Industrial Machinery Manufacturing (U.S.) — NAICS 3332

A Histometrics rollup primer for public-market and private investors. NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the standard code the U.S. government uses to group businesses. This is a 4-digit "industry group" that contains exactly one 5-digit "industry," 33324.

1. Overview

NAICS 3332 is the "make the machines that make things" corner of U.S. manufacturing — the equipment builders whose customers are other factories. It is a single-child level: the 4-digit industry group 3332 contains one and only one 5-digit industry, 33324 (Industrial Machinery Manufacturing). Nothing sits in 3332 that is not also in 33324, so the two are the same population of firms counted two ways. This page is deliberately short: it states the level's own ground-truth figures and points you to the full child primer (33324) for the detail that actually matters.[2]

Why the level equals its one child is not an accident of our data — it is how the federal classification is built. The Census Bureau nests 33324 directly under 3332 with no siblings, so every dollar, firm, and worker rolls up one-for-one.

2. What's inside — and why 3332 equals 33324

Below 33324 sit four very different equipment businesses, and those are where an investor's decisions get made:

• Semiconductor machinery (333242) — wafer-fab tools (deposition, etch, lithography, inspection). ~34% of the level's receipts (~$13.75B) from just 144 firms, an oligopoly (HHI 1,153, CR4 60.7%), pay of ~$151k per worker, and by far the most public.[4]
• All-other industrial machinery (333248) — plastics, printing, textile, chemical, glass, and 3D-printing machines. ~40% of receipts (~$15.9B) spread across 1,678 firms, extremely fragmented (HHI 66, CR4 ~11%), mostly private or foreign.[6]
• Food-product machinery (333241) — dairy, bakery, meat/poultry, and beverage lines. ~16% of receipts (~$6.6B), 399 firms, HHI 274, a defensive base.[3]
• Sawmill, woodworking & paper machinery (333243) — saws, chippers, and pulp/paper machines. ~10% of receipts (~$4.0B), 316 firms, HHI 255, with no U.S.-listed pure-play.[5]

Because 3332 has no children other than 33324, all of that internal contrast lives one level down. Three differences do most of the work, and the revised child primers sharpen all three:

• Value is concentrated; firm counts are not. Semiconductor is 6% of the level's companies but a third of its revenue — roughly $95 million of receipts per firm — against $9.5 million per firm in the all-other bucket, where about 96.7% of companies fall below the U.S. Small Business Administration's 750-employee small-business threshold.[4][6][17]
• Concentration spans the entire spectrum inside one code — and the federal numbers understate it. Domestic HHIs run 66 to 1,153, but the true product markets are tighter than that: ASML holds essentially the whole market for extreme-ultraviolet lithography, Lam roughly 45% of etch, KLA around 52% of process control, and the top five suppliers about 65% of the global market; on the wood side HOMAG claims an estimated global woodworking-machinery share above 30% while the domestic HHI reads 255.[4][5][13] The global champions build much of their equipment offshore and barely register in the U.S. establishment count. Read concentration by product market, not by NAICS code — at either level.
• The pay gap is the tell. Semiconductor pays ~$151k per worker against ~$79–82k in the other three — the signature of a far more R&D-intensive business (Applied Materials spent $3.57 billion on R&D in fiscal 2025, about 12.6% of revenue; Lam $2.10 billion, 11.4%). That one child, not the other three, behaves like a technology stock.[4][6][8]

Even the government treats them as different animals: the SBA's small-business employee ceiling runs 500 for food machinery, 550 for sawmill/paper, 750 for all-other, and 1,500 for semiconductor.[3][4][5][6] For the full breakdown — the four-way comparison table, company names, and the reasoning — read the 33324 primer. The rest of this page gives 3332's own top-line numbers and a compressed tour so the level stands on its own.

3. How big it is (this level's figures)

Our ground-truth federal figures for NAICS 3332 — which, being a single-child level, equal 33324's exactly:[1]

CBP = County Business Patterns, an annual Census dataset. CR4 is the share of receipts held by the four largest firms. HHI is a standard concentration gauge; higher means more concentrated, and antitrust agencies treat ~1,500 as the "moderately concentrated" line.

