Farm Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing (U.S.)

NAICS 2022 code 333111. NAICS is the North American Industry Classification System, the federal government's standard for grouping businesses by activity.

1. Overview

This is the industry that builds the big iron of American agriculture: tractors, combines (the self-propelled machines that harvest grain), planters, balers, sprayers, tillage tools, irrigation systems, and the specialized implements farmers pull behind them. It also includes commercial turf and grounds-care equipment (nonresidential mowing systems), though consumer lawn and garden gear is a separate industry.[1] It is a capital-goods manufacturing business — long-lived, expensive machines sold mostly to farms and ranches through networks of independent dealers.

Why an investor should care: farm equipment sits at the intersection of two forces that rarely move together — global food demand (steady, growing) and the farm economy (deeply cyclical). The result is a durable, oligopoly-structured industry with a handful of dominant makers, high barriers to entry, and profits that swing hard with crop prices and farm income. It is also in the middle of a genuine technology shift, as GPS-guided (Global Positioning System) autosteer, sensors, and data services turn tractors into rolling computers and open up recurring, software-style revenue on top of one-time machine sales.

Public vs. private ways in. This is one of the more investable corners of the industrial economy for public-market investors: several of the world's largest makers trade on U.S. exchanges, led by Deere & Company. Private capital plays through the large family- and foreign-owned manufacturers (Kubota, Claas, Kinze, Vermeer), the sprawling base of independent equipment dealerships, the components and precision-ag supply chain, and the equipment-finance and used-machinery markets. Details are in sections 4 and 10.

2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. NAICS 333111 covers establishments that manufacture agricultural and farm machinery: wheeled and tracked tractors, combines and other harvesting equipment, planting and seeding machines, plows and tillage tools, balers and haying equipment, sprayers, manure spreaders, irrigation systems, milking machines, poultry and livestock feeding equipment, cotton ginning machinery, and commercial (nonresidential) turf and grounds-care equipment.[1]

What it excludes (this matters for reading the numbers):

• Lawn and garden equipment for home use — riding mowers, garden tractors, home lawn gear — is a separate industry, NAICS 333112.[1]
• Tires, wheels, and undercarriage for ag machines fall under rubber and metal-products codes, not here.
• Engines (NAICS 333618) and the GPS receivers and electronics inside precision-ag systems are classified with their own product families.
• Construction and forestry machinery (NAICS 33312) is separate — relevant because the biggest U.S. maker, Deere, straddles both.
• The dealers who sell and service the equipment are retail (NAICS 42382/44421), not manufacturing.

Operating model. This is engineered, relatively low-volume durable-goods manufacturing rather than simple metal fabrication. Production combines machining, stamping, forming, castings and forgings, welding, painting and final assembly with engines, hydraulics, transmissions, electronics, sensors and embedded software. Deere identifies steel products, castings, forgings, plastics, hydraulics, electronics and ready-to-assemble components as important purchased inputs.[2] Design, systems integration, software, emissions compliance and field testing increasingly account for the economic value above the metal itself.

Ownership mix. This is a concentrated, capital-intensive manufacturing industry, not a fragmented service trade. A small number of full-line makers (offering everything from tractors to combines) dominate, surrounded by a long tail of roughly a thousand "shortline" and specialty firms that build a narrow slice — a particular planter, hay tool, grain cart, or irrigation pivot. Ownership runs from large public corporations to foreign multinationals (Japan's Kubota, India's Mahindra) to privately held American firms (Kinze, Vermeer) and family-owned European groups (Claas, Kuhn). Unlike some industries in this series, it is not distorted by government ownership or by armies of tiny sole proprietors — the federal business statistics capture it reasonably well, with one important caveat about trade and global footprint noted in section 3.

The dealer channel. Manufacturers normally sell through branded, independently owned dealers rather than directly from the factory. Dealers carry new and used machines, provide parts and time-critical field repairs, demonstrate technology, arrange financing and take trade-ins. Deere reported approximately 1,600 agricultural-equipment dealer locations in the United States and Canada in fiscal 2025.[2] This makes the dealer network — and the installed base it services — a substantial competitive moat. The channel also creates accounting complications: manufacturers can record a wholesale sale before the dealer completes the retail sale, while incentives, interest-free floor-plan periods and repurchase obligations leave part of the economic risk with the OEM. Consequently, reported OEM shipments can diverge from end-user demand, and dealer destocking can make an industry downturn temporarily worse than the decline in farmer purchases.

