All Other Crop Farming in the United States (NAICS 11199)

A Histometrics rollup primer for public-market and private investors. NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) 2022 code 11199, "All Other Crop Farming," is a five-digit federal industry that bundles three otherwise-unrelated child industries: 111991 Sugar Beet Farming, 111992 Peanut Farming, and 111998 All Other Miscellaneous Crop Farming. This primer synthesizes the three child primers plus federal statistics for this level; it does not re-research the crops from scratch.

1. Overview

"All Other Crop Farming" is a federal filing cabinet, not a coherent market. NAICS groups it as one industry, but a sugar-beet grower in North Dakota, a peanut farmer in Georgia, and an Oregon grass-seed or Vermont maple operation have almost nothing in common as businesses — different crops, buyers, regions, policy regimes, and cycles. For an investor the value of looking at 11199 as a whole is not a single thesis; it is the contrast among the three, because they illustrate three different answers to the same structural problem in U.S. specialty and industrial-crop farming.[1]

That shared problem: many small farms sell into markets dominated by a few buyers, with no liquid price to hedge against. Each child solves it differently. Sugar-beet growers became the buyers — they own the processing cooperatives outright, the most vertically integrated model in U.S. agriculture.[14] Peanut growers face concentrated corporate shellers and lean on a federal price floor, while slowly building farmer-owned shellers to claw back margin.[15] The miscellaneous crops (hops, grass seed, maple, mint, ginseng, and outdoor cannabis) stay fragmented and largely unprotected, riding violent boom-bust cycles set by narrow end-markets.[1]

Two facts unify all three for an investor:

• There is no listed U.S. pure-play grower in any of them. The farms are private families and grower cooperatives. Public-market exposure is always indirect — input suppliers, downstream processors and brands, farmland real-estate investment trusts (REITs), or (only in the miscellaneous bucket) publicly traded cannabis cultivators.
• Standard federal business statistics do not count these farms at all. Crop production (NAICS sector 111) is excluded from the Census Bureau's business programs; the authoritative source is the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which reports by commodity, not by tidy NAICS code (Section 3).[3]

The rest of this primer leads with how the three children differ, then treats the rolled-up level as a whole.

2. What's inside — the three children and how they differ

All three are "farm-gate" industries: the code covers growing the crop and stops at the first sale. Processing, branding, and most of the money sit in separate manufacturing codes downstream.[1] Beyond that, they diverge sharply. The contrast is the point.

The one metric they share: the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) sets the same $2.5 million average-annual-receipts small-business size standard for all three codes — the ceiling below which a farm counts as "small" for federal programs.[2] Nearly every farm in all three clears that bar, so the entire level is small-business by federal definition. That threshold is not a revenue estimate; it is the only firm-level federal business figure that exists for these codes (Section 3).

How they relate structurally. PLC = Price Loss Coverage (the Farm Bill payment that tops up growers when the average price falls below a statutory reference price); ETF = exchange-traded fund. The through-line: in each child a liquid, transparent price is absent, so growers manage it through ownership (beets), government (peanuts), or long contracts and cooperatives (miscellaneous). The differences in who captures the margin — the grower-owned processor, the corporate sheller, or the scarce-input holder — drive everything downstream, including how an outside investor can participate.

3. How big it is

No ingested federal stat for this level. Histometrics holds no aggregated federal stat_metrics record for NAICS 11199 specifically — no establishment count, employment, payroll, or revenue figure. That is expected, and it reflects two separate coverage gaps, not a data error:

1. The business census excludes farming. The Census Bureau's County Business Patterns (CBP), the Economic Census, and Nonemployer Statistics all exclude Crop and Animal Production (NAICS 111–112), because most farms have no paid employees and are counted instead through USDA's separate Census of Agriculture.[3] So there is no CBP/Economic-Census total to roll up for 11199.
2. The only firm-level federal figure is the SBA size standard ($2.5M average annual receipts), which is a qualification threshold, not a measure of industry revenue.[2]

For actual scale you must roll up USDA commodity data from the three children — reported by crop, not by the 11199 code. The figures below are approximate sums of individually cited USDA (and USDA-derived) figures for different recent years, assembled here for orientation; they are not an official Census total for the industry.

NASS = USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service; ERS (used later) = its Economic Research Service. Read the ~$5–6 billion only as an order-of-magnitude farm-gate figure: the years don't line up, and the miscellaneous bucket is the least measurable of the three (outdoor cannabis, herbs, and "combination" farms are largely uncaptured).

The undercount caveat — read this carefully. Two effects push the true economic footprint well above the farm-gate rollup:

• Value realized downstream. Farm-gate value captures only the first sale. In beets, growers own the processing cooperatives, so most of the value — refining, byproducts, and the policy-protected margin over the world sugar price — is booked one code downstream in beet-sugar manufacturing, not in farm value.[5] In peanuts, shelling, oil, and branded peanut butter dwarf the ~$1.78B farm value. The grower and the next link are often the same families (beet co-ops; farmer-owned peanut shellers), so farm value understates what these operators actually earn.
• Small/individual ownership. Because these are overwhelmingly small, family-owned, unincorporated farms (family operations are ~95% of all U.S. farms), and because they are excluded from the business census, any dataset built from employer statistics will read near-zero — which must not be mistaken for a small or absent industry.[3][4] Missing employer data is a coverage artifact, not a measure of size.

4. The investable universe — where value concentrates across the three

The single most important fact holds across all three children: no U.S.-listed pure-play grower exists. Where public value does concentrate differs by child, and that is what an investor should map. Tickers and multiples are reserved to this section and Section 10.

Sugar beets — the operators are private co-ops; public exposure is inputs, foreign processors, and a sugar ETF. The real operators (American Crystal Sugar, Amalgamated, Michigan Sugar, Minn-Dak, Western Sugar, Southern Minnesota, Wyoming Sugar) are grower-owned cooperatives with no tickers.[14] Public proxies are all indirect: seed/trait firms KWS SAAT (Frankfurt: KWS) and Bayer (BAYN); equipment maker Deere (NYSE: DE); fertilizer/ag-retail Nutrien (NYSE/TSX: NTR); the Teucrium Sugar Fund (NYSE Arca: CANE) for the world sugar price (which U.S. policy deliberately decouples from domestic beet economics); and foreign beet processor Südzucker (Xetra: SZU).

Peanuts — public value sits in shellers and brands. The closest listed play is Archer-Daniels-Midland (NYSE: ADM), which owns Golden Peanut, the largest U.S. sheller; Olam Group (SGX: VC2) is roughly third. Downstream brands: J.M. Smucker (NYSE: SJM, Jif), Hormel (NYSE: HRL, Skippy/Planters), and Hershey (NYSE: HSY, Reese's). The largest independent sheller, Birdsong, and the fast-growing grower-owned shellers (Premium Peanut, Coastal Growers, Delta Peanut) are private.[15]

Miscellaneous — the only child with a listed cultivator, plus downstream buyers and land. Outdoor cannabis is in-scope, so publicly traded cannabis growers (Green Thumb GTBIF, Trulieve TCNNF, Glass House GLASF) are the nearest listed cultivators — though most production is indoor/greenhouse and outside the code. Other proxies: seed operator S&W Seed (SANW, a distressed micro-cap); spice buyer McCormick (MKC); lawn/seed buyer Scotts Miracle-Gro (SMG); maple brand owner B&G Foods (BGS). Private operators dominate — Yakima Chief Hops, Hopsteiner, BarthHaas (hops); Sweet Tree, Bascom (maple); Wisconsin ginseng growers.[1]

The common threads for a public investor:

• Farmland REITs (Gladstone Land LAND, Farmland Partners FPI) are the one vehicle that spans all three — they own row-crop and specialty acreage that includes some peanut-belt and miscellaneous-crop ground, but the link to any single crop is loose.
• Input and equipment names (Deere, Nutrien, Corteva, Bayer) touch all three but are broad agricultural-cycle plays, not exposure to this level.
• In every case, the listed name is a diversified food, agribusiness, land, or (for cannabis) legally distinct business in which the crop is a small slice. None should be valued as a pure-play; the right analysis is segment mix, procurement, and capital allocation, not crop acreage.

5. How the money works

Underneath the crop differences, the farm-level equation is the same everywhere: saleable yield per acre × realized price, minus input, land, labor, and financing costs, plus any government support and downstream/processing margin the owner can capture. What differs is how the price is set and who keeps the margin — the defining contrast of this level.

• Beets: the grower's income is the processor's profit. There is no delivery price. Growers deliver beets to their cooperative and later receive a net beet payment — the factory's sugar-sales revenue minus processing cost, split by tons and sugar content. American Crystal announced a record ~$84.67/ton for its 2023 crop; benchmark payments then fell toward a mid-$50s/ton breakeven as sugar prices dropped in 2024–26.[6][16] Members also capture refining and byproduct margin (pulp, molasses) an independent grower never would.
• Peanuts: price by contract, floored by policy. With no futures market, growers price through option/marketing contracts with shellers plus the federal marketing-assistance loan, backstopped by the PLC reference price (raised to $630/ton for the 2025 crop).[13][17] Quality grade (moisture, aflatoxin, kernel size) is decisive for realized price. Shellers earn the spread between what they pay growers and what shelled kernels and oil fetch.
• Miscellaneous: scarce inputs and long asset lives. Many of these are perennial or multi-year assets — hop trellises (~$10,000–15,000+/acre to install), decades-long maple stands, ~4-year ginseng cycles that can't be replanted on the same ground for decades. That front-loaded capital makes supply slow to respond to price, amplifying boom-bust. Over long horizons much of the total return has been land appreciation, not operating profit — which is why farmland funds structure around owning the ground and leasing it out.[1]

Metrics that matter across the level: yield and quality per acre; realized price vs. breakeven; irrigated-vs-dryland mix; input cost per acre; contracted vs. uncommitted volume; and, for the co-ops and shellers, throughput, recovery/shell-out, storage shrink, inventory turnover, and leverage. Because none of the three has a transparent farm-gate price, contract terms and buyer/processor access matter more than a generic revenue multiple.

6. What drives demand

Demand is crop-specific — a diversification benefit and a research burden — but sorts into three patterns:

• Beets → mature, slowly declining. U.S. per-capita caloric-sweetener use is ~121 lb and trending down ~1%/year, with GLP-1 (glucagon-like peptide-1) weight-loss drugs and sugar-reduction reformulation the most-watched structural headwinds.[19] Most beet sugar goes to food and beverage manufacturers, so demand tracks packaged-food volumes and competes with cane sugar and corn-based high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS).
• Peanuts → defensive, stable. Peanut butter — cheap, shelf-stable, high-protein, recession-resistant — is more than 60% of U.S. food peanut use and argues for stability over growth; exports (~20–25% of the crop, with China's buying sharply reduced) are the swing factor.[17]
• Miscellaneous → narrow, volatile end-markets. Hops track craft/mainstream beer volumes and hopping rates (flat-to-declining beer is a headwind); grass/turf seed tracks housing, lawns, and sports fields; maple rides the natural-sweetener/premiumization trend; ginseng is almost entirely an Asian export story; mint feeds gum/candy/oral-care; herbs and spices compete against cheap imports.[1]

Across all three, weather and climate, input-cost inflation (fertilizer, fuel, hand labor), and trade policy move results year to year, and none of the three is a demand-growth story — the level as a whole is mature-to-declining, cushioned in beets and peanuts by policy and in the miscellaneous crops by premium/niche positioning.

7. Regulation

Policy intensity is itself a contrast — it steps down from beets to peanuts to the miscellaneous crops:

• Beets — the most administered crop in the group. The U.S. Sugar Program (USDA Farm Service Agency, FSA) supports domestic sugar prices well above world levels via nonrecourse price-support loans to processors (FY2026: 24.00¢/lb raw cane, 32.77¢/lb refined beet), marketing allotments (~54% beet / ~46% cane), and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) that cap imports.[12] Nearly the entire beet crop is Roundup Ready (glyphosate-tolerant) genetically modified (GMO) seed, cleared through USDA/EPA/FDA biotech oversight.
• Peanuts — heavily programmed. A "covered commodity" eligible for PLC/ARC and marketing-assistance loans; the 2025 reconciliation law raised the reference price to $630/ton. Aflatoxin (a carcinogenic mold toxin) grading — USDA's 15-ppb edible standard and FDA's 20-ppb action level — is the binding food-safety constraint.[13][17]
• Miscellaneous — the thinnest support. General agricultural rules apply (FDA Produce Safety Rule, USDA organic, EPA/FIFRA pesticides, Department of Labor H-2A seasonal labor), but commodity price supports are largely absent. Two crop-specific regimes stand out: American ginseng exports fall under CITES Appendix II permits, and hemp/cannabis face an unsettled federal picture — hemp defined at ≤0.3% delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), marijuana still Schedule I at the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) with rescheduling to Schedule III pending.[1]

The unifying legal foundation across the co-op-heavy children is the Capper-Volstead Act (1922), which gives qualified farmer cooperatives a limited antitrust exemption for collective marketing — the basis of the beet co-ops, farmer-owned peanut shellers, and hop/ginseng/maple co-ops alike.[20] For all three, policy is both a support and a risk: any change to the sugar program, the peanut reference price, or cannabis scheduling would reprice the affected child directly.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The structural signature is identical across the level: fragmented at the farm, concentrated at the buyer/processor — a barbell. Thousands of small growers sell into markets served by a few processors, exporters, or brands. What differs is how growers have responded, and cooperatives are the recurring answer:

• Beets are already fully grower-owned and consolidating downward — farms fell from ~3,900 (2012) to 3,257 (2022) while output per farm rose, and marginal factories close (American Crystal shut its Sidney, Montana plant in 2023), stranding whole districts because a beet must reach a nearby factory within days.[4][5][14]
• Peanuts show the classic monopsony tension — two shellers handle ~80% of the crop — met by a counter-move of farmer-owned shellers (Premium Peanut, Coastal Growers, Delta Peanut) built to recapture shelling margin.[15]
• Miscellaneous is the most fragmented and the most geographically clustered — the Yakima Valley holds ~75% of U.S. hop acreage, the Willamette Valley the majority of cool-season grass seed, Marathon County ~95% of Wisconsin ginseng, Vermont 53% of U.S. maple — with grower cooperatives (Yakima Chief Hops) pooling scale and processing.[8]

Across all three, the durable competitive advantages are the same: control of a scarce input — land, water, genetics/varieties, processing capacity, or contracted buyer access — plus local agronomic knowledge and specialized equipment. Scale spreads fixed cost but is not itself a moat; a large operator without water, labor, or contracted demand can still lose money. Layered on top is a slow financialization: farmland REITs and pension-backed funds are buying and leasing back cropland across the level, converting owner-operated farms into institutionally owned, leased assets.

9. Risks

The risks rhyme across the three children, with different emphasis:

• Price cyclicality and oversupply — the central risk everywhere: beets fell from ~$85/ton record payments toward mid-$50s breakeven in 2024–26; hop acreage and value dropped 18%/21% in a single year; ginseng saw ~90% of U.S. growers go bankrupt after a 1990s glut.[6][8][11]
• Buyer/processor concentration — few buyers set terms for many growers (most acute in peanuts; also hops, mint, ginseng).[15]
• No liquid hedge — none of the three has a usable futures/price market, so growers cannot offload price risk on a screen; exposure is physical (land, crop, co-op equity).
• Policy and trade dependence — beet and peanut economics rest on federal floors and import limits; any liberalization or Farm Bill change hits directly, and export-dependent miscellaneous crops (seed, ginseng, alfalfa) are hostage to tariffs and currency.[12][13]
• Weather, disease, and water — drought, freeze, hurricane (peanuts), and crop-specific pathogens (Cercospora in beets, aflatoxin/white mold in peanuts, hop mildew, ginseng replant disease); western/irrigated production is exposed to water rights.
• Structural demand erosion — GLP-1 and sugar-reduction for beets; peanut-allergy avoidance; flat beer for hops.[19]
• Regulatory/legal status — cannabis Schedule I risk is unique to the miscellaneous bucket and can change market access overnight.
• Private-market opacity and illiquidity — co-op financials, member-capital accounts, contract terms, and specialty-farm valuations are hard for outsiders to verify; beet "stock" and co-op equity are not freely tradable, and exit depends on a single local buyer's health.

