Other Food Crops Grown Under Cover (NAICS 111419) — A U.S. Industry Primer

1. Overview

This is the business of growing food — mostly vegetables, herbs, and berries — inside greenhouses and other covered structures instead of open fields. In official terms it is North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 111419, "Other Food Crops Grown Under Cover." [1] In everyday terms it is the food-producing slice of what the trade calls controlled environment agriculture (CEA): glass and plastic greenhouses, hydroponic operations (growing in nutrient-enriched water rather than soil), and fully enclosed indoor "vertical" farms.

Why it matters: the industry sits at the intersection of two durable tailwinds — retailer demand for year-round, food-safe, locally grown produce, and reshoring pressure on imported vegetables — but it is a capital-heavy, thin-margin farming business, not the software-margin "AgTech" story that venture capital priced it as from 2018 to 2022. That mismatch produced one of the sharpest boom-and-bust cycles in recent agriculture.

Public-market and private investors reach this industry very differently, and that distinction is the single most important thing to understand. There is essentially no large, clean public pure-play left after a wave of bankruptcies; listed exposure is limited to a couple of small, high-risk names plus the equipment, input, and real-asset suppliers around the industry. Most of the real ownership — including the largest and most profitable growers — is private, family-owned, or venture/private-equity backed. This is best treated as a collection of operating businesses and productive assets, not a conventional stock-market sector.

2. What it is and how it's structured

NAICS 111419 covers establishments primarily engaged in growing food crops (except mushrooms) under glass or protective cover. [1] It sits inside NAICS industry group 1114 (Greenhouse, Nursery, and Floriculture Production). Included activities are:

• Greenhouse vegetables, melons, and fruit
• Hydroponic food-crop farming
• Covered sprout production other than mushrooms
• Any food crop grown in a greenhouse or other protective structure [1]

The core products are greenhouse tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, leafy greens and lettuce, fresh-cut herbs, and a growing amount of strawberries and other berries.

What it excludes (adjacent codes worth naming):

• 111411 Mushroom Production — mushrooms grown under cover are their own industry, and a large one (see §3). [1]
• 111421 Nursery and Tree Production and 111422 Floriculture Production — plants and flowers grown under cover for ornament, not food. [1]
• 111219 Other Vegetable and Melon Farming and the other open-field crop codes — the same tomato or pepper grown in an open field, not under cover, is classified there. [1]
• Food processing (canning, pickling, drying) — classified outside crop production entirely. [1]

The value chain runs from seed and growing media through climate control, labor, harvesting, packing, cold storage, and distribution to retail or foodservice sale.

Ownership is a barbell. At one end are thousands of very small operations — a farm stand's hoop house, a market gardener's high tunnel — many with under 1,000 square feet under cover. At the other end are a few hundred large commercial greenhouses, often 5 to 60+ acres of glass, that do the bulk of the dollar volume, and increasingly combine production, packing, branding, logistics, and retailer relationships in one company. Legal form runs from sole proprietorships to family corporations (the largest branded growers) to venture-funded startups. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) sets the small-business size standard for this industry at $4.5 million in annual receipts — a program-eligibility threshold, not a measure of market size, but a sign that most operations are small. [2]

3. How big it is

Our ground-truth federal file reports exactly one industry-specific figure for NAICS 111419: the SBA size standard of $4.5 million (2023) — again, an eligibility threshold, not revenue. [2] It does not report NAICS 111419 revenue, employment, establishment count, or profitability directly; those are not invented here.

