Berry (except Strawberry) Farming in the United States

NAICS 2022 code 111334 — an industry primer for investors

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1. Overview

Berry (except Strawberry) Farming covers U.S. farms whose main crop is a berry other than the strawberry — chiefly blueberries and cranberries, plus raspberries, blackberries, and a long tail of minor fruits (boysenberry, currant, gooseberry, huckleberry, loganberry, and others).[2] It is a small slice of American agriculture by farm count but a high-value one per acre: cultivated blueberries alone were worth about $1.15 billion at the farm gate in 2024, one of the most valuable fruit crops in the country.[3]

Berries are a rare "growth" corner of agriculture. U.S. per-capita consumption has climbed for two decades on health marketing, and year-round fresh supply — filled by imports in the domestic off-season — has turned a seasonal treat into an everyday grocery item.[10] But the same forces that grew demand (new plantings in Peru, Mexico, and Morocco, plus better genetics everywhere) have grown supply even faster, so farm-gate prices are now under real pressure.[11][12]

This is primarily a private, farm-level operating industry. There is no pure-play, U.S.-listed berry farmer to buy. Public-market access runs through diversified produce companies; the biggest and most profitable names in the category — the Driscoll's brand and the Ocean Spray cooperative — are private. Direct private ownership (farmland, an operating farm, a grower-marketer, or ag-focused private equity) is where most capital in this industry actually sits. The editorial view of this primer: the strongest businesses control high-quality plant varieties, reliable water and labor, packing and cold-chain capacity, food-safety systems, and customer access — not simply acreage.

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2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 111334 is one line within industry group 1113, Fruit and Tree Nut Farming. It captures establishments primarily engaged in growing berries other than strawberries.[2]

What it explicitly excludes (adjacent NAICS codes):

• Strawberry Farming — 111333. Strawberries are the single largest berry crop and have their own code.[2]
• Gathering wild, non-cultivated berries — 113210 (Forest Nurseries and Gathering of Forest Products). Note the nuance: cultivated wild-variety ("lowbush") blueberries — Maine's crop — are farmed and count under 111334, whereas truly foraged berries do not.[2]
• Fruit and Tree Nut Combination Farming — 111336, when neither berries nor nuts is at least half of output; Tree Nut Farming — 111335; and Other Noncitrus Fruit Farming — 111339.[2]

The value chain. (1) Land, plants or vines, water, and crop inputs; (2) cultivation, pollination, pruning, and harvest; (3) cooling, sorting, packing, and quality control; (4) fresh sales to retailers and foodservice, or processing into frozen, juice, dried, and ingredient products; (5) marketing, branding, distribution, and export.

Split by crop and system. Blueberries and raspberries are commonly sold fresh but also have processing outlets; cranberries are unusually processing-oriented; blackberries, currants, and smaller crops are more fragmented and region-specific; and cultivated farms differ economically from wild-harvest operations.

Ownership mix. At the farm level this is a fragmented, family-farm industry — thousands of independent growers, most of them small. Structurally it splits three ways:

1. Independent growers who sell into a brand or marketer.
2. Grower cooperatives, above all Ocean Spray, which pools the crop of roughly 700 cranberry farmers and returns the proceeds to members.[15]
3. Brand/genetics companies such as Driscoll's, which grow relatively little themselves but license proprietary plant varieties to independent farmers and market the fruit under one label — a model closer to franchising than to farming.[17][18]

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3. How big it is

A caveat on the federal numbers first. Standard business statistics undercount farming. Programs built from payroll and employer records — the Census Bureau's County Business Patterns and much of the Economic Census — exclude crop production, self-employed operators, and businesses with no employees, so they are a weak lens on this industry.[38] The better source is the USDA Census of Agriculture, but it runs only every five years and counts any operation that produces or normally sells at least $1,000 of farm products, so tiny and informal growers still slip through.[37]

In our own ingested federal dataset for NAICS 111334, the only figure carried is the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) size standard of $3.75 million in annual receipts — the revenue ceiling below which a berry farm counts as "small" for federal programs. That is an eligibility threshold, not industry revenue.[1] Our dataset carries no NAICS-level total sales, employment, or establishment count for this code, so none is asserted here. Everything below comes from USDA and is cited as such.

Scale from USDA (2024 crop year unless noted), by crop:

Combining cultivated and wild, U.S. blueberries were worth roughly $1.2 billion at the farm gate in 2024, a record cultivated crop. The top three states — Washington, Oregon, and Georgia — supply nearly two-thirds of it; Washington alone produced about 207 million lb (~$205 million) and Oregon about 153 million lb (~$196 million).[5] For cranberries, Wisconsin grows roughly 60% of the U.S. total, followed by Massachusetts (~26%), New Jersey (~8%), and Oregon (~7%).[8] Raspberries concentrate in California, Oregon, and Washington; much of U.S. fresh blackberry supply is imported from Mexico.

USDA's 2024 noncitrus report publishes no national row for blackberries, currants, or gooseberries, and no combined national total for NAICS 111334 should be inferred from these separate crop figures.[3]

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4. The investable universe

There is no clean public "berry stock." The category's leaders are private, and the U.S.-listed names are diversified produce companies for which berries are one product among many.

Public companies (diversified exposure only):

There is no current U.S.-listed pure-play berry grower. Public investors are buying diversified produce, sourcing, logistics, and marketing exposure — not a clean berry-farm proxy. (Note: do not confuse Village Farms, Nasdaq: VFF, a greenhouse operator in cannabis and vegetables, with a berry play.)

Major private owners and operators (illustrating structure, not verified market shares):

• Driscoll's — family-owned, berry-focused; a global brand and plant-genetics owner touching roughly a third of the U.S. berry market; ~$3B+ revenue.[17][18]
• Ocean Spray — farmer-owned cranberry cooperative representing ~700 family farmers and ~70% of U.S. cranberry output; ~$2B in sales and ~$1.6B in assets.[15][16]
• Naturipe Farms — grower-owned platform / joint venture (its partners include Hortifrut, Munger Brothers, and grower families); the U.S. marketing arm for a large share of blueberry supply.[20]
• Reiter Affiliated Companies — private, family-owned; works with hundreds of growers across regions, including as a Driscoll's supplier.[19]
• MBG Marketing — grower-owned blueberry and blackberry cooperative with 200-plus growers.[21]
• Wish Farms — fourth-generation family berry grower and shipper.[22]
• California Giant Berry Farms — operates through a family of growers and grower partnerships.[23]
• Fruitist (formerly Agrovision) — private farms in several countries; has expanded U.S. blueberry production in Oregon.[24]
• Costa Group — large Australian berry grower/marketer, taken private and delisted from the ASX by Paine Schwartz Partners in 2024.

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5. How the money works

Berries are perennial crops, and that shapes the economics more than anything else.

Upfront capital, then years to bearing. A blueberry field takes roughly 2–3 years to first harvest and 5–6 to full yield; a cranberry bog is a multi-decade, near-permanent asset (often a re-engineered wetland). An owner sinks large capital into land, plants, irrigation, and — for cranberries — bog construction before seeing revenue. That lock-in means you cannot quickly exit a bad market by switching crops.

Revenue ≈ harvested volume × packout × realized price. Packout is the share of harvested fruit that meets customer specifications — the farming equivalent of capacity utilization. Bruising, shrink, rejection, shelf-life failures, and weather damage all cut revenue after the crop is picked. The single biggest lever is the fresh-versus-processed channel:

• Fresh commands a large premium but must be hand-picked, cooled fast, and moved quickly. About 55% of cultivated blueberries go fresh.[3][4]
• Processed (frozen, juice, dried, purée) is a lower-price floor that absorbs fruit not sold fresh. Wild blueberries and cranberries are almost entirely processed — cranberries flow into juice, sauce, and sweetened dried fruit rather than the fresh aisle.[3]

Cost is labor-dominated. For fruit and tree-nut farms, labor can run as high as ~38% of production cost, because fresh berries must be hand-harvested to protect quality.[14] Land, plants, water, crop chemicals, packing materials, cooling, and freight make up most of the rest, alongside food-safety systems, insurance, and interest. Machine harvesting exists but bruises fruit, so it is mostly reserved for the processed market.

Two distinctive models sit on top of the farm:

• The cooperative (Ocean Spray). Growers own the marketer, deliver their crop into a pool, and receive their share of proceeds. It aggregates and smooths returns but ties a grower's fortunes to one buyer.[15]
• The brand/genetics licensor (Driscoll's). Money comes from proprietary plant varieties and a premium brand, not from owning most of the acreage. Independent growers plant Driscoll's-bred berries and sell exclusively through Driscoll's, which captures margin on genetics and marketing.[17][18]

Because most berries are ultimately commodities, grower profitability swings with price cycles. When supply outruns demand — the blueberry story right now — farm-gate prices fall and the marginal, small, high-cost grower loses money even as volumes hit records.[11][12] Metrics that matter: yield per acre, packout and shrink, realized price by crop and channel, labor cost per harvested unit, customer concentration, and working-capital days.