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public routes (indirect in every child). Because no listed U.S. grower exists, public investors pick a proxy and accept dilution of the crop theme:

• Closest to origination/processing: ADM and Olam (peanut shelling); KWS and Bayer (beet seed/traits); the listed cannabis cultivators (GTBIF, TCNNF, GLASF) for outdoor cannabis, carrying Schedule I legal risk.
• Downstream brands: Smucker, Hormel, Hershey (peanuts); McCormick, Scotts, B&G (miscellaneous) — staple-food defensives with pricing power over cheap inputs.
• Inputs/equipment: Deere, Nutrien, Corteva — broad agricultural-cycle exposure across all three.
• Land (the one cross-cutting vehicle): farmland REITs Gladstone Land (LAND) and Farmland Partners (FPI) — review net asset value (NAV), funds from operations (FFO/AFFO), rent coverage, tenant quality, and water rights; the link to any single crop here is loose.
• Commodity proxy: the Teucrium Sugar Fund (CANE) tracks world sugar, which U.S. policy holds above and less volatile than the domestic beet price — a weak proxy.

None of these should be bought for this level; each describes a diversified parent, not the crop.

Private routes (where most real capital sits). Direct participation looks different in each child: for beets, owning farmland plus cooperative "beet stock" (delivery rights to a local factory) — a closed, relationship-driven market where diligence centers on the local co-op's balance sheet; for peanuts, belt farmland, equipment/working-capital finance, or equity in a farmer-owned sheller; for the miscellaneous crops, specialty cropland, grower cooperatives, processing platforms, or institutional farmland funds (Nuveen/Westchester, Manulife/Hancock, PGIM, Fiera Comox). Diligence across all three should demand crop-level yield and price history, water rights, offtake contracts, insurance/loss records, debt maturities, succession plans, and a valuation that separates land, water, operations, processing, and brand.