3. How big it is

Federal statistics for the U.S. manufacturing industry (establishments physically making this equipment in the United States):

That works out to average pay of roughly $73,000 per worker[5] — solidly middle-class manufacturing wages, reflecting a skilled, unionized-in-places, machining-and-assembly workforce.

Establishment size distribution. The industry has a concentrated top and a long specialty-manufacturer tail. In 2022, only 8 establishments had at least 1,000 employees, but they employed 16,539 people; meanwhile, 709 establishments (roughly two-thirds) had fewer than 20 employees.[6] An establishment is a plant or operating location, not necessarily an independent firm.

Concentration. This is one of the more concentrated manufacturing industries in the economy. The four largest firms account for 61.6% of industry receipts (the four-firm concentration ratio, or CR4); the top eight for 67.1%; the top 20 for 75.9%; and the top 50 for 84.2%.[3] In other words, roughly 1,000 remaining firms split the last ~16%. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration measure that squares and sums market shares) is suppressed in the federal data for this industry, so we do not report a value — but the concentration ratios make clear this is an oligopoly with a very long tail. Note that the 61% figure refers to domestic shipments by firms, not dealer concentration, repair-market concentration, or the global agricultural-machinery market.

The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) sets the small-business size standard for this industry at 1,250 employees[7] — high, because even mid-sized equipment makers are large by headcount.

The undercount / mismeasurement caveat. The $42.8 billion (2022) and $30.8 billion (2025) figures are U.S. factory shipments — what plants inside the United States produce. They are not the size of the U.S. farm-equipment market, and they are not the global scale of U.S.-headquartered makers. Two distortions pull in opposite directions:

• Imports understate domestic factories relative to what farmers buy. A large share of equipment sold to American farms — most compact tractors especially — is imported (Kubota from Japan and its U.S. plants, Mahindra from India, and machines the majors build in Mexico, Brazil, and Europe). Aftermarket parts, dealer margins, and financing also sit outside this manufacturing line.
• The global footprint dwarfs the domestic line item. Deere alone reported worldwide net sales and revenues of about $45.7 billion in fiscal 2025 — more than the entire U.S. industry's shipments — because most of that is earned abroad and across construction and finance.[8] So a single company's global revenue can exceed the whole domestic NAICS figure without contradiction.

Read the shipments figure as "value made in U.S. farm-machinery plants," not "the American ag-equipment economy."

4. The investable universe

For public-market investors, this is a rich sector by industrial standards — the global leaders trade on U.S. exchanges. Note that the two largest are not pure farm-equipment plays: Deere earns roughly a third of sales from construction/forestry and finance, and CNH also makes construction equipment. AGCO is the largest pure-play farm-equipment maker in the world.[9]

Approximate scale figures below are recent market values and revenues; they move constantly and should be checked before acting.

ADR = American Depositary Receipt, a U.S.-traded proxy for a foreign stock. NYSE = New York Stock Exchange; TSE = Tokyo Stock Exchange; hp = horsepower.

Major private and foreign-owned makers (not directly investable on U.S. markets): Kubota (Japan, with major U.S. manufacturing in Gainesville, Georgia, producing 100,000+ units a year[16]); Mahindra (India); Claas (German, family-owned, forage/combine leader; reported global fiscal-2025 sales of €4.9 billion[17]); Kuhn (owned by Switzerland's Bucher Industries); Kinze Manufacturing and Vermeer (privately held Iowa firms, strong in planters and hay/forage respectively); and the ~1,000 smaller shortline manufacturers.

If you want farm-equipment exposure without stock-picking, broad industrial and agribusiness ETFs (exchange-traded funds, baskets of stocks) hold Deere and peers, and a few thematic agriculture-technology funds tilt toward the group.

5. How the money works

Owners in this industry make money the way heavy-manufacturing owners generally do — but with a sharp cyclical twist. The metrics that actually matter:

Cyclicality tied to farm income. Equipment is a big-ticket, deferrable purchase. When crop prices and net farm income are high, farmers replace machines and buy up; when income falls, they run old iron another year. Demand therefore tracks farm cash receipts and USDA net-farm-income forecasts (USDA = U.S. Department of Agriculture), not GDP. This is the single most important driver of the P&L.

Capacity utilization and operating leverage. Factories carry heavy fixed costs, so profits are highly sensitive to volume. In good years, incremental sales drop through to margins (operating margins in the high teens are achievable at the peak); in downturns, makers deliberately underproduce — building fewer machines than dealers retail — to draw down dealer inventory, which crushes factory throughput and margins on the way down. This "producing below retail demand" is the defining move of a farm-equipment downcycle.

The public-company results illustrate the operating-leverage swing. Deere's global Production & Precision Agriculture segment generated fiscal-2025 operating margin of 15.4%, versus 21.7% one year earlier — Deere attributed the decline mainly to lower volume and mix.[2] CNH's global Agriculture segment reported 2025 adjusted EBIT margin of 6.2%, down from 10.5%.[18] AGCO reported 2025 adjusted operating margin of 7.7% on sales of $10.1 billion.[12] These are useful cycle indicators but are not comparable NAICS-level margins: they use different geographies, products, segment definitions and adjustment policies.

Input costs. Steel, castings, engines, electronics, and labor are the main costs. Steel and component tariffs directly raise the bill: Deere said it absorbed about $600 million of tariff cost in fiscal 2025 and guided to roughly $1.2 billion for 2026; AGCO put its 2025 tariff hit near $40 million, rising toward $110 million in 2026.[19]

The dealer channel and inventory cycle. Makers sell wholesale to independent dealers, who carry new and used machines. Watching dealer new- and used-inventory levels is how the market reads where you are in the cycle — inventories built up into 2025 and had to be worked down (industry manufacturer inventories fell from a peak of ~$7.2 billion in late 2022 to ~$5.7 billion by December 2025[19]). Used-equipment values matter because trade-in economics influence the farmer's effective purchase price; falling used values can constrain new sales and generate dealer losses.

Aftermarket parts and service — the ballast. Every machine in the field is an annuity: parts, repairs, and service run for the equipment's whole life and are far more stable and higher-margin than new-machine sales. The bigger a company's installed base, the more this counter-cyclical revenue cushions the downturns.

Precision ag and recurring/software revenue — the growth story. GPS guidance, autosteer, section control, and data platforms increasingly carry subscription and per-acre fees, higher margins than steel, and lock-in through data and dealer support. The full precision-farming market was on the order of ~$13 billion in 2025 and growing double-digits[20]; the majors are trying to convert one-time hardware buyers into ongoing subscribers, which would smooth the cycle and lift valuations if it works.

Captive finance. Deere, CNH, and AGCO run in-house lending arms (John Deere Financial, CNH Capital, AGCO Finance) that finance both dealers' inventory and farmers' purchases. These earn interest income and, crucially, keep machines moving when bank credit tightens — but they add credit risk and interest-rate sensitivity to the business.

Order boards and backlog. Because big machines are built to order, management-reported order backlog is a leading indicator of near-term factory volume and pricing power.

6. What drives demand

• Net farm income and crop prices. The master variable. Row-crop income (corn, soybeans) has fallen for several years from the 2022 record. USDA forecasts 2026 net farm income of $153.4 billion, down 0.7% nominally from 2025, while net cash farm income is forecast at $158.5 billion, up 3.0%. Sector debt is forecast to rise 5.2% to $624.7 billion, and working capital to decline 9.2%.[21] Government payments and livestock conditions can support aggregate income even while liquidity among crop producers — the primary buyers of large tractors and combines — remains constrained.
• Farm consolidation. In the 2022 Census of Agriculture, the United States had 1,900,487 farms, down 7% from 2017, while average farm size rose 5% to 463 acres. More importantly, only 105,384 farms (6% of the total) had at least $1 million in annual sales, yet they produced more than three-quarters of agricultural product value.[22] The practical addressable market for high-end equipment is thus far more concentrated than the headline farm count suggests, favoring larger, more productive and more technologically intensive machines.
• Replacement cycles and the age of the fleet. Tractors and combines last decades; demand is partly deferred maintenance. A very old installed base eventually forces buying regardless of income.
• Interest rates. Most equipment is financed. Higher rates raise the monthly cost of a $500,000-plus combine and suppress demand.
• Commodity and input economics. Fertilizer, fuel, and seed costs versus crop prices set the margin farmers have to spend.
• Labor scarcity and automation. Chronic farm-labor shortages push adoption of autosteer and autonomy — a structural, counter-cyclical tailwind for precision equipment. Connectivity remains a constraint but is improving: farms reporting internet access rose from 75% in 2017 to 79% in 2022.[22]
• Government farm policy. Farm-bill support, crop insurance, ethanol/biofuel mandates, and trade policy all move farmers' cash and confidence.
• Weather and yields, and global grain trade (exports, tariffs, and retaliation) that set U.S. crop prices.

7. Regulation

Farm equipment is less heavily regulated than, say, pharmaceuticals, but several regimes matter:

• Right to repair — now a live constraint. For years farmers complained that software locks forced them to authorized dealers for repairs. After a 2023 voluntary memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the American Farm Bureau that critics called toothless, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued Deere in January 2025, and in July 2026 secured a settlement requiring Deere to give farmers and independent shops the same diagnostic software and repair tools as its dealers for ten years — including fault-code resets, component programming and restarting machines after emissions-related shutdowns — and barring dealer retaliation against customers who repair independently.[23] This reshapes the aftermarket-service economics discussed above and sets a template for the industry.
• Emissions. Off-road diesel engines must meet U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Tier 4 standards, adding after-treatment cost and complexity. Greater engine complexity adds engineering, certification and service requirements.[24]
• Safety. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rules and voluntary ASABE (American Society of Agricultural and Biological Engineers) standards govern rollover protection, guarding, and operator safety.
• Trade and tariffs. Steel/aluminum tariffs raise input costs (section 5), and retaliatory tariffs on U.S. crops indirectly cut farmers' buying power. Trade policy is a two-sided risk for this industry.
• Autonomy and spectrum. Fully driverless machines run ahead of a settled regulatory framework; GPS/telematics rely on protected radio spectrum.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The structure is a classic oligopoly with a long tail. Three global full-line makers — Deere, CNH, and AGCO — plus Kubota anchor the market; together the top players hold well over 60% of U.S. sales.[9] The CR4 of 61.6% in the federal data confirms this.[3] Below them, ~1,000 shortline and specialty firms compete on niches the majors underserve. CNH identifies Claas, Kubota, Mahindra, Argo Tractors and SDF as additional important competitors.[18]

Barriers to entry are steep: capital-intensive plants, decades-deep dealer networks, brand loyalty (John Deere green is generational), and now a widening technology moat in precision ag and data. That last moat is why the majors spend heavily on research and development (R&D) and acquisitions — buying GPS, sensor, sprayer-vision, and autonomy startups (for example CNH's purchase of Raven Industries) to avoid being disintermediated by software players.

Consolidation has already concentrated the top: AGCO itself was assembled from Massey Ferguson, Fendt, and Valtra; CNH from Case and New Holland (Fiat lineage). Ongoing moves are more bolt-on technology deals than mega-mergers, partly because antitrust scrutiny (and the right-to-repair fight) now watches the leaders closely. Chinese and Indian makers (Mahindra) are the most likely long-run share threats, especially at the low-horsepower end.

9. Risks

• Deep cyclicality. Earnings can halve peak-to-trough; the industry entered a multi-year downturn as farm income fell. In 2025, U.S. tractor sales were down ~10% and combine sales down ~36% year over year; within tractors, 100-plus-horsepower two-wheel-drive units fell 22.6% and four-wheel-drive tractors fell 41.6%, while smaller under-40-horsepower units fell only 9.1%.[25]
• Farm-income and commodity-price shocks — the dominant, largely uncontrollable risk.
• Interest-rate sensitivity, both to demand and to the captive-finance loan books.
• Tariffs and trade wars — raising input costs and cutting customers' income simultaneously.
• Technology disruption / margin compression on repair. Right-to-repair rulings erode a high-margin service stream; software entrants could challenge the data moat.
• Inventory whiplash. Overbuilding into a downturn forces painful destocking and production cuts.
• Input and supply-chain volatility (steel, semiconductors, engines).
• Concentration/customer risk for suppliers like Titan whose fortunes ride on a few large makers.
• Software and connectivity risks. Connected fleets add cybersecurity, privacy, interoperability and technology-obsolescence risk. A disabled connected fleet or compromised farm data could create product-liability and reputational consequences well beyond a conventional mechanical failure.