Average pay works out to roughly $98,000 per worker ($10.95B ÷ 111,497) — above the U.S. manufacturing average, and pulled up by the high-wage semiconductor child. On paper the level looks fragmented (HHI 152.7, CR4 20.8%), but that is a statistical artifact of stapling four unrelated product markets together: no single firm can dominate "industrial machinery" when the machines range from a wafer etcher to a paper-making line. Read concentration at the child level, not here. The compilation does at least hang together: the four sub-children's establishments, employment, and payroll sum exactly to the level, and their receipts sum to ~$40.24B against $40.23B.[1][3][4][5][6]

Two measurement caveats the revised children now force onto this page. First, the employment figure is frame-dependent — for the all-other child alone, Bureau of Labor Statistics payroll data reported 66,200 jobs in April 2026 against CBP's 51,199 for 2023, different survey frames and reference periods rather than a correction of one by the other.[6][16] Second, half this level's history is not splice-able: two of the four sub-children are 2022 NAICS constructs (333243 merged the formerly separate sawmill/woodworking and paper-machinery industries; 333248 combined former 333244 with former 333249, the latter about 87–89% of the predecessors' receipts, firms, and employees), so any long time series stitched across the 2022 revision at this level is unreliable.[5][6][17]

Undercount caveat. These figures are honest but measure U.S. factory output, not the U.S. market. Two gaps, both now quantified by the children. (1) Much of the equipment American plants install is imported (from Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Japan, Finland, Austria, the Netherlands, and China) — in plastics, 2024 imports of equipment equalled 68.8% of domestic shipments and mold imports 93% — and the U.S. semiconductor champions build much of their gear offshore, so domestic shipments understate even U.S. firms' true scale: Applied Materials alone booked $28.4 billion of global revenue in fiscal 2025 against the entire semiconductor child's ~$13.75B of domestic shipments, while global equipment billings ran about $135 billion in 2025.[4][7][8][15] (2) A large share of the industry sits inside private-equity platforms and family firms, so public disclosure captures only a slice. This is not a sole-proprietor undercount — these are real factories averaging ~40 workers each — but treat $40B as "domestic output," not "market size."

4. Investable universe

Because 3332 is 33324, the investable map is the child's map. The dominant fact: your route in changes completely depending on which of the four sub-industries you want, and public-market value is heavily skewed toward one of them (semiconductor), which alone dwarfs the other three combined. Tickers appear here and in §10 only.

• Semiconductor (deepest public menu): a stock-picker's field — U.S. leaders Applied Materials (Nasdaq: AMAT) (~$28.4B FY2025 revenue), Lam Research (LRCX) (~$18.44B), and KLA (KLAC) (~$12.16B), specialists (ACLS, ONTO, MKSI, KLIC) plus Veeco (VECO), now being acquired by Axcelis, and foreign leaders ASML (€32.7B of 2025 sales) and Tokyo Electron.[4][8][9]
• Food (two thin pure-plays): JBT Marel (NYSE: JBTM) (~$3.80B of 2025 revenue, ~50% recurring) and Midera (Nasdaq: MFP), whose separation from Middleby completed July 6, 2026 (~$853M of 2025 net sales, 40% aftermarket); broader exposure is foreign (GEA, Krones, Alfa Laval) or private (KKR's Fortifi, Warburg's Duravant, Leonard Green's ProMach).[3][10][11]
• Sawmill/paper (no U.S. pure-play, but one more listed route than this page previously showed): the nearest proxy is diversified Kadant (NYSE: KAI) — ~71% parts and consumables, with wood processing only about 22% of 2025 revenue; the paper-machine leaders are foreign-listed (Valmet, Andritz) or private (Voith, USNR, Wood-Mizer); for woodworking specifically there is now a clear listed platform in Dürr/HOMAG (XETRA: DUE).[5][12][13]
• All-other (mostly private/foreign): a speculative public fringe of small, loss-making 3D-printing names (SSYS ~$551M of 2025 revenue, DDD ~$387M, NNDM, VLD) plus diversified industrials — Hillenbrand (HI), whose Advanced Process Solutions segment ran ~$2.07B at 34.0% gross margin, and Nordson (NDSN) at ~$2.7B and 55.2%; the classic plastics and printing capacity sits with private equity (Bain now holds ~51% of Milacron, Hillenbrand 49%) or foreign makers.[6][14]

