Hunting and Trapping (U.S.) — NAICS 114210

A Histometrics industry primer for public- and private-market investors

1. Overview

This is the industry of paid access to game and to wild fur: outfitters and guides who sell hunts, "preserves" and game ranches that charge to hunt on private land, and commercial trappers who sell pelts or do paid predator and nuisance-animal work. Under the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), code 114210 covers establishments primarily engaged in commercial hunting or trapping, commercial game preserves and retreats, and hunting preserves [3]. It is one of the smallest industries in the federal statistical system — a few hundred payroll businesses [1] — yet it sits underneath a recreation economy in which 14.4 million Americans hunted in 2022 and spent $45.2 billion doing it [5].

Why an investor should care: almost none of that $45.2 billion lands inside this industry code. Most of it flows to gun and ammunition makers, sporting-goods retailers, and travel — separate industries. Code 114210 captures only the sliver paid directly to operators of hunts, preserves, and traps. So the code is a poor proxy for "the hunting economy" and a precise proxy for a niche service business: selling experiences and wildlife-management services on scarce land.

Ways in differ sharply by segment, and this is not a conventional stock-market sector. For a public-market investor there is no pure-play stock — the closest listed exposures are a nuisance-wildlife-control roll-up (inside a large pest-control company) and timberland owners who earn hunting-lease income [14][31][32]. For a private investor this is a hands-on, operator-owned world: buy or lease land and run a preserve, outfit guided hunts, breed deer, or collect lease checks. It is fragmented, seasonal, lightly capitalized, and split between a shrinking fur half and a growing recreation-and-services half. The real investment question is not simply how many people hunt — it is whether an operator controls scarce land, permits, tags, habitat, client relationships, and usable capacity at attractive margins.

2. What it is and how it's structured

The Census Bureau defines NAICS 114210 as establishments primarily engaged in (1) commercial hunting and trapping, (2) operating commercial game preserves and game retreats, and (3) operating hunting preserves [3]. In plain terms, three businesses live under one code:

• Recreation operators — hunting preserves, shooting preserves, game ranches, and guide/outfitter services that charge hunters for access, guiding, lodging, and trophy fees.
• Commercial trappers — individuals and small firms who trap fur-bearers (beaver, muskrat, coyote, bobcat, raccoon, mink) and sell pelts, plus paid predator and nuisance-wildlife removal.
• Deer breeders / exotic-game ranches — a large private-land sub-segment, concentrated in Texas, that raises trophy and exotic animals and sells hunts.

What it excludes (adjacent codes an investor should not confuse with it) [3]:

These boundaries matter: a business can serve hunters yet report its primary activity under accommodation, recreation, agriculture, or pest control [3].

Ownership mix. Overwhelmingly private, family-owned, and tiny. Federal data count 446 establishments with paid employees [1], but the economically active population is far larger once non-employer sole proprietors are counted (Section 3). No public company is a meaningful owner of the core activity; the closest institutional owners are the timberland real estate investment trusts (REITs) that lease hunting rights on land held for other purposes [31][32]. Government wildlife agencies regulate and manage the resource but are classified separately from 114210.

3. How big it is

Federal business statistics for NAICS 114210 (ground-truth figures):

Average pay works out to roughly $46,000 per employee [1] — modest, seasonal work. Our federal source set does not contain a revenue/receipts figure, net income, capital investment, land acreage, or capacity/utilization for this code, so we do not state any of those as ground truth. A third-party estimate (IBISWorld) puts industry revenue near $1.2 billion across roughly 17,600 businesses [6]; treat that as an estimate, not a Census number.

The undercount is unusually large here — for two reasons an investor should hold in mind:

1. Non-employer dominance. County Business Patterns counts only businesses with paid employees and excludes most government employees; it does not capture nonemployer businesses [4]. This industry is mostly one-person operations — a trapper, a guide, a landowner leasing hunting rights — with no employees. That is why the payroll count (446 establishments) is a small fraction of the ~17,600 total businesses estimated once sole proprietors are included [1][6]. The active population is an order of magnitude larger than the federal employer count.

2. Most "hunting activity" is non-commercial or falls in other codes. The 14.4 million Americans who hunted in 2022 [5] were overwhelmingly self-guided on public land or their own land — no NAICS 114210 transaction occurs. Their $45.2 billion in spending [5] went mostly to equipment (~$19.6 billion) and trips/travel (~$12.3 billion) [5] — retail and travel industries. And a large share of paid wildlife removal is booked under pest control (561710). So 114210 systematically understates the footprint of hunting and overstates its own share of it.

4. The investable universe

There is no U.S.-listed pure-play in Hunting and Trapping. The core activity is too small and too fragmented to support a public company. The realistic public-market exposures are adjacent proxies — not direct measurements of this industry — and an investor should size them as such:

Demand-adjacent, not part of the industry (they sell to hunters; they don't operate hunts): firearms and ammunition makers — Sturm Ruger (NYSE: RGR) [26], Smith & Wesson (NASDAQ: SWBI) [27], Olin/Winchester (NYSE: OLN) [29]; gear and retail — American Outdoor Brands (NASDAQ: AOUT) [28], Academy Sports + Outdoors (NASDAQ: ASO) [30], Sportsman's Warehouse (NASDAQ: SPWH), and Vista Outdoor/Revelyst. These trade on hunting participation but do not book NAICS 114210 revenue; value them on their own industries, never off the 114210 payroll figure.

Major private and other owners — where the industry actually lives:

• Thousands of independent guide/outfitter businesses and hunting/shooting preserves, mostly single-location and family-run [6].
• Texas exotic-game ranches and deer-breeding operations — the largest and most capitalized private cluster; the Texas deer-breeding-plus-hunting complex is estimated at ~$1.6 billion in state economic impact across ~1,250+ permitted breeding facilities [11].
• Independent commercial trappers — mostly part-time sole proprietors.
• Hunting-lease marketplaces — private platforms brokering landowner-to-hunter leases; an asset-light, venture-style corner.
• Fur auction houses — historically the price-setting intermediaries, now largely foreign and structurally impaired after the 2019 collapse of North American Fur Auctions (Section 8) [17].

Adjacent private consolidators an investor will encounter — but which sit in retail/firearms/ammo, not core 114210 — include Great American Outdoors Group (Bass Pro Shops + Cabela's) [33], Beretta Holding [35], and Czechoslovak Group's Kinetic Group (Federal/Remington ammunition) [34].

5. How the money works

Economics differ by segment; the unit metrics to track are per-hunter pricing, occupancy of the season, pelt prices, and per-acre lease yield. Useful operating gauges across the recreation half are sellable hunter-days/slots/tags, capacity fill rate, revenue per hunter-day, harvest/fulfillment rate, repeat bookings, land-and-permit cost per hunter-day, and guide utilization.

Preserves and guide/outfitter operations — the growth engine. Revenue is per-hunter and per-package. Trade estimates put guided trips commonly at $2,000–$15,000 per hunter for a multi-day hunt, with trophy Western elk hunts at the high end and add-on trophy fees on top; net margins for well-run big-game operations are often cited in the 15–30% range after food, labor, guiding, and overhead, with new operations taking 3–5 years to reach profitability given land and lodging capital [10]. (These are operator rules of thumb, not official data.) The model is high fixed cost against a short season, so utilization — how many paying hunters you fit into a limited number of huntable weeks — is everything. Exotic-game ranches enjoy a structural edge: non-native species aren't bound by state seasons, so they can sell hunts year-round and smooth the revenue calendar [11].

Deer breeders and exotic ranches. Two revenue lines: selling breeding stock (genetics for large antlers) and charging for hunts. This is a capital- and permit-intensive niche; movement of animals is tightly regulated for disease control, which is both a moat and a risk (Section 7).

Commercial trappers — a commodity price-taker business, plus service work. Pelt income depends on the global fur price, set at international auction and driven by fashion demand in China, Russia, South Korea, and Europe [18]. That price has been depressed for a decade: wild-fur prices hit a multi-decade high around 2013 and have fallen since, with beaver and muskrat down heavily and many pelts selling below the cost of the trapper's time and supplies [16]. Because of this, the more durable money in trapping today is paid service work — nuisance-wildlife removal (per-job fees) and predator control that protects livestock — rather than pelt sales. USDA's Wildlife Services program, the government analog, reports preventing over $232 million in annual livestock-predation losses and $150 million in bird damage [13], a proxy for the value the private service side also delivers.

Landowners leasing hunting rights — passive yield. The lowest-effort model: lease hunting access for roughly $5–$50+ per acre per year (national averages often cited around $8–$20), with premium Midwest whitetail and waterfowl ground at the top and remote Western acreage at the bottom; a 2,000-acre property can generate roughly $12,000–$30,000 a year at typical rates [12]. This is the mechanism by which listed timberland REITs monetize the industry at scale [31][32].

The funding backdrop that keeps the game around. Commercial operators don't earn this money, but their product exists because of it: an 11% federal excise tax on firearms, ammunition, and archery gear (plus 10% on handguns) under the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration program channels roughly $1 billion-plus a year — about $1.2 billion apportioned to state wildlife agencies in 2023 — for habitat and game management [7][8]. Hunters and anglers fund roughly 90% of state wildlife-agency budgets through licenses, tags, and these excise taxes [9]. Healthy, managed game populations are the raw material of every paid hunt.

6. What drives demand

• Hunter participation and demographics. 14.4 million hunters in 2022, 11.5 million of them pursuing big game [5] — the direct customer pool. Long-run participation has drifted down since 1980 (about 15.9 million paid license-holders in 2021, a ~4.8% participation rate vs. ~6.9% in 1980), and the hunter is aging (share age 45+ rose from ~29% to ~55% since the early 1990s; youth license sales down sharply) [9]. This secular headwind is the single most important demand variable.
• Discretionary income. Guided hunts and preserve access are luxury recreation; demand tracks disposable income and travel budgets [6].
• Land access. As free public and permission access shrinks, more hunting is pushed onto paid preserves and leases — a tailwind for the recreation half.
• Fur fashion cycles and export markets. Pelt demand is set abroad (China, Russia, Europe); sanctions on Russia and weak demand have gutted the wild-fur market [16][18].
• Urban/suburban wildlife conflict. Sprawl into wildlife habitat steadily raises demand for paid nuisance-wildlife removal — the industry's growth corner [14].
• Disease and game-population health. Chronic wasting disease (CWD) in deer and periodic waterfowl disease outbreaks can shut down seasons and animal movement, directly hitting demand.
• Booking and mapping technology. Digital booking, mapping, and client-acquisition tools increasingly separate operators that fill capacity from those that don't.

7. Regulation

This is a heavily regulated activity where the rules can outright eliminate a segment, and where permits and land rights are core assets rather than paperwork.

• State wildlife agencies are the primary regulator: they set licenses, seasons, bag limits, legal methods of take, and trap types. Most legal hunting requires a state license and compliance with state fish-and-game rules; rules vary widely by state.
• Trap-method and trapping bans. Several states restrict or ban leghold traps (often by ballot initiative). California went furthest: the Wildlife Protection Act of 2019 (AB-273) made it the first state to ban commercial and recreational fur trapping outright [19]. The affected commercial base was already tiny — California sold just 133 trapping licenses generating about $16,000 in 2017 [19] — which is exactly why the ban passed with little economic resistance and illustrates the political fragility of the fur segment.
• Federal wildlife law. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act governs waterfowl and other migratory-bird hunting through annual federal seasons and limits [20]; the Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits unauthorized "take" of listed species [21]; the Lacey Act bars importing, transporting, selling, or possessing wildlife taken in violation of federal, state, tribal, or foreign law [22]; and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) requires permits for many cross-border wildlife transactions, including tags for exporting certain pelts such as bobcat, river otter, and lynx [23].
• Operating on federal land. Commercial hunts on federal land can require a U.S. Forest Service special-use authorization or a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Special Recreation Permit (SRP) [24][25].
• Captive-wildlife and game-ranch rules. Deer breeders and exotic ranches operate under state breeding/movement permits and, for some species, USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) oversight. CWD containment drives strict, and tightening, animal-movement restrictions — a live regulatory risk to the breeding sub-segment.
• The excise-tax/license system (Pittman-Robertson) is less a burden than the financial scaffolding of the whole activity [7][8].

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

Structurally fragmented. No single firm is estimated to hold more than ~5% of the industry [6]. It is a sea of single-location, owner-operated businesses competing locally on land quality, game, guiding reputation, and price. There are effectively no economies of scale in running hunts, and geography plus permit-dependence limit the value of a national operating model — so the recreation half has resisted roll-up. The strongest direct moats are long-term access rights, reliable wildlife management, client trust, repeat bookings, and an operating record that supports permit renewals. Notably, a federal special-use permit may not automatically transfer after a sale or change of control, which can complicate acquisitions [24].

