Peanut Farming in the United States (NAICS 111992)

An investor's primer for a general audience — relevant to both public-market and private investors. NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) 2022 code 111992 covers U.S. establishments primarily engaged in growing peanuts.

1. Overview

Peanut farming is a weather-exposed, low-margin row-crop business: growers plant, cultivate, harvest, and sell peanuts at the farm gate to shellers, processors, exporters, and food manufacturers. Three features make it unusual among major U.S. crops — there is no futures market to hedge the price, a small number of buyers (shellers) dominate the crop, and a federal support program effectively sets a price floor. The farming itself is run almost entirely by private, family operations — roughly 7,000 peanut-farming families — clustered in a "peanut belt" running across the Southeast and into Texas [3].

The key point for any investor is that you cannot own U.S. peanut farming directly through public markets. No pure-play peanut grower is listed on any exchange. Public-market exposure comes one step downstream and heavily diluted: the shellers and processors that buy the crop (led by Archer-Daniels-Midland's Golden Peanut unit), the branded peanut-butter and snack makers (J.M. Smucker's Jif, Hormel's Skippy and Planters), and the confectioners that are large peanut buyers (Hershey, and privately held Mars) [12][23][27]. Private investors can get closer to the farm gate — owning or leasing peanut-belt farmland, financing equipment or working capital, or investing in the farmer-owned shelling cooperatives that have grown up to push back against buyer concentration [12].

The economics are driven by yield per acre, the farmer-stock price, crop quality, a handful of shellers, weather, and government program payments — not by anything resembling a stock-market cycle. The central underwriting questions are yield, realized price, quality grade, input costs, irrigation, rotation, offtake contracts, and sheller access.

2. What it is and how it is structured

Scope. NAICS 111992 is the growing of peanuts — planting, cultivating, and harvesting the crop as "farmer stock" (peanuts still in the shell, as they come off the field). A typical cycle runs from seed, planting, and crop protection through digging, inverting, curing, drying, harvesting, grading, and delivery. That is where the code stops. Shellers then remove the hull, sort kernels by size and quality, and sell for peanut butter, snacks, candy, oil, meal, seed, and animal feed [2][4].

Peanut types. The four commercial types — Runner, Spanish, Valencia, and Virginia — determine end use, price, and customer eligibility. Runners dominate U.S. acreage (especially Georgia) and go mostly into peanut butter; Virginias are the large "in-shell" and gourmet snack nuts [4].

What it excludes — and where most of the money and nearly all the investable public companies actually sit:

Peanuts are almost always grown in rotation with cotton and corn: rotation breaks disease cycles, and peanuts — a legume — fix nitrogen back into the soil, raising the yield of the next crop. So the "peanut decision" is partly a whole-farm rotation decision, and peanut acreage rises and falls partly with cotton prices [4].

Ownership mix. Overwhelmingly private, family-controlled sole proprietorships and partnerships. USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) reported that family farms were 95% of all U.S. farms in 2022 (an all-crops figure, not peanut-specific) [22]. Field-level operations are capital-intensive — specialized diggers and combines, and, across much of the belt, irrigation — which pushes toward fewer, larger farms over time, but the growing sector has essentially no public or institutional ownership. Shelling and processing are far more concentrated, mixing corporate owners, family businesses, and farmer-owned cooperatives.

3. How big it is

The undercount caveat — read this first. Do not look for this industry in the usual federal business statistics. Crop farming (including 111992) is excluded from the Economic Census, County Business Patterns, and Nonemployer Statistics, because most farms have no paid employees and are instead counted through USDA's separate Census of Agriculture [2][22]. Our ingested federal record for NAICS 111992 therefore contains only one business metric — the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) size standard — and no firm, employment, payroll, revenue, or market-value counts, because those are simply not collected for this code in the business census [1]. Missing employer statistics should not be read as zero farms, jobs, or revenue. For structure and scale you must use USDA crop data, as this primer does; the "~7,000 operations" figure is an industry/USDA count of peanut-farming families, not a business-census establishment count [3].