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6. What drives demand

• Health positioning. Berries are marketed as antioxidant-rich "superfoods"; this narrative, more than price, has driven two decades of rising per-capita consumption.[13]
• Year-round fresh availability. Counter-seasonal imports from Peru, Chile, and Mexico keep fresh berries on shelves 12 months a year, converting an occasional treat into routine grocery volume — a demand tailwind that is simultaneously a supply threat to domestic growers. Imports supplied 59% of U.S. fresh-fruit availability in 2023, and the import shares of blueberries and raspberries each rose more than 20 percentage points between 2007 and 2023 (an all-fresh-fruit measure, not a berry-only figure, but indicative).[9][10]
• Processed and ingredient demand. Frozen berries for smoothies and bakery, juice, and dried cranberries provide a large, steadier baseload that absorbs fruit not sold fresh.
• Seasonal and cultural anchors. Cranberry demand spikes around U.S. holidays (Thanksgiving sauce) and rides the snacking growth of sweetened dried cranberries.[8]
• Exports. Cranberries in particular lean on export markets, which took roughly $351 million of U.S. product in fiscal 2024.[7]

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7. Regulation

• Marketing and promotion (USDA). The U.S. Highbush Blueberry Council runs a national research-and-promotion "check-off," funded by an $18-per-ton assessment on domestic and imported highbush blueberries.[28] The long-running federal Cranberry Marketing Order (No. 929) — which once let the industry manage oversupply by restricting volume — was terminated after grower support lapsed; USDA's final rule published July 12, 2024, effective July 31, 2024, removing a supply-control tool the sector had relied on for decades.[29]
• Labor. Hand-harvested berries depend heavily on migrant and seasonal labor. The H-2A temporary agricultural guest-worker visa (with its mandated wage floor and housing) governs much of this workforce; rising H-2A wage rates and immigration-policy uncertainty are a persistent cost and supply risk.[33] The EPA Worker Protection Standard (WPS) sets pesticide-safety training, restricted-entry, and decontamination rules for farm workers.[31]
• Food safety. The FDA's Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) Produce Safety Rule sets standards for agricultural water, worker hygiene, soil amendments, equipment, and handling of fresh produce.[30]
• Fair dealing. The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) regulates fair trading in fresh and frozen produce, with licensing, dispute resolution, and trust protections for sellers.[34]
• Organic and environmental. The USDA National Organic Program (NOP) governs organic production and labeling.[32] EPA pesticide registration, water rights, and — for cranberry bogs, which are engineered wetlands — Clean Water Act wetland rules all bear on operations.
• Crop insurance. USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA) federal crop insurance is available for blueberries in selected counties and states, but it is not a universal hedge against farm-level risk.[35]

State water rules, pesticide restrictions, labor laws, zoning, and permits can matter as much as federal rules, because production is geographically concentrated.

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The industry is fragmented in the field but concentrated in the middle. Thousands of small growers produce the fruit, but a handful of players control branding, genetics, and marketing: Driscoll's touches roughly a third of the U.S. berry market, and Ocean Spray channels about 70% of U.S. cranberries.[17][15]

The durable advantages sit at control points, not in acreage: proprietary genetics (better-tasting, higher-yielding, longer-shelf-life varieties are patented and licensed), brand, reliable water and microclimate, cooling/packing scale, and year-round global sourcing to keep retail shelves full. A grower without access to premium genetics or a strong marketer competes as a price-taker on a commodity. Cooperatives and marketers can therefore aggregate supply — and contract growing can expand geographic coverage — without owning every farm.

Consolidation pressure is intensifying. Global blueberry supply — led by Peru, now the world's largest exporter, growing volume on the order of ~30% a year against U.S. consumption growth under 10% — is compressing prices and margins.[11][12] Private capital is buying scale (Paine Schwartz took Australia's Costa Group private in 2024; PSP Investments took Hortifrut private). And financial stress is rising: U.S. farm (Chapter 12) bankruptcies climbed about 46% in 2025, with specialty-crop growers among the squeezed.[36] The likely direction of travel is fewer, larger, better-financed operations tied to genetics and brands — though scale alone does not guarantee returns: a big operator still loses money when yields fall, labor costs rise, water tightens, or the market is oversupplied.