The one place consolidation is real: nuisance-wildlife control. Rollins, Inc. (owner of Orkin) bought Trutech and the Critter Control franchisor, assembling the two largest U.S. wildlife-control brands under one public roof [14]. This is the industry's clearest institutional-capital play — and it lives on the pest-control-overlap boundary (561710), not in guided hunting.

Adjacent consolidation is in retail and ammunition, not core 114210. Bass Pro Shops and Cabela's combined under a private parent in 2017 [33], and Vista Outdoor completed the sale of its Kinetic Group (Federal/Remington ammunition brands) to Czechoslovak Group in 2024 [34]. These show consolidation in retail, ammunition, and equipment — not within the hunting-and-trapping activity itself.

The fur segment is in secular decline, not consolidation. The 2019 insolvency of North American Fur Auctions (NAFA) — the world's second-largest fur auction house and the largest handler of wild fur — removed a central marketplace and left trappers with bounced checks and no reliable outlet [17]. Combine that with a decade of falling prices [16], expanding state bans [19], and a broad retreat from real fur by designers and retailers [15], and the fur half of the industry is contracting toward irrelevance in the U.S.

Net: capital and growth are migrating to the recreation/services half — outfitters, exotic ranches, and wildlife removal — while the extractive fur half shrinks.

9. Risks

• Secular decline of hunting participation and an aging customer base — the deepest long-term threat to the recreation half [9].
• Regulatory/animal-welfare risk — fur-trapping and leghold bans can wipe out the trapping segment state by state; anti-hunting and captive-hunt politics pressure preserves and exotic ranches; and permit non-renewal or non-transfer can strand capacity [19][15][24].
• Fur-price and export collapse — a global, uncontrollable commodity price plus geopolitics (Russia sanctions) leave trappers with little margin [16][18].
• Resource and disease risk — drought, wildfire, habitat loss, CWD in deer, and avian disease can impair harvest availability, close seasons, halt animal movement, and damage the high-value deer-breeding niche.
• Weather and seasonality — a short season magnifies the effect of bad weather, travel disruption, or cancellations.
• Land-cost and access risk — rising land prices and lost lease access squeeze operator margins.
• Thin capitalization, liability, and founder dependence — mostly sub-$8.5-million, sole-proprietor businesses [2] with high fixed land costs, personal-injury exposure (firearms, remote terrain, lodging), and value tied to one operator's reputation.
• Data and proxy risk — federal employer statistics undercount small and nonemployer operators [4], and the listed proxies (pest control, timberland, firearms, ammo, retail) have materially different economics from a direct hunting operator.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public-market routes (indirect only). There is no pure-play, so exposure is a deliberate proxy — a menu of exposure types, not a single sector basket:

• Nuisance-wildlife-control consolidation via Rollins (ROL) — but understand you are buying a large pest-control company where wildlife is a minor, growing slice [14].
• Hunting-land economics via timberland REITs — Weyerhaeuser (WY), PotlatchDeltic (PCH), Rayonier (RYN) — where recreational leases are a small, stable revenue line on top of timber [31][32].
• Participation proxy via gun/ammo/gear names (RGR, SWBI, OLN, AOUT, ASO), which rise and fall with hunter numbers but are their own industries [26][27][28][29][30]. Reserve any discussion of tickers, yields, and multiples to this route; do not value these companies off the 114210 payroll figure.

Private-market routes (where the real ownership is).

• Operate: buy or lease land and run a guided-hunt outfitter, shooting/hunting preserve, or exotic-game ranch — mid-teens-to-30% margins on well-run big-game operations, but several years and material land/lodging capital to get there [10].
• Breed: deer-genetics and exotic-game ranching, concentrated in Texas — higher capital, higher regulation, year-round revenue for exotics [11].
• Yield: own rural land and collect hunting-lease income ($5–$50+/acre) as a low-effort add-on to a timber or farm asset [12].
• Services: the most defensible cash flow today is paid nuisance-wildlife and predator control, which grows with suburban sprawl and doesn't depend on fur prices or hunter counts [13][14].

Key private-diligence questions: Are land, permits, tags, and hunting rights owned, leased, or revocable — and do the permits transfer on a sale [24]? What are sustainable hunter-day capacity and historical harvest outcomes? How much revenue is prepaid, repeat, or concentrated in a few clients? Are safety, insurance, wildlife, and compliance records complete? What are normalized land, labor, fuel, and habitat costs — and is the business transferable beyond the founder's personal reputation?