The one business figure we have. By the SBA size standard, a peanut farm counts as a "small business" if average annual receipts are under $2.5 million [1]. In practice nearly every peanut farm clears that bar, so the entire growing sector is small-business by federal definition.

Physical scale (USDA — U.S. Department of Agriculture — figures). These describe the crop, not total industry revenue:

Farm value captures the first sale of the crop only; it excludes downstream shelling, oil and meal, branded foods, and retail margins.

Geographic concentration. Six states — Georgia, Florida, Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas — grow essentially the entire crop, and Georgia alone produces more than all the others combined (3.706 billion lb in 2025) [5][8].

Year-to-year swings are large. Peanut acreage and output are cyclical. The 2022 crop was much smaller — about 5.57 billion lb on ~1.45 million harvested acres [4] — and USDA's July 2026 outlook projected a pullback for 2026/27 to roughly 1.5 million planted acres and 5.5 billion lb of production [9]. Treat any single year as a point on a swinging line, not a trend.

4. Investable universe

There is no publicly traded pure-play peanut farm. Public exposure is downstream and adjacent, and in every case peanuts are only a slice — often a rounding error — of a much larger, diversified business. Peanut economics are rarely disclosed separately in consolidated results.

Public companies

ADM and Olam sit closest to origination and processing; Smucker, Hormel, and Hershey are downstream brand owners; Corteva, Nutrien, and Deere are input/equipment suppliers; the REITs are land. None is a "peanut stock" in any meaningful sense — buying them is diversified food, agribusiness, or land exposure in which peanuts are a small input.

Private owners and strategic buyers

• Birdsong Peanuts — the largest independent, privately held sheller; a multigenerational family business that buys directly from growers and supplies manufacturers [29].
• Premium Peanut (Georgia) — grower-owned sheller; its materials cite 450+ grower-owners, 300,000+ tons of annual processing capacity, and roughly 10% of U.S. harvested peanuts [30].
• Coastal Growers (Alabama) — farmer-owned sheller built to recapture shelling margin for growers [12].
• Delta Peanut (Arkansas) — 100%-farmer-owned sheller with 180,000+ tons of annual capacity at maximum operation [31].
• Mars, Incorporated (private) — a major downstream buyer; says it purchases 300+ million lb of peanuts a year for Snickers, M&M's, and other products [32].
• KMC (Kelley Manufacturing) — private maker of peanut-specific harvest equipment.

5. How the money works

At the farm level the equation is simple and the marketing system is distinctive:

Revenue ≈ grade-adjusted pounds sold × realized price + government support and insurance proceeds

• Yield. Irrigated runner peanuts in Georgia can yield 4,000–4,500+ lb/acre; dryland fields much less. Yield swings with rainfall, disease pressure, and harvest quality [5].
• Quality is decisive. Moisture, foreign material, kernel size, sound mature kernels, splits, damage, and aflatoxin all determine whether a lot qualifies for higher-value food channels. The clean, edible-market grade ("Segregation 1") captures the best price; farmer-stock peanuts are received, dried, graded, and stored at local buying points before moving to a sheller [5].
• No futures market. Peanuts are one of the only major U.S. crops with no futures contract and no transparent cash exchange, so growers cannot hedge on a screen (Hershey's own filings flag this) [16][28]. Instead they market two ways: (1) option/marketing contracts signed with a sheller, often before planting, at a set price per ton; and (2) the federal marketing assistance loan — a nonrecourse loan that lets a grower store the crop, pledge it as collateral, and take interim cash instead of dumping it at harvest [16][17].
• Government payments as a floor. Under Price Loss Coverage (PLC) in the Farm Bill, when the average farm price falls below the statutory reference price, the government pays growers the difference on 85% of their "base acres." The reference price was raised from $535/ton to $630/ton starting with the 2025 crop — a meaningful margin cushion when market prices are weak [14][15].
• Costs. The big line items are fungicides (peanuts are disease-prone — leaf spot, white mold, tomato spotted wilt virus), seed, fertilizer, irrigation, fuel, land rent, labor, drying, storage, and equipment. Harvest is a two-step mechanical process (digging/inverting, then combining) needing specialized gear. Cash flow is seasonal and requires substantial post-harvest working capital [4].

