Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing (U.S.) — NAICS 3344

A Histometrics rollup primer for public- and private-market investors. NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the federal scheme used to define and count industries. This is a four-digit "industry group." It contains exactly one child industry — NAICS 33441, which carries the same name — so this page is a short pass-through: the numbers here are its numbers, and the full story lives one level down.

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1. Overview

NAICS 3344 is where electronic hardware is physically made in the United States: the chips that compute, the bare boards that carry them, the passive parts that condition power, the connectors that join circuits, the loaded assemblies that become finished products, and a long tail of specialty components. Because the taxonomy places all of that inside a single child industry (33441), the four-digit group and the five-digit industry are, for practical purposes, the same thing.[1]

For an investor this level is worth knowing as the physical backbone of the digital economy — one line that spans the two economic extremes of manufacturing at once: the most capital-hungry business in the economy (a leading-edge chip factory runs roughly $10 billion for the plant plus about $5 billion of equipment, with the largest complexes quoted at $15–20 billion) and one of the thinnest-margined (contract board assembly earned 7.0% to 10.1% gross margins across the listed bench in fiscal 2025 — high-single-digit to low-teens, not the low-to-mid teens often assumed).[2][3] What ties them together is a common demand engine — artificial intelligence (AI) data centers, electric vehicles, defense, and medical devices pulling on all of it at once — and a common vulnerability: most of the world's electronic-hardware production migrated to Asia (roughly 90% of bare-board supply; TSMC alone held ~72% of foundry revenue, about $132.9 billion), so U.S. factory output is a fraction of what the U.S. economy consumes.[4][5]

The one fact that most changes how this level should be read: its parts are not moving in the same direction. While global chip sales rose 25.6% to $791.7 billion in 2025, U.S. bare-board fabrication has shed 80.6% of its workforce since 2000 — 137,501 jobs down to 26,676.[6][7] Same four-digit code, opposite trajectories.

This is a pass-through page. For the full analysis — the six sub-industries, their very different cap tables, and the named investable universe — go to the 33441 primer. What follows is the short version plus this level's own ground-truth federal statistics.

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2. What's inside — and why this level equals its one child

The federal taxonomy nests four-digit industry groups above five-digit industries. Most groups hold several children; 3344 holds only one — 33441 — so the rollup is trivial: every dollar, plant, and worker in 3344 is a dollar, plant, and worker in 33441. That identity is now verified line by line one level down: the six sub-industries' establishments sum to exactly 3,686, their employment to exactly 279,841, and their receipts and payroll to the level totals of $115.9 billion and $27.8 billion.[8][9] Nothing is added or lost between the two levels.

The economic diversity is all inside 33441, which splits into six sub-industries that are genuinely different businesses with different owners and different ways in:[1]

• 334413 Semiconductors & related devices (chips) — ~54% of receipts ($62.4B) and ~42% of jobs; almost entirely public/large-corporate; a subsidised, AI-led supercycle.
• 334418 Printed circuit assembly (EMS) (contract "soldering parts onto boards") — ~21% ($24.5B), ~18% of jobs; a public bench plus hundreds of private job shops, with the growth flowing to Mexico.
• 334419 Other electronic components (crystals, timing, sensors, RF laminates) — ~12% ($14.2B) but ~20% of jobs; ~1,189 mostly small/private firms.
• 334417 Electronic connectors — ~6% ($7.1B), ~7% of jobs; a barbell of large public and large private names; a content-per-device compounder.
• 334412 Bare printed circuit boards (the blank etched board) — ~4% ($4.4B) but ~8% of jobs; overwhelmingly private and structurally shrinking on U.S. soil.[7]
• 334416 Passives (capacitors, resistors, coils, transformers) — ~3% ($3.3B), ~5% of jobs; an Asian-led global oligopoly, and polarised in 2026 as AI-grade parts tighten while consumer demand stays weak.[10]

Three level-shaped observations that only become visible once the children are laid side by side:

• Receipts and jobs do not line up, and the gap is the economics showing through. Semiconductors earn 54% of the revenue on 42% of the workforce; "other components" is the mirror image at 20% of the jobs for 12% of the revenue.[8][9]
• Pay tracks capital intensity, and the whole ladder sits inside one code. Average pay runs roughly $137,000 in semiconductors, $85,000 in connectors, $73,000 in both assembly and other components, $65,000 in bare boards and $60,500 in passives — against about $99,000 for the level as a whole.[9]
• Firms straddle the codes, so no sub-industry is a clean corporate boundary. Vishay spans semiconductors and passives; TTM spans bare boards and assembly; Sanmina runs board-fab lines inside an assembly business; Bel Fuse spans passives, connectors and assembly.[11][12]

The single most useful thing to carry down to the child page: these six are wildly unequal in size and ownership, so picking the sub-industry is most of the investment decision. The 33441 primer works through each in detail.

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3. How big it is (this level's rollup figures + the undercount caveat)

Our ground-truth federal statistics for NAICS 3344 — identical to 33441's, because there is only one child:

The SBA thresholds span the same spread as the economics — 550 employees in passives, 750 in boards, assembly and other components, 1,000 in connectors, 1,250 in semiconductors.[13]

One rollup wrinkle worth knowing. Receipts, plants, jobs and payroll reconcile exactly between this level and its child, but firm counts do not: the six sub-industries' firm counts add to 3,470 while the level reports 3,376 unique firms.[8] The 94-firm gap is real economics, not error — companies operating in more than one sub-industry are counted once here and again in each sub-industry below (see the straddlers named in Section 2).

Use County Business Patterns for employment; the other federal series do not roll up here. The Bureau of Labor Statistics measures these industries on different boundaries — its payroll survey counts roughly 181,000 semiconductor-manufacturing jobs (April 2026) against CBP's 116,831 for the same sub-industry, because the two draw different universes.[9][14] Similarly, two vintages of revenue now exist: the 2023 Annual Integrated Economic Survey puts semiconductors at $61.0 billion and printed circuit assembly at $27.2 billion, versus the 2022 census figures of $62.4 billion and $24.5 billion.[8][15] These are different instruments, not a revision — do not mix them into one total.

The undercount caveat — read this before comparing to any headline. The $115.9 billion measures only hardware physically manufactured on U.S. soil, and it understates the industry's true economic weight in two structural ways:

1. Value migrated offshore. Roughly 90% of bare boards are imported and the U.S. makes about 4% of global board output (under 1% of advanced IC substrates); most passive components are made in Asia; the leading-edge chips America designs are built by TSMC in Taiwan, which held ~72% of foundry revenue.[4][5] The corporate footprints tell the same story: Amphenol employed about 15,000 people in the United States out of roughly 170,000 worldwide at the end of 2025, with 79% of its long-lived assets outside the U.S., and Jabil booked 75% of fiscal-2025 revenue as foreign-source.[3][16] The census counts the U.S. factory, not the enterprise.
2. Value migrated to design (counted elsewhere). America's most valuable chip names — Nvidia, AMD, Qualcomm, Broadcom — are "fabless": they design chips and own no factories, so their enormous revenue sits in other codes. U.S.-headquartered firms captured roughly half of global chip revenue (~$318 billion in 2024), many multiples of the made-in-America census figure.[17]

The scale of that gap is best seen sub-industry by sub-industry against the relevant global market — and not as a single sum, since those are separately scoped studies that overlap. Two illustrations suffice at this level: global chip sales were ~$791.7 billion in 2025, and worldwide connector shipments were $86.5 billion in 2024, of which North American sales alone were $20.1 billion — nearly three times the roughly $7 billion of connectors actually shipped from U.S. plants.[6][8][18]

This is not the kind of undercount caused by tiny cash operators slipping through the data — the manufacturing census is mandatory and thorough, and even the most fragmented sub-industry (334419, 1,189 firms) is well captured.[8] The gap is the opposite: value moved to design (booked in other codes) and to foreign fabs (booked nowhere in U.S. data). Note too that receipts are a 2022 snapshot, so the AI-driven surge since — global chip sales alone rose 25.6% to $791.7 billion in 2025, on track past $1 trillion in 2026 — is not captured, and the level is statistically unconcentrated (HHI 317.5) even though several of its sub-industries are global oligopolies whose scale sits abroad.[6]

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4. The investable universe — where value concentrates

Because the six sub-industries have such different cap tables, there is no single "electronics hardware" trade. In brief:

• Public depth lives in three sub-industries — semiconductors, EMS, and connectors hold nearly all the liquid, large-cap U.S. exposure. The scale mismatch is instructive: Amphenol booked $23.1 billion of 2025 sales and TE Connectivity $17.3 billion in fiscal 2025, each individually several times the entire domestic connector industry's ~$7 billion of shipments.[8][19][20]
• Private/foreign depth lives in the other three — bare boards, passives, and other components are mostly private, foreign-listed, or a single U.S. pure-play each, and are where private-equity roll-ups do their buying.
• The codes leak, so verify what you are buying. Neither Amphenol nor TE is a pure connector company; TTM is neither U.S.-only nor purely bare-board; some marquee "other component" names may be classified as semiconductors. Exposure should be measured from product and segment disclosure, not a database industry label.[16][21]
• There is no dedicated fund for this level. Broad semiconductor ETFs capture mostly the chip sub-industry — and even there blend fabless designers, equipment vendors and foreign foundries — giving only diluted exposure to the rest.

Named companies and tickers belong on the child page; the 33441 primer lists them sub-industry by sub-industry, which is the level where an actual portfolio decision gets made.

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5. How the money works

Every part of this level is a manufacturing business, so the economics are about volume, capacity utilization, yield, mix, and the cycle — not fees, rents, or same-store sales. Operating leverage is the whole game: plants carry heavy fixed costs, so filling them drops incremental volume to profit while running them half-empty collapses margins — at Kimball Electronics a 13% fiscal-2025 sales decline produced a 26% gross-profit decline, partly from lost absorption.[3] Domestic margin lives in the high-reliability, hard-to-second-source tier (defense, medical, automotive-qualified), because commodity work has migrated offshore; Vishay reports that only 17% of its resistor revenue was commodity product in 2025, against 52% certified and 31% custom.[11] And "design-win stickiness" is the moat — a part qualified into a car platform or defense program ships for that product's multi-year life with limited price erosion.

The defining internal contrast, spelled out fully on the child page, is now visible as a complete margin ladder inside one four-digit code:

• Contract assembly is the floor — fiscal-2025 gross margins of 7.0% to 10.1% and operating margins of 3.1% to 5.0% across Jabil, Flex, Sanmina, Plexus and Kimball; double-digit operating margins are almost unheard of.[3]
• Bare boards sit just above, and were once worse — a federal survey found an average net margin of only 2.7% across 2012–2015, with a third of respondent facilities reporting negative net income in the average year; today's survivors, concentrated in advanced and defense work, do better (TTM's adjusted EBITDA margin was 15.7% in 2025).[22][23]
• Passives and specialty components occupy the middle — Vishay's combined passive segments earned 22.7% gross and 17.8% operating margins in fiscal 2025; in specialty components Rogers' advanced-electronics segment earned 29.6% and CTS 38.4%.[11][12]
• Connectors are the best of the non-chip group — TE Connectivity earned 35.2% gross and 18.6% operating margins, and Amphenol's operating margin rose to 25.4% in 2025 from 20.7%.[19][20]
• Semiconductors are the capital-heavy, high-margin — and most violent — extreme. Industry capital spending reached about $166 billion in 2025 and is projected near $200 billion in 2026, running roughly 35–50% of revenue at foundries. The reward is pricing power; the cost is whiplash: Micron's revenue rose about 49% in fiscal 2025 with gross margin swinging to 39.8% from 22.4%, while in the same window Microchip's revenue fell about 42% on an inventory correction.[2][24]

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6. What drives demand

A striking feature of this level is that one demand stack powers all of it at once — which is why the parts rise and fall together:

• AI data centers — the current supercycle and the dominant swing factor: advanced logic and memory, denser boards (AI-server layer counts have gone from ~16–20 to 28–36, lifting board value per server by more than 30%), tens of thousands of ceramic capacitors per rack (40,000–60,000 in a next-generation rack), high-speed connectors, specialist assembly, and precision timing. It is already in the results — TE's digital-data-networks sales rose from $1.3 billion to $2.2 billion in fiscal 2025 and Jabil's Intelligent Infrastructure revenue rose 34%.[3][10][19][25]
• Automotive electrification — EVs and driver-assistance multiply electronic content per vehicle, including 3–5× the passive content (on the order of 15,000 ceramic capacitors versus about 3,000 in a legacy car).[26]
• Defense and aerospace — radar, avionics, satellites, and secure communications require trusted, U.S.-made, qualified hardware; the anchor demand where domestic production is protected.
• Medical, industrial, 5G/telecom, and IoT — steady, higher-reliability demand favoring domestic and specialty suppliers, over the broad electronics inventory cycle.
• Reshoring — but read it as nearshoring. Tariffs and supply-chain policy are pushing production out of China; the larger flow is to Mexico under the USMCA rather than onto U.S. soil. Flex produced $6.9 billion in Mexico against $4.3 billion in China in fiscal 2025. U.S. capacity wins where intellectual-property protection, export controls or trusted-source requirements outweigh the domestic cost premium.[3]

The shared near-term caveat: a large share of current strength is AI capital spending, which could digest (Section 9).

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7. Regulation

None of this is rate-regulated like a utility; the binding rules are trade, materials, quality certification, and industrial policy — with an important asymmetry that the child page now sizes. Industrial subsidy is concentrated on semiconductors: the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act put $52.7 billion — roughly $39 billion in incentives plus an investment tax credit — almost entirely behind chip fabrication, with over $36 billion allocated across roughly 19 firms by late 2025. The credit is 25% on qualifying equipment placed in service through 2025, rising to 35% thereafter, but is scheduled to expire at the end of 2026.[27][28] What the rest of the supply chain received is smaller by orders of magnitude — a $39.9 million Defense Production Act award for bare-board and substrate capacity is representative — and the proposed Protecting Circuit Boards and Substrates (PCBS) Act, which would add roughly $3 billion plus a 25% credit for buyers of U.S.-made boards, had not been enacted as of mid-2026.[4][29] Passives, connectors and assembly have no equivalent program: America is subsidizing the chip but barely the board, passive or assembly it must be built onto.

Subsidy is also edging into ownership — in August 2025 the U.S. government converted part of Intel's support into a roughly 10% equity stake, a departure from grant-only support that equity holders now have to price.[30] Export controls (ITAR, EAR, and Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security rules on advanced chips) apply across the level, hardest at the top, and have whipsawed: after restricting advanced AI chips outright, BIS moved by late 2025 to case-by-case licensing of some advanced parts into China in exchange for the U.S. government taking 25% of the revenue, effective January 2026.[31][32] Materials rules (the EU's RoHS and REACH; U.S. conflict-minerals disclosure) are universal, and critical-input dependence is federally documented — the United States was 100% net-import reliant for both gallium and tantalum in 2025.[33] Quality certification (AS9100 aerospace, ISO 13485 medical, IPC workmanship, AEC-Q automotive, MIL-PRF military) is the real gatekeeper that keeps high-value work onshore. Section 301 and 2025–26 tariff actions cut both ways — raising input costs while pushing reshoring — and not always in domestic producers' favour, since a U.S. fabricator can pay duty on full-value inputs while an imported finished board is dutied once.[34]

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8. Consolidation

The level is statistically unconcentrated (HHI 317.5; top-4 firms 29.3% of receipts),[8] but that average hides a wide spread — and is partly an artifact of aggregation. This level's CR4 sits below that of its three largest sub-industries individually, because combining six heterogeneous product lines dilutes measured concentration. Underneath, the spread is wide: semiconductors are the most top-heavy (CR4 48%, HHI 897), followed by EMS (CR4 43.6%) and connectors (CR4 39.6%, HHI 582.5); bare boards sit in the middle (CR4 28.7%), while passives (CR4 24.1%, HHI 226.3) and especially "other components" (CR4 ~11%, HHI 84.6) are among the most fragmented corners of all manufacturing.[8] Read domestic HHIs with care, too — passives measure unconcentrated only because the oligopolists' plants are abroad.

The right mental model is a barbell: a few giants at the top of some sub-industries and a long fragmented tail beneath all of them. Two engines run across the level: strategic M&A at the top (Amphenol's serial acquisitions in connectors, including a $10.5 billion CommScope connectivity deal; Asian groups such as Yageo — KEMET at ~$1.6–1.8 billion, Pulse Electronics at ~$740 million — and Kyocera buying Western passive brands) and private-equity roll-ups of the tail (Summit Interconnect's 2024 sale from HCI Equity Partners to Lindsay Goldberg, and the APCT/Advanced Circuits combination into AdvancedPCB at roughly $220 million enterprise value).[35][36][37] It is not frictionless: DuPont's ~$5.2 billion agreement to buy Rogers Corporation was terminated in late 2022 after failing to clear Chinese antitrust review, with Rogers collecting a $162.5 million break fee — cross-border review now shadows any large deal here.[38] Capital and certification are the moats, so scale keeps concentrating even as the statistical industry stays fragmented.