Outlook (forward-looking). Expect a two-speed industry. The fur/trapping half likely keeps shrinking under dead-end prices, lost export markets, and spreading bans — plan around it, don't bet on a rebound. The recreation-and-services half should keep growing modestly (third-party estimates put overall industry revenue near $1.2 billion and rising low-single-digits) [6], supported by discretionary spending, the premium-hunt and exotic-ranch segment, and shrinking free land access that pushes hunters toward paid experiences. The nuisance-wildlife-control corner is the steadiest grower and the only one attracting institutional capital. The overhang on the whole picture is the slow decline in the number of American hunters [9]: the industry's growth depends on extracting more revenue per remaining hunter — premium hunts, leases, exotics, and services — rather than on a growing customer base. It is a viable niche private-business strategy where an operator controls scarce access and repeat demand, but it is unlikely to become a large, clean public-market sector because the assets are geographically dispersed and often permit- or founder-dependent.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau. "County Business Patterns (CBP): 2023," NAICS 114210 (establishments 446; employees 2,034; annual payroll $93.486M; Q1 payroll $22.065M). Ingested ground-truth federal statistics. https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2023/econ/cbp/2023-cbp.html
2. U.S. Small Business Administration. "Table of Small Business Size Standards," NAICS 114210 ($8.5M avg. annual receipts). 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
3. U.S. Census Bureau. "2022 North American Industry Classification System Manual" (114210 definition; adjacent codes 112930, 712190, 561710, 721214, 713990). 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/reference_files_tools/2022_NAICS_Manual.pdf
4. U.S. Census Bureau. "Nonemployer Statistics and County Business Patterns Data Tell the Full Story" (CBP excludes nonemployer businesses). 2018. https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/09/three-fourths-nations-businesses-do-not-have-paid-employees.html
5. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. "Americans Spent $394B on Hunting, Fishing, and Wildlife-Associated Activities in '22" (14.4M hunters; $45.2B hunting spend; 11.5M big-game; equipment ~$19.6B / trips ~$12.3B). 2023. https://www.fws.gov/press-release/2023-10/americans-spent-394b-hunting-fishing-and-wildlife-associated-activities-22
6. IBISWorld. "Hunting & Trapping in the US — Industry Analysis" (revenue ~$1.2B; ~17,600 businesses; low-single-digit CAGR; no firm >5% share). 2025. https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/industry/hunting-trapping/86/
7. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. "Wildlife Restoration" (Pittman-Robertson excise tax on firearms, ammunition, and archery equipment funding state wildlife management). 2025. https://www.fws.gov/program/wildlife-restoration
8. U.S. Department of the Interior. "Sportsmen and Sportswomen Generate Nearly $1 Billion in Conservation Funding" (~$1.2B apportioned to states, 2023). 2023. https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/sportsmen-and-sportswomen-generate-nearly-1-billion-conservation-funding
9. DJ Case & Associates / U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. "R3 and hunter-participation trends" (~15.9M license-holders in 2021; ~4.8% participation; aging demographic; ~90% of agency funding from hunters/anglers). 2024. https://djcase.com/hunting-fishing-shooting-recruitment-retention-reactivation-r3
10. ProfitableVenture / Financial Models Lab. "Hunting outfitter business economics" (trip prices $2,000–$15,000; 15–30% net margins; 3–5 years to profitability — trade estimates). 2024–2025. https://www.profitableventure.com/how-hunter-outfitter-business/
11. Texas Deer Association / Victoria Advocate. "Deer breeding, hunting impacts Texas economy by $1.6 billion annually" (~1,257 permitted breeding facilities; ~7,000 jobs). 2018. https://victoriaadvocate.com/2018/11/11/deer-breeding-hunting-impacts-texas-economy-by-1-6-billion-annually/
12. National Land Realty. "Leasing Hunting Land for Passive Income" ($5–$50+/acre; ~$8–$20 average; example yields). 2024–2026. https://nationalland.com/blog/leasing-hunting-land-for-passive-income/
13. USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. "Wildlife Services" (>$232M livestock-predation and $150M bird-damage losses prevented annually). https://www.aphis.usda.gov/wildlife-services
14. Rollins, Inc. "Rollins Acquires Critter Control / Trutech" (nuisance-wildlife-control consolidation). 2015. https://www.rollins.com/investors/press-releases/detail/125/rollins-inc-acquires-two-critter-control-franchises
15. FOUR PAWS USA. "'A Decade of Decline' for Fur Industry" (falling acceptability; retreat from real fur). 2023. https://www.fourpawsusa.org/our-stories/press-releases/a-decade-of-decline-for-fur-industry
16. Fox Business. "Poor economy, sanctions in fur-loving Russia catch up with wild-animal trappers in US" (pelt-price declines; trapper attrition). https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/poor-economy-sanctions-in-fur-loving-russia-catch-up-with-wild-animal-trappers-in-us
17. CBC News. "North American Fur Auctions seeks creditor protection" (2019 NAFA insolvency; world's #2 auction house, largest wild-fur handler). 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/north-american-fur-auctions-creditor-protection-1.5348510
18. FashionNetwork. "Canada's fur-trade route leads to Russia, China" (U.S./Canadian wild-fur export destinations). https://us.fashionnetwork.com/news/Canada-s-fur-trade-route-leads-to-russia-china,490081.html
19. California Legislature. "AB-273 — Fur-bearing and nongame mammals: recreational and commercial fur trapping: prohibition" (Wildlife Protection Act of 2019; first state ban; 133 licenses / ~$16,000 in 2017). 2019. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB273
20. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. "Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations" (Migratory Bird Treaty Act seasons and limits). 2026. https://www.fws.gov/law/migratory-bird-hunting-regulations
21. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. "About the Endangered Species Act" (ESA prohibition on unauthorized take). 2026. https://www.fws.gov/species/endangered-species/about-endangered-species-act
22. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. "Office of Law Enforcement: About Us" (Lacey Act enforcement). 2026. https://www.fws.gov/program/office-of-law-enforcement/about-us
23. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. "CITES" (permits/certificates for international wildlife transactions). 2026. https://www.fws.gov/international-affairs/cites
24. U.S. Forest Service. "Outfitters and Guides" (special-use authorizations; permit transferability caveat). 2026. https://www.fs.usda.gov/r10/permits/outfitters-and-guides
25. Bureau of Land Management. "Special Recreation Permits" (commercial use on BLM land). 2026. https://www.blm.gov/programs/recreation/permits-and-passes/special-recreation-permits
26. U.S. SEC. Sturm, Ruger & Company, Form 10-K (firearms for the commercial sporting market). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/95029/000117494726000243/rgr-20251231.htm
27. U.S. SEC. Smith & Wesson Brands, Form 10-K (firearms including hunting-oriented long guns). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092796/000095017025088157/swbi-20250430.htm
28. U.S. SEC. American Outdoor Brands, Form 10-K (hunting tools, optics, land-management and shooting accessories). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1808997/000180899725000014/aout-20250430.htm
29. U.S. SEC. Olin Corporation, Form 10-K (Winchester sporting ammunition). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/74303/000007430326000027/oln-20251231.htm
30. U.S. SEC. Academy Sports and Outdoors, Form 10-K (retail hunting category). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1817358/000181735826000031/aso-20260131.htm
31. U.S. SEC. Weyerhaeuser, Form 10-K (timberland ownership and recreational leases). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/106535/000119312526051422/wy-20251231.htm
32. U.S. SEC. Rayonier, Form 10-K (timberland licensing including hunting-related property use). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/52827/000005282726000036/ryn-20251231.htm
33. Bass Pro Shops. "Bass Pro Shops and Cabela's Join Forces" (2017 combination under a private parent). 2017. https://about.basspro.com/newsroom/stories/bass-pro-shops-and-cabelas-join-forces-with-a-vision-to-become-north-americas-premier-outdoor-and-conservation-company/
34. Vista Outdoor. "Vista Outdoor Announces Completion of CSG Transaction" (Kinetic Group / Federal & Remington ammunition sold to Czechoslovak Group, 2024). 2024. https://investors.vistaoutdoor.com/Investors/news/news-details/2024/Vista-Outdoor-Announces-Completion-of-CSG-Transaction/default.aspx
35. Beretta Holding. "Ruger and Beretta Holding S.A. Announce Strategic Cooperation Agreement" (private firearms/outdoor group). 2026. https://berettaholding.com/ruger-and-beretta-holding-s-a-announce-strategic-cooperation-agreement/