Useful farm metrics: harvested yield/acre; price received/lb; cost per acre and per pound; irrigated vs dryland mix; quality premiums, discounts, and rejection rates; contracted vs uncommitted volume; sheller access and freight; debt service and working-capital needs. For shellers, the relevant metrics are throughput, storage utilization, shell-out recovery, kernel mix, oil/meal yields, inventory turnover, customer concentration, and plant downtime — they earn the spread between what they pay growers and what shelled peanuts and oil sell for. Branded makers (Jif, Skippy, Reese's) earn on brand pricing power over a cheap, stable commodity input.

6. What drives demand

• Peanut butter is the anchor. USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS) reports it accounts for more than 60% of U.S. peanuts consumed as food (2024/25 marketing year), with peanut-butter use 6% above its prior 10-year average — a low-cost, shelf-stable, high-protein staple that holds up in downturns [10]. Snack nuts and confectionery split most of the rest, and roughly 15% of the crop is crushed for oil [4].
• Protein and snacking trends. Rising interest in affordable plant protein and high-protein snacking supports peanut and peanut-butter demand; high-oleic varieties improve shelf life and product quality, and manufacturers increasingly want consistent, traceable supply.
• Exports absorb roughly a fifth to a quarter of the crop. Mexico is now the top raw-peanut destination (~147,000 tons/yr recently), followed by Canada (~112,000 tons); Mexico, Canada, China, and the EU together take about 90% of raw U.S. peanut exports. China was the largest buyer as recently as 2019–2021 but has cut purchases sharply, making trade policy a live swing factor [11].
• Government and institutional buying. USDA commodity purchases of peanut butter for food banks and school meals add a steady, counter-cyclical demand floor.
• The allergy cross-current. Peanut allergy is a genuine headwind (school bans, avoidance), but updated medical guidance favoring early peanut introduction in infants may slowly reduce prevalence — a long-run potential tailwind, not a near-term swing.
• Recent trajectory. USDA's July 2026 outlook revised 2025/26 peanut food use up 7% to 3.4 billion lb, with peanut-butter use up 6% through May 2026 [9][10].

7. Regulation

Peanut farming is one of the more heavily programmed U.S. crops.

• Farm Bill commodity program. Peanuts are a "covered commodity" eligible for PLC and Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and for marketing assistance loans and loan deficiency payments (LDPs), administered by USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) on behalf of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) [17]. The 2025 budget-reconciliation law ("One Big Beautiful Bill Act," signed July 2025) raised the peanut reference price to $630/ton, lifted the marketing-loan rate to $390/ton for 2026, added base acres, and set a separate peanut payment limit of $155,000 per entity — a notably generous update relative to corn, soybeans, and wheat [14][15].
• Federal crop insurance (USDA Risk Management Agency) underwrites yield and revenue protection for growers.
• Grading and aflatoxin. All farmer-stock peanuts are graded, and grade/segregation status governs price and edible-market eligibility. Drought-stressed peanuts can develop aflatoxin, a carcinogenic mold toxin: the USDA standard for edible peanuts is 15 parts per billion (ppb) total aflatoxins, and the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) action level is 20 ppb; contaminated lots are diverted or destroyed. This is the single biggest food-safety and quality risk in the crop [18].
• Food safety and allergen law. Downstream processors fall under the FDA's Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) — preventive controls, sanitation, traceability, allergen controls — and peanuts are one of the major food allergens that must be labeled (the 2008–09 Peanut Corporation of America salmonella outbreak led to criminal convictions and reshaped industry practice) [19].
• Pesticide/environmental oversight. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registers pesticides and sets residue tolerances; changes in approved chemistry or limits directly affect cost and yield [20].
• Labor. Seasonal labor and the Department of Labor's H-2A temporary agricultural-worker program can affect operations, though peanut production is relatively mechanized [21].

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The defining feature of the peanut economy is buyer concentration in shelling. Two shellers — Birdsong Peanuts and Golden Peanut (owned by ADM) — together handle roughly 80% of U.S. peanuts, with Olam a distant third at around 10% and a dozen small shellers sharing the rest [12]. With no futures market and few buyers, growers have long complained of limited price transparency and bargaining power; ADM once paid $45 million to settle peanut price-fixing allegations, and academic and advocacy work has flagged the market-power problem [12][13].

Consolidation has run in two directions. Corporate scale grew — ADM took full control of Golden Peanut in 2011, and Olam acquired McCleskey Mills in 2014 [23][25]. The counter-move is farmer-owned vertical integration: grower-owned shellers such as Premium Peanut (Georgia), Coastal Growers (Alabama), and Delta Peanut (Arkansas) were built specifically to recapture shelling and marketing margin, and their storage/shelling share has been rising [12][30][31]. Meanwhile the grower base is slowly consolidating into fewer, larger farms.

Shelling and processing are capital-heavy (plants, buying points, storage, quality systems, logistics, customer approvals), which creates regional scale advantages. The most durable advantages are dependable grower relationships, nearby buying and storage, reliable irrigation and quality, customer-approved varieties, efficient grading, low freight, and conservative inventory/commodity-risk management. Brands (Jif, Skippy, Reese's) carry stronger consumer moats than farms, but remain exposed to raw-peanut prices, recalls, and shifting preferences.

9. Risks

• Weather. The crop is concentrated in the hurricane-exposed Southeast (Hurricane Michael devastated the 2018 Georgia crop) and is sensitive to drought during pod fill, heat, and poor harvest timing.
• Aflatoxin and disease. Drought stress raises aflatoxin risk; leaf spot, white mold, and tomato spotted wilt virus require heavy fungicide spending and can hit yield and grade. Contamination or recall events can hit growers and processors alike.
• Price cyclicality and oversupply. Acreage swings with cotton and prior-year peanut prices; a big crop and high carryover stocks can crater farmer-stock prices, with the PLC floor as the main cushion [14].
• Input-cost inflation. Fungicides, fuel, fertilizer, land rent, labor, and interest costs compress already-thin farm margins [4].
• Water and irrigation restrictions in parts of the belt.
• Buyer/customer concentration. Dependence on a small number of shellers or customers squeezes grower margins and price transparency [12].
• Trade exposure. With ~20–25% of the crop exported and China's buying already sharply reduced, tariffs and trade disputes are a real demand risk; competition comes from Argentina, India, and China [11].
• Demand-side allergy risk — school bans and avoidance remain a structural headwind for a crop whose largest end use is a childhood staple.
• Policy risk. Grower economics lean heavily on Farm Bill support; any future rollback of the newly raised reference and loan rates would matter a lot [14][15].
• Private-asset risk — illiquidity, limited disclosure, contract/counterparty and working-capital risk, and succession/operator-quality risk at family farms.

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes (indirect only). No pure-play grower exists, so public exposure means owning the downstream and input chain and accepting heavy dilution of the peanut theme:

• Processing/shelling (closest): Archer-Daniels-Midland (Golden Peanut); Olam Group (SGX-listed).
• Branded end-products: J.M. Smucker (Jif), Hormel (Skippy, Planters), Hershey (Reese's) — staple-food defensives with pricing power over a cheap input.
• Inputs and equipment: Corteva, Nutrien, Deere.
• Land: farmland REITs (Gladstone Land, Farmland Partners) for diversified row-crop acreage, a sliver in the peanut belt.

None should be bought for peanuts. The right analysis is segment mix, procurement policy, inventory, pricing power, recall exposure, and capital allocation — not a one-to-one link to peanut acreage.

Private routes (closer to the crop). Direct farm ownership or operating partnerships; buying or leasing peanut-belt farmland; farmland vehicles; equipment finance or private credit; grower-owned shellers (Premium Peanut, Coastal Growers, Delta Peanut); or storage assets. Diligence should verify soil and water rights, irrigation, crop and yield history, rotation, offtake contracts, quality history, insurance, debt terms, sheller access, environmental compliance, and succession. The structural limit: with no peanut futures contract, there is no liquid instrument to take a pure long/short view on peanut prices — exposure is physical (land, crop, cooperative equity) or equity in a diversified processor [16].