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes. The cleanest exposure is the listed makers in section 4 — Deere (DE) for the blue-chip, technology-led leader (with the caveat that a third of it is construction and finance), CNH for a more ag-weighted global player, and AGCO for the pure-play. Smaller specialists — Lindsay (LNN) in irrigation, Alamo (ALG) in vegetation management — offer narrower, sometimes less cyclical, angles, and Titan International (TWI) is a way to play the components tier. For dealer-tier exposure rather than manufacturing, Titan Machinery (TITN) sells and services primarily CNH equipment, making its economics especially sensitive to regional retail demand, used inventory, parts, service and floor-plan financing. Broad industrial and agribusiness ETFs give diversified exposure without single-name risk. Dividends are modest (Deere and Lindsay both yield around 1%[10]); this is a total-return, cyclically timed sector, not an income sector.

Private routes. Private capital participates through the large private/foreign makers (Kubota, Kinze, Vermeer, Claas), the fragmented and consolidating dealership networks (private equity has been rolling up ag-equipment dealers), the precision-ag and autonomy startup ecosystem, equipment-finance and leasing, and the large secondary market in used machinery. Specialty OEMs may offer consolidation opportunities because the establishment base has a long small-company tail, but diligence should focus on customer and dealer concentration, dependence on a full-line OEM, product liability, cyclically inflated earnings, working-capital needs, steel pass-through mechanisms and whether intellectual property is genuinely differentiated.