Outlook — three different mature stories under one code. Sugar beets are a policy-protected, regionally concentrated commodity with stable-to-declining demand — good for downside protection and farmland income, with little organic growth and no clean public play. Peanuts are a defensive, policy-cushioned niche whose 2025 reference-price increase materially improves the grower safety net, with upside gated by exports and downside by weather and cyclicality. The miscellaneous crops are fragmented, cyclical niches where long-run returns have come more from owning the land than farming it, and where cannabis policy is the wild card. The unifying investor lesson across 11199 is the same in all three: the margin belongs to whoever controls the scarce asset — the grower-owned processor, the concentrated sheller, or the holder of land, water, genetics, and contracts — so the right question for any deal is which scarce asset captures the margin, and whether you are being paid for the risk attached to it.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS Definitions — 11199 All Other Crop Farming; 111991 Sugar Beet; 111992 Peanut; 111998 All Other Miscellaneous Crop Farming" (scope, examples, exclusions, cannabis/maple treatment), 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/
2. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Size Standards" (NAICS 111991, 111992, 111998 each = $2.5 million average annual receipts) — Histometrics ingested ground-truth federal record, 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
3. U.S. Census Bureau, "County Business Patterns / Nonemployer Statistics — Methodology" (Crop and Animal Production, NAICS 111–112, excluded from CBP, the Economic Census, and Nonemployer Statistics), 2024–26. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
4. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), "2022 Census of Agriculture" (3,257 sugar-beet farms; 1.9M U.S. farms; family operations ~95% of farms; small family farms ~85% of farms / ~14% of value), 2024. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2022/
5. USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), "Sugar and Sweeteners — Background" (beet ~55–60% of U.S. sugar; growing regions; substitutes; farm consolidation), 2025. https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/sugar-and-sweeteners/background
6. USDA NASS, "Crop Values Summary" (sugar-beet farm-gate value ~$2.1B in 2022, ~$2.7B in 2023), 2025. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cpvl0226.pdf
7. USDA NASS, "Crop Values 2025 Summary" (peanut farm value ~$1.78B, ~$0.247/lb; ~7,000 peanut-farming families per USDA/industry count), 2026. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cpvl0226.pdf
8. USDA NASS / Hop Growers of America, "2024 National Hop Report" ($446M value; 44,793 acres; Yakima Valley ~75% of U.S. acreage; −18% acreage, −21% value in 2024), 2024. https://www.usahops.org/news/2024-usda-nass-national-hop-report
9. Oregon State University Extension, "Willamette Valley Grass Seed Production" (~$639M value; ~400,000 acres), 2022–24. https://valleyfieldcrops.oregonstate.edu/willamette-valley-grass-seed-production
10. USDA NASS, "Maple Syrup Production" (~$159M value 2023; 5.86M gallons 2024; Vermont 53% of U.S.), 2024–25. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/New_England_includes/Publications/Current_News_Release/2024/2024-Maple-Syrup-Survey.pdf
11. Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation / UW-Madison, "Wisconsin Ginseng" (~1,500 acres; ~$15M farm revenue; >$19M exports; ~95% of state crop in Marathon County; 1990s bankruptcies), 2024. https://wedc.org/wisconsin-ginseng-has-international-appeal/
12. USDA Farm Service Agency and Congressional Research Service / USDA ERS, "U.S. Sugar Program" (FY2026 loan rates: raw cane 24.00¢/lb, refined beet 32.77¢/lb; marketing allotments ~54.35% beet / ~45.65% cane; tariff-rate quotas; no-net-cost design), 2024–25. https://www.fsa.usda.gov/news-events/news/09-26-2025/usda-announces-fiscal-year-2026-sugar-loan-rates-no-actions-feedstock
13. Georgia Peanut Commission / Ohio State University Farm Office, "2025 Reconciliation Farm Bill — Summary Overview" (peanut reference price $535→$630/ton for 2025 crop; marketing-loan rate $390/ton for 2026; $155,000 peanut payment limit), July 2025. https://farmoffice.osu.edu/blog/fri-07112025-907am/2025-reconciliation-farm-bill-%E2%80%93-summary-overview
14. U.S. Beet Sugar Association, "About Us" (farmer-owned processing; ~20 factories; 11 states; cooperatives including American Crystal, Amalgamated, Michigan Sugar, Minn-Dak, Western Sugar, Southern Minnesota, Wyoming Sugar), 2026. https://beetsugar.org/about/
15. Civil Eats, "The Peanut Industry Has a Monopoly Problem — but Farmers Are Pushing Back" (Birdsong + Golden Peanut/ADM ~80% of U.S. peanuts, Olam ~10%; farmer-owned shellers Premium Peanut, Coastal Growers, Delta Peanut), 2021. https://civileats.com/2021/01/15/op-ed-the-peanut-industry-has-a-monopoly-problem-but-farmers-are-pushing-back/
16. Agweek and Terrain (Farm Credit), "American Crystal record grower payments" (~$84.67/ton, 2023 crop) and "Big Supplies, Slowing Demand Roil Sugar Prices, Margins" (mid-$50s/ton breakeven; ~$1,600/acre cost), 2024–25. https://www.agweek.com/news/sugarbeet/american-crystal-sugar-expects-to-make-record-payments-to-growers
17. USDA ERS, "Oil Crops Outlook" and USDA FSA, "Peanut Program" (no peanut futures market; marketing-assistance loans; peanut butter >60% of food use; ~20–25% of crop exported; edible aflatoxin standard 15 ppb / FDA 20 ppb), 2025–26. https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/
18. USDA ERS, "Sugar and Sweeteners Outlook," July 2026 (2025/26 and 2026/27 beet acreage, yield, and sugar production), 2026. https://www.ers.usda.gov/media/29364/sss-m-455.pdf
19. Food Business News, "Sugar reduction and GLP-1s" (per-capita caloric-sweetener use ~121 lb, ~−1%/yr; ~1 in 5 U.S. households includes a GLP-1 user), 2025–26. https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/27877-sugar-reduction-and-glp-1s
20. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, "National Council of Farmer Cooperatives" (Capper-Volstead Act, 1922, limited antitrust exemption for farmer cooperatives), 2010. https://www.justice.gov/atr/national-council-farmer-cooperatives-general