The public menu outside semiconductor is not only thin but compromised: the largest food pure-play recorded a $49.7 million loss from continuing operations in 2025 despite $3.8B of revenue, the closest sawmill/paper proxy derives only ~22% of revenue from wood, and the all-other pure-plays lose money.[6][10][12] Diversified, liquid exposure to "industrial machinery" mostly means buying chip-tool makers.

5. How the money works

All four run the same capital-goods-plus-aftermarket model, and the split is the whole game. New equipment is the "razor": large, engineered-to-order systems (millions to hundreds of millions each — advanced EUV lithography tools reportedly run well over $100M and the newest High-NA machines around $380M apiece; Valmet booked a single pulp-mill order worth over €1 billion), sold on long lead times against a backlog, at modest margins. Backlog quality — cancellation rights, deposits, escalation clauses, remaining engineering content — matters as much as its size.[5][6][9] The aftermarket — spare parts, consumables, rebuilds, service, and increasingly software — is the "blades": higher-margin, stickier, and far less cyclical, an annuity on an installed base that runs 10–20 years. Disclosed shares span a wide band and are rising: Kadant ~71% parts and consumables (up from 66% in 2024), JBT Marel ~50% recurring, Midera 40%, ASML's service roughly a quarter of revenue, and Lam's customer-support line at $6.94B against $11.49B of systems.[8][9][10][11][12] The metrics owners and investors watch are common across the level: order backlog and book-to-bill (new orders ÷ shipments; above 1.0 means demand is building), recurring-revenue mix, margins, and customers' capacity utilization.

Margin is a direction, not a level. It is tempting to read this level as "chip tools rich, mechanical machinery thin," and the children do not support that. Semiconductor gross margins cluster high (Applied 48.7%, Lam 48.7%, ASML 52.8%, KLA 60.9%), but inside the all-other child Nordson runs a 55.2% company gross margin on proprietary components and recurring parts while Hillenbrand's process-solutions segment runs 34.0%; Kadant's consolidated gross margin was 45.2% in 2025, JBT Marel's 35.1%, Midera's 36.2%.[8][9][10][11][12][14] What travels reliably is the direction: parts and service are richer than projects, so mix moves margin more than volume — Kadant's gross margin rose from 44.3% to 45.2% precisely because capital-equipment revenue fell 16% while parts and consumables grew 11%.[12] EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

Where the children disagree: working capital. The food primer argues that deposits and progress payments on custom projects make this business less working-capital-intensive than many capital-goods categories; the all-other primer describes working capital as heavy, with cash tied up in long-lead work-in-progress and customer advances flattering cash generation in an upcycle and reversing when bookings slow.[3][6] Both are defensible — contract terms decide it, not the NAICS code — so check billing structure company by company. What is common is high operating leverage. See 33324 §5 for the child-by-child detail.

6. What drives demand

Demand is derived — it rises and falls with customers' willingness to invest. Three drivers are common to the whole level: automation to offset scarce factory labor (the dominant structural tailwind — 95% of surveyed consumer-packaged-goods companies report trouble hiring skilled operators, and only 6.6% of food-manufacturing plants used robots in 2022); reshoring and new-factory construction (roughly $1.66 trillion of announced U.S. manufacturing investment since January 2025, and nearly $450 billion announced in semiconductors and electronics alone — with the standing caveat that announcements are not completed spending); and the capital-spending cycle itself, the biggest short-term swing factor and the source of the group's cyclicality.[3][4][5][6]