Near-term drivers (forward-looking). The industry is in the trough of a cyclical downturn as of 2026: farm income is soft, dealer inventories are being worked down, and tariffs are raising costs — several makers cut production and guided profits lower. That backdrop has historically been the setup for the next up-leg rather than a permanent state: an aging fleet, eventual commodity-price recovery, and possible rate cuts would release deferred replacement demand. Structurally, the shift toward precision agriculture, automation, and subscription revenue is the swing factor that could raise the industry's through-cycle margins and valuation if the majors convert their installed base into recurring customers — while right-to-repair and low-cost foreign competition are the offsetting pressures. As always in this industry, the cycle will do most of the near-term work; the technology transition will decide the decade.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS — 333111 Farm Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing" (definition and exclusions, incl. 333112). https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=333&input=333&year=2022
2. Deere & Company, 2025 Form 10-K (purchased inputs, dealer count ~1,600 US/Canada, segment margins). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/315189/000110465925122321/de-20251102x10k.htm
3. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census, Concentration by Largest Firms (NAICS 333111): receipts $42.83B; 1,033 firms; CR4 61.6%, CR8 67.1%, CR20 75.9%, CR50 84.2%; HHI suppressed. https://data.census.gov/
4. U.S. Census Bureau, M3 Manufacturers' Shipments (NAICS 333111), via FRED: 2025 shipments ~$30.8B, down 15.8% from ~$36.6B in 2024. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/U33AVS
5. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 (NAICS 333111): employment 69,047; establishments 1,120; annual payroll $5.06B. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
6. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2022 (NAICS 333111): establishment size distribution (8 establishments with 1,000+ employees; 709 with <20). https://data.census.gov/table/CBP2022.CB2200CBP?codeset=naics~333111&y=2022
7. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 333111 = 1,250 employees), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
8. Deere & Company, "Deere Reports Net Income of $5.027 Billion for Fiscal Year 2025" (net sales & revenues ~$45.7B). https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/deere-reports-net-income-of-1-065-billion-for-fourth-quarter-5-027-billion-for-fiscal-year-302626652.html
9. ResearchAndMarkets / BusinessWire, "Agriculture Equipment Global Market Outlook 2025-2030 — AGCO, CNH, John Deere, Kubota, Mahindra" (AGCO largest pure-play; top makers >60% U.S. share), 2025. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250509328034/en/
10. Zacks / Yahoo Finance / CompaniesMarketCap, agricultural-equipment market caps and dividend yields (Deere ~$134B, CNH ~$16B, AGCO ~$8B, Alamo ~$2.6B, Lindsay ~$1.5B; Deere/Lindsay yields ~1%), 2026. https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/DE/key-statistics/
11. CNH Industrial N.V., "Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results" (consolidated revenue $19.84B; ~70% agriculture), 2025. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/02/04/3020104/0/en/CNH-Industrial-N-V-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2024-Results.html
12. AGCO Corporation, 2025 Form 10-K / Annual Report (2025 sales $10.082B; adjusted operating margin 7.7%). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/880266/000088026626000010/agco-20251231.htm
13. CompaniesMarketCap, "Alamo Group (ALG) Revenue" ($1.62B 2024). https://companiesmarketcap.com/alamo-group/revenue/
14. StockAnalysis, "Titan International (TWI) Revenue" ($1.85B 2024). https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/twi/revenue/
15. Farm Equipment / Art's-Way Manufacturing, "Art's Way 2024 Earnings" (ag-products sales $14.66M FY2024). https://www.farmequip.org/news/arts-way-reports-2024-earnings/
16. Kubota Manufacturing of America; AGDaily, "Where are Kubota tractors made" (Gainesville, GA; 100,000+ units/yr; U.S. compact-tractor leader). https://www.agdaily.com/technology/where-kubota-tractors-made/
17. CLAAS, 2025 Annual Report (global sales €4.918B fiscal 2025). https://annualreport.claas.com/2025/
18. CNH Industrial N.V., 2025 Form 10-K / Annual Report (Agriculture segment 2025 adjusted EBIT margin 6.2% vs 10.5%; competitor list). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1567094/000156709426000006/cnhi-20251231.htm
19. farmdoc daily (Univ. of Illinois), "The U.S. Farm Machinery & Equipment Market: Sales, Inventories, and Tariff Headwinds" (inventories $7.2B peak → $5.7B Dec 2025; Deere tariff $600M/2025, ~$1.2B/2026; AGCO ~$40M/$110M), Feb 2026. https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2026/02/the-u-s-farm-machinery-equipment-market-sales-inventories-and-tariff-headwinds.html
20. GMInsights, "Autonomous Farm Equipment Market" and precision-farming market sizing (~$13B precision-farming market 2025, double-digit growth), 2025-2026. https://www.gminsights.com/industry-analysis/autonomous-farm-equipment-market
21. USDA Economic Research Service, "Farm Sector Income & Finances: Highlights from the Farm Income Forecast" (2026 net farm income $153.4B, −0.7%; net cash farm income $158.5B, +3.0%; debt $624.7B, +5.2%; working capital −9.2%), May 2026. https://ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-sector-income-finances/highlights-from-the-farm-income-forecast
22. USDA, 2022 Census of Agriculture summary (1,900,487 farms, −7% from 2017; avg 463 acres, +5%; 105,384 farms with $1M+ sales produced >75% of value; internet access 75%→79%). https://data.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/2024/02-13-2024.php
23. Federal Trade Commission, "FTC, States Secure Settlement with Deere & Company, Advancing Farmers' Right to Repair" (10-year access to repair software/tools; settlement July 2026). https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/07/ftc-states-secure-settlement-deere-company-advancing-farmers-right-repair
24. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Regulations for Emissions from Heavy Equipment (Compression-Ignition)" (Tier 4 nonroad diesel standards). https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-emissions-heavy-equipment-compression
25. Association of Equipment Manufacturers (AEM), "U.S. Ag Tractor and Combine Sales — December 2025" (tractors 195,857, −9.9%; combines 3,579, −35.6%; under-40hp 2WD −9.1%; 100+hp 2WD −22.6%; 4WD −41.6%). https://www.aem.org/getattachment/9ee3a193-4c55-4c47-8e3a-ec1237b41f09/US-Month-Ag-Report-2025-12.pdf