Orange Groves (United States) — NAICS 111310

An investor's primer. Figures are U.S. unless noted, and are the most recent official releases available. Facts labeled "reported" are sourced; forward-looking statements are flagged as judgments.

1. Overview

The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 111310 covers farms primarily engaged in growing oranges — the grove itself, up to the farm gate. It stops before the juice plant, the packing house, and the retail brand, which sit in other codes [7].

This is a land-, water-, labor-, and biology-intensive business, and it is living through one of the sharpest distress stories in U.S. agriculture. Two decades ago the U.S. grew roughly 300 million boxes of oranges a year, most of it in Florida for juice. A bacterial tree disease — citrus greening, known technically as HLB (Huanglongbing) — plus repeated hurricanes have cut Florida's orange crop by more than 90% [10][11]. The industry has split into two: a collapsing Florida juice sector and a smaller, steadier California fresh-fruit sector. National orange output is now about 2.4 million tons a year, roughly three-quarters of it from California [1][3].

Why this matters to an investor of any kind: there is almost no clean way to own a U.S. orange grove through the public markets. The main U.S.-listed grower just quit the business [15][38]. What remains is (a) farmland and its development/optionality value, (b) a globally traded commodity — orange-juice futures — that has whipsawed violently, and (c) a possible science-driven turnaround if a cure for HLB arrives. The meaningful capital is largely private: land, groves, cooperatives, and processing.

Bottom line: U.S. orange groves are a scarce-asset and operating-business situation, not a clean public-market growth sector. The most defensible opportunities are selective — resilient fresh-market supply, disease-tolerant replanting, efficient processing, irrigation/technology, and carefully underwritten land.

2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. 111310 is the on-farm growing of oranges: planting, grove care (fertilizer, irrigation, pest and disease control), and harvest. USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture) distinguishes early, midseason, and Navel oranges (more associated with fresh eating) from Valencia oranges (particularly suited to juice) [4]. Growers sell into one of two channels — fresh (to packing houses, sold as whole fruit) or processed (to juice plants, priced on juice content).

What it excludes (adjacent NAICS codes an investor should not conflate):

• 111320 — Citrus (except Orange) Groves: lemons, limes, grapefruit, tangerines/mandarins (including the "Cuties"/"Halos" mandarin business). Different crop line, different code [7].
• Other 1113x codes: noncitrus fruit and tree-nut farms.
• Harvesting contractors, farm-management firms, packinghouses, juice processors, wholesalers, retailers, and consumer brands are all separate businesses outside 111310. This is where most of the value and the famous brands (Tropicana, Minute Maid, Simply, Florida's Natural) actually sit — not in the grove line item.

So 111310 badly understates the industry's economic footprint: packing, juice manufacturing, and branding are counted elsewhere.

Ownership mix. Fragmented at the grove level. Florida's industry describes most groves as family-owned and operated, while larger integrated companies and grower cooperatives control more of the packing, processing, marketing, and distribution [25]. In California the fresh-fruit marketing cooperative Sunkist Growers aggregates thousands of grower-members; in Florida the juice cooperative Florida's Natural Growers is farmer-owned [17][24]. Large land-and-farming companies (Wonderful Citrus, U.S. Sugar's Southern Gardens, Alico) hold big acreage blocks, and the processing/branding tier above the grove is highly concentrated and often foreign-owned [18][20][15][37].

3. How big it is

Our ground-truth federal figure. The one industry-specific metric in our ingested official stats file is the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) size standard: a business is "small" if average annual receipts are $4 million or less for NAICS 111310 (2023) [6]. That is a government-contracting threshold, not a measure of industry revenue or market size. The file contains no sector-wide establishment, employment, payroll, acreage, or revenue total — so none is stated or inferred here. Most orange farms clear the $4 million bar comfortably; by federal definition this is a small-business industry.

Best official operating measures (USDA). From USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS):

• National, 2024–25 marketing year: about 307,800 bearing acres produced 2.394 million tons of oranges worth roughly $1.09 billion at the packinghouse-door. About 1.47 million tons went to fresh use and 0.93 million tons to processing [1]. (All U.S. citrus combined — oranges plus grapefruit, lemons, and tangerines — was worth on the order of $2.8 billion; oranges are the largest single piece [1].)
• Florida's collapse: Florida produced 12.2 million boxes of oranges in 2024–25, down 32% in a single year — of which 11.12 million boxes went to processing and 1.08 million to fresh. The all-orange on-tree price rose to $13.30 per box, from $10.01 the prior season [2]. Against a peak of roughly 240 million boxes around 2003–04, that is a decline of more than 90% [10][11].
• 2025–26 forecast (USDA, April 2026): about 2.53 million tons nationally — 1.94 million tons in California, 550,000 in Florida, 39,000 in Texas [3]. That confirms California at roughly three-quarters of the national crop and Florida as a minority. These are forecasts, not final results.

Undercount and coverage caveat. Standard federal business registers understate this industry: the Census Bureau's County Business Patterns and Nonemployer Statistics both exclude crop production (NAICS 111) [8], so there is no reliable payroll-firm or establishment count for orange groves the way there is for, say, restaurants. The authoritative operating census is USDA's Census of Agriculture (2022) [9]. Our ingested ground-truth file holds only the SBA size standard, so we do not state a precise national farm count. Directionally, the commercial grower base is a few thousand operations and shrinks each season as groves are abandoned, sold, or converted [10].

4. Investable universe

Pure public plays barely exist. The table below is the practical map; tickers and valuation are discussed further in Section 10.

Beverage majors give only trace, diluted exposure and are buyers/brand owners, not growers: The Coca-Cola Company (NYSE: KO) owns Minute Maid and Simply; PepsiCo (Nasdaq: PEP) sold a majority of Tropicana to private-equity firm PAI Partners in 2022, retaining a minority stake [37].

Our conclusion: no currently listed company offers clean, concentrated exposure to NAICS 111310. Public investors must accept legacy exposure (ALCO), geographic mismatch (LMNR), diversification (DOLE, FDP), or trace beverage exposure (KO, PEP).

Major private owners and control points carry most of the industry:

• The Wonderful Company / Wonderful Citrus — privately held, controlled by Stewart and Lynda Resnick; describes itself as America's largest citrus grower, with about 74,000 acres farmed across its citrus footprint (exact U.S. orange acreage not disclosed) [18][19].
• U.S. Sugar / Southern Gardens Citrus — a privately held, vertically integrated Florida grower-processor; historical materials cite Southern Gardens at more than 32,000 acres, though recent reporting notes some citrus land is being converted to other uses [20][21].
• IMG Citrus — family-owned Florida company farming more than 11,000 acres of fresh Florida citrus, including juice oranges [22].
• Cooperatives: Sunkist Growers (California/Arizona fresh-citrus marketing co-op) and Florida's Natural Growers (Florida juice co-op) aggregate, pack, brand, and market on behalf of members rather than owning every grove [17][24].
• Processing / brand tier (mostly private-equity- or foreign-owned): Tropicana Brands Group (PAI Partners) is the largest U.S. juice brand; Brazil's Cutrale and Citrosuco and Switzerland's Louis Dreyfus dominate global juice-concentrate trade; Peace River Citrus Products is an independent Florida processor with affiliated groves (about 20 million boxes of annual processing capacity and a 2,500-acre grove under development) [37][23].

Bottom line: there is no large, pure, listed U.S. orange-grove equity. The real ownership — and the real growing — is private.

5. How the money works

Orange growing is a perennial-crop, land-heavy business. A simplified grove model:

saleable boxes/acre × realized price/box − grove care − harvest & hauling − packing or processing − overhead & financing.

• Yield = boxes per acre (a "box" is ~90 lbs in Florida, ~75 lbs in California).
• Price depends on channel. Fresh oranges (California navels) sell by the carton at a premium but carry grading, size, and rejection risk. Processing oranges (Florida Valencia/Hamlin) are priced on pound-solids — the amount of juice sugar (measured as Brix) in the fruit — at much lower per-box value, but with a more predictable outlet. Returns are quoted "on-tree" (to the grower) or "packinghouse-door," net of harvesting, hauling, packing, and marketing. Florida's 2024–25 all-orange on-tree price was $13.30/box [2].
• Cost structure: grove care is relatively fixed in the short run (fertilizer and, critically, repeated spraying against the disease-carrying psyllid); harvest is hand-picked and heavily reliant on H-2A guest labor; water and replanting round it out. Disease, weather, or fruit drop can cut revenue without cutting much of the maintenance expense [15].

Long capital horizon. New orchards are typically non-bearing for about 4–5 years and are then productive and depreciated over roughly 20–30 years (Limoneira's disclosed convention) [16]. Replanting is therefore a major capital-allocation decision, not a routine annual expense.

Why the unit economics broke. HLB attacks the whole model at once — it lowers yield, shrinks fruit, drops fruit early, and cuts juice content (Brix) — while raising cost per acre, because infected trees need far more nutrition and spraying to survive [14][12]. Many Florida groves went cash-negative, which is why the rational move for a large owner became exit and monetize the land — precisely Alico's decision [15][38]. A grove can be worth more for water access, conservation, or future development than for its annual fruit cash flow.

Cyclicality and hedging. Because trees can't respond quickly to price, supply shocks (freeze, hurricane, disease) send prices sharply up or down. FCOJ (frozen concentrated orange juice) futures on ICE (the Intercontinental Exchange) are the industry's price barometer and hedging tool: they spiked to a record near $5.50/lb in December 2024 on scarcity, then crashed below $2.25/lb by April 2025 as demand buckled, and fell further into 2026 [34][35]. Growers also lean on federal crop insurance and marketing-order support.

6. What drives demand

Fresh and processed demand are moving in opposite directions.

• Fresh oranges — relatively stable, favors California. Fresh-citrus availability was expected to exceed 26 lbs per person in 2024–25, with imports supplying more than 40% of fresh-citrus availability [4]. Fresh demand rests on convenience, nutrition (the vitamin-C/"immunity" angle), premium varieties, foodservice, and year-round retail programs.
• Orange juice — in structural, long-run decline. U.S. orange- and grapefruit-juice consumption fell about 57% from 2005–06 levels, with per-person orange-juice availability heading toward roughly 2 gallons of single-strength equivalent (SSE) in 2024–25; imports were expected to supply nearly 90% of U.S. orange-juice availability [4]. USDA's March 2026 outlook forecast just 99 million SSE gallons of domestic OJ production in 2025–26 against imports above 580 million SSE gallons, with Mexico and Brazil together supplying 94% of U.S. OJ imports [5]. Rabobank projects global juice demand contracting again in 2026–27 [36].

Investment implication: fresh-market oranges have the better structural demand story. For juice, domestic supply scarcity can support processor pricing even as consumption volume keeps falling — a pricing benefit, not a growth story. The secular juice decline is the headwind that most threatens the Florida-style grove.

7. Regulation

The binding regulatory issues are plant disease, food safety, pesticides, labor, water, land use, and trade.

• Plant health (the big one). HLB/citrus greening is a bacterial disease spread by the Asian citrus psyllid (ACP); USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) states that infected trees eventually die and there is no cure [12]. APHIS and state agriculture departments impose quarantines and movement restrictions on citrus plants and material — APHIS expanded a California HLB quarantine area in 2026 [13].
• Research and marketing bodies. USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) runs federal marketing orders (grade/quality standards, industry-funded research and promotion) for Florida citrus and California navels [32]; the Florida Department of Citrus (funded by a per-box tax) and the Citrus Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) channel money into the HLB-cure effort [33].
• State licensing. The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS) licenses citrus dealers, packinghouses, and processing plants, and Florida law (Fla. Stat. §601.40) requires registration of citrus packing and processing facilities [26][27].
• Food safety. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) Produce Safety Rule sets standards for growing, harvesting, packing, and holding produce [28].
• Pesticides and worker safety. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registers which chemicals growers may use against the psyllid, and its Agricultural Worker Protection Standard governs worker pesticide exposure [29].
• Labor. The Department of Labor (DOL) H-2A temporary agricultural visa program supplies most citrus harvest labor and carries recruitment, wage, and housing requirements; its mandated Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) has jumped roughly 10–15% in recent years, and the industry is lobbying for reform [30][31].
• Water. A binding constraint in California, governed by water rights and the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).
• Trade. The U.S. has historically taxed Brazilian orange-juice imports; tariff policy on Brazilian juice remains a live variable for domestic processors and consumers [37].

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The U.S. industry is really two industries:

• California — mostly fresh, premium navels; more stable; constrained by water and labor, and watching HLB creep in. USDA's 2025–26 forecast places California at 1.94 million tons [3].
• Florida — mostly juice; in steep, disease-driven decline (550,000 tons forecast for 2025–26), and disproportionately important to what domestic juice supply remains. Texas (39,000 tons) and Arizona are small [3][4].

A grove's competitive edge is not just acreage — it is water access, tree health, variety mix, proximity to packing/processing, harvesting logistics, customer relationships, and the balance sheet to finance several non-bearing years of replanting.

Globally, the U.S. is a price-taker. Brazil (São Paulo state) dominates world juice-concentrate supply, and a handful of processors — Cutrale, Citrosuco, and trader Louis Dreyfus — control the bulk trade; U.S. brands increasingly blend imported (Mexican and Brazilian) juice because domestic supply has vanished [37][5].

Consolidation here is really contraction. Florida's processor count fell from dozens to a handful, packing houses have closed, and acreage keeps converting to housing or other crops; Alico's citrus exit is the highest-profile example of an owner deciding the capital and operating risk no longer justified staying in [15][38]. Marketing and packing are also consolidating — Limoneira's citrus sales-and-marketing merger with Sunkist was expected to generate about $5 million of annual cost savings from FY2026 (management's expectation, not a guarantee) [17]. Growers are price-takers with little bargaining power against concentrated processors and retailers.

9. Risks

• Disease (HLB): existential in Florida (near-total commercial infection) and a growing threat in California and Texas; no commercial cure yet [12][14].
• Weather: hurricanes (Ian 2022, Milton 2024) and freezes can wipe out a season, with no quick replant fix because trees take years to bear [10].
• Demand erosion: the secular decline in orange-juice consumption undercuts the Florida model directly [4][5][36].
• Cost inflation and labor: rising H-2A/AEWR wages plus fertilizer, spray, irrigation, and insurance costs — which can rise even as crop volume falls [31][15].
• Water and inputs: drought and groundwater limits (SGMA) in California.
• Price volatility: FCOJ has swung from record highs to a crash within months [34][35].
• Trade policy: tariff shifts on imported juice cut both ways for growers, processors, and consumers [37].
• Land conversion / slow biology: the industry cannot supply-respond quickly, and the highest-and-best use of many groves is now non-agricultural [15].
• Customer concentration: a grower dependent on one processor, co-op, or fresh buyer has limited leverage.
• Data opacity: private groves are not fully captured in standard federal business statistics, making sizing and competitor comparison hard [8].

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public-market routes (limited).

• Direct equity is thin. Treat Alico (ALCO) as a land-transition situation, Limoneira (LMNR) as a diversified lemon/farmland/water company with negligible (and Chilean) orange exposure, and Dole (DOLE) / Fresh Del Monte (FDP) as broad produce proxies. Coca-Cola (KO) and PepsiCo (PEP) give only trace beverage-side exposure. None should be valued as a pure U.S. orange-grove operator [15][16].
• The commodity itself: FCOJ futures and options on ICE offer direct — and highly volatile, speculative — price exposure, not an operating investment [34][35].
• Farmland vehicles: listed farmland owners such as Gladstone Land (LAND) and Farmland Partners (FPI) hold permanent-crop acreage, but orange-specific exposure is small and not the reason to own them.

Private routes (where the real exposure is).

• Acquire or lease groves with verified water, disease, tree-age, and land-use characteristics; land-bank in Florida for development optionality (the Alico thesis); finance replanting, irrigation, cold storage, packing, or processing; invest alongside cooperatives or integrated private operators; and back disease-tolerant varieties, nurseries, monitoring, and grove-management technology [15][37].

The most useful diligence metrics are industry-specific — not utility rate base or REIT-style multiples: bearing vs. productive tree acres; boxes per acre and fruit-drop rate; fresh-vs-processed mix; realized on-tree price per box; pound-solids yield for processing fruit; tree age and replanting needs; HLB incidence and treatment cost; irrigation cost and water security; packinghouse access; debt per acre and maintenance capital; and insurance recoveries and alternative-use land value.

Outlook (forward-looking judgment). USDA's 2025–26 forecast (~2.53 million tons, modestly above the revised 2024–25 crop) reflects the new geography: California fresh oranges look more resilient, while Florida juice faces continued structural decline unless science intervenes [3]. Hopes rest on HLB-tolerant rootstocks, bactericide/antibiotic treatments, and gene-edited/CRISPR trees, backed by CRDF and USDA funding — but a durable, scaled cure is uncertain and years away, and juice demand is falling regardless [33][36]. Surviving growers may benefit from tight domestic supply and firmer prices, but the industry does not yet offer a simple long-term growth thesis. Across the industry, the most reliable value is increasingly the land, not the fruit.

Near-term drivers to watch: the size of the 2025–26 crop; any breakthrough in HLB treatment; where orange-juice prices settle after the 2024–25 boom-and-bust; U.S. tariff policy on Brazilian juice; and Florida's hurricane season.

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Sources

1. USDA NASS, Citrus Fruits 2024 Summary (Aug 2025) — national orange acreage, production, value, fresh/processed split. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cfrt0825.pdf
2. USDA NASS, 2024–2025 Florida Citrus Summary (Preliminary) (Aug 2025) — Florida boxes, processing/fresh split, on-tree price. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Florida/Publications/Citrus/Citrus_Summary/Citrus_Summary_Prelim/cit082925.pdf
3. USDA NASS, Crop Production (April 2026) — 2025–26 orange forecast by state. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/crop0426.pdf
4. USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), Fruit and Tree Nuts Outlook (FTS-381, March 2025) — fresh per-capita, import shares, OJ per-capita, varieties. https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/outlooks/111231/FTS-381.pdf
5. USDA ERS, Fruit and Tree Nuts Outlook (FTS-384, March 2026) — 2025–26 OJ production/imports, Mexico/Brazil import share. https://www.ers.usda.gov/media/20866/fts-384.pdf
6. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards (2023) — NAICS 111310 = $4.0 million receipts. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
7. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS: 111310 Orange Groves — scope and exclusions. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=111310&year=2022
8. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns Methodology — crop production (NAICS 111) excluded. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
9. USDA NASS, 2022 Census of Agriculture. https://www.nass.usda.gov/AgCensus/
10. Southern Ag Today, "Citrus Greening, Hurricanes, and the Decline of the Florida Citrus Industry" (2024). https://southernagtoday.org/2024/01/05/citrus-greening-hurricanes-and-the-decline-of-the-florida-citrus-industry/
11. Citrus Industry Magazine, "How Florida Orange Production Plummeted 92% in 20 Years" (2024). https://citrusindustry.net/2024/05/07/florida-orange-production-plummeted-years/
12. USDA APHIS, Citrus Greening and Asian Citrus Psyllid — infected trees die; no cure. https://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant-pests-diseases/citrus-diseases/citrus-greening-and-asian-citrus-psyllid
13. USDA APHIS, APHIS Expands the Citrus Greening (HLB) Quarantined Area in California (2026). https://www.aphis.usda.gov/news/program-update/aphis-expands-citrus-greening-huanglongbing-quarantined-area-california-7
14. University of Florida IFAS, "Impact of Citrus Greening on Citrus Operations in Florida" (FE983). https://ask.ifas.ufl.edu/publication/FE983
15. Alico, Inc., Form 10-K, FY2025 — citrus wind-down, gross/net citrus acres, land holdings. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/3545/000000354525000140/alco-20250930.htm
16. Limoneira Company, Form 10-K, FY2025 — orange acreage/revenue, orchard economics. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342423/000134242325000039/lmnr-20251031.htm
17. Limoneira Company, Citrus Sales & Marketing Merger with Sunkist Growers (8-K exhibit, 2025) — ~$5M expected savings. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342423/000110465925057828/tm2517481d1_ex99-1.htm
18. The Wonderful Company, Who We Are — Resnick ownership; largest citrus grower framing. https://www.wonderful.com/who-we-are/
19. Wonderful Citrus, Why Wonderful — ~74,000 acres farmed. https://www.wonderfulcitrus.com/why-wonderful
20. U.S. Sugar, What We Do — Southern Gardens Citrus. https://www.ussugar.com/what-we-do/
21. U.S. Sugar, 2025 Annual Report — citrus acreage and conversion. https://www.ussugarannualreport.com/2025
22. IMG Citrus, Our Story — 11,000+ acres of fresh Florida citrus. https://imgcitrus.com/our-story/
23. Peace River Citrus Products, About Us — ~20M-box processing capacity; 2,500-acre grove. https://www.peacerivercitrus.com/about.html
24. Florida's Natural Growers, About Us — farmer-owned cooperative. https://www.floridasnatural.com/about
25. Florida Citrus (floridacitrus.org), About Us — family-owned grove framing; Florida Department of Citrus. https://www.floridacitrus.org/about/
26. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS), Division of Fruit and Vegetables — dealer/packinghouse licensing. https://www.fdacs.gov/divisions-offices/fruit-and-vegetables
27. Florida Statutes §601.40, Registration of Citrus Packinghouses and Processing Plants. https://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0600-0699/0601/Sections/0601.40.html
28. U.S. FDA, FSMA Final Rule on Produce Safety (2016). https://www.fda.gov/food/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma/fsma-final-rule-produce-safety
29. U.S. EPA, Agricultural Worker Protection Standard. https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-worker-safety/agricultural-worker-protection-standard-wps
30. U.S. Department of Labor, H-2A Temporary Agricultural Program. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/programs/h-2a
31. Citrus Industry Magazine, "FFVA Urges Changes to H-2A Program" (2025) — AEWR wage increases. https://citrusindustry.net/2025/05/22/ffva-urges-changes-h-2a-program/
32. USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), Florida Citrus Marketing Order. https://www.ams.usda.gov/content/usda-proposed-changes-florida-citrus-marketing-order
33. Citrus Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), About. https://citrusrdf.org/about/
34. Bespoke Investment Group, "No More Juice — The Rise and Fall of Orange Juice Futures" (2025). https://www.bespokepremium.com/interactive/posts/think-big-blog/no-more-juice-the-rise-and-fall-of-orange-juice-futures
35. Barchart, "Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice Prices Are Surging" (2024/2025). https://www.barchart.com/story/news/20637910/
36. Fruitnet / Rabobank, "Orange Juice Demand Set to Fall Despite Lower Prices" (2026). https://www.fruitnet.com/fruitnet/orange-juice-demand-set-to-fall-despite-lower-prices/271705.article
37. CNBC, "How Brazil Stole the Production of Orange Juice from Florida" (2018) — Brazil dominance; Cutrale/Citrosuco/Louis Dreyfus; U.S. tariff context. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/23/brazil-florida-orange-juice-tariff-trade-war.html
38. Food Dive, "Tropicana Orange Supplier Alico to Exit Citrus Business" (2025). https://www.fooddive.com/news/alico-exits-citrus-tropicana-orange-supplier/737017/
39. Dole plc, Annual Report, FY2025 (SEC). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1857475/000185747526000028/dole-20251231.htm
40. Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc., Annual Report, FY2025 (SEC). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047340/000104734026000015/fdp-20251226.htm