The best official scale measure is the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) 2022 Census of Agriculture, Table 39, which measures food crops grown under glass or other protection at the farm gate (the price the grower receives, not retail). It is a close proxy — it captures greenhouse vegetables, herbs, and berries but not literally every covered food crop in the code. [3] For 2022:

• Greenhouse vegetables and fresh-cut herbs: 11,465 operations, about 133.4 million square feet under cover, $981.7 million in sales — up from $748.3 million in 2017 (+31%). [3]
• Greenhouse tomatoes alone: 8,578 operations, 68.4 million square feet, $470.1 million (the single largest food crop under cover). [3]
• Other greenhouse vegetables and herbs (lettuce, cucumbers, peppers, herbs): 7,228 operations, 64.9 million square feet, $511.7 million. [3]
• Greenhouse fruits and berries: 1,295 operations, 7.0 million square feet, $36.4 million — up from $25.1 million in 2017. [3]

Combined, food-for-consumption under cover (excluding mushrooms) was roughly $1.0 billion in farm-gate sales in 2022, across about 140 million square feet (~3,200 acres) of covered growing area. [3] For scale, the excluded mushroom industry (NAICS 111411) was worth $1.36 billion on its own. [3]

The industry is fragmented by count but concentrated by revenue. At the small end, 4,197 farms — 37% of the total — reported just 1 to 999 square feet under cover. [3] At the large end, only 352 vegetable/herb operations with 40,000+ square feet produced $704.6 million of the $981.7 million total (about 72%), and just 113 tomato operations at that scale produced $343.4 million of the $470.1 million tomato total (about 73%). [3] A few hundred large greenhouses carry the industry.

Undercount and interpretation caveats. First, the general "business statistics" series most industries lean on — the Economic Census, County Business Patterns, Statistics of U.S. Businesses, and Nonemployer Statistics — largely exclude agricultural crop and animal production (NAICS 111/112), so they show almost nothing for this code; USDA's Census of Agriculture is the correct ground truth, and it counts any place with $1,000+ of sales as a "farm," sweeping in many tiny growers. [6] Second, this ~$1 billion figure measures U.S. production, not U.S. consumption. Americans eat far more greenhouse produce than they grow: an estimated 88% of U.S. greenhouse-tomato supply was imported in 2023, greenhouse-grown tomatoes are now roughly 60% of all fresh-tomato import volume, and Mexico supplied about 69% of U.S. fresh-vegetable imports in 2024. [4][5] The domestic industry is a small producer inside a large, import-fed market.

4. The investable universe

Public companies (thin and speculative)

Direct public exposure is narrow and high-risk. The 2020–2021 wave of blank-check listings that brought indoor-farming startups to market has almost entirely unwound, and a given ticker may mix greenhouse produce with cannabis or other unrelated activities.

The larger, healthier owners are private

• Mastronardi Produce (SUNSET brand) — the largest greenhouse-produce grower-marketer in North America, family-owned; it disclosed a U.S. greenhouse network exceeding 600 acres in 2025 and has absorbed distressed assets, including former AppHarvest facilities. [15][19]
• NatureSweet — vertically integrated greenhouse grower, packer, and branded marketer of tomatoes, cucumbers, and peppers; acquired by Blue Road Capital in 2023. [18]
• BrightFarms and Mucci Farms — both inside Cox Enterprises' private greenhouse platform (majority ownership of BrightFarms since 2020; strategic investment in Mucci Farms in 2022). [16][17]
• Windset Farms — family-owned, with greenhouse space in California and British Columbia; it disclosed 298 owned acres and more than 2,500 marketed acres across its partner-grower network. [20]
• Gotham Greens — leafy-greens and herbs operator with a regional greenhouse network; disclosed total production of 1.8 million square feet in 2023. [21]
• Little Leaf Farms — greenhouse lettuce operator expanding across the East and Southeast; its Pennsylvania campus reached 40 acres in 2025. [22]
• Vanguard Food — PE-backed partnership formed around the former Village Farms U.S. produce business (Village Farms holds 37.9%). [9]
• AeroFarms — private vertical-farming company focused on microgreens, backed by investors including Grosvenor Food & AgTech, Ingka Investments, Cibus Capital, and ACEG. [23]
• Other sizable private greenhouse growers include Windset, Nature Fresh Farms, Red Sun Farms, Houweling's, Pure Green Farms, Revol Greens, Oishii (indoor strawberries), and 80 Acres Farms (vertical).

Bottom line: there is no obvious blue-chip way in. The genuine operating leaders are private; the listed names are a repurposed cannabis story and a distressed microcap.