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9. Risks

• Import-driven oversupply and price collapse — the central near-term risk. Record fresh-blueberry supply from Peru, Mexico, and others has driven double-digit price declines and pushed marginal growers toward losses.[11][12]
• Labor cost and availability. Hand-harvest dependence makes rising H-2A wages and immigration policy an existential cost variable for fresh-market growers.[14]
• Capital lock-in. Perennial plantings and bogs mean high sunk cost and long payback; owners cannot pivot quickly when prices turn.
• Weather and climate. Frost, heat, drought, flooding, and wildfire hit yields, and hand-harvest windows are weather-sensitive.
• Water. Scarcity, higher costs, and changing allocation rules are acute in the concentrated Western growing regions.
• Pests and disease. Spotted-wing drosophila, blueberry viruses, and food-safety failures raise cost and risk.
• Concentration/counterparty risk. Growers tied to a single cooperative or marketer are exposed to that buyer's decisions — sharpened for cranberries now that the federal marketing order's supply-management backstop is gone.[29]
• Perishability and channel. Cold-chain failure, rejection, and shrink can erase margin after harvest; the processing channel exposes growers to lower commodity prices.
• Trade and financial. Tariffs, safeguard actions, and phytosanitary rules can swing import/export economics abruptly, and leveraged growers face interest-rate and refinancing risk.

Perishability plus imports makes supply–demand balance decisive: a good crop across several regions can drop prices fast, while a weather event can do the opposite.

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10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes. With no U.S.-listed pure-play (Hortifrut is now private), the practical options are Dole (DOLE) and Fresh Del Monte (FDP) for diversified produce exposure in which berries are a minority contributor, plus the "picks-and-shovels" around berries — plant-genetics/nursery, agricultural inputs, and cold-chain logistics. Relevant diligence on DOLE/FDP: berry exposure, geographic sourcing, fresh-produce margins, working capital, customer concentration, capital spending, leverage, and the quality of crop-risk disclosure.[26][27] Ocean Spray is a member cooperative, not a buyable stock.

Private-market routes — where most real exposure lives:

• Direct ownership of berry farmland or an operating farm.
• Farmland vehicles. Publicly traded farmland owners such as Gladstone Land (LAND) and Farmland Partners (FPI) hold permanent-crop acreage and offer lower-friction farmland-linked cash flow, though not berry-specific.
• Ag-focused private equity (e.g., Paine Schwartz; PSP Investments), active consolidators of berry assets.
• Cooperative membership, available only by becoming a grower.

Private diligence should center on water rights and climate exposure; variety ownership, plant health, and remaining productive life; yield, packout, shrink, and realized price by crop and customer; labor availability and mechanization plans; fresh-versus-processing outlet capacity; packing/cooling/freight economics; retailer contracts and receivables; and insurance, debt service, and downside liquidity.

Outlook (forward-looking judgment, not fact): fresh-berry demand growth remains one of the healthiest in produce, but supply growth from Peru, Mexico, and Morocco looks set to outrun it for the next several seasons, keeping farm-gate prices and grower margins under pressure.[12] Expect the winners to be operations with proprietary genetics, strong brands, mechanization, secured water, and global sourcing scale, and the losers to be small, high-cost, undifferentiated growers — a recipe for continued consolidation. Cranberries are a mature, oversupplied category now navigating the loss of their marketing-order safety valve, with growth dependent on dried-fruit, ingredient, and export demand rather than volume.[29][7] For an investor, the attractive entry points are less the raw commodity crop and more the genetics, brand, and infrastructure layers that capture margin regardless of where the fruit is grown. The industry is investable but operationally intensive and data-poor: acreage alone is an inadequate thesis. The decisive question is whether an operator can reliably produce saleable fruit, move it fast, preserve quality, and keep enough of the final consumer dollar.

