Dry Pea and Bean Farming in the United States (NAICS 111130)

An investor's primer on the U.S. pulse-crop farming industry — relevant to both public-market and private investors.

1. Overview

The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 111130 covers farms that grow pulses — the dried, edible seeds of legume plants. In plain terms: dry edible beans (pinto, navy, black, kidney, Great Northern), dry peas, lentils, and chickpeas (garbanzos), all harvested dry rather than fresh [1]. The economic activity here is farm production, not food processing or trading — those sit in separate industries (Section 2).

This is a small, commodity-driven corner of American agriculture. In the 2025 crop year the dry-bean harvest alone was worth roughly $0.8 billion at the farm gate; add dry peas, lentils, and chickpeas and the pulse complex covers close to 4 million acres across the Northern Plains, the Great Lakes, and the Mountain West [2][4][5]. It is also cyclical: bean value fell from about $1.0 billion in 2024 to roughly $0.8 billion in 2025 as bigger acreage and softer demand pushed prices down [2][5][19][24].

Why an investor cares: this is a price-cycle, input-cost, and export business. Growers make or lose money on the swing between a fluctuating commodity price and the cost to plant, spray, and harvest an acre — with a meaningful share of the crop sold overseas [3]. That makes the sector a small but real exposure to global protein demand, trade policy, and weather. The strongest businesses in it tend to control logistics, quality, contracted supply, or customer relationships — not merely acreage.

Ways in. There is no pure-play U.S. public "dry bean farmer" to buy. Public-market investors get exposure indirectly, through the grain merchants and ingredient processors that buy, clean, ship, and mill pulses — and, since March 2026, through one newly listed pulse processor, AGT Food and Ingredients (Section 4). Private investors participate more directly: through farmland, family farm operations, grower contracts, regional bean elevators and processors, farmer-owned cooperatives, and the fast-growing pea-protein ingredient chain [9][11].

2. What it is and how it's structured

In scope (NAICS 111130). Establishments primarily engaged in growing dry peas, beans, and/or lentils — including dry bean field and seed production, dry cowpea, dry garbanzo (chickpea), dry lima bean, faba (fava) bean, and dry pea and lentil farming [1].

The value chain runs: seed and inputs → farm production → harvest, drying, cleaning, sorting and storage → processors, traders and exporters → packaged foods, ingredients, foodservice and feed. Farm economics are weather- and land-intensive; downstream economics are more industrial (plant throughput, quality yield, working capital, customer specifications).

What it excludes (this matters for reading the numbers):

• Fresh green beans and green peas — vegetable crops under NAICS 111219 (Other Vegetable and Melon Farming). "Dry" is the dividing line [1][2].
• Soybeans — a legume, but classified separately (NAICS 111110). Colloquially "beans" often means soybeans; this industry does not include them.
• Processing — canning, pickling, artificial drying, milling pulse flour, and extracting pea protein sit in food manufacturing (NAICS 31142 and related), not farming [2].
• Trading and wholesaling — bean elevators and grain merchants fall under wholesale trade (NAICS 424510, grain and field-bean merchant wholesalers).

Ownership mix. These are overwhelmingly family-owned commercial grain and oilseed farms — plus some partnerships, corporations, and leased operations — that plant pulses as one crop in a rotation with wheat, canola, corn, or sugar beets, rather than specialist single-crop operations. Pulses are valued agronomically because they fix nitrogen in the soil, cutting fertilizer needs for the following crop [20]. Sales occur through spot markets or forward grower contracts; processing and origination are far more concentrated than farm production. Geography: North Dakota, Michigan, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Idaho lead in dry beans, while dry peas, lentils, and chickpeas cluster in Montana, North Dakota, Washington, and Idaho [2][3][4].

3. How big it is

The single industry-specific figure in our authoritative federal source is the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) small-business size standard for NAICS 111130: $2.75 million in average annual receipts (2023 standards) [8]. That is an eligibility threshold, not industry revenue — but it is telling, because nearly every one of these farms falls under it, confirming the sector is composed almost entirely of small operators.

For the industry's actual size, the real yardsticks are USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture) crop statistics from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). The 2025 crop year (latest published):

(cwt = hundredweight = 100 pounds.) A derived sum of dry beans, dry peas, and lentils is roughly $1.27 billion in 2025 farm-gate value — a crop-value proxy, not audited NAICS industry revenue [5]. Chickpeas are reported separately; add them and rotation acreage and the pulse complex is close to 4 million acres.

