Surgical Appliance and Supplies Manufacturing (U.S.) — An Investor's Primer

NAICS 2022 code 339113

1. Overview

This is the industry that makes the physical goods left inside or strapped onto a patient: artificial hips and knees, spinal implants and screws, prosthetic limbs and braces, wound dressings and surgical sutures, ostomy and gynecological supplies, breast implants, hospital beds and operating-room tables [1]. It is a real, factory-based manufacturing sector — not a service — and it sits at the crossroads of an aging population, surgical volume, and how Medicare and private insurers pay for procedures.

Why an investor cares: demand is largely non-discretionary and demographically driven (people don't defer a broken hip for long), gross margins on implants are high, and the products enjoy durable regulatory and surgeon-relationship moats. The trade-off is heavy regulation, constant reimbursement pressure, and product-liability risk.

There are two ways in. Public-market investors can buy the diversified device giants or a handful of focused mid- and small-cap manufacturers (tickers and scale are in Section 4). Private investors meet the industry mostly through private-equity roll-ups (orthopedic and prosthetics/orthotics clinics, contract manufacturers), venture-backed surgical-robotics and regenerative-medicine startups, and privately held wound-care and ostomy makers. Note upfront: very few large public companies are pure plays on this exact code — most straddle adjacent categories — so matching a stock to the NAICS line takes care.

2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope (what's in 339113). Establishments primarily making surgical appliances and supplies: orthopedic devices and prosthetic appliances; surgical dressings and sutures; crutches, orthopedic support hosiery and braces; hospital beds and operating-room tables; ostomy and gynecological supplies; and personal industrial safety devices such as safety helmets (except athletic) [1]. That boundary produces an economically heterogeneous industry: one end consists of high-value implants and prosthetics where design intellectual property, regulatory clearance, and surgeon preference matter more than factory labor; at the other end are high-volume disposables and durable equipment sold through distributors and group purchasing organizations. FDA expressly treats kit assemblers, specification developers, contract manufacturers, and single-use-device reprocessors as regulated manufacturing participants in many circumstances, even when they do not own a conventional factory [2].

What it excludes (adjacent NAICS codes to name). The code deliberately carves out neighbors:

• 339112 — Surgical and Medical Instrument Manufacturing: instruments, catheters, hypodermic needles and syringes. This is the biggest source of confusion, because the household-name giants (Stryker, Medtronic, Becton Dickinson) book much of their revenue here [1].
• 339115 — Ophthalmic Goods: eyeglasses, contact lenses, protective eyewear [1].
• 339111 — Laboratory Apparatus and Furniture [1].
• 334510 — Electromedical apparatus (pacemakers, imaging) sits in a different subsector entirely.
• Distribution and fitting are not manufacturing: medical-supplies wholesalers (NAICS 423450 — Medline, McKesson, Cardinal Health) and prosthetic/orthotic fitting clinics are separate industries.

Ownership mix. The federal count is 1,546 firms operating 1,804 establishments [3][4] — a "long tail" structure: a few very large, capital-rich manufacturers plus hundreds of small specialist shops (the U.S. Small Business Administration size standard for this industry is a generous 800 employees, reflecting how capital-intensive even mid-size players are) [5]. Ownership runs from large publicly traded corporations to private-equity-backed platforms, family-owned custom fabricators, and U.S. arms of foreign firms (Coloplast, Mölnlycke, Össur, Ottobock).

3. How big it is

Federal ground-truth figures for NAICS 339113:

Four caveats before you use these numbers. First, company revenue is not the same as this NAICS line. The giants book most of their sales under instrument code 339112 or overseas, so you cannot add up Stryker, Medtronic and J&J to reach the industry figure — the $37.9 billion is U.S. factory shipments of these specific products [4]. Second, imports mean domestic shipments understate the U.S. market. A large share of surgical supplies used in the U.S. is made abroad — one estimate puts ~14% of U.S.-marketed medical devices as manufactured in China, and roughly three-quarters of personal protective equipment is imported [9]. Third, the low aggregate concentration is misleading. An HHI of 418 and CR4 of 35% look competitive [4], but only because the code bundles unrelated niches. Within any single niche the market is an oligopoly (Section 8). Fourth, recent output has not grown smoothly. BLS real sectoral output fell approximately 8.2% from 2022 to 2023 [10], consistent with post-pandemic normalization — the classification includes masks, gloves, protective clothing, beds, and other pandemic-sensitive products, so 2020–2021 peaks should not be treated as a structural baseline. Private market-research estimates that draw the boundary differently put the "surgical appliance and supplies" category nearer $43–44 billion [11]; the broader "medical instrument and supply manufacturing" universe is ~$104 billion [11].

4. The investable universe

There is no clean pure-play public company that maps exactly to NAICS 339113 — the diversified giants dominate and the focused names each specialize in a slice (implants, wound care, ostomy, or braces). The table separates the two.

Diversified device makers with large 339113-type product lines (approximate total-company revenue, latest full year):

Focused / near-pure-play manufacturers (approximate total revenue):

Major private and other owners. Mölnlycke (Sweden — wound and surgical, 99% owned by Investor AB's Patricia Industries) [25], Hollister (ostomy, private), Ottobock (Germany — prosthetics, private-equity minority), Össur (Iceland-listed — prosthetics/orthotics), Drive DeVilbiss (wheelchairs, beds, durable medical equipment, private) [26], and platforms built by financial buyers — H.I.G. Capital bought ZimVie's spine business for $375 million in 2024 [27], and Patient Square Capital owns prosthetics/orthotics provider Hanger. Hundreds of the 1,546 firms [4] are small private contract manufacturers.

5. How the money works

Owners in this industry make money on the classic manufacturing levers — volume, price, mix, and factory efficiency — but with three features specific to implanted and reimbursed medical goods:

• High gross margins, heavy operating costs. Orthopedic and advanced-wound products carry gross margins commonly in the 60–70%+ range, protected by patents, brand, and surgeon familiarity — Stryker reported a 64.0% company-wide gross margin in 2025 [14]. But much of that is eaten by three costs: a large field sales force (implant reps who staff the operating room and manage consignment inventory — a full set of implant sizes stocked at the hospital and paid for only when used [28][29]), R&D, and regulatory/quality overhead. Operating margins are far lower than gross margins. Consumable and distribution businesses operate differently: Medline's consolidated gross margin was 26.4% in 2025, with segment adjusted EBITDA margins of 24.3% for its branded products and only 5.5% for its distribution/supply-chain segment [12].

• Reimbursement is the ceiling on price. For inpatient surgery, Medicare pays the hospital a fixed, bundled amount per procedure (a Diagnosis-Related Group, or DRG). Because the hospital's payment is fixed, every dollar it spends on an implant comes out of its own margin — so hospitals and their buying agents push hard on implant prices [30]. For products dispensed outside surgery (prosthetics, orthotics, braces, surgical dressings), Medicare pays off the DMEPOS fee schedule — Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies — and, for many items, through competitive bidding, where suppliers bid for the right to serve a region at a set price [31]. Both mechanisms cap what a manufacturer can ultimately charge.

• Concentrated buyers. Hospitals rarely buy alone. Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) aggregate thousands of facilities and negotiate manufacturer contracts, typically extracting 10–18% off list [32]. That buyer concentration is a permanent headwind to pricing power.

Recurring vs. capital revenue. The best businesses pair a durable good with a consumable stream. A "razor-and-blades" dynamic runs through the sector: place a surgical robot or a capital device (the razor), then sell the branded implants, dressings, or supplies that pull through it (the blades). Stryker reported that by end-2025 more than two-thirds of its U.S. knee procedures ran on its MAKO robots [14] — a lock-in that protects implant volume. Wound dressings, ostomy pouches, sutures, and injection supplies are pure repeat-purchase consumables with sticky demand.

Capacity, input costs, and cyclicality. As a manufacturer, the industry lives on capacity utilization and input costs. General supplies use plastics, resins, rubber, nonwovens, textiles, adhesives, and packaging; orthopedic products require cobalt-chrome, titanium, tantalum, and specialized polymers [33]. Producer pricing is positive but not spectacular — the BLS primary-products PPI increased approximately 2.9% year over year through June 2026 [34], though actual price realization differs by contract structure. Cyclicality is mild because most procedures are medically necessary — but elective volume is deferrable, as COVID-19's surgery shutdowns showed, and a backlog then snaps back. Watch procedure volumes (hip/knee/spine cases, wound-care patient counts) as the top-line driver, and price/mix as the margin driver.

6. What drives demand

• Demographics and disease. An aging population drives joint replacement, spine surgery, and wound care. The U.S. Census Bureau projects that adults aged 65 and older will outnumber children under 18 beginning in 2029 [35]. Obesity and diabetes expand the pools of joint disease, chronic (non-healing) wounds, and lower-limb amputations that feed prosthetics [14][15].
• Procedure volume and site-of-care shift. Surgeries are migrating from hospitals to lower-cost Ambulatory Surgery Centers (ASCs), reshaping how implants are sold and priced. For 2026, CMS revised ASC covered-procedure criteria and eliminated several exclusion criteria as binding rules, broadening physician discretion over eligible outpatient procedures [36]. That shift favors compact instrument sets, efficient procedure kits, and outpatient commercial support — but also increases purchasing pressure because ASCs are highly cost conscious [30].
• Technology adoption. Surgical robotics, navigation, and 3D-printed/patient-specific implants raise the value (and switching cost) of a manufacturer's ecosystem. FDA confirms that additive manufacturing is already used for orthopedic and cranial implants and external prosthetics [37].
• Reimbursement generosity. Coverage decisions and fee-schedule levels directly gate volume — a newly covered indication expands the market; a payment cut shrinks it [31][38].
• Reprocessing as substitute and adjacent business. FDA notes that reprocessing single-use devices has become widespread as a cost- and waste-reduction mechanism, while requiring reprocessors to meet manufacturer-like validation and postmarket obligations [39]. Successful reprocessing can reduce new-unit demand for eligible products; stricter validation or infection-control standards work in the opposite direction.
• Trauma and surgical recovery. Accidents, burns, and the post-pandemic elective-surgery rebound feed baseline demand.

7. Regulation

This is one of the most heavily regulated manufacturing industries in the U.S.

• FDA market entry. The Food and Drug Administration classifies devices by risk. Most orthopedic and surgical-supply products are Class II, cleared through the 510(k) pathway by showing "substantial equivalence" to an already-marketed product — usually without a new clinical trial [38][40]. The highest-risk Class III implants require Premarket Approval (PMA), the most rigorous review, backed by clinical evidence [38][40]. The 510(k) route is faster and cheaper, which lowers barriers for niche entrants but also means many products reach market without fresh clinical data.
• Quality system overhaul (new). Effective February 2, 2026, the FDA replaced its long-standing Quality System Regulation with the Quality Management System Regulation (QMSR), which incorporates the international standard ISO 13485:2016 — harmonizing U.S. rules with the rest of the world but expanding what inspectors can review, including management reviews and supplier audits [41]. Compliance cost and transition risk are live issues for every manufacturer.
• Sterilization capacity. Ethylene oxide (EtO) remains important for products that cannot tolerate heat or moisture, while EPA's 2024 emissions rule is under active reconsideration in 2026 [42]. Facility closures, compliance investment, or hurried transfers to alternative sterilizers can constrain supply and require regulatory supplements.
• Reimbursement rules. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) set the DRG bundles, the DMEPOS fee schedule, and competitive-bidding terms that cap prices [31]. CMS is also pushing bundled-payment models that put hospitals at financial risk for the whole episode — the mandatory Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model, and its successor the Transforming Episode Accountability Model (TEAM), which becomes mandatory in selected regions on January 1, 2026 [43]. These models intensify pressure on implant pricing.
• Post-market obligations. Adverse-event reporting, recalls, Unique Device Identification, and physician-payment transparency (the Sunshine Act) all apply.
• Trade and taxes. The Affordable Care Act's 2.3% medical-device excise tax was permanently repealed in December 2019, removing a former drag on the sector [44]. Working the other way, 2025 tariffs raised the cost of imported devices and components — a universal baseline plus much higher rates on Chinese goods — squeezing margins for anyone with an offshore supply chain. Medline attributed a 115-basis-point reduction in its 2025 gross margin to higher import costs and estimated a $290 million adverse effect on pretax income from tariffs and related developments that year [12][9].
• Exporters also face the EU's Medical Device Regulation (MDR) and other national regimes.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The aggregate statistics understate how concentrated the real markets are. Zoom into a niche and it is an oligopoly:

• Joint reconstruction: the top four (Zimmer Biomet, Stryker, J&J DePuy, Smith+Nephew) hold roughly 80%+ of U.S. knee and hip implants [14][17].
• Spine: after Globus Medical's 2023 merger with NuVasive, the top four control close to 80%, led by Medtronic (~32%) and Globus (~23%) [18].
• Advanced wound care: the top five (Solventum, Smith+Nephew, Mölnlycke, ConvaTec, Coloplast) hold ~45–50% [16].

The competitive moats are surgeon switching costs (a surgeon trained on one system is reluctant to change), consignment inventory and sales-rep relationships, and increasingly robotics ecosystems that lock in implant pull-through [14][28].

Consolidation is the defining strategic theme. The industry grows by acquisition:

• Globus Medical–NuVasive, ~$3.1 billion, closed September 2023 [18].
• Zimmer Biomet–Paragon 28 (foot-and-ankle), ~$1.2 billion, closed April 2025 [45].
• ZimVie's spine unit sold to H.I.G. Capital for $375 million in 2024 [27].
• Enovis was itself created when Colfax combined the DJO bracing business with orthopedic-implant maker Lima.
• Medline completed its IPO in December 2025, giving public-market investors their first direct access to the largest U.S. medical-surgical consumables platform [12].

Running the other direction, Johnson & Johnson has said it will spin off its DePuy Synthes orthopaedics business to sharpen focus [13] — a reminder that the giants also break themselves apart to unlock growth.

9. Risks

• Reimbursement and pricing erosion. Bundled payments, competitive bidding, and repeated Medicare physician fee-schedule cuts (a 2.83% conversion-factor cut in 2025 and a further efficiency adjustment for 2026) steadily compress what the system will pay [31][43][38]. Price is the industry's most persistent downside.
• Product liability and recalls. Implants that fail create large litigation exposure — the sector has lived through metal-on-metal hip, surgical-mesh, and breast-implant lawsuits. A recall can wipe out a product line's economics.
• Regulatory delay and cost. PMA timelines, the 2026 QMSR transition, and post-market surveillance all raise the cost of doing business [38][41].
• Sterilization bottlenecks. Ethylene-oxide capacity constraints or EPA rule changes can constrain supply and require costly regulatory supplements [42].
• Tariffs and supply chain. Titanium, polymers, and finished imports are exposed to 2025 tariff actions; concentrated overseas sourcing (especially China) is a vulnerability. Medline's $290 million pretax tariff hit illustrates the magnitude [9][12].
• Customer concentration. GPOs and consolidating hospital systems hold negotiating leverage that caps margins [32].
• Commoditization. Mature implant categories face gradual price erosion as clinical differentiation narrows and lower-cost entrants use the 510(k) path [38].
• Elective-volume shocks. Non-emergency procedures can be deferred in a downturn or a public-health emergency, as 2020 demonstrated. The 8.2% decline in real sectoral output from 2022 to 2023 is direct evidence that "healthcare demand always rises" is an inadequate forecasting rule [10].

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes.

• Diversified giants (MDLN, JNJ, SYK, MDT, BDX, BAX) give broad exposure with lower single-product risk, but this NAICS line is only a slice of each [12][13][14]. Medline (MDLN) is now the broadest listed exposure to U.S. medical-surgical consumables and private-label conversion, though roughly half its 2025 sales came from distribution rather than Medline-branded products [12].
• Focused mid-caps (ZBH, GMED, ENOV, IART, SNN, CTEC.L, COLO-B, SOLV) are the closest thing to pure exposure to implants, wound care, and ostomy [15]–[22].
• Small-cap innovators (ATEC, SIBN, TMCI, BVS, ESTA, OFIX) offer higher growth and higher volatility, often as acquisition targets [24].
• Funds — broad medical-device ETFs (for example, the iShares U.S. Medical Devices ETF, IHI, or the SPDR S&P Health Care Equipment ETF, XHE) hold baskets of these names for investors who prefer diversification over stock-picking.

Private-market routes.

• Private equity runs active roll-ups of orthopedic and prosthetic/orthotic providers, contract manufacturers, and wound-care specialists (H.I.G./ZimVie spine, Patient Square/Hanger) [27].
• Venture capital funds early-stage surgical robotics, regenerative/biologic wound therapies, and next-generation implants — the pipeline the giants ultimately buy.
• Direct ownership of privately held makers (Mölnlycke, Hollister, Ottobock, Drive DeVilbiss) is generally reachable only through those funds or secondary stakes [25][26].

Near-term outlook (forward-looking judgments, not established facts). The demographic tailwind is powerful and durable: an aging, heavier population points to rising joint-replacement, spine, and chronic-wound volumes for years — the U.S. orthopedic market alone is estimated around $33 billion in 2025 and growing roughly 5% a year, and advanced wound care faster still (mid-to-high single digits) [13][16]. Robotics adoption and the shift to ambulatory surgery centers should keep favoring the scaled players with full ecosystems. Consolidation is likely to continue, making well-run mid-caps plausible takeout candidates. The genuine uncertainties are: how hard bundled payments and competitive bidding squeeze price; how tariffs reshape supply chains and margins; the compliance cost of the 2026 QMSR transition; sterilization-capacity constraints if EtO regulation tightens; and the still-unclear long-run effect of GLP-1 weight-loss drugs — which could reduce obesity-driven joint disease over time while improving patients' fitness for surgery in the near term. Net: a defensive, demographically supported manufacturing sector with attractive margins, whose upside is gated less by demand than by price and regulation.