Outlook. Domestic demand rests on peanut butter — cheap, storable, protein-rich, recession-resistant — which argues for stability rather than growth. The clearest near-term positive is policy: the 2025 jump in the reference price to $630/ton and the higher marketing-loan rate materially improve the grower safety net into the 2026 crop [14]. USDA's July 2026 forecast for 2026/27 pointed to a supply pullback — roughly 1.5 million planted acres, 5.5 billion lb of production, food-use growth of ~2%, exports of ~1.4 billion lb, ending stocks of ~2.0 billion lb, and a season-average farm price near $0.24/lb — consistent with a heavy 2025 crop working off through weaker prices [9]. Offsetting the policy support are export softness (especially China), persistent aflatoxin/weather risk in a climate-stressed belt, and structural buyer concentration that keeps grower margins thin. The most interesting internal dynamic to watch is the continued rise of farmer-owned shellers, which could gradually rebalance power and margin toward growers [12].

Bottom line: a defensive, policy-cushioned agricultural niche rather than a growth story. Expect a stable-to-modestly-improving grower economy underpinned by generous federal support, with upside gated by exports and downside gated by weather and price cyclicality. Public equities offer convenient but diluted exposure; private farm and infrastructure assets offer more direct exposure but demand stronger operating diligence and tolerate less execution error. The most attractive private assets combine reliable irrigation, strong rotation economics, efficient production, quality premiums, contracted offtake, nearby shelling access, and moderate leverage.

