Grape Vineyards (U.S.) — NAICS 111332

An investor's primer. Core figures are U.S. federal statistics unless noted; forward-looking statements are labeled as judgments.

1. Overview

Grape vineyards are the farms that grow grapes — for wine, for the fresh-fruit aisle (table grapes), for raisins, and for juice. This is the farming end of the business: planting, tending, and harvesting the fruit. It stops at the farm gate. Turning grapes into wine is a separate, downstream industry (Section 2).

A vineyard bundles together agricultural land, long-lived vines, water infrastructure, seasonal labor, and commodity price exposure. Grapes are the highest-value fruit crop grown in the United States: the 2024 U.S. crop was worth about $6.19 billion at the farm level [1]. But the money and the risk are unusual for farming — a vineyard is a permanent planting that costs a great deal to establish, takes four to five years to reach full production, then yields for decades. That makes it as much a land-and-capital business as a crop business.

Why an investor cares: vineyards sit where agriculture, luxury branding, and real estate overlap. Returns come from the annual grape harvest, from the value of the underlying farmland, and — for those who go further downstream — from wine brands, tasting rooms, and direct-to-consumer sales.

This is overwhelmingly a private, farm-owned industry. There is no large pure-play "grape grower" listed on a U.S. exchange. Public-market exposure is indirect — through wineries that own estate vineyards, through farmland real estate investment trusts (REITs, listed companies that own land and lease it out) that hold vineyards, or through global drinks and luxury groups. Direct participation happens privately: buying or leasing vineyard land, backing a wine estate, or farming at scale under winery contracts.

2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 111332 covers establishments primarily engaged in growing grapes, including grapes grown to be sun-dried into raisins [2]. It spans wine-grape vineyards that sell fruit to wineries, growers selling to juice makers, table-grape farms, and raisin farms that sun-dry their own fruit.

What it excludes — the adjacent codes. The classification draws a sharp line at processing:

• Making wine is NAICS 312130, Wineries — a manufacturing industry, not farming [2]. This matters for investors: many famous "vineyards" are really wineries that happen to own vines, and their reported revenue is wine revenue, not grape revenue.
• Artificially (mechanically) drying grapes into raisins is NAICS 311423, Dried and Dehydrated Food Manufacturing [2]. Only sun-drying stays in 111332.
• Growing other fruit falls under NAICS 111339 (Other Noncitrus Fruit and Tree Nut Farming); mixed fruit-and-nut farms where no single activity is more than half of value are combination farming; propagating grapevines is nursery production (NAICS 111421) [2].

Ownership mix — a barbell. At one end are tens of thousands of small, family- or individually-owned farms; at the other, a handful of very large growers and vertically integrated wine companies that farm thousands of acres. The 2022 Census of Agriculture counted 27,951 farms growing grapes (including muscadines) on about 1.108 million acres, bearing plus non-bearing — an average near 40 acres, but with a long tail of tiny plots and a few enormous ones [3]. Operating-arrangement data reinforce the small-farm picture: 7,948 farms had a single producer and 14,216 had two producers in 2022 [3]. Most growers sell fruit under contract to wineries or packers; some are "estate" operations that grow and process their own.

3. How big it is

Federal crop figures (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service — NASS, 2024 crop):

• Value of production: ~$6.19 billion, down from $6.83 billion in 2023 [1].
• Bearing acreage: 923,000 acres [1].
• Utilized production: about 5.40 million tons, averaging roughly $1,150 per ton [1].

California dominates. The state accounted for about $5.64 billion — roughly 91% of U.S. grape value — on 793,000 bearing acres in 2024 [1]. Within California the three uses split as follows [1]:

Virtually all U.S. raisins and fresh table grapes are grown in California [1]. Wine grapes are more geographically spread: after California, the largest growing states are Washington, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania [3].

The market is contracting. USDA's 2025 State Agriculture Overview shows California grape acreage down to about 751,000 acres and value near $5.21 billion — consistent with the vine removals underway (Section 9) [5]. The end-market gap is widening: in 2025 California processing (mostly wine) grapes averaged about $934 per ton while fresh-market grapes averaged about $1,900 per ton [5].

The undercount caveat (important). The federal business statistics most industries are measured by — the Census Bureau's Economic Census, County Business Patterns, and the Small Business Administration's (SBA) employer data — exclude crop production (NAICS 111). There is no Census employer-establishment count, employment, or payroll figure for grape vineyards. The only Census/SBA-linked number we have is the SBA's small-business size standard of $4.0 million in average annual receipts, below which a grape farm counts as "small" — a size threshold, not a measure of revenue or market size [4]. Authoritative structural data instead comes from USDA's Census of Agriculture (Section 2). So standard business databases will understate or omit this industry; treat USDA crop figures as ground truth and read any "business-registry" count of vineyards as incomplete.

4. The investable universe

There is no large publicly traded pure grape grower in the U.S. The nearest public plays are small wineries that own estate vineyards, farmland REITs that own vineyards and lease them, and diversified drinks and luxury companies. Tickers and market values are reserved for this section.

Major private and other owners. The biggest vineyard holdings sit outside public markets. E. & J. Gallo (the largest U.S. wine supplier, ~90 million cases in 2025) and The Wine Group (~43 million cases) are both private and farm or contract vast acreage; The Wine Group's 2025 purchase of Constellation brands and facilities included roughly 6,600 owned or leased California vineyard acres [14][15]. Other large private owners include Jackson Family Wines, Trinchero Family Estates, and Bronco Wine. Recent deals moved brands and vineyards from public to private hands: The Duckhorn Portfolio (more than 2,200 vineyard acres across 38 estate properties) was taken private by Butterfly Equity for $1.95 billion in December 2024 [16]; Ste. Michelle Wine Estates, the major Washington platform, was acquired by the Wyckoff family in 2025 [17]; and Vintage Wine Estates went bankrupt and liquidated in 2024. Below all of them sit ~28,000 independent grower-farmers who supply fruit under contract [3]. Private owners often give more direct vineyard exposure than public stocks, but with less liquidity, less standardized disclosure, and more dependence on local management.

5. How the money works

A vineyard owner earns money three ways, and a serious investor watches all three.

1. The annual crop. A useful grower framework is:

Revenue ≈ productive acres × tons per acre × realized price per ton

Yield depends on vine age, weather, irrigation, disease, pruning, and crop load; a mature wine vineyard yields roughly 3–6 tons per acre, table grapes higher [1]. Price is everything and varies enormously. In 2024 California wine grapes averaged ~$1,200 per ton statewide, but Napa Cabernet can fetch $8,000+ per ton while bulk Central Valley fruit sells for a few hundred [1][18]. Table grapes and raisins are commodity-priced by size, sugar, and pack-out. Growers sell under one-year spot deals, intermediate contracts, or long-term agreements; contracts stabilize revenue but cap upside [7].

2. Unit economics and the long payback — the defining feature. Establishing a vineyard is expensive and slow:

• Bringing a vineyard to production runs roughly $23,000+ per acre in cash costs over the establishment years in a moderate region like Oregon; in Napa the land alone can cost $300,000–$400,000 per acre [18][19].
• A new planting produces almost nothing for three years, reaches full bearing around year five, then yields for 20–30+ years before replanting [7][19].
• Because of that ramp, returns are negative for years. University budgets show a vineyard may not turn cash-positive for a decade, and only above a break-even near $7,000–$8,000 per acre in revenue in higher-cost California regions [18][20].

The same vine costs about the same to farm whether its grapes sell for $500 or $8,000 a ton, so premium appellations carry far better margins. Growers manage the capital intensity with long-term supply contracts and by choosing region and variety carefully.

3. Land appreciation. Prime vineyard land — especially in named appellations — is a scarce real asset. For many owners the long-run return is as much the land value as the harvest, which is why farmland REITs and family estates treat vineyards as a real-estate holding that also throws off crop income.

Going downstream. Owners who add a winery capture inventory and brand economics: grapes crushed in autumn may sit as wine inventory for years, and direct-to-consumer (DTC) sales and tasting rooms can earn far higher gross margins than distributor sales — but require marketing, hospitality, compliance, and customer-acquisition spending [7][8].

6. What drives demand

• Wine consumption and mix. Most U.S. grape value is wine grapes, so demand tracks wine sales — and U.S. and global wine consumption has been falling, hitting grape demand hard (Section 9) [21]. Within wine, a shift toward premium bottles supports high-end appellations even as bulk demand shrinks; Constellation and others describe deceleration in the category and a pivot to premium [9].
• Fresh-fruit and health trends. Table grapes benefit from year-round fresh-fruit demand; U.S. winter supply is filled by imports (Chile, Mexico, Peru), so domestic table-grape prices move with the harvest calendar and trade flows [1].
• Raisins and snacking. Raisin demand has drifted lower for years, and California raisin acreage has steadily declined as growers switch to more profitable crops [21][22].
• Hospitality and DTC. Tasting rooms, wine tourism, wine clubs, and online sales are a growing demand channel for estate operators and a source of margin resilience.
• Substitution to other permanent crops. In California's Central Valley, grapes compete with almonds, pistachios, and other higher-return plantings for land and water; relative economics move acreage between them [24].
• Weather and vintage. Yields and quality swing with drought, heat, frost, and wildfire smoke — the last a real risk that can taint an entire wine-grape crop.

A vineyard's value ultimately depends on what it can produce and who can buy it. Fruit from a recognized American Viticultural Area (AVA) with a strong buyer commands a premium; undifferentiated grapes are exposed to oversupply and buyer concentration.

7. Regulation

Grape farming is lightly regulated as manufacturing goes, but several regimes matter — and for estate operators the downstream alcohol rules apply too.

• Appellations (TTB). The federal Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) defines American Viticultural Areas (AVAs) — official grape-growing regions codified in 27 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 9, with more than 140 in California alone (Napa, Sonoma, Russian River, etc.) [25][26]. AVAs don't regulate the farming, but a wine labeled with an AVA must be ≥85% from that area, so they create the geographic brands that give vineyard land its premium value. Estate operators that make wine also need TTB authorization (bonded winery/wine-cellar permits) and must follow TTB labeling rules [25].
• Water. In California, groundwater use is being tightened under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), forcing growers in over-drafted basins to cut irrigation or fallow land — a structural constraint on Central Valley grape (and competing-crop) acreage [24].
• Labor. Grapes, especially table grapes, are labor-intensive at harvest. Growers rely on seasonal labor, including the federal H-2A temporary agricultural guest-worker visa program, under the Department of Labor's (DOL) Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA), which governs disclosures, wages, housing, transportation, and farm-labor contractors [28]. Rising wages, housing costs, and mechanization pressure follow.
• Pesticides and food safety. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Worker Protection Standard (WPS) governs pesticide safety for farmworkers and handlers [27]. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) grants enforcement discretion for wine grapes under parts of its Produce Safety Rule, though general food-adulteration rules still apply [29].
• Marketing orders. Federal/state marketing orders fund research and promotion (e.g., the California Table Grape Commission and raisin programs) via grower assessments [22].

For investors, water rights and labor compliance can matter as much as acreage.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The grower base is fragmented — tens of thousands of farms — but the buyers are concentrated. A handful of large wine companies (Gallo, The Wine Group, Constellation) buy a big share of the wine-grape crop, giving them pricing power over independent growers [15]. Competition runs at three levels: growers compete for suitable land, water, labor, and winery contracts; wineries compete for grapes, distribution, and shelf space; brands compete on variety, appellation, quality, price, and hospitality.

The wine side has been consolidating fast. Gallo and The Wine Group absorbed Constellation's lower-priced brands and facilities (the latter deal including ~6,600 vineyard acres) as Constellation exited most of its U.S. wine business in 2024–25 [9][14]. Private equity has entered the premium tier (Butterfly Equity's Duckhorn take-private) [16], while over-leveraged players have failed (Vintage Wine Estates). Integrated companies can shift sourcing between owned and contracted fruit as conditions change — which is exactly what leaves independent growers exposed when a buyer pulls back.

For growers, consolidation shows up as vineyard removals and land turnover more than corporate mergers: weaker operators pull out vines or sell land, and scale players with efficient farming and secure contracts absorb the survivors' share. The genuinely scarce asset is not raw acres but productive acres with reliable water, desirable varieties, favorable climate, established buyers, and appellation credibility.