Where the four part ways is the end market each is chained to, and right now they are visibly out of phase. Semiconductor rides chip capex — projected near $200 billion in 2026, with equipment demand about 79% concentrated in China, Taiwan, and Korea — a structural AI-driven up-cycle that is still boom-and-bust.[4][7] Food rides food-processor capex: defensive, but with more than half of processors planning to cut 2026 budgets and the aggregate up only ~2.9%.[3] Sawmill/paper rides housing and packaging — starts fell ~4% in 2024 and ~2.3% in 2025, while printing-and-writing paper capacity fell 13.9% in a single year and containerboard ran at a 91.9% operating rate.[5] All-other rides broad manufacturing capex and interest rates, and is the most internally dispersed: in Q3 2025 North American injection-molding-machine shipments rose 4.2% year over year while single-screw extruders fell 24.2% and twin-screw 38.6%, with the child's payrolls down 4.2% year over year.[6][15][16]

7. Regulation

None of this is economically regulated — there is no rate base, price setting, or reimbursement regime like a utility or hospital. Regulation instead shapes product design, creates replacement cycles, and — in one child — directly gates revenue. Machine and worker safety (U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration / OSHA guarding rules under 29 CFR 1910.212 and lockout/tagout under 1910.147, plus CE marking for European sales) applies universally but lightly; the wood child gets extra demand from OSHA's woodworking and sawmill standards (1910.213, 1910.265).[5][6] Food-contact machinery carries heavier hygiene rules (3-A Sanitary Standards; support for the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act and USDA FSIS sanitation standards), which act as both a moat and a demand engine.[3]

Trade policy is the shared swing variable, and the children now put numbers on it: numerous steel and aluminum categories carry 50% Section 232 tariffs, imported Chinese pulp-and-paper machinery a 25% Section 301 tariff, and combined softwood-lumber duties on Canada reached roughly 45% by late 2025 (which tilts production toward U.S. mills and indirectly lifts sawmill-equipment demand) — while plastics-equipment imports at 68.8% of domestic shipments show how exposed the all-other child is on the input side.[5][12][15]

The standout is semiconductor, where policy is a front-page revenue lever rather than a background cost. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) rules from October 2022 through December 2024 progressively restricted advanced tool sales to China; in August 2025 BIS removed license-free treatment for certain foreign-owned fabs there, the Netherlands added metrology and inspection systems to its control list in January 2025, and the EU incorporated the Dutch controls in November 2025. Pulling the other way, the CHIPS and Science Act ($52.7 billion, with ~$33.7 billion in direct awards finalized by early 2025 plus a 25% equipment tax credit) pulls domestic fab construction and tool orders forward, though several marquee builds have slipped.[4] Detail in 33324 §7.

8. Consolidation

All four children are consolidating, through different vehicles — a tell about who holds the value. Semiconductor sees public M&A among mid-caps (Axcelis's ~$4.4B Veeco deal, announced October 2025, creating the #4 U.S. wafer-fab-equipment supplier at combined pro-forma 2024 revenue near $1.7B) while the giants stay put, being too large to merge without antitrust objection.[4] Food shows a public mega-merger plus PE roll-ups plus a spin-off all at once (JBT + Marel, KKR's Fortifi closing Provisur, Warburg's Duravant, Leonard Green's ProMach, Middleby → Midera).[3][10][11] Sawmill/paper is a domestic roll-up (USNR, Kadant bolt-ons) under a foreign oligopoly (Voith, Valmet, Andritz), with HOMAG holding a claimed 30%-plus share of global woodworking machinery.[5][13] And all-other combines PE consolidation — Bain completed a ~51% majority investment in Milacron in March 2025 — with a brutal 3D-printing shakeout: Desktop Metal filed Chapter 11 within months of being acquired, and Markforged was resold to Stratasys for $42.5 million against the $116 million just paid for it.[6][14] The common logic: buyers want fewer suppliers, integrated lines, and one throat to choke on service — so installed base and aftermarket reach beat single-machine excellence. Scale is being bought more than built. Full account in 33324 §8.

