Ammunition (except Small Arms) Manufacturing — U.S. Industry Primer

NAICS 2022 code 332993

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1. Overview

This industry makes the big, expendable munitions of modern warfare: artillery and tank shells larger than 30 mm (roughly 1.18 inches), bombs, grenades, land and sea mines, depth charges, torpedoes, and unguided rockets [1]. If you have seen the phrase "155 mm artillery shell" in coverage of the war in Ukraine, that round is the flagship product of NAICS 332993.

Why an investor should care: munitions are consumables. Unlike a tank or a jet that lasts decades, a shell is fired once and must be replaced. That gives the industry a recurring "razor-and-blades" replenishment demand — and, since 2022, a wartime demand shock. The U.S. government is spending billions to roughly quintuple artillery output, restock inventories drained by aid to Ukraine, and rebuild a production base that had shrunk since the Cold War [6][10].

The catch for investors is that this is a near-monopsony (a market with essentially one buyer): the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), supplemented by allied governments buying through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). There is no meaningful public "pure play" — no U.S.-listed company whose stock is mostly large-caliber ammunition.

• Public-market route: buy the diversified defense primes that run the ammunition lines — General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, RTX, Lockheed Martin, plus foreign-listed BAE Systems and Rheinmetall. The ammunition is a small, fast-growing slice of each; you are buying the whole company.
• Private route: direct ownership is gated by security clearances, export law, and the fact that the government owns most of the plants. Realistic private angles are the suppliers feeding the ramp-up — steel forgings, explosives and propellants, machine tools, automation — and a handful of venture-backed munitions startups.

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2. What it is, and what it excludes

In scope (NAICS 332993): establishments primarily manufacturing ammunition larger than small-arms caliber — bombs, depth charges, rockets (except guided missiles), grenades, land mines, sea mines, torpedoes, and large-caliber (over 30 mm) artillery, tank, and naval gun ammunition [1]. The practical product set also includes medium-caliber ammunition, mortar rounds, bomb bodies, warheads, cartridge cases, projectiles, fuzes and primers, plus load-assemble-pack work [21][22].

Explicitly excluded — and where those live:

• Small-arms ammunition (30 mm / about .60 caliber and smaller — rifle, pistol, machine-gun rounds) → NAICS 332992 [1].
• Guided missiles (a shell that steers itