 (net farm income; direct government payments $42.4B vs $9.6B in 2024). https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-sector-income-finances/farm-sector-income-forecast
11. USDA NASS, "Land Values 2025 Summary," Aug. 2025; American Farm Bureau Federation, "Farmland Values Hit Record High" (U.S. cropland $5,830/acre, +4.7%, 2025). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2025/2025LandValuesCashRents_FINAL.pdf
12. USDA Farm Service Agency, "2025 Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) & Price Loss Coverage (PLC)" fact sheet; farmdoc daily, "Projected ARC and PLC Payments for 2025"; Terrain, "ARC and PLC to Offer Higher Payments," 2025 (ARC-CO guarantee 86%→90%, max rate 10%→12.5%); USDA Risk Management Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. https://www.fsa.usda.gov/resources/income-support/arc-plc
13. American Soybean Association, "The Rising Cost Squeeze: Soybean Farmers Face a Third Year of Losses," 2025; Purdue University Center for Commercial Agriculture, "2025 Purdue Crop Cost and Return Guide." https://soygrowers.com/news-releases/the-rising-cost-squeeze-soybean-farmers-face-a-third-year-of-losses/
14. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), "Production, Supply and Distribution" database, United States (2025/26 sorghum, barley, oats, rye). https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/cropexplorer/util/new_get_psd_data.aspx?regionid=us
15. Southern Ag Today / Oklahoma Farm Report, "Grain Sorghum Exports to China at Their Lowest in Over a Decade," Nov. 2025; Kansas Farm Bureau, "Grain Sorghum and Corn Basis Trends in 2025." https://www.oklahomafarmreport.com/okfr/2025/11/13/grain-sorghum-exports-to-china-at-their-lowest-in-over-a-decade/
16. Agweek, "U.S. barley acreage hit lowest level since 1876 as beer demand sinks," 2024; Brewers Association; USDA ERS, "Barley use declining as U.S. beer production trends lower." https://www.agweek.com/crops/cereal-grains/u-s-barley-acreage-hit-lowest-level-since-1876-as-beer-demand-sinks
17. Ambrook / Offrange, "Farmers Aren't Keeping Up With Oat Milk Demand"; USDA FAS, "Grain and Feed Annual — Canada," 2025. https://ambrook.com/offrange/supply-chain/oat-shortage-milk-demands
18. U.S. EPA, "Overview of the Renewable Fuel Standard Program" and "EPA Sets Record Renewable Fuel Volumes for 2026–2027." https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard/overview-renewable-fuel-standard-program
19. Farmland Partners Inc., Annual Report on Form 10-K (FY2025). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001591670&type=10-K
20. Gladstone Land Corporation, Annual Report on Form 10-K (FY2025). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001495240&type=10-K
21. Company filings/results: Deere & Co.; AGCO; Corteva; Nutrien; Mosaic; CF Industries; Archer-Daniels-Midland (states it does not own farms); Bunge Global (incl. Viterra combination); The Andersons (elevators, merchandising, basis). https://www.deere.com/en/our-company/investor-relations/
22. Fund and futures descriptions: Teucrium Corn (CORN), Soybean (SOYB), Wheat (WEAT); Invesco DB Agriculture (DBA); VanEck Agribusiness ETF (MOO); Commodity.com, "Oats Trading Guide" (CME/CBOT oats; no active U.S. sorghum/barley/rye contract). https://etfdb.com/etf/MOO/
23. Corteva, Inc., 2025 Annual Report; ETC Group, "Food Barons" seed-sector concentration (top four ≈ 56% of seed). https://investors.corteva.com/
24. USDA ERS, "Farm Size and the Organization of U.S. Crop Farming" (ERR-152) and consolidation chart gallery. https://www.ers.usda.gov/media/8660/err-152.pdf
25. Investigate Midwest, "China resumes US soybean purchases under trade deal," 2026; American Farm Bureau Federation, "China Steps Back from U.S. Soybeans," 2025; farmdoc daily, "U.S.–China Soybean Deal," Nov. 2025. https://investigatemidwest.org/2026/07/01/china-resumes-us-soybean-purchases-under-trade-deal-with-trump-but-future-for-farmers-remains-daunting/
26. USDA NASS, "Family Farms: 2022 Census of Agriculture Highlights," 2025; USDA ERS, "Farmland Ownership and Tenure." https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2025/Census22_HL_FamilyFarms_FINAL.pdf
27. Regulation bundle: U.S. EPA, "Introduction to Pesticide Labels" (FIFRA) and "Agricultural Worker Protection Standard (WPS)"; USDA AMS, "Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS)" / U.S. Grain Standards Act; USDA FSA, "Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA)," "Conservation Compliance," and "Conservation Reserve Program"; USDA AMS, "National Organic Program." https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-labels/introduction-pesticide-labels
28. Private owners and platforms: Cargill (agriculture); CHS Inc.; Louis Dreyfus Company; Scoular; AgReserves; J.R. Simplot Company; Nuveen Natural Capital ("Investing in U.S. Row Crops"); Manulife Investment Management; AcreTrader; FarmTogether. https://www.cargill.com/agriculture