9. Risks

• Cyclicality (all four). Big-ticket orders are the first thing customers defer; operating leverage swings margins hard. Lam's $17.43B → $14.91B → $18.44B fiscal-year arc is the sharpest illustration; over roughly the same window Kadant's capital-equipment revenue fell 16% and Hillenbrand's process-solutions backlog 9%. Semiconductor swings most, food least.[3][4][8][12][14]
• The aftermarket cushions but does not cancel the cycle. In the same year Kadant's capital equipment fell 16%, its parts and consumables grew 11% — the best single reason to weight recurring mix over headline sales at every one of the four.[12]
• Customer concentration. Applied reported two customers at approximately 19% and 15% of fiscal 2025 revenue; food demand hangs on a handful of large processors' capital plans; sawmill and paper buyers are a small universe in which one delayed project moves a builder's year.[3][5][8]
• Import competition and FX. Formidable German, Swiss, Italian, Japanese, Finnish, Austrian, Dutch, and increasingly Chinese makers set the bar — plastics-equipment imports at 68.8% of domestic shipments and molds at 93% quantify the exposure — and a strong dollar whipsaws competitiveness.[5][6][15]
• Tariff and input-cost whipsaw. Steel and aluminum dominate the bill of materials; 50% metal tariffs compress builders' margins and raise customers' project costs, delaying orders — made worse by fixed-price backlog that embeds yesterday's input assumptions.[3][6][12]
• Labor constrains the builders too. Automation demand exists because operators are scarce, but the OEMs themselves need controls engineers, welders, and field technicians; in semiconductor, one industry study projected 67,000 expected new U.S. jobs — 58% of the total — could go unfilled by 2030 at then-current degree-completion rates.[3][4][6]
• Single-child dominance (rollup-specific). A public bet on "industrial machinery" is really a bet on semiconductor capex plus a few diversified industrials — the group is not as diversified as its label implies.
• Child-specific tails: China/export-control exposure, ~79% demand concentration in China/Taiwan/Korea, and node-transition risk in semiconductor; avian influenza and protein-price shocks in food, where even the largest pure-play posted a $49.7M loss from continuing operations in 2025; graphic-paper decline and housing-rate sensitivity in sawmill/paper; and going-concern/cash-burn risk in the listed 3D-printing names.[3][4][5][6][7][10]

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Route to child. Broad, liquid public exposure is essentially semiconductor — AMAT, LRCX, KLAC plus specialists and foreign leaders (ASML, Tokyo Electron), or broad chip ETFs (SOXX, SMH) that blend in chipmakers; these are volatile cyclicals where entry valuation matters as much as company quality. Focused pure-plays are scarce elsewhere: food offers JBTM and MFP; sawmill/paper offers the diversified proxy KAI (2026 revenue guided to roughly $1.18–1.20B), foreign Valmet/Andritz, or — for woodworking specifically — Dürr/HOMAG; all-other offers speculative small-cap 3D printers or diversified industrials (HI, NDSN). Track the same metrics everywhere — backlog, book-to-bill, recurring-revenue mix, margins — plus each child's leading demand signal, and ask the diligence questions that travel across all four: organic versus acquired orders, backlog age and cancellation rights, parts capture, service-technician density near the installed base, and pricing lag against metals.[3][4][5][6][12][13] Much of the value in food, sawmill/paper, and all-other sits in private equity and family firms and is largely closed to public investors.

Outlook (forward-looking judgment, not a reported fact). The four are not moving together — the whole point of a rollup view. Semiconductor has the strongest backdrop (SEMI projects record global equipment sales of ~$139B in 2026 and ~$156B in 2027, up from ~$135B in 2025) but the oldest risk (cyclicality, China policy, and whether AI merely front-loads the cycle); food is steady, not spectacular — an automation-and-regulation replacement cycle against a cautious 2026 capex year, with U.S. processing-machinery shipments put at $6.2B in 2025, up 3.2%, and ~$6.7B by 2027; sawmill/paper is soft near-term with a medium-term lumber-reshoring and graphic-to-packaging conversion case; all-other is a cyclical, reshoring-levered bet currently in the trough whose additive-manufacturing subset is still consolidating.[3][4][5][6][7] The through-line: value keeps shifting from selling machines to selling the parts, service, and software that keep them running — Kadant's move from 66% to 71% recurring in a single soft year is that trend in miniature.[12]

For everything in this section at company-by-company depth, go to the 33324 primer — this level adds no firms it does not contain.