5. How the money works

This is fresh-produce economics, not technology economics. The revenue identity is simple: saleable volume × realized price = revenue, where the gap between biological output and saleable output — shrink, disease, cosmetic rejects, spoilage, retailer deductions, unsold inventory — is where growers win or lose. The levers:

• Yield. Output is measured in saleable pounds per square foot (or kilograms per square meter) per year. A modern glass tomato greenhouse can vastly out-yield the same footprint of open field, year-round.
• Realized price and mix. Commodity round tomatoes barely clear cost; branded specialty items — snacking and on-the-vine tomatoes, organics, berries, packaged herbs — earn the premiums where margin lives. Long-term programs with grocery chains provide volume and price stability.
• Shrink and cold chain. Every pound not sold fresh is a loss, so sell-through and cold-chain discipline matter as much as growing.
• The three big costs — energy, labor, capital — are the whole game. Greenhouses that use sunlight plus supplemental light and heat are far cheaper per pound than fully enclosed vertical farms that rely entirely on artificial light. Legacy indoor farms burned 40–120 kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity per kilogram of lettuce; even best-in-class facilities are around 11–15 kWh/kg. [24] That energy line is why sunlight-based greenhouse tomatoes and berries are profitable at scale while "grow everything in a warehouse" leafy-green models have repeatedly failed.
• Capital intensity and working capital. A commercial greenhouse runs roughly $1–3 million per acre to build; a building-integrated vertical farm can run $2,500–$3,750 per square meter, with paybacks commonly 7–10+ years. [24] Perishable inventory plus grocery receivables that arrive later make working capital tight. When the cost of capital rose in 2022–2023, "growth at all costs" models built on cheap money could not reach unit-economic profitability, and many folded. [24]

Useful operating metrics (KPIs) for underwriting a facility include saleable pounds per square foot, realized price per pound, labor hours and energy cost per pound, productive-area utilization, retailer fill rate and customer concentration, contribution margin per square foot, maintenance capital expenditure, and debt-service coverage. The durable-money version of this industry looks like a disciplined, low-cost, high-yield greenhouse operator with strong retail relationships and a branded specialty mix — closer to a food company than a tech startup.

6. What drives demand

• Year-round local supply. Retailers want consistent, blemish-free availability 52 weeks a year; greenhouses deliver that regardless of season.
• Food safety. Recurring field-lettuce E. coli and romaine recalls push grocers toward controlled-environment greens, where contamination risk is lower.
• Water and climate resilience. Enclosed hydroponic systems recirculate water and use a small fraction per pound of field farming, and are insulated from drought, heat, and storms.
• Premium and specialty demand. Snacking tomatoes, berries, organics, and fresh herbs command prices that support the higher cost base.
• Labor scarcity and technology. Automation, robotics, sensors, better seeds, and falling LED (light-emitting diode) costs gradually improve yield, consistency, and labor intensity.
• Trade policy and import substitution (a 2025 tailwind). Because most U.S. greenhouse produce is imported, trade policy moves domestic economics directly. In July 2025 the U.S. Commerce Department terminated the 2019 Tomato Suspension Agreement and imposed an antidumping (AD) duty of 17.09% on most fresh tomatoes from Mexico (effective July 14, 2025). [25] That raises import prices and helps domestic greenhouse growers — though analysts note it also raises tomato prices for U.S. consumers. [26]

Demand should keep growing in selected protected-culture categories where freshness, consistency, or local supply justify a premium. But growth does not automatically translate into attractive returns if capacity expands faster than retail demand. [5]