Dry beans are grown in more than 30 states, with commercial-scale production in about 18 [3]. By share of the dry-bean crop, the leading states are North Dakota (~32%), Michigan (~17%), Nebraska (~11%), Minnesota (~9%), and Idaho (~8%), with Colorado, California, and Washington rounding out the top eight [2][3].

The federal undercount caveat (read this before quoting any "number of firms"). Do not measure this industry with employer-business datasets. County Business Patterns (CBP), the SBA establishment counts, and similar payroll-based series exclude farm production employees, the self-employed, and operations without paid staff — so these farms largely vanish from them [8]. Even USDA's Census of Agriculture, the best base, classifies only a small minority of farms as primarily dry pea/bean operations (its 2022 count of the industry is on the order of a few hundred to a few thousand farms, reporting well under $300 million in market value) precisely because most pulse acreage sits on farms classified as wheat or other grain, where pulses are a rotation crop [7]. Treat that primary-classification figure as illustrative of the undercount, not as the industry total — the ~4 million acres and ~$1.3 billion of crop value in the NASS surveys are the honest measure of scale.

4. The investable universe

There is no publicly traded pure-play dry-pea-and-bean farm. Farm-level production is private and fragmented across thousands of family operations. Public-market exposure runs through the companies that buy, move, and process the crop — for most of whom pulses are one line among many. Exchanges referenced: New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq), and Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX).

Public companies

Fairfax Financial (TSX/OTC: FFH) is the controlling shareholder of AGT and thus another very indirect link.

Private and cooperative owners

This is where most real ownership sits — originators, processors, cooperatives, and ingredient makers (operators and supply-chain owners, not necessarily owners of the farms that supply them):

• Cargill (private) — largest U.S. grain merchant; pulse sourcing and the pea-protein partner behind Puris (U.S.-grown yellow peas) [9].
• Columbia Grain International (private; owned by Japan's Marubeni) — vertically integrated Pacific-Northwest/Northern-Plains pulse originator, processor, and exporter [15].
• Kelley Bean Company (employee- and family-owned) — dry-bean originator/processor sourcing through grower relationships; grew via acquisitions (ConAgra dry-bean operations in 2006, further deals in 2024 and 2026) [14].
• CHS Inc. (farmer-owned cooperative) — Washington dry-edible-bean processing, with beans grown under contract [16].
• Roquette (private, family-owned) — major pea-protein ingredient maker (NUTRALYS line); Emsland is another European pea-protein supplier [13][17].
• Kirsten Company and similar regional family enterprises — e.g., California dry-bean production, handling, marketing, and warehousing (the company reports farming roughly 750 acres).

5. How the money works

A pulse grower's economics are the classic commodity crop equation: gross revenue per acre = harvested yield × realized price, set against cash cost per acre. Owners make — and lose — money three ways.

Yield. Hundredweight per acre. Dry-bean yields ran ~2,012 lb/acre (about 20 cwt) in 2025; peas ~1,740 lb/acre [4]. Yield swings on rainfall, heat, and disease, and it is the single biggest lever a grower controls (variety, seeding rate, agronomy).

Price — and the cycle. Pulse prices are volatile and class-specific. The 2025 all-bean average was $30.20/cwt (down from about $38 in 2024), and by late 2025 pinto and black beans in Minnesota and North Dakota had fallen to roughly $21–22/cwt as larger acreage and softer demand pressured the market [5][24]. Because pulses trade in thin markets, a year of over-planting or a lost export channel can crater prices, while a short crop can spike them. Growers manage this by forward-contracting part of the crop with processors and by rotating pulse acreage up or down each year on price signals.

Cost and margin. Main inputs are seed, fertilizer (lower for pulses because they fix their own nitrogen — a structural advantage), crop-protection chemicals, fuel, machinery, land rent, and interest, plus drying, cleaning, and storage. Input costs hit record and near-record highs in 2022–2024, squeezing margins even when prices held [24]. Because pulses need less nitrogen, they are often the more profitable rotation choice precisely when fertilizer is expensive — a key reason acreage expands in high-cost years [20].

Underwriting metrics (for anyone financing or valuing a grower): yield per acre, realized price per cwt, quality discounts and rejected volume, cash cost per acre, gross margin per acre, crop-insurance coverage, contracted-vs-uncommitted production, and water availability / land rent. Most owners optimize a whole-farm rotation and multi-year balance sheet, not a single pulse crop — pulses earn their place by spreading price risk, breaking pest cycles, and cutting the next crop's fertilizer bill.

Processor economics differ: a cleaner/sorter/packager earns on throughput, recovery (quality) yield, inventory turns, per-ton margin, plant utilization, and customer concentration — and carries the working-capital risk of owning inventory through the marketing year.

