Ship Building and Repairing (United States) — NAICS 336611

An investor's primer. NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the U.S. government's standard code for industries.

1. Overview

This is the industry that designs, builds, and repairs large ships — aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, frigates, Coast Guard cutters, tankers, container ships, and the dry docks and yards that maintain them. In the United States it is, first and foremost, a defense business: the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard are the overwhelming customers, and two large contractors do most of the work. Commercial shipbuilding — merchant vessels sold to private ship operators — is a small sliver, because U.S. yards cannot compete on price with Asia.

Why an investor cares: government demand is large, funded for decades, and rising, but the sector is capacity- and labor-constrained rather than order-constrained. A Department of Defense review estimated that the industrial base would require 174,000 new workers over the following decade, while a skilled-trades employee generally needs three to five years to become proficient [1]. That makes it a story about execution and throughput (can they build and fix ships fast enough?) more than about winning demand. Margins are thin and contract risk is real, but backlogs run to multiple years and a wave of policy support is aimed squarely at the industry.

• Public-market ways in: two U.S.-listed names dominate — a pure-play shipbuilder and a diversified defense prime whose largest segment is ships. Several mid-tier U.S. yards are owned by foreign-listed parents (Italy, Australia, South Korea).
• Private ways in: repair yards and specialty builders held by private equity or families, a large allied-capital investment wave (notably Korea's Hanwha), and the components/workforce supply chain feeding the big yards.

2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope (NAICS 336611). Establishments primarily engaged in operating a shipyard — building ships, and repairing, converting, or overhauling them. A "ship" here means a large vessel; shipyards are fixed facilities with dry docks, cranes, and ways. Output includes naval ships and submarines, cargo and passenger ships, ferries, tugs, barges, floating drilling and production platforms, prefabricated ship sections, unmanned watercraft, and yachts built in shipyards [2]. OSHA describes shipbuilding as encompassing modular or keel-up construction, assembly, installation, cleaning, painting, outfitting, and testing, with unusually severe confined-space, hot-work, toxic-exposure, fire, and explosion hazards [3].

What it excludes (adjacent codes):

• Boat building (NAICS 336612) — smaller recreational and commercial boats are a separate industry.
• Repairs in floating drydocks (NAICS 488390) — distinguished from shipyard-based work.
• Ship engines, propulsion, and parts fall under other machinery/electrical codes, not 336611.
• Marine cargo shipping and passenger transport (operating the ships) is Transportation (NAICS 483), not manufacturing.
• Ship scrapping/recycling is waste (NAICS 5629/423930).
• Naval architecture and marine engineering design done by standalone firms is professional services (NAICS 5413).

Ownership mix. Three layers:

1. Two private prime contractors — Huntington Ingalls Industries and General Dynamics' Marine Systems — build the Navy's most complex ships (nuclear carriers, submarines, destroyers).
2. A handful of mid-tier private yards, several now foreign-owned, building smaller combatants, cutters, and support ships, plus a fragmented private ship-repair segment.
3. Four government-owned naval shipyards run by the Navy itself (see §3) — these do submarine and carrier depot maintenance and are not counted in the private-sector business statistics below.

3. How big it is

Federal statistics for the private industry (the government-owned yards are excluded — see the caveat):

Employment is highly concentrated: using 2022 Census data, 12 establishments with at least 1,000 employees employed about 70% of all workers, while another seven establishments employed 500–999 people [7]. This is the central structural fact: numerous small and regional repair/specialty yards coexist with a handful of enormous naval complexes. BLS's seasonally adjusted payroll series showed 104,700 shipbuilding-and-repairing jobs in November 2025, versus 107,000 in December 2024 [8].

The market-concentration measure the Census calls the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is suppressed for this industry, so we do not report a value. But the concentration ratios tell the story: the four largest firms make roughly two-thirds of all revenue — this is a top-heavy industry, not a fragmented one. As a sanity check, the two biggest U.S. players alone booked about $26 billion of ship revenue in 2025 (§4), close to the entire industry's $30 billion of 2022 receipts.

The undercount caveat (important here). These business statistics cover private establishments only. They exclude the four government-owned "public" naval shipyards — Norfolk (Virginia), Portsmouth (Maine/New Hampshire), Puget Sound (Washington), and Pearl Harbor (Hawaii) — which do the Navy's nuclear submarine and carrier maintenance in-house [9]. Those yards employ tens of thousands of additional federal civilian workers (on the order of 37,000) [10] whose labor is government activity, not private receipts. Counting them, total U.S. shipbuilding-and-repair employment is well above the ~100,000 private figure — closer to ~135,000+. So the private statistics understate the true size of the national enterprise, because the single biggest source of ship-repair demand is served by the government's own workforce. (There is little "tiny-operator" undercount here — small boat and repair shops mostly fall under boat building, NAICS 336612.)

4. The investable universe

Ships are a duopoly at the top, foreign-owned in the middle, and fragmented in repair. GAO identified only seven builders of Navy battle-force ships: Austal USA; General Dynamics' Electric Boat, Bath Iron Works, and NASSCO; HII's Newport News Shipbuilding and Ingalls Shipbuilding; and Fincantieri Marinette Marine [1]. Very few pure ways to own the industry exist on U.S. exchanges.

Publicly traded (primary exposure):

Private / other owners (not directly investable):

• Bollinger Shipyards (family/PE, Louisiana) — Coast Guard cutters; selected in 2026 for the Navy's new Landing Ship Medium program alongside Marinette. [18]
• Eastern Shipbuilding Group (private, Florida) — Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Cutters.
• Vigor / Titan Acquisition Holdings (private equity) — Pacific Northwest repair and construction.
• Detyens Shipyards, Colonna's Shipyard, MHI Ship Repair, Lyon Shipyard — private regional repair yards. [17]
• Four public naval shipyards — government-owned, not investable; funded through the Navy budget.

For most public-market investors, practical exposure comes through GD and HII directly, or diffusely through defense/aerospace ETFs (e.g., ITA, XAR, PPA) that hold both. There is no clean U.S.-listed pure repair or commercial-shipbuilding stock.

5. How the money works

Owners in this industry earn returns from long-cycle government contracts, not from selling ships into an open market. The economics that matter:

• Backlog and book-to-bill. A yard's health is read off its funded backlog — years of contracted work. HII ended 2025 with ~$53.1B backlog ($17.8B at Ingalls, $29.9B at Newport News), with substantially all tied to U.S. government work [12]; GD Marine Systems' estimated total contract value was $64.2B [11]. Backlog gives revenue visibility a normal manufacturer never has.
• Revenue recognized over time. Ships take years, so revenue and profit are booked as work progresses (percentage-of-completion), using an estimate-at-completion (EAC) of total cost. When a program's cost estimate rises, the company takes an immediate profit charge — this is the single biggest swing factor in reported earnings. HII recorded $350 million of gross unfavorable cumulative catch-up adjustments in 2025, showing how estimate revisions can consume nominal program profit [12].
• Thin margins. Even in a good year, shipbuilding operating margins sit in the mid-single digits: HII's Newport News margin was 5.1% in 2025, Ingalls was 7.6%, and GD Marine Systems ran 7.0% (up from 6.5% in 2024) [11][12]. A single troubled "first-of-class" ship (the first of a new design) can erase margin across a segment.
• Contract type = risk allocation. Cost-plus contracts pass overruns to the Navy (lower risk, lower margin). Fixed-price contracts put overrun risk on the builder — dangerous in an inflationary period, and the source of recent losses. HII generated approximately 46% of 2025 revenue under fixed-price-incentive contracts, 50% under cost-type contracts, 3% under firm-fixed-price contracts, and 1% under time-and-material arrangements [12].
• Throughput and labor. Profit ultimately depends on ships delivered per year and on having enough skilled trades (welders, pipefitters, electricians). Labor shortage and attrition are the binding constraint; a yard that can't staff up leaves backlog uncompleted and margin on the table.
• Capital intensity. Dry docks, cranes, and covered ways cost billions and last decades. The government is funding a major recapitalization of its own yards (§7, SIOP).
• Repair vs. new-build. Maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) is steadier and lower-risk than new construction — recurring fleet-maintenance demand rather than lumpy first-of-class programs. It is a meaningful, if less glamorous, profit pool.

The one thing that does not drive money here is competitive commercial pricing: a large ocean-going ship costs an estimated 300–400% more to build in the U.S. than in Korea or Japan [19], so U.S. yards win essentially no open-market international orders. Domestic commercial work survives only inside the Jones Act protected niche (§7). Commercial construction is more conventionally cyclical — orders for tankers and offshore vessels respond to energy activity; barges and towboats respond to freight volumes and operator finances; ferries depend heavily on public budgets. New inland construction has remained below historical levels partly because of elevated vessel and plate-steel prices [20].

6. What drives demand

• The Navy budget and force-structure goals. The Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan targets a fleet of 381 manned ships (plus 134 large unmanned vessels), at an estimated cost averaging about $40 billion a year — over $1 trillion across 30 years [21]. CBO estimated this is 46% above the preceding five-year average appropriation [22]. The annual shipbuilding account runs roughly $32–39 billion [21][23]. This single line item dwarfs all private commercial demand.
• Geopolitics and the submarine push. China's rapid naval buildup and the AUKUS (Australia–UK–US) submarine partnership are driving the largest program of all — Columbia-class ballistic-missile and Virginia-class attack submarines. A 2024 contract modification alone was worth up to $18.4 billion to the two sub-builders [24].
• The maintenance backlog. Fleet repair is its own demand engine — and a crisis. Roughly 37–40% of the attack-submarine fleet is tied up in maintenance at any time; by mid-2026 reporting, 18 of 49 attack submarines could not deploy because the yards couldn't fix them [10]. Every delayed overhaul is unmet repair demand.
• Coast Guard recapitalization. Offshore Patrol Cutters and polar icebreakers add non-Navy government demand.
• Jones Act commercial replacement. A small, protected pipeline of U.S.-built tankers, container ships, and ferries to replace an aging domestic fleet. GAO reported that more than 40,000 U.S.-flag vessels were engaged in domestic trade in 2022 [25].
• Energy and offshore wind (uncertain). Jones Act rules can force some LNG, offshore-wind-installation, and coastal energy vessels to be U.S.-built — a potential but policy-dependent commercial pocket. GAO found more than 300 vessels involved in three selected offshore-wind projects, about 80% U.S.-flag and 20% foreign-flag, with foreign vessels disproportionately representing large specialized equipment [26].
• Policy tailwinds (forward-looking). A cluster of 2025 measures aims to expand demand and capacity (§7).

7. Regulation

Ships are one of the most heavily regulated industries in the U.S. — the rules create the domestic market as much as they constrain it.

• The Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act of 1920). The foundational rule: goods moving between two U.S. ports must travel on ships that are U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, U.S.-flagged, and U.S.-crewed [27]. This is what keeps any domestic commercial shipbuilding alive. Critics argue it has shielded the industry into high-cost irrelevance rather than strength [28]; defenders call it essential to the industrial base. Repeal is periodically debated but politically unlikely.
• Defense procurement rules. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and its defense supplement (DFARS), plus ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) export controls, govern warship work and restrict who can touch it. Government customers may disallow costs, withhold payments, terminate contracts, or suspend or debar a contractor.
• Foreign-investment review (CFIUS). The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States vets foreign purchases of U.S. yards — Hanwha's Philly Shipyard buy required CFIUS clearance [15]. This gates the foreign-ownership trend reshaping the mid-tier.
• Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). A ~20-year, roughly $21 billion Navy program to rebuild the four aging public yards' dry docks and facilities [9] — capacity policy as much as regulation.
• Trade policy (in flux). The U.S. Trade Representative's 2025 Section 301 action imposed port-entry fees on China-built and China-linked ships, phasing in from October 14, 2025 — then suspended for one year on November 10, 2025 amid U.S.–China trade talks [29][30]. The whiplash shows how fast the policy backdrop can move.
• Policy stimulus (forward-looking). Executive Order 14269, "Restoring America's Maritime Dominance" (April 2025) [31], and the bipartisan SHIPS for America Act [32] propose a Strategic Commercial Fleet of ~250 U.S.-flag ships, a 25% investment tax credit for qualified domestic shipyards, more grants, and higher U.S.-flag cargo requirements [33]. The current Maritime Action Plan describes U.S. global commercial output as less than 1% of new ships and seeks durable demand, foreign investment, supply-chain expansion, and productivity improvements [34]. These are proposals and directives, not yet a fully funded, enacted program.
• Safety and environment. OSHA's shipyard-specific safety regime [3], EPA discharge and coatings rules — including the shipbuilding-and-ship-repair surface-coating NESHAP imposing hazardous-air-pollutant limits on marine coatings [35] — and classification-society standards (e.g., ABS) apply throughout.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

• A protected duopoly at the top. For the hardest ships there is effectively no competition: Newport News is the only builder of nuclear aircraft carriers, and it and Electric Boat are the only two submarine builders, teaming (not competing) on the Virginia and Columbia programs. Bath Iron Works and Ingalls split destroyer work.
• A single dominant buyer (monopsony). The Navy is nearly the only customer. That caps the builders' pricing power — but the Navy equally has nowhere else to go, so the relationship is one of mutual dependence, renegotiation, and cost-sharing rather than open bargaining.
• The mid-tier is going foreign. Italy's Fincantieri, Australia's Austal, and now Korea's Hanwha own key U.S. yards. Allied governments and firms are pouring capital in (Korea has floated a $150B U.S. investment posture; Hanwha alone pledged $5B to Philly [16]) — a deliberate strategy to import shipbuilding know-how the U.S. lost.
• Repair is fragmented. Dozens of private yards (BAE, Vigor, Detyens, Colonna's, MHI, Lyon) compete on regional maintenance work — the most competitive part of the industry. MARAD counted 145 private shipyards engaged in building and more than 300 engaged in repair as of February 2025 [25].
• Very high barriers to entry. Multi-billion-dollar dry docks, security clearances, nuclear certifications, and a decades-deep skilled workforce make new domestic entrants almost impossible — which is exactly why the growth strategy is allied acquisition of existing yards, not greenfield entry.
• Program churn. Consolidation isn't only mergers — it's program reshuffling. The Navy canceled the troubled Constellation-class frigate in late 2025 after years of delay [36], then stood up a new Landing Ship Medium program split between Bollinger and Marinette in 2026 [18]. Winning or losing a program can remake a mid-tier yard's outlook overnight.

9. Risks

• Single-customer/political risk. Revenue rides on the federal budget. Continuing resolutions, appropriations fights, and outright program cancellations (see Constellation) can stall or delete years of expected work.
• Fixed-price and inflation losses. Fixed-price contracts signed before the recent inflation surge have produced real charges; a new design that runs over budget hits earnings immediately through EAC adjustments.
• Labor is the hard ceiling. Skilled-trade shortages and attrition cap how fast any yard can build or repair — the industry's most-cited "strategic challenge." GAO found that none of the seven battle-force builders was positioned to meet Navy delivery goals [1]. Money cannot buy welders that don't exist.
• Execution and schedule slippage. Late deliveries (submarines years behind, carriers delayed) compound the maintenance backlog and squeeze margins.
• Supply chain. Bottlenecks in castings, forgings, and specialized nuclear components can idle a yard regardless of its own capacity. Many naval components require customer-approved or sole-source suppliers, security controls, and specialized metallurgy.
• Capital intensity. Heavy fixed costs mean underutilized yards bleed money.
• Structural commercial disadvantage. The 300–400% cost gap versus Asia is not closing; commercial ambitions depend on subsidies, tax credits, and protected demand that may or may not materialize.
• Policy-reversal and trade volatility. The one-year suspension of the USTR China port fees, weeks after they began, shows how quickly the demand-shaping policy backdrop can swing.
• Foreign-ownership/political sensitivity. The allied-capital wave is strategically encouraged today but leaves key yards subject to CFIUS scrutiny and shifting national-security politics.
• Labor relations. With ~45% of HII employees covered by collective-bargaining agreements [12], negotiation and work-stoppage exposure adds to operational risk.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public-market routes.

• General Dynamics (GD) — the diversified way in; ships are ~33% of a broader defense portfolio (also combat vehicles, IT, Gulfstream jets), so shipbuilding risk is diluted.
• Huntington Ingalls (HII) — the concentrated, pure-play bet on U.S. Navy shipbuilding and repair; highest sensitivity to Navy budgets, contract renegotiations, and yard execution.
• Foreign-listed parents — Fincantieri (Milan), Austal (Sydney), Hanwha Ocean/Systems (Korea), and BAE Systems (London, for repair) offer indirect exposure to U.S. yards, bundled with each parent's home business.
• ETFs — aerospace/defense funds (ITA, XAR, PPA) hold GD and HII and spread single-name risk.

Private routes. Direct private ownership is concentrated in private equity and family holdings (Vigor under PE, Bollinger, Eastern) and in the allied-capital wave (Hanwha's $5B Philly build-out). Adjacent private plays include the components and services supply chain (castings, propulsion, electronics, engineering firms) and yard-town real estate and workforce ventures — often the only way to participate in the repair and mid-tier growth without buying a listed prime. Repair assets can be attractive infrastructure-like investments where waterfront access and drydock capacity create local barriers, but underwriting must account for maintenance capital, environmental liabilities, cyclicality, and customer concentration.

Outlook (forward-looking judgment). Demand is not the problem — the defense side has a decade-plus of funded backlog in submarines, carriers, destroyers, the frigate reset, and unmanned vessels, and multiple policy tailwinds (SHIPS Act, a proposed 25% shipyard tax credit, allied investment) point up. The binding constraints are labor and yard capacity, and those turn slowly. Expect near-term margins to stay thin as inflation-era fixed-price contracts, first-of-class programs, and the repair backlog work through the system, with upside if contract renegotiations, SIOP capacity, and allied-funded throughput improvements land as hoped. The commercial-revival ambition faces a stubborn structural cost gap and will live or die on whether subsidies and protected demand are actually funded. Near-term watch items: FY2026–27 shipbuilding appropriations; the submarine contract renegotiations; how the Landing Ship Medium and post-Constellation frigate plans settle; the Hanwha/Philly capacity ramp; and the fate of the suspended USTR China measures.

Three common claims are misleading. First, broad "shipbuilding economic impact" figures are not NAICS 336611 market size: they frequently add NAICS 488390 repair, suppliers, and induced employment. Second, record backlog is not evidence of attractive margins; the public primes' results show mostly mid-single-digit to high-single-digit shipbuilding margins with large estimate risk. Third, larger Navy budgets do not automatically produce more delivered ships. Demand is abundant, but trained labor, supplier capacity, drydocks, certifications, and program-specific learning curves determine which companies can convert it into cash.

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Sources

1. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding: Challenges Impacting Shipbuilders' Ability to Meet the Navy's Goals, GAO-25-106286. https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-106286/index.html
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definition: 336611 Ship Building and Repairing. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=336611&input=336611&year=2022
3. OSHA, Shipyard Employment eTool: Shipbuilding. https://obis.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/shipyard/shipbuilding/index.html
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10. 19FortyFive, "37 Percent of US Navy Nuclear Attack Submarines Can't Deploy Because the Yards Can't Fix Them," 2026. https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/07/37-percent-of-us-navy-nuclear-attack-submarines-cant-deploy-because-the-yards-cant-fix-them/
11. General Dynamics, 2025 Form 10-K (Marine Systems revenue, margin, backlog). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40533/000004053326000006/gd-20251231.htm
12. Huntington Ingalls Industries, 2025 Form 10-K (revenue, backlog, segment margins, contract mix, catch-up adjustments, labor agreements). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1501585/000150158526000006/hii-20251231.htm
13. Huntington Ingalls Industries, "HII Increases Throughput, Expands Industrial Base" and division pages (workforce: ~44,000). https://www.hii.com/news/hii-increases-throughput-expands-industrial-base-through-distributed-shipbuilding
14. Austal Limited, FY2025 Results (shipbuilding revenue and EBIT margin). https://www.austal.com/media-releases/austal-reports-101-ebit-1134-million-fy2025-commonwealth-strategic-shipbuilding
15. WorkBoat, "Hanwha closes $100 million Philly Shipyard acquisition," 2024 (CFIUS approval Sept 2024; close Dec 2024). https://www.workboat.com/hanwha-closes-100-million-philly-shipyard-acquisition
16. Hanwha, "Hanwha announces $5 billion Philly Shipyard investment," 2025. https://www.hanwha.com/newsroom/news/press-releases/hanwha-announces-5-billion-philly-shipyard-investment-as-part-of-south-koreas-commitment-to-us-shipbuilding-growth.do
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22. Congressional Budget Office, "An Analysis of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2025 Shipbuilding Plan," 2024 (cost comparison to historical appropriations). https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60732
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31. King & Spalding, "Executive Order 'Restoring America's Maritime Dominance,'" 2025 (EO 14269). https://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/executive-order-restoring-americas-maritime-dominance-revitalizing-the-us-shipbuilding-and-maritime-industry
32. U.S. Congress, S.1541 — SHIPS for America Act of 2025, 119th Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1541/text
33. Office of Senator Mark Kelly, "SHIPS for America Act — Section-by-Section," 2025 (25% shipyard investment tax credit; ~250-ship Strategic Commercial Fleet; funding levels). https://www.kelly.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/SHIPS-for-America-Act_Section-by-Section_4.30.2025.pdf
34. The White House, Restoring America's Maritime Dominance: Maritime Action Plan, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Restoring-Americas-Maritime-Dominance.pdf
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36. Daily Press, "More details on Navy's decision to cancel Marinette contract," 2025 (Constellation-class frigate cancellation). https://www.dailypress.net/news/local-news/2025/12/more-details-on-navys-decision-to-cancel-marinette-contract/