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9. Risks

Because one demand stack drives everything, the risks are largely shared and correlated:

• Cyclicality — the defining risk; utilization-driven margins swing hard, and the industry regularly overbuilds into shortages, then suffers gluts. Memory is the most extreme (Micron up ~49% in fiscal 2025) but the swings are not confined to it (Microchip down ~42% in the same window).[24]
• AI-capex concentration — much of current growth leans on a handful of hyperscale buyers; a pause would hit the whole level at once.
• The offshore cost wall — for boards and passives especially, the structural cost gap versus Asia is existential without policy support.[4]
• Geopolitics and China — leading-edge chipmaking concentrated in Taiwan is a flashpoint; China is a major buyer, a major input source, and — via antitrust review — a gate on Western consolidation; export-control and tariff whiplash can strand revenue overnight.[5][32][38]
• Customer concentration — the disclosed levels are real: Jabil's five largest customers were 36% of fiscal-2025 revenue with one at 16%, and Sanmina's top ten were 52%.[3]
• An eroded domestic skills base — the 80.6% collapse in bare-board employment since 2000 means the labor pool for a reshoring push is thinner than policy assumes, and federal surveys repeatedly identify skilled-worker availability as the binding limit on raising utilization.[7][22]
• Input-cost, materials and currency swings — with two inputs carrying documented 100% U.S. import reliance (gallium, tantalum)[33] — plus technology and substitution risk (missing a process node or a packaging transition), valuation risk at the premium-multiple franchises, and policy dependence (the CHIPS tax credit is set to expire end-2026; the PCBS Act has not passed; the new government-equity model adds a novel governance risk).[4][27][30]

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10. How to invest & outlook

How to invest. Choose the sub-industry first — that decision determines the risk, the ownership, the margin structure, and the way in more than any single company does. Public-market breadth lives in semiconductors, connectors, and EMS; the non-chip sub-industries (bare boards, passives, other components) are largely private, foreign-listed, or a lone U.S. pure-play each, and are where private-equity roll-ups and strategic acquirers do their buying. Because this pass-through level has no dedicated fund and the real cap-table differences are one level down, the actionable universe — names, tickers, ETFs, and private theses — is laid out on the 33441 child page.

Outlook (forward-looking). The tailwinds are unusually aligned and point the same way for the whole level: an AI capital-spending wave lifting demand and per-unit content, automotive electrification raising content per vehicle, firm defense budgets steering dollars to trusted domestic suppliers, and trade policy pushing production out of China — though more often to Mexico than to the United States.[3][6][25][26] The counterweights are equally shared: deep cyclicality, a structural cost gap versus Asia for the commodity tiers, a thinned-out domestic skills base, dependence on policy that is partly unlegislated or expiring, and the fact that much current strength is AI capex that could normalize. The most durable truth at this level is that timing the cycle matters as much as picking the company — and that which sub-industry you buy determines almost everything else. The plausible path is a smaller-but-higher-value U.S. footprint concentrated in defense, AI, and specialty work rather than a return to commodity-scale dominance.

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Sources

Drawn from the NAICS 33441 child primer, which carries the full source list.

1. NAICS Association / U.S. Census Bureau. "NAICS 33441 — Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing" and its six child definitions. 2022. https://www.naics.com/naics-code-description/?code=33441
2. Semiconductor Intelligence / Deloitte. "CapEx Up for Foundry, Memory" (fab build cost ~$10B plus ~$5B equipment; industry capex ~$166B in 2025, ~$200B in 2026; capex intensity by business model). 2026. https://www.semiconductorintelligence.com/capex-up-for-foundry-memory/
3. Jabil Inc. / Flex Ltd. / Plexus Corp. / Kimball Electronics / Sanmina FY2025 Forms 10-K (EMS gross margins 7.0%–10.1% and operating margins 3.1%–5.0%; Jabil 75% foreign revenue, top-five customers 36% with one at 16%, Intelligent Infrastructure +34%; Sanmina top-ten customers 52%; Flex $6.9B produced in Mexico vs $4.3B in China; Kimball sales −13% with gross profit −26%). 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/898293/000162828025045293/jbl-20250831.htm
4. Summit Interconnect / Printed Circuit Board Association of America. "Bipartisan PCBS Act" (U.S. ~4% of PCB output; Asia ~90% of supply; under 1% of advanced substrates; ~$3B authorization plus 25% buyer credit; not yet enacted). 2025. https://summitinterconnect.com/blog/article/bipartisan-pcbs-act/
5. Dataconomy. "TSMC Dominates Foundry Market With 72% Share" (full-year foundry revenue ~$132.9B; most leading-edge U.S.-designed logic built in Taiwan). 2025. https://dataconomy.com/2025/12/23/tsmc-dominates-foundry-market-with-72-share-in-q3-2025/
6. Semiconductor Industry Association. "Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025" (on track past $1 trillion in 2026). 2026. https://www.semiconductors.org/global-annual-semiconductor-sales-increase-25-6-to-791-7-billion-in-2025/
7. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Industries with employment decreases from 2000 to 2024" (NAICS 334412: 137,501 in 2000 to 26,676 in 2024; −80.6%). 2025. https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2025/industries-with-employment-decreases-from-2000-to-2024.htm
8. U.S. Census Bureau. 2022 Economic Census — receipts, firm counts, and concentration ratios for NAICS 3344/33441 and each sub-industry (level: receipts $115.9B, 3,376 firms, CR4 29.3%, CR8 40.2%, CR20 53.2%, CR50 65.8%, HHI 317.5; sub-industry receipts and CR4/HHI as cited). 2022. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
9. U.S. Census Bureau. County Business Patterns — establishments (3,686), employment (279,841), annual payroll ($27.8B), first-quarter payroll ($7.53B) for NAICS 3344/33441 and each sub-industry. 2023. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
10. TrendForce. "2026 MLCC Market Update" (polarized demand: AI and advanced applications tightening, consumer electronics weak; 40,000–60,000 MLCCs per next-generation AI rack). 2026. https://www.trendforce.com/presscenter/news/20260205-12914.html
11. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. Form 10-K FY2025 and segment financial data (passive segments 22.7% gross margin and 17.8% operating margin; 17% commodity / 52% certified / 31% custom resistor mix; Bel Fuse magnetics 27.6% gross margin). 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/103730/000010373026000019/form10k.htm
12. CTS Corporation Form 10-K FY2025 (38.4% gross margin) and Rogers Corporation Form 10-K FY2025 (Advanced Electronics Solutions 29.6% gross margin). 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/26058/000119312526067039/cts-20251231.htm
13. U.S. Small Business Administration. Table of Small Business Size Standards (550 employees for 334416; 750 for 334412, 334418, 334419; 1,000 for 334417; 1,250 for 334413). 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
14. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Current Employment Statistics, NAICS 334413 (~181,000 employees, April 2026). 2026. https://www.bls.gov/ces/data/employment-and-earnings/2026/table1a_202605.htm
15. U.S. Census Bureau. Annual Integrated Economic Survey — NAICS 334413 sales $61.0B and NAICS 334418 revenue $27.2B. 2023. https://data.census.gov/table/AIESBASICTIMESERIES.AIES31BASIC01?codeset=naics~334413&g=010XX00US
16. Amphenol Corporation. Form 10-K FY2025 (operating margin 25.4% vs 20.7%; ~15,000 U.S. of ~170,000 worldwide employees; 79% of long-lived assets outside the U.S.). 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/820313/000110465926013549/aph-20251231x10k.htm
17. Semiconductor Industry Association. "2025 SIA Factbook" (U.S.-headquartered firms ~$318B / 50.4% of global chip revenue, 2024). 2025. https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-SIA-Factbook-FINAL-1.pdf
18. Bishop & Associates / TTI. "2024 World Connector Market Review" (worldwide connector shipments $86.5B; North American sales $20.1B). 2025. https://www.ttieurope.com/content/ttieurope/en/resources/marketeye/categories/connectors/me-bishop-20250228.html
19. TE Connectivity. Form 10-K FY2025 ($17.3B net sales; 35.2% gross margin; 18.6% operating margin; digital-data-networks sales from $1.3B to $2.2B). 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465925109150/tel-20250926x10k.htm
20. Amphenol Corporation / StockTitan. "Amphenol Reports Record Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2025 Results" ($23.1B FY2025 sales; $10.5B CommScope connectivity acquisition). 2026. https://www.stocktitan.net/news/APH/amphenol-reports-record-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2025-nkeprvqejb11.html
21. TTM Technologies, Inc. "Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2025 Results" (adjusted EBITDA margin 15.7% vs 14.4%; multi-code footprint spanning bare boards and assembly). 2026. https://investors.ttm.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/400/ttm-technologies-inc-reports-fourth-quarter-fiscal-year
22. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. "U.S. Bare Printed Circuit Board Industry Assessment" (2012–2015: average net margin 2.7%; 32% of respondents reporting negative net income; skilled-labor constraints). 2017. https://media.bis.gov/media/documents/u.s.-bare-printed-circuit-board-industry-assessment-2017.pdf
23. TTM Technologies, Inc. FY2025 results (adjusted EBITDA margin 15.7%). 2026. https://investors.ttm.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/400/ttm-technologies-inc-reports-fourth-quarter-fiscal-year
24. Micron Technology FY2025 Form 10-K (revenue +49%; gross margin 39.8% vs 22.4%) and Microchip Technology FY2025 results (revenue −42% on inventory correction). 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312525000038/mu-20251125.htm
25. UGPCB. "AI Server PCB: High-Frequency Materials & Market Trends" (AI-server layer counts from 16–20 to 28–36; PCB value per server +30%). 2026. https://www.ugpcb.com/news/trade-news/ai-server-pcb/
26. SNS Insider. "Passive Electronic Components Market Size" (EV passive content 3–5×; ~15,000 MLCCs per EV versus ~3,000 in a legacy vehicle). 2026. https://finance.yahoo.com/sectors/technology/articles/passive-electronic-components-market-size-073000399.html
27. GovConFeed / Manufacturing Dive. "CHIPS and Science Act — $52.7B; ~$39B manufacturing incentives; over $36B allocated across ~19 firms; tax credit expiring December 2026." 2025. https://govconfeed.com/article/chips-act-30-billion-awarded-tax-credit-december-2026
28. U.S. Internal Revenue Service. "Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit" (Section 48D: 25% through 2025, 35% thereafter). 2025. https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/advanced-manufacturing-investment-credit
29. U.S. Department of Defense. "DoD Awards $39.9 Million to Strengthen U.S. Supply Chains for Printed Circuit Boards" (Defense Production Act award to Calumet Electronics). 2023. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/article/3589418/dod-awards-399-million-to-strengthen-us-supply-chains-for-printed-circuit-boards/
30. TrendForce. "U.S. Reportedly Mulls Stakes in CHIPS Act Recipients After Intel" (~10% U.S. government equity stake in Intel). 2025. https://www.trendforce.com/news/2025/08/20/news-u-s-reportedly-mulls-stakes-in-chips-act-recipients-after-intel-raising-risks-for-tsmc-samsung/
31. Congressional Research Service. "U.S. Export Controls and China: Advanced Semiconductors" (R48642; BIS rules, ITAR/EAR framework). 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48642
32. Baker McKenzie. "BIS Revises License Review Policy for Advanced Computing Commodities / AI Semiconductors to China and Macau" (case-by-case licensing with 25% revenue share, effective January 2026). 2026. https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/bis-revises-license-review-policy-for-advanced-computing-commodities-ai-semiconductors-to-china-and-macau-when-exported-from-the-united-states/
33. U.S. Geological Survey. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (U.S. 100% net-import reliant for gallium and for tantalum). 2026. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf
34. Accuris. "New Electronic Component Tariffs: How to Prevent Supply Chain Disruptions" (Section 301 and 2025–26 tariff actions; sourcing shifts). 2026. https://accuristech.com/blog/electronic-component-tariffs/
35. Amphenol Corporation / StockTitan. "Amphenol Reports Record Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2025 Results" ($10.5B CommScope connectivity acquisition). 2026. https://www.stocktitan.net/news/APH/amphenol-reports-record-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2025-nkeprvqejb11.html
36. Wikipedia / EEPower. "KEMET Corporation" (Yageo acquisition ~$1.6–1.8B) and "Yageo to Acquire Pulse Electronics for US$740 Million" / Kyocera–AVX (Asian roll-up of Western passive brands). 2021–25. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KEMET_Corporation
37. PR Newswire / Lincoln International. "HCI Equity Partners Completes Sale of Summit Interconnect" (to Lindsay Goldberg, 2024) and the APCT / Advanced Circuits combination into AdvancedPCB (~$220M enterprise value). 2023–24. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/hci-equity-partners-completes-sale-of-summit-interconnect-301385097.html
38. Rogers Corporation. "Rogers Announces Termination of Merger Agreement with DuPont" (~$5.2B deal terminated after failing Chinese antitrust review; $162.5M break fee). 2022. https://www.rogerscorp.com/news/2022/rogers-announces-termination-of-merger-agreement-with-dupont