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Sources

Figures for this level are our ground-truth federal compilation (stats-3332.md); all company-, market-, and policy-level facts are carried up from the child primer 33324 (and, beneath it, 333241/333242/333243/333248), with the primary filings and datasets behind the load-bearing figures listed directly.

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration Ratios and Statistics for NAICS 3332 (Industrial Machinery Manufacturing) and County Business Patterns 2023 — receipts, firms, establishments, employment, payroll, concentration ratios, and HHI (Histometrics ground-truth compilation, stats-3332.md; identical to stats-33324.md because 3332 has a single child). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html; https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
2. Histometrics child primer, Industrial Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS 33324) — the full-detail leaf-group primer this page summarizes, including the four-way comparison table and the internal-consistency check of child figures against the level total.
3. Histometrics sub-child primer, Food Product Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS 333241) — Economic Census 2022 / CBP 2023 (receipts ~$6.62B; 399 firms; CR4 25.3%; HHI 273.6; SBA 500-employee ceiling); JBT Marel, Midera, KKR/Fortifi, Warburg/Duravant, Leonard Green/ProMach; PMMI/FPSA and Food Processing capex data; 3-A, FSMA, and FSIS hygiene regime; the working-capital argument cited in §5.
4. Histometrics sub-child primer, Semiconductor Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS 333242) — Economic Census 2022 / CBP 2023 (receipts ~$13.75B; 144 firms; CR4 60.7%; HHI 1,153; SBA 1,500-employee ceiling); ASML/Lam/KLA product-market shares and top-five global share; Axcelis–Veeco; BIS export-control timeline (2022–August 2025, Dutch January 2025, EU November 2025); CHIPS and Science Act ($52.7B, ~$33.7B awarded, 25% equipment tax credit); ~$450B announced U.S. semiconductor and electronics investment; ~$200B 2026 chip capex; SIA/Oxford Economics labor projection.
5. Histometrics sub-child primer, Sawmill, Woodworking, and Paper Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS 333243) — Economic Census 2022 / CBP 2023 (receipts ~$3.97B; 316 firms; CR4 25.7%; HHI 255; SBA 550-employee ceiling); Valmet, Andritz, Voith, USNR, Wood-Mizer; the Arauco pulp-mill order over €1 billion; AF&PA paper capacity and operating-rate data; housing starts, lumber self-sufficiency, and ~45% softwood duties; 25% Section 301 tariff on Chinese pulp-and-paper machinery; OSHA 1910.213 and 1910.265.
6. Histometrics sub-child primer, All Other Industrial Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS 333248) — Economic Census 2022 / CBP 2023 (receipts ~$15.9B; 1,678 firms; CR4 ~11%; HHI 65.7; SBA 750-employee ceiling); ~96.7% of firms below that threshold; the 2022 NAICS construct and the ~87–89% predecessor share; Bain/Milacron, Gamut/Davis-Standard, Koenig & Bauer, Bobst; the additive-manufacturing shakeout (Desktop Metal Chapter 11; Markforged resold for $42.5M against $116M paid); ~$1.66 trillion of announced U.S. manufacturing investment; backlog-quality and working-capital analysis.
7. SEMI, Global Semiconductor Equipment Billings Reached $135 Billion in 2025; Global Total Semiconductor Equipment Sales Forecast to Reach a Record $139 Billion in 2026; …$156 Billion in 2027 — including the ~79% China/Taiwan/Korea share of equipment spending. https://www.semi.org/en/SEMI-Reports-Global-Semiconductor-Equipment-Billings-Reached-135-Billion-in-2025; https://www.semi.org/en/semi-press-release/global-total-semiconductor-equipment-sales-forecast-to-reach-a-record-of-dollar-139-billion-in-2026-semi-reports; https://www.semi.org/en/semi-press-release/global-semiconductor-equipment-sales-projected-to-reach-a-record-of-156-billion-dollars-in-2027-semi-reports