7. Regulation

• Food safety. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) Produce Safety Rule governs growing, harvesting, packing, and holding; it applies to covered greenhouse activities and imposes extra requirements on sprouts. Buyers layer on private audits (GAP — Good Agricultural Practices). [28]
• Pesticides and worker protection. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets pesticide registrations and food-residue tolerances, and its Agricultural Worker Protection Standard (WPS) applies to farms, nurseries, and greenhouses using agricultural pesticides. [29]
• Organic labeling. The USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) National Organic Program administers organic certification. In the U.S., hydroponic produce can be certified organic — a position U.S. courts have allowed to stand (a 2021 district-court ruling upheld on appeal) but one still contested by soil-based farmers and not permitted in the EU, Canada, or Mexico. This remains a live uncertainty for hydroponic growers marketing "organic." [30][27]
• Labor. The Department of Labor (DOL) administers the H-2A Temporary Agricultural guest-worker program; wage, housing, recruitment, and documentation rules are a direct cost and staffing risk, and immigration enforcement compounds it. [31]
• Worker safety. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) addresses machinery, heat, chemical, ladder, and general workplace hazards on agricultural operations. [32]
• Trade. Antidumping and countervailing duties (see the 2025 tomato order) can swing competitiveness overnight. [25]
• Site-level approvals. Zoning, land use, water rights, wastewater/stormwater, construction, and energy/utility interconnection permits all apply.

Regulation is both a cost and a competitive barrier: larger operators spread compliance systems over more volume and satisfy demanding retailer standards more efficiently.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The defining recent event is the 2023–2025 shakeout. After roughly $2.7 billion of venture money flowed into indoor/vertical farming, a cluster of celebrated names failed: AppHarvest (2023), AeroFarms (2023), Kalera, Bowery Farming (ceased operations 2024 after a plant-disease outbreak), and Plenty (Chapter 11, 2025). [13][14][24] The common cause: enormous upfront capital and energy bills against thin produce margins and softer-than-hoped consumer willingness to pay a premium.

The competitive map that survives:

• Sunlight-based greenhouses win. Large tomato, pepper, cucumber, and berry greenhouses with low-cost energy and branded retail programs are the profitable core.
• Vertical farming narrows to niches. Survivors focus on high-value, light-efficient crops — microgreens, herbs, strawberries — rather than commodity lettuce.
• Consolidation into strong private hands. Mastronardi has absorbed distressed assets and disclosed 600+ U.S. acres; Cox combined BrightFarms and Mucci Farms; Blue Road Capital bought NatureSweet; 80 Acres bought former Kalera farms; Village Farms transferred its U.S. produce into private Vanguard Food. [9][13][15][16][17][18][19]
• Imports are the real competition. The most important competitive force is not other U.S. growers but Mexican and Canadian greenhouses, which supply the majority of the U.S. greenhouse-produce market. [4]

Scale matters in packing, refrigeration, logistics, procurement, and retailer service; a grower with excellent biological performance can still lose money without distribution or sales discipline. Glasshouse acreage without retailer access is not a moat.

9. Risks

• Energy price shocks — the largest variable cost, and existential for artificial-light indoor models.
• Capital intensity and refinancing risk — high build costs, long paybacks, and going-concern exposure when capital gets expensive; high leverage against volatile farm cash flow.
• Commodity cyclicality, overcapacity, and perishability — price swings plus shrink compress already-thin margins, and a crop cannot be stored until conditions improve.
• Crop disease in monoculture systems — a single pathogen can wipe out an enclosed facility (a factor in Bowery's collapse). [13]
• Imports and trade-policy reversal — Mexican/Canadian competition is the baseline; the 2025 tomato duty is a tailwind that could be litigated away or negotiated down. [25]
• Labor — availability, wage inflation, housing, and immigration-policy change.
• Customer concentration and private-label bargaining power — a few grocery buyers can dictate terms.
• Organic-label uncertainty for hydroponic growers. [27]
• Water restrictions and local permitting delays.
• Execution risk — applying tech-company growth expectations to an agriculture-margin business, the mistake that sank much of the 2021 cohort.
• Investment-specific risk — public: dilution, listing risk, hybrid business models, thin liquidity; private: opacity, illiquidity, and limited audited financials.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public routes (limited, high-risk). There is no large-cap pure-play. Local Bounti (LOCL) offers the most direct U.S. CEA exposure but carries substantial financing and listing risk. [11] Village Farms International (VFF) is now a more complicated cross-border and hybrid story — primarily cannabis after divesting most of its produce business in 2025, with residual Canadian greenhouse exposure. [8][9][10] Start any public analysis by separating greenhouse revenue from cannabis, energy, or equipment lines. More durable public exposure is indirect — diversified fresh-produce and agribusiness companies, and suppliers of greenhouse structures, LED lighting, climate-control and automation systems, substrates, and seed/genetics that sell into the industry regardless of which grower wins. Farmland REITs (real estate investment trusts) exist but mostly hold open-field cropland, not greenhouses.

Private routes (where the industry actually lives). The real ownership and the best risk-adjusted entry points are private, and available at far more disciplined post-shakeout valuations than in 2021. Structures include:

• Direct equity in growers and grower-marketers
• Preferred equity or convertible capital
• Asset-backed loans and equipment finance
• Greenhouse real estate and sale-leaseback structures
• Private/venture funds investing in controlled-environment agriculture
• Supplying the "picks and shovels" — lighting, climate systems, substrates, packaging, automation, and cold chain

Underwrite at the facility level: ask for saleable yield, realized price, labor and energy cost per pound, customer concentration, crop-loss history, required maintenance capital, debt maturities, and proof of repeat retail demand.

Near-term drivers and outlook. The 2025 antidumping duty on Mexican tomatoes materially improves domestic greenhouse tomato and berry economics, at least while it stands. [25] Retail demand for food-safe, local, year-round produce remains structurally supportive, and falling LED costs and better energy efficiency slowly improve indoor economics — but energy prices and capital discipline remain the gating factors. The reasonable expectation is that the winners are sunlight-based greenhouse operators at scale and focused indoor niche players (berries, microgreens, herbs), not a return to the venture-funded "vertical farms everywhere" thesis. Returns will be selective rather than broad-based. Treat this as a real-asset, food-margin industry with a genuine reshoring tailwind — a selection of operating businesses and productive assets, not a high-growth technology sector.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau / NAICS 2022, "111419 – Other Food Crops Grown Under Cover" (definition and exclusions). https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=111419&year=2022
2. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Small Business Size Standards" (NAICS 111419 = $4.5 million receipts), 2023 (Histometrics ingested federal statistics). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
3. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, "2022 Census of Agriculture, Volume 1, Chapter 1, Table 39 — Food Crops Grown Under Glass or Other Protection," 2024. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2022/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/st99_1_039_039.pdf
4. USDA Economic Research Service, "Greenhouse tomatoes fuel U.S. import growth in fresh tomatoes," and U.S. fresh-vegetable import-share data, 2024–2025. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/chart-detail?chartId=109371
5. USDA Economic Research Service, "Vegetables and Pulses Outlook: April 2024," 2024. https://esmis.nal.usda.gov/sites/default/release-files/cj82k729x/rj431t78q/0v839q06h/vgs-372.pdf
6. U.S. Census Bureau, "Statistics of U.S. Businesses" and "Nonemployer Statistics" (both exclude crop and animal production). https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/susb.html; https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/mu0500.html
7. Village Farms International, "Q4 and Full Year 2024 Results" (2024 revenue $336.2 million), 2025. https://news.villagefarms.com/news-releases/news-release-details/village-farms-international-reports-q4-and-full-year-2024
8. Village Farms International, "Announces Transformative Transaction to Privatize its Fresh Produce Business" (Vanguard Food LP; $40M plus 37.9% stake), GlobeNewswire, May 2025; and SEC Form 8-K. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1584549/000095017025073686/vff-20250512.htm
9. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Village Farms International Form 8-K / Vanguard Food LP" (37.9% equity interest), 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1584549/000095017025073686/vff-20250512.htm
10. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Village Farms International Form 10-K (FY2025)" (retained Canadian greenhouse operations; cannabis segment), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1584549/000119312526104189/vff-20251231.htm
11. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Local Bounti Corporation Form 10-Q / 8-K earnings releases" (revenue; NYSE listing noncompliance; going concern), 2024–2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1840780/000162828026035317/locl-20260331.htm
12. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "AppHarvest Form 15" (Chapter 11 / deregistration, 2023). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1807707/000180770723000163/apphform15.htm
13. The Food Institute, "What Does AeroFarms' Bankruptcy Signal for CEA's Future?" and TechCrunch, "Bowery Farming is ceasing operations" (AppHarvest, AeroFarms, Kalera, Bowery outcomes), 2023–2024. https://techcrunch.com/2024/11/04/bowery-farming-is-ceasing-operations/
14. Foodlore, "14 Vertical Farms Went Bankrupt — What Killed Them" (Plenty Chapter 11, 2025), 2025. https://foodlore.blog/why-vertical-farms-go-bankrupt/
15. CEAg World, "The Largest Greenhouse Produce Growers in the U.S. in 2025" (Mastronardi/SUNSET as largest; consolidation), 2025. https://www.ceagworld.com/greenhouse-produce/the-largest-greenhouse-produce-growers-in-the-u-s-in-2025/
16. Cox Enterprises, "Cox Assumes Majority Ownership of BrightFarms," 2020. https://www.coxenterprises.com/press-releases/cox-assumes-majority-ownership-of-brightfarms
17. Cox Enterprises, "Cox Makes Strategic Investment in Mucci Farms," 2022. https://www.coxenterprises.com/press-releases/cox-makes-strategic-investment-in-mucci-farms
18. Business Wire, "Silver Ventures Announces the Sale of NatureSweet" (acquired by Blue Road Capital), 2023. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20230919787512/en/Silver-Ventures-Announces-the-Sale-of-NatureSweet
19. SUNSET Grown / Mastronardi Produce, "Flavor Fuels Mastronardi Westward Expansion" (U.S. network exceeding 600 acres), 2025. https://www.sunsetgrown.com/flavor-fuels-mastronardi-westward-expansion/
20. Windset Farms, "About Windset" (298 owned acres; 2,500+ marketed acres), 2026. https://windsetfarms.com/about-windset/
21. Gotham Greens, "Our Story" (1.8 million square feet of production, 2023). https://www.gothamgreens.com/our-story/
22. Little Leaf Farms, "Little Leaf Farms Becomes the World's Largest CEA Leafy Greens Producer" (40-acre Pennsylvania campus), PR Newswire, 2025. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/little-leaf-farms-becomes-the-worlds-largest-cea-leafy-greens-producer-with-expansion-of-pennsylvania-campus-302582218.html
23. AeroFarms, "AeroFarms Raises Equity to Fund Pre-Construction Activities" (microgreens focus; investor list), 2025. https://www.aerofarms.com/aerofarms-raises-equity/
24. Oxford University Press, Plant Physiology, "Vertical farming limitations and potential" (energy kWh/kg, capex, ~$2.7B losses), 2025. https://academic.oup.com/plphys/article/198/3/kiaf056/8104144
25. Federal Register, "Fresh Tomatoes From Mexico: Termination of Suspension Agreement… and Imposition of an Antidumping Duty Order" (17.09% duty, effective July 14, 2025), U.S. Department of Commerce, 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/17/2025-13453/fresh-tomatoes-from-mexico-termination-of-suspension-agreement-rescission-of-administrative-reviews
26. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "Rotten Tomatoes: Implications of the Termination of the U.S.-Mexico Tomato Suspension Agreement," 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/rotten-tomatoes-implications-termination-us-mexico-tomato-suspension-agreement
27. Food Safety News, "Court ruling clears way for hydroponics to join National Organic Program," 2021; and National Agricultural Law Center, "The Fight Over Organic Hydroponics." https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2021/03/court-ruling-clears-way-for-hydroponics-to-join-national-organic-program/
28. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, "FSMA Final Rule on Produce Safety," 2016. https://www.fda.gov/food/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma/fsma-final-rule-produce-safety
29. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Food and Pesticides" and "Agricultural Worker Protection Standard," 2025. https://www.epa.gov/safepestcontrol/food-and-pesticides
30. USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, "Organic Certification and Accreditation" (National Organic Program), 2026. https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/organic-certification
31. U.S. Department of Labor, "H-2A Temporary Agricultural Program," 2026. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/programs/h-2a
32. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, "Agricultural Operations — Hazards and Controls," 2026. https://www.osha.gov/agricultural-operations/hazards