6. What drives demand

• Global food staples. Beans, lentils, and chickpeas are dietary staples across Latin America, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and are used in U.S. retail, foodservice, and institutional meals. The U.S. is generally a net exporter: total pulse exports were about $1.13 billion in 2024 (dry beans ~$471M, lentils ~$307M, dry peas ~$222M), with Mexico, Canada, the European Union, and India the largest markets [18].
• Plant-based and "clean-label" protein. The structural growth story. Pea protein isolate — extracted mainly from yellow peas — is a leading ingredient in plant-based meat, dairy alternatives, and protein powders. The North American pea-protein market has been growing at roughly 9% a year, pulling new demand toward U.S.-grown yellow peas [17]. This is the biggest secular tailwind for pea acreage — but it also ties growers to the financial health of plant-based brands.
• Health and diet trends. High-fiber, high-protein, low-fat, gluten-free pulses ride the same nutrition wave. USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS) reported U.S. per-capita pulse availability rose about 1.5 lb (~13%) in 2025, led by lentils [19].
• Government procurement. USDA buys dry beans, peas, and lentils for domestic nutrition-assistance programs (under Section 32 surplus-removal authority) and for international food aid — a steady but policy-sensitive demand channel [22] (see Risks).

Judgment: demand growth is supportive, but acreage response and carry-over inventory can overwhelm consumption growth for several seasons at a time.

7. Regulation

Lightly regulated at the farm gate compared with, say, meatpacking, but federal farm policy shapes the economics:

• Farm Bill commodity programs (Title I). Dry peas, lentils, and chickpeas are covered commodities — eligible for Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC), which pay when prices or revenue fall below benchmarks, and for nonrecourse marketing assistance loans / loan-deficiency payments (reauthorized for the 2026–2031 crop years). For the 2025 crop, reference prices were about $0.1310/lb for dry peas and $0.2375/lb for lentils [20]. Note: dry edible beans are generally not a Title I covered commodity — bean growers rely mainly on crop insurance.
• Federal crop insurance. USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA) offers yield and revenue protection for dry beans and dry peas — the primary safety net, especially for beans; recent changes let certain contract-seed growers use weighted contract prices in their guarantees (2026 crop year) [21].
• Grades and market news. USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) publishes bean, pea, and lentil market reports and maintains grade standards that affect quality, pricing, and customer acceptance [22].
• Trade, tariffs, and phytosanitary rules. As an export-heavy sector, the industry lives with foreign tariffs, quotas, and plant-health (phytosanitary) standards in destination markets.
• Antidumping/countervailing enforcement. U.S. producers of downstream pulse products have won trade cases — the U.S. imposed preliminary antidumping (AD) duties of 112%–270% on certain Chinese pea protein in February 2024, followed by final AD and countervailing duties (CVD) of roughly 127%–626% in mid-2024, protecting the domestic pea-protein chain that buys U.S. peas [23].
• Food safety, pesticides, organic. Downstream processors fall under the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) preventive-controls rules; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registers pesticides and sets residue tolerances; USDA's National Organic Program (NOP) governs organic production and labeling. On-farm growing is largely outside FSMA, but processors and packagers face real compliance obligations. State water-rights, labor, and pesticide rules can materially change farm economics by location.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

At the farm level this is a fragmented, price-taking industry — thousands of independent growers, none with pricing power, all responding to the same signals. Competition is about being a low-cost producer and choosing the right rotation.

The consolidation is downstream, among buyers. A handful of global merchants and processors — AGT, ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Columbia Grain — dominate origination, cleaning, packaging, and export [9]. Their moves ripple back to the farm: ADM's acquisition of Saskatchewan pulse processor Prairie Pulse (2023) and Bunge's absorption of Viterra (2025) both concentrated buying power [9][10], while Kelley Bean has grown by acquisition (ConAgra's dry-bean operations in 2006; further deals in 2024 and 2026) [14]. On the ingredient side, a small set of firms (Roquette, Puris, Emsland) controls pea-protein capacity, and their expansion or retrenchment directly sets demand for yellow peas [17]. The most defensible private assets are grower contracts, elevators with rail access and storage, optical sorting and grading, food-safety approvals, and the working capital to carry inventory — not undifferentiated acreage.

International competition is fierce: Canada (the dominant global pulse exporter, especially peas and lentils) and India (a huge producer that raises pulse tariffs when it wants self-sufficiency) largely set the price floor and ceiling for U.S. growers.