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Sources

1. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards, 2023 (ground-truth stats file, NAICS 111334 = $3.75M receipts). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definition — 111334 Berry (except Strawberry) Farming, 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=111334&year=2022
3. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts 2024 Summary, 2025. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/ncit0525.pdf
4. USDA Economic Research Service, Most cultivated blueberries are destined for the fresh market, while wild blueberries are bound for processing, 2025. https://ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/chart-detail?chartId=113313
5. Capital Press, Stars aligning for another large Northwest blueberry crop (WA/OR 2024 values, USDA), 2025. https://www.capitalpress.com/2025/06/03/stars-aligning-for-another-large-northwest-blueberry-crop/
6. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2022 Census of Agriculture — Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold (berries: 31,208 farms; $6.603B), 2024. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2022/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_2_US_State_Level/st99_2_002_002.pdf
7. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Cranberries on the Up (exports ~$351M FY2024), 2024. https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/us-cranberries-on-the-up
8. Agricultural Marketing Resource Center, Cranberries (state production shares), 2024. https://www.agmrc.org/commodities-products/fruits/cranberries
9. USDA Economic Research Service, U.S. Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Supplies Continue to Rely on Imports (59% import share, 2023), 2025. https://ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/chart-detail?chartId=110713
10. USDA Economic Research Service, Fresh Blueberry Supplies Expand as U.S. Consumers Develop a Taste for Year-Round Blueberries, 2020. https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2020/december/fresh-blueberry-supplies-expand-as-u-s-consumers-develop-a-taste-for-year-round-blueberries
11. IFPRI, Peru's rapid rise as the world's leading blueberry exporter, 2024. https://www.ifpri.org/blog/perus-rapid-rise-as-the-worlds-leading-blueberry-exporter/
12. Produce Report, Peru's Blueberry Industry: Managing Oversupply and Market Pressures, 2025. https://www.producereport.com/article/perus-blueberry-industry-managing-oversupply-market-pressures
13. Choices Magazine (AAEA), Foreign Competition Reshaping the Landscape of the US Blueberry Market, 2024. https://www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-magazine/submitted-articles/foreign-competition-reshaping-the-landscape-of-the-us-blueberry-market
14. USDA Economic Research Service, U.S. Fruit and Vegetable Industries Try To Cope With Rising Labor Costs, 2022. https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2022/december/u-s-fruit-and-vegetable-industries-try-to-cope-with-rising-labor-costs
15. Ocean Spray, Our Farmers / Wikipedia, Ocean Spray (cooperative) (~700 farmers; ~70% U.S. cranberries), 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ocean_Spray_(cooperative)
16. FoodNavigator-USA, Behind the juice aisle lies an ingredients business (Ocean Spray sales/assets), 2025. https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2025/12/01/behind-the-juice-aisle-lies-an-ingredients-business
17. Forbes (Chloe Sorvino), How Rosé Strawberries And Other Specialty Berries Will Help Driscoll's Pull In Millions, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/chloesorvino/2021/06/23/how-rose-strawberries-and-other-specialty-berries-will-help-driscolls-pull-in-millions/
18. OrganicEye, Driscoll's, Inc. — Backgrounder, 2023. https://organiceye.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Backgrounder-2-worlds-largest-berry-producer-v2.pdf
19. Reiter Affiliated Companies, Company, 2026. https://www.berry.net/company/
20. Naturipe Farms, Fresh Berries from Family Farmers, 2026. https://www.naturipefarms.com/
21. MBG Marketing, Grower-Owned Blueberry and Blackberry Cooperative, 2026. https://www.blueberries.com/
22. Wish Farms, Meet the Family, 2025. https://www.wishfarms.com/meet-the-family/
23. California Giant Berry Farms, About Us, 2026. https://www.calgiant.com/about-us/
24. Fruitist, About Us, 2026. https://www.fruitist.com/about
25. Carey Abogados, PSP Investments launches tender offer to buy Hortifrut, and FreshPlaza, Controlling Group of Hortifrut agrees to tender offer from PSP Investments (CMF cancelled share registration, May 2024). https://www.carey.cl/en/psp-investments-launches-tender-offer-to-buy-hortifrut/; https://www.freshplaza.com/north-america/article/9488210/controlling-group-of-hortifrut-agrees-to-tender-offer-from-psp-investments/
26. Dole plc, 2024 Annual Report (Form 10-K), 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1857475/000185747525000008/dole-20241231.htm
27. Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc., 2024 Annual Report (Form 10-K), 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047340/000104734025000009/fdp-20241227.htm
28. USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Highbush Blueberry Council ($18/ton assessment), 2024. https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/research-promotion/blueberry
29. USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA Terminates Cranberry Marketing Order, and Federal Register final rule (effective July 31, 2024). https://www.ams.usda.gov/content/usda-terminates-cranberry-marketing-order; https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/12/2024-15246/
30. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FSMA Produce Safety Rule, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma/what-produce-safety-rule-means-consumers
31. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Agricultural Worker Protection Standard (WPS), 2026. https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-worker-safety/agricultural-worker-protection-standard-wps
32. USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, Organic Regulations (National Organic Program), 2026. https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/organic
33. U.S. Department of Labor, H-2A Temporary Agricultural Program, 2026. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/programs/h-2a
34. USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), 2026. https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/paca
35. USDA Risk Management Agency, Blueberries, 2024. https://www.rma.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/Blueberries.pdf
36. American Farm Bureau Federation, Farm Bankruptcies Continued to Climb in 2025, 2026. https://www.fb.org/market-intel/farm-bankruptcies-continued-to-climb-in-2025
37. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, Census of Agriculture (farm definition: $1,000+ of products), 2026. https://www.nass.usda.gov/agcensus/
38. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns — Methodology (excludes crop production and non-employers), 2026. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html