9. Risks

• Structural oversupply and falling wine demand. The dominant near-term risk. A global drop in wine drinking has left California with a persistent grape glut — an estimated 30% of the state's 2025 wine grapes went unsold [21]. Growers removed more than 38,000 acres of vineyards (about 7% of the state's acreage) between late 2024 and 2025, with industry leaders targeting another ~40,000 acres — because projected long-run demand is only around 410,000 wine-grape acres versus the ~590,000 planted [21][22][23]. Bulk prices have collapsed; some Central Valley fruit sells below picking cost [21]. The 2024 California crush shows the mechanics: crush volume fell 24% to 2.88 million tons and value fell 26% to about $2.99 billion, while the weighted-average price fell only 3% — a volume shock, not just a price cut [6].
• Capital intensity and illiquidity. The multi-year, high-cost establishment cycle means owners can't quickly adjust to price swings, and vineyard land (and private vineyard stakes) can be slow to sell and hard to value without recent comparable transactions [19].
• Weather and climate. Drought, heat, frost, hail, wildfire smoke, disease, and pests can cut yield or downgrade quality; climate change is shifting suitable growing regions [9].
• Water and input costs. Groundwater limits (SGMA) plus higher labor, fuel, and materials costs have squeezed margins even where prices held [18][24].
• Buyer concentration. A grower dependent on one winery or contract buyer has limited bargaining power if that buyer cancels or renegotiates.
• Trade and imports. Table grapes and bulk wine face import competition; tariffs and trade shifts cut both ways.
• Downstream exposure. Owners who also make wine take on brand, inventory, distribution, recall, and labeling risk a grape-only grower avoids.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public routes. With no pure-play grape stock, public investors get indirect exposure:

• Small estate wineries — Willamette Valley Vineyards (WVVI) and Crimson Wine Group (CWGL) own vineyards but trade on wine-brand economics; both are micro-caps with limited liquidity [7][8].
• Farmland REITs — Gladstone Land (LAND) and Farmland Partners (FPI) hold vineyard acreage inside broader farm portfolios: an income-oriented, land-value play rather than pure grape exposure [11][12].
• Diversified drinks and luxury — Constellation (STZ), Treasury Wine Estates (TWE), and LVMH own vineyards, but grapes are a small part of far larger businesses [9][10][13].

Private routes (where the real industry is): buying or leasing vineyard land directly; sale-leasebacks; grower partnerships and agricultural funds; private credit; backing or acquiring a wine estate; or farming at scale under long-term winery contracts. These are illiquid, capital-heavy, and management-intensive — increasingly a real-estate/luxury-brand bet as much as a farming one. Key diligence questions: How many acres are truly productive? What are yield and realized price per ton by variety and AVA? Who buys the grapes, and how long are the contracts? Are water rights secure and transferable? What is the vine-age and replanting profile? What labor, insurance, and wildfire exposure exists? How much value is land vs. grapes vs. wine inventory vs. brand and hospitality?

Near-term outlook (judgment). The wine-grape segment is in a painful, deliberate correction: removing tens of thousands of acres to rebalance a market with too many vines and shrinking demand [21][23]. Expect continued weak bulk prices, further removals, more grower failures and land turnover, and durable strength only in premium appellations where scarcity and brand support pricing. Table grapes and raisins are steadier commodity businesses but face their own demand and labor pressures. The clearest opportunities are likely counter-cyclical — acquiring quality, water-secure vineyard land or distressed estates during the shakeout — rather than broad exposure to a contracting crop. Underwrite the vineyard, the contract, and the downstream customer separately; acreage alone is not a sufficient proxy for value.