9. Risks

• Price cyclicality. The core risk. Thin markets mean a single year of over-planting, a bumper global crop, or a lost export outlet can collapse prices — ERS reported 2025–26 prices down roughly 18% for dry beans and 16% for dry peas through early 2026, and pinto growers felt it directly [19][24].
• Trade and tariff shocks. Because so much crop is exported, retaliatory tariffs bite hard. Mexico has targeted U.S. beans in past disputes, and India periodically raises pulse tariffs; renewed friction with major buyers is a live threat [25].
• Food-aid and government-purchase cuts. Reductions to U.S. food-aid procurement in 2025 removed a chunk of steady demand and added to bean-price pressure [24][25].
• Input-cost and financing inflation. Record fertilizer, fuel, chemical, machinery, and interest costs in 2022–2024 compressed margins; a re-acceleration would hurt again [24].
• Weather, water, and climate. Drought, heat, frost, disease, and untimely rain in the Northern Plains and Mountain West drive large yield and quality swings.
• Concentrated buyers. With few large processors and merchants, growers have limited leverage and are exposed to any one buyer's strategy shift.
• Quality and food safety. Contamination, residue violations, poor grading, or recalls can destroy value and customer relationships.
• Substitution and fad risk. The plant-protein tailwind is real but has already seen one hype cycle cool; if pea-protein demand growth disappoints, the newest source of pea demand softens.
• Public-market mismatch. The diversified public names have only modest pulse exposure, so their share prices are poor short-term indicators of farm economics.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public-market routes. The one relatively direct listed vehicle is now AGT Food and Ingredients (TSX: AGTF), a global pulse processor that returned to public markets in March 2026 — though it is a processing/ingredients business, not a U.S. grower, and remains Fairfax-controlled. The diversified proxies — ADM (NYSE: ADM), Bunge (NYSE: BG), Ingredion (NYSE: INGR) — carry only a sliver of pulse exposure, so they trade on global grain/oilseed and ingredient margins, not bean prices. Beyond Meat (Nasdaq: BYND) is a pea-protein demand signal, not a farm proxy. Treat these as different exposures, not substitutes: analyze segment sales, ingredient volumes, margins, inventory, and management commentary rather than assuming a crop-price cycle moves a diversified company's consolidated earnings. No futures contract or fund tracks dry beans or lentils specifically.

Private routes — where most real ownership lives:

• Farmland in the pulse belt (North Dakota, Montana, Michigan, Idaho, Washington), owned and leased to growers.
• Direct farm operation or partnership in a family grain/oilseed enterprise that rotates pulses.
• Elevators, cleaning/sorting/packaging plants, and regional processors that aggregate and add value to the raw crop.
• Grower-contract financing and private debt secured by inventory, receivables, or equipment; farmer-owned cooperative participation.
• The pea-protein and pulse-ingredient supply chain — the highest-growth, highest-margin adjacency, and the segment most likely to reward capital over the next decade [17].

Due diligence should focus on crop mix, water security, yield and quality history, contract terms, local buyer concentration, storage capacity, insurance, working capital, and environmental liabilities.

Near-term drivers to watch:

1. Acreage and the price cycle. USDA's 2026 intended plantings show dry edible beans at 1.236 million acres (down from ~1.366 million in 2025) and lentils at 832,000 (down from ~1.072 million), while dry peas hold near 1.174 million — lower bean/lentil acreage could tighten supply and support prices [6][19].
2. Trade policy. Tariff moves by Mexico, India, and China, and the fate of food-aid procurement, will swing export demand [25].
3. Plant-based protein demand. Whether pea-protein growth reaccelerates or stays muted determines the strongest new source of pea acreage [17].
4. Input costs. The direction of fertilizer, fuel, and interest rates sets the margin floor and how attractive low-nitrogen pulse acreage looks [24].