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Sources

1. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards (NAICS 111992 = $2.5M average annual receipts), 2023. (Histometrics ingested ground-truth federal statistics record.) https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
2. U.S. Census Bureau, NAICS 2022 — definitions of 111992 (Peanut Farming) and adjacent codes 115114, 311911, 311224, 3113, 111920, 111150. https://www.census.gov/naics/
3. National Peanut Board / USA Peanuts, "Peanut Growers & Industry" (~7,000 U.S. peanut-farming families), 2024–2025. https://nationalpeanutboard.org/industries/growers/
4. Agricultural Marketing Resource Center (Iowa State University), "Peanut Profile" (peanut types; ~60% peanut butter, ~15% oil; rotation/nitrogen fixation; 2022 crop ~5.57 billion lb on ~1.45M acres), revised 2024. https://www.agmrc.org/commodities-products/nuts/peanut-profile
5. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, Crop Production 2025 Summary (2025 planted 1.953M / harvested 1.906M acres; 7.18 billion lb; 3,767 lb/acre; Georgia 3.706 billion lb), 2026. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cropan26.pdf
6. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, Crop Values 2025 Summary (preliminary 2025 farm value ~$1.777B; price ~$0.247/lb), 2026. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cpvl0226.pdf
7. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2022 Census of Agriculture (farm-structure context). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2022/
8. USDA Economic Research Service, "Georgia leads U.S. production of peanuts, outproducing all other States combined." https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/106192
9. USDA Economic Research Service, Oil Crops Outlook: July 2026 (2025/26 food use 3.4 billion lb, +7%; 2026/27 forecast ~1.5M planted acres, 5.5 billion lb, exports ~1.4 billion lb, ending stocks ~2.0 billion lb, price ~$0.24/lb), 2026. https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/
10. USDA Economic Research Service, "Peanut butter accounts for more than 60 percent of U.S. peanuts consumed for food; consumption up 6 percent from the 10-year average," 2026. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/
11. Oklahoma Farm Report, "How Might Trade Disputes Affect the US Peanut Industry?" (Mexico #1 ~147k tons, Canada ~112k, China decline; top-4 ≈ 90% of raw exports), February 2025. https://www.oklahomafarmreport.com/okfr/2025/02/19/how-might-trade-disputes-affect-the-us-peanut-industry/
12. Civil Eats, "The Peanut Industry Has a Monopoly Problem—but Farmers Are Pushing Back" (Birdsong + Golden Peanut ~80%, Olam ~10%; farmer-owned shellers Premium Peanut, Coastal Growers), January 2021. https://civileats.com/2021/01/15/op-ed-the-peanut-industry-has-a-monopoly-problem-but-farmers-are-pushing-back/
13. FoodBev Media, "ADM agrees to pay $45m to settle peanut price-fixing allegations." https://www.foodbev.com/news/adm-agrees-to-pay-45m-to-settle-peanut-price-fixing-allegations
14. Georgia Peanut Commission / Ohio State University Farm Office, "2025 Reconciliation Farm Bill — Summary Overview" (peanut reference price $535→$630/ton for 2025 crop; marketing loan $355→$390/ton for 2026; added base acres; $155,000 peanut payment limit), July 2025. https://farmoffice.osu.edu/blog/fri-07112025-907am/2025-reconciliation-farm-bill-%E2%80%93-summary-overview
15. Congressional Research Service / American Farm Bureau Federation, "Farm Commodity Provisions in the 2018 Farm Bill" (prior reference price $535/ton, loan rate $355/ton, PLC/ARC on 85% of base acres). https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45730
16. Farm Progress / USDA ERS, "Peanut Futures: Know the tools to handle peanut production risks" and "U.S. Peanut Sector Adapts to Major Policy Changes" (no peanut futures/cash exchange; marketing assistance loan + option contracts). https://www.farmprogress.com/peanut/peanut-futures-know-the-tools-to-handle-peanut-production-risks
17. USDA Farm Service Agency, "Peanut Program" (nonrecourse marketing assistance loans, LDPs, Commodity Credit Corporation). https://www.fsa.usda.gov/resources/programs/peanut-program
18. FDA and USDA, "Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Aflatoxins in Peanuts" (USDA edible standard 15 ppb; FDA action level 20 ppb). https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/domestic-mous/
19. FDA, "FSMA Final Rule for Preventive Controls for Human Food" and "Food Allergies." https://www.fda.gov/food/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma/ and https://www.fda.gov/food/food-allergies
20. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Setting Tolerances for Pesticide Residues in Foods." https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-tolerances/setting-tolerances-pesticide-residues-foods
21. U.S. Department of Labor, "H-2A Temporary Agricultural Program." https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/programs/h-2a
22. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, "Family-Owned Farms Account for 95% of U.S. Farms" (2022 Census of Agriculture), 2025. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/archive/2025/08-19-2025.php
23. Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, "ADM Acquires Remaining Interest in Golden Peanut Company" (2011) and 2025 Form 10-K. https://investors.adm.com/ and https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000007084
24. Olam Group Limited, "Annual Report 2025 — Financial Report" (Olam Peanut Shelling Company; Universal Blanchers) and Shareholder Centre (SGX: VC2). https://www.olamgroup.com/investors/shareholder-centre.html
25. Olam International, "Olam to Acquire U.S. Peanut Sheller McCleskey Mills," 2014. https://www.olamgroup.com/news/all-news/press-release/olam-acquire-us-peanut-sheller-mccleskey-mills.html
26. The J.M. Smucker Co., 2025 Form 10-K (Jif, Uncrustables). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000091419
27. Hormel Foods Corporation, 2025 Form 10-K (Skippy, Planters). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000048465
28. The Hershey Company, 2025 Form 10-K (peanuts a major raw material for which active futures contracts are unavailable). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000047111
29. Birdsong Peanuts, "What We Do." https://www.birdsongpeanuts.com/what-we-do/
30. Premium Peanut, company materials (450+ grower-owners; 300,000+ tons capacity; ~10% of U.S. harvested peanuts). https://www.premiumpnut.com/
31. Delta Peanut, "About Us" (100%-farmer-owned; 180,000+ tons annual capacity). https://deltapeanut.com/about-us
32. Mars, Incorporated, "Protect the Peanut" (purchases 300+ million lb of peanuts annually for M&M's, Snickers). https://www.mars.com/