The most common analytical error is treating NAICS 339113 as a coherent "surgical supplies market." It is neither confined to surgery nor equivalent to the medical-device sector. It includes industrial PPE and hospital furniture, includes implants but excludes most surgical instruments, and mixes high-margin intellectual-property businesses with commodity converting and distribution-linked manufacturing. A second error is using diversified issuer revenue as industry market share. A third is treating pandemic-era 2020–2021 sales as a structural baseline. For this classification, product-level and channel-level economics are more decision-useful than a single reported market size.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definition — 339113 Surgical Appliance and Supplies Manufacturing, 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=339113&input=339113&year=2022
2. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Who Must Register, List, and Pay the Fee, 2025. https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-registration-and-listing/who-must-register-list-and-pay-fee
3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns (CBP), NAICS 339113, 2023. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
4. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration Ratios and Selected Statistics, NAICS 339113, 2022. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
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9. UNC Center for the Business of Health / HFMA / MDDI, Tariffs on Medical Devices and Supplies (est. ~14% of U.S.-marketed devices made in China; PPE import dependence), 2025. https://cboh.unc.edu/publication/tariffs-on-medical-devices-and-supplies-healthcare-cost-implications/
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11. IBISWorld and Kentley Insights, Medical Instrument & Supply Manufacturing (~$103.8B) and Surgical Appliance & Supplies Manufacturing (~$43.6B) market size, 2024. https://www.ibisworld.com/classifications/naics/339113/surgical-appliance-and-supplies-manufacturing/
12. Medline Industries, LP, 2025 Form 10-K (net sales $28.432B; Medline Brand $13.720B; gross margin 26.4%; tariff impact $290M), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2046386/000204638626000009/mdln-20251231.htm
13. MarketDataForecast / FierceBiotech / Life Science Intelligence, U.S. orthopedic market ~$33.4B in 2025; J&J MedTech orthopaedics ~$9.2B and planned spin-off, 2025. https://www.marketdataforecast.com/market-reports/united-states-orthopedic-market
14. Stryker Corporation, 2025 Form 10-K (revenue $25.116B; gross margin 64.0%; MAKO penetration), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310764/000031076426000010/syk-20251231.htm
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16. MarketsandMarkets, Advanced Wound Care Market ~$13.4B (2025); top-5 share ~45–50%; Solventum AWC ~$1.835B, 2025. https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/ResearchInsight/advanced-wound-care-market.asp
17. Gabelli / market research, Zimmer Biomet 2024 revenue ~$7.7B; top-4 hip/knee share ~80%+, 2025. https://gabelli.com/research/orthopedics-market-2025-update/
18. ODT Magazine / Globus Medical, Globus Medical 2024 revenue $2.52B; NuVasive merger ($3.1B, Sept 2023); spine top-4 ~80% (Medtronic ~32%, Globus ~23%), 2024. https://www.odtmag.com/ma-strategic-partnerships-shaped-the-orthopedic-industry-in-2024/
19. Convatec Group, 2024 Annual Results — revenue $2,289M, 2025. https://www.convatecgroup.com/media-articles/press-releases/2025/annual-results-for-the-year-ended-31-december-2024/
20. Enovis Corp, Full-Year 2024 Results — revenue $2.11B, 2025. https://ir.enovis.com/news-releases/news-release-details/enovis-announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2024-results
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22. Coloplast A/S, Full-Year 2024/25 Financial Results (~DKK 27.9B / ~€3.8B), 2025. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/11/04/3179964/0/en/Coloplast-A-S-Full-Year-Financial-Results-2024-25.html
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24. Company filings / stockanalysis, 2024 revenue: Orthofix ~$799.5M; Alphatec $612M; Bioventus $573.3M; SI-BONE ~$165M; Establishment Labs ~$166M, 2025. https://investors.alphatecspine.com/press-releases/news-details/2025/ATEC-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2024-Financial-Results/default.aspx
25. Mölnlycke Health Care, Our Owner (99% owned by Investor AB's Patricia Industries), 2025. https://www.molnlycke.com/en-ca/about/our-governance/our-owner/
26. Drive DeVilbiss Healthcare, Product Portfolio, 2025. https://www.drivemedical.com/sales-channel-homecare
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30. Becker's ASC / MGMA, Bundled DRG payments, hospital implant-cost pressure, and ASC migration, 2025. https://www.beckersasc.com/supply-chain/orthopedic-companies-vie-for-asc-business-stryker-johnson-johnson-smith-nephew-zimmer-biomet-s-approach/
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33. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., 2025 Annual Report (materials: cobalt-chrome, titanium, tantalum, polymers), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1136869/000119312526135671/d80737dars.pdf
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38. AAOS / Musculoskeletal Key / NCBI, FDA device classes I/II/III; 510(k) vs PMA pathways; ~70–80% of orthopedic devices are Class II; 2025–2026 Medicare conversion-factor cuts, 2020–2025. https://www.aaos.org/aaosnow/2020/jul/research/research03/
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41. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Quality Management System Regulation (QMSR) — final rule effective Feb 2, 2026; incorporates ISO 13485:2016, 2024–2026. https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/postmarket-requirements-devices/quality-management-system-regulation-qmsr
42. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Ethylene Oxide Emissions Standards for Sterilization Facilities, 2024–2026. https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/ethylene-oxide-emissions-standards-sterilization-facilities
43. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) and Transforming Episode Accountability Model (TEAM), mandatory Jan 1, 2026, 2025. https://www.cms.gov/priorities/innovation/innovation-models/cjr
44. Forbes / BDO / IRS, Affordable Care Act 2.3% medical-device excise tax permanently repealed December 2019, 2019–2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2019/12/21/medical-device-tax-is-history-after-trump-signs-repeal/
45. Cravath / MassDevice, Zimmer Biomet completes ~$1.2B acquisition of Paragon 28 (foot & ankle), April 2025, 2025. https://www.massdevice.com/zimmer-biomet-completes-paragon-28-acquisition/