Bottom line. Dry pea and bean farming is a small, cyclical, export-sensitive slice of U.S. agriculture. Near-term farm economics look soft and volatile — prices have weakened and acreage is adjusting — while the longer-horizon story rests on pulse consumption, exports, crop-rotation value, and ingredient demand. There is still no clean U.S. public-equity entry point to the crop itself; the durable thesis is the value-added pulse and pea-protein chain, accessed mainly through private ownership, farmland, and processing (and, newly, through AGT on the TSX). The best investments are likely low-cost operators with secure water, strong quality control, storage or processing assets, diversified customers, and disciplined balance sheets.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS — 111130 Dry Pea and Bean Farming" (definition and cross-references). https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=111130&year=2022
2. Agricultural Marketing Resource Center (AgMRC), "Dry Edible Bean Profile" (acreage, price, value, producing states; scope/exclusions), 2025. https://www.agmrc.org/commodities-products/grains-oilseeds/dry-edible-bean-profile
3. U.S. Dry Bean Council, "Production Facts" (state production shares; export share; states in production). https://usdrybeans.com/industry/production-facts/
4. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), "Crop Production 2025 Summary" (2025 harvested acres, yield, production), Jan. 2026. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cropan26.pdf
5. USDA NASS, "Crop Values 2025 Summary" (2025 average prices and crop values), Feb. 2026. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cpvl0226.pdf
6. USDA NASS, "Prospective Plantings" (2026 intended acreage vs 2025), Mar. 2026. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/pspl0326.pdf
7. USDA NASS, "2022 Census of Agriculture" (farm counts by NAICS classification; land and market value). https://www.nass.usda.gov/AgCensus/
8. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Size Standards" — NAICS 111130 receipts standard of $2.75 million, 2023 (Histometrics ingested federal statistic; and CBP employer-coverage caveat). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
9. World Grain, "Pulses showing global strength" (roles of ADM, Bunge, Cargill/Puris, Columbia Grain, AGT; ADM Prairie Pulse), 2024. https://www.world-grain.com/articles/21027-pulses-showing-global-strength
10. Archer-Daniels-Midland, "ADM Eager to Partner With Farmers, Customers After Acquisition of Prairie Pulse" (Vanscoy, Saskatchewan pulse processor), July 2023. https://www.adm.com/en-us/news/news-releases/2023/7/adm-eager-to-partner-with-farmers-customers-after--acquisition-of-prairie-pulse/
11. AGT Food and Ingredients Inc., "Completes Initial Public Offering and Concurrent Fairfax Private Placement" (TSX: AGTF re-listing, ~$625M gross, closed ~Mar. 9, 2026). https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/agt-food-and-ingredients-inc-completes-initial-public-offering-and-concurrent-fairfax-private-placement-for-total-gross-proceeds-to-agt-of-625-million-833828076.html
12. Ingredion, "Pulse Flours" (downstream pulse ingredients). https://www.ingredion.com/na/en-us/ingredients/ingredient-product-families/homecraft-pulse-flours
13. Beyond Meat, "2025 Form 10-K" (pea-protein suppliers, including Roquette), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1655210/000165521026000022/bynd-20251231.htm
14. Kelley Bean Company, "About Kelley Bean" (employee/family ownership; acquisition history). https://www.kelleybean.com/about/
15. Columbia Grain International, "Processing" (vertically integrated pulse processor/exporter; Marubeni-owned). https://columbiagrain.com/processing/
16. CHS Inc., "Dry Edible Beans" (farmer-owned cooperative; Washington processing under contract). https://www.chsinc.com/products-and-services/agriculture/grains/dry-edible-beans
17. Market.us / Straits Research, "Yellow Pea / Pea Protein Market" (North America ~9% CAGR; Roquette, Puris, Emsland capacity), 2024–2025. https://www.news.market.us/yellow-pea-protein-market-news/
18. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), "U.S. Pulses Exports 2024" (~$1.13 bn total; beans ~$471M, lentils ~$307M, peas ~$222M; top markets Mexico, Canada, EU, India). https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/commodities/pulse-crops
19. USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), "Vegetables and Pulses Outlook" (per-capita pulse availability +~13% in 2025; 2025–26 price declines; 2026 acreage), 2026. https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/vegetables-and-pulses-outlook
20. USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA), "Pulse Crops Program" and ARC/PLC overview (covered commodities; marketing loans for 2026–2031; 2025 reference prices; rotation nitrogen value). https://www.fsa.usda.gov/resources/programs/pulse-crops-program
21. USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA), "Dry Bean and Dry Pea Revenue Endorsement Changes, 2026 and Succeeding Crop Years," 2025. https://www.rma.usda.gov/
22. USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), "Section 32 Purchases of Dry Edible Beans, Peas and Lentils" and "Dry Edible Beans, Peas and Lentils" market news/grade standards. https://www.ams.usda.gov/market-news/dry-edible-beans-peas-and-lentils
23. Federal Register, "Certain Pea Protein From the People's Republic of China: Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders" (preliminary AD 112–270% Feb. 2024; final AD/CVD ~127–626% mid-2024), 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/26/2024-19071/certain-pea-protein-from-the-peoples-republic-of-china-antidumping-and-countervailing-duty-orders
24. Agweek, "Average dry bean harvest runs into pricing problems due to tariffs, food aid shifts" (2025 pinto/black bean prices; input costs; food-aid pressure). https://www.agweek.com/crops/dry-edible-beans
25. Congressional Research Service (CRS), "Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agriculture and USDA's Responses" (bean tariff exposure; food-aid procurement), 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48548