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Sources

1. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts 2024 Summary (May 2025). https://esmis.nal.usda.gov/sites/default/release-files/zs25x846c/mc87rn20c/w37656321/ncit0525.pdf
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS — Sector 11 and code 111332 (Grape Vineyards) definition and cross-references. https://www.census.gov/naics/ (see also https://www.naics.com/naics-code-description/?code=111332)
3. USDA NASS, 2022 Census of Agriculture — U.S. grape operations, acreage, and Table 77 (Summary by Operating Arrangements). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2022/Full_Report/Volume_1%2C_Chapter_1_US/st99_1_077_077.pdf
4. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (2023) — NAICS 111332 receipts-based standard of $4.0 million (Histometrics ingested federal statistic). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
5. USDA NASS, 2025 State Agriculture Overview: California (grape acreage, value, processing vs. fresh-market prices). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Quick_Stats/Ag_Overview/stateOverview.php?state=California
6. USDA / CDFA, California Grape Crush Report 2024 (2024 crush volume, value, and price change; via USDA ERS). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/California/Publications/Grape_Crush/
7. Crimson Wine Group (CWGL), 2025 Form 10-K (SEC) for acreage/sourcing; StockAnalysis for revenue and market cap. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001562151&type=10-K; https://stockanalysis.com/quote/otc/CWGL/
8. Willamette Valley Vineyards (WVVI), 2025 Form 10-K (SEC) for acreage; StockAnalysis / Macrotrends for revenue and market cap. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000838875&type=10-K; https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/wvvi/
9. Constellation Brands (STZ), FY2026 Form 10-K (SEC); VinePair and Press Democrat on Constellation's exit from most U.S. wine and the Gallo deal (2024–25). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000016918&type=10-K; https://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/business/gallo-finalizes-blockbuster-wine-deal-with-constellation-brands/
10. Treasury Wine Estates (TWE), 2025 Annual Report (U.S. wineries and California vineyard hectares). https://www.tweglobal.com/investors
11. Gladstone Land Corporation (LAND), Farmland Portfolio and SEC filings. https://www.gladstonefarms.com/farmland-portfolio
12. Farmland Partners (FPI) company profile / SEC filings. https://farmlandpartners.com/
13. LVMH, "Chandon California" (Moët Hennessy wines & spirits). https://www.lvmh.com/en/our-maisons/wines-spirits/chandon/chandon-california
14. The Wine Group, "Agreement to Acquire Wine Brands and Production Facilities from Constellation Brands" (~6,600 California vineyard acres), 2025. https://www.thewinegroup.com/
15. VinePair, "The 25 Largest Wine Suppliers in the U.S. (2026)" — Gallo and The Wine Group case volumes. https://vinepair.com/booze-news/25-largest-wine-suppliers-us-2026/
16. Butterfly Equity, "Butterfly Completes $1.95 Billion Acquisition of The Duckhorn Portfolio" (>2,200 acres across 38 estates), Dec. 2024. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20241223905209/en/
17. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates, "Wyckoff Family Acquires Ste. Michelle Wine Estates," 2025. https://www.smwe.com/pressReleases/details/378
18. The Wine Economist, "Unsustainable? Anatomy of California Vineyard Economics" (2023). https://wineeconomist.com/2023/04/18/margins-revisited/
19. Oregon State University Applied Economics, Vineyard Economics: Establishing and Producing Wine Grapes (AEB 0087). https://appliedecon.oregonstate.edu/sites/agscid7/files/applied-economics/aeb_0087.pdf
20. UC Davis / UCCE, Sample Costs to Establish a Vineyard and Produce Wine Grapes — Napa (2020). https://coststudyfiles.ucdavis.edu/uploads/cs_public/fe/24/fe24e27a-5c29-4cc3-a83c-63a31cd0c767/2020napawinegrape.pdf
21. Press Democrat, "California vine removals a path to wine market reset" (Dec. 2025); California Farm Bureau / Morning Ag Clips, "Grape Glut Lessens as Growers Scrap Vines" (2025). https://www.pressdemocrat.com/2025/12/04/wine-expo-industry-forecast-2025/; https://www.morningagclips.com/grape-glut-lessens-as-growers-scrap-vines/
22. USDA NASS / CDFA, California Grape Acreage Report, 2024 Crop (2025). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/California/Publications/Specialty_and_Other_Releases/Grapes/Acreage/2025/2024%20Crop%20Grape%20Acreage%20Report.pdf
23. Vinetur, "California Vineyards Accelerate Removals as Growers Target 40,000 Acres in 2025" (2026). https://www.vinetur.com/en/2026021096139/california-vineyards-accelerate-removals-as-growers-target-40000-acres-in-2025.html
24. National Nut Grower / CDFA, Central California crop values and permanent-crop competition (2024). https://nationalnutgrower.com/news/almonds-central-california-top-crops-2024/
25. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), "American Viticultural Area (AVA)" (27 CFR Part 9), plus Wine Permits and Wine Labeling. https://www.ttb.gov/regulated-commodities/beverage-alcohol/wine/american-viticultural-area-ava
26. Wine Institute, "American Viticultural Areas." https://wineinstitute.org/our-industry/avas/
27. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Agricultural Worker Protection Standard (WPS)." https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-worker-safety/agricultural-worker-protection-standard-wps
28. U.S. Department of Labor, "Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA)." https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/agriculture/mspa
29. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, "Produce Safety Rule Enforcement Discretion Policy for Certain Commodities" (wine grapes). https://www.fda.gov/food/hfp-constituent-updates/fda-announces-produce-safety-rule-enforcement-discretion-policy-certain-commodities