8. Applied Materials, 2025 Form 10-K (FY2025 revenue $28.37B, gross margin 48.7%, R&D $3.57B, two customers ~19% and ~15% of revenue); Lam Research, 2025 Form 10-K (FY2025 revenue $18.44B, gross margin 48.7%, R&D $2.10B, systems $11.49B, customer support $6.94B, FY2023 $17.43B and FY2024 $14.91B); KLA, 2025 Annual Report (FY2025 revenue $12.16B, gross margin 60.9%). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/6951/000162828025056742/amat-20251026.htm; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/707549/000070754925000075/lrcx-20250629.htm; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/319201/000119312525213412/d912971dars.pdf
9. ASML, Q4 2025 Financial Results (2025 sales €32.7B, gross margin 52.8%; service roughly a quarter of revenue; High-NA system pricing ~$380M). https://www.asml.com/en/news/press-releases/2026/q4-2025-financial-results
10. JBT Marel Corporation, 2025 Form 10-K and Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2025 Results — revenue $3.798B, ~50% recurring, gross margin 35.1%, $49.7M loss from continuing operations. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1433660/000143366026000053/jbt-20251231.htm; https://ir.jbtmarel.com/news/press-releases/detail/530/jbt-marel-corporation-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2025-results-and-establishes-2026-guidance-with-continued-growth
11. Midera Food Processing, Registration Statement (Form 10), and Middleby Corporation, Middleby Completes Spin-Off of Midera Food Processing (July 2026) — net sales $853.2M, $341M (40%) aftermarket, gross margin 36.2% (39.6% in 2024). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2088281/000119312526241891/d14360dex991.htm; https://www.middleby.com/newsroom/middleby-completes-spin-off-of-midera-food-processing/
12. Kadant Inc., 2025 Form 10-K (parts and consumables 71% of 2025 revenue, up from 66% in 2024; wood processing ~22% of consolidated revenue; gross margin 45.2% vs 44.3%; capital-equipment revenue −16%, parts and consumables +11%; Section 301/232 tariff exposure) and company overview (2026 guidance $1.178–1.203B). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886346/000088634626000018/kai-20260103.htm; https://www.stocktitan.net/overview/KAI/
13. HOMAG Group company profile (estimated global woodworking-machinery share above 30%; ~€1.4B sales) and Dürr AG 2025 results. https://www.homag.com/en/company/about-us/homag-group; https://www.durr-group.com/en/media/news/news-detail/view/duerr-group-significantly-improves-profitability-114080
14. Hillenbrand, Inc., 2025 Form 10-K (Advanced Process Solutions FY2025 revenue $2.069B, gross margin 34.0% vs 35.5%, backlog −9%; Milacron 49% stake) and Nordson Corporation, 2025 Form 10-K (FY2025 revenue ~$2.7B; gross margin 55.2%). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1417398/000162828025053207/hi-20250930.htm; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72331/000007233125000144/ndsn-20251031.htm
15. Plastics Industry Association, Tariffs and the U.S. Plastics Industry Supply Chain (2024 imports: plastics equipment 68.8% of domestic shipments; molds 93%) and 2025 Q3 Committee on Equipment Statistics Report (injection molding +4.2% year over year; single-screw extruders −24.2%; twin-screw −38.6%). https://www.plasticsindustry.org/blog/tariffs-and-the-u-s-plastics-industry-supply-chain-where-do-we-stand/; https://www.plasticsindustry.org/newsroom/plastics-industry-association-releases-2025-q3-committee-on-equipment-statistics-report/
16. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table B-1b — Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls by Industry (NAICS 333248: 66,200 in April 2026 vs 69,100 in May 2025). https://www.bls.gov/ces/data/employment-and-earnings/2026/table1b_202605.htm
17. U.S. Small Business Administration / Federal Register, Small Business Size Standards: Revision of Monetary Based Size Standards (July 2022) — NAICS 333248 created by combining 333244 and 333249, with 333249 representing ~87–89% of the combined base; ~96.7% of firms below the 750-employee threshold — and SBA, Table of Small Business Size Standards Matched to NAICS Codes (2023). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-07-05/pdf/2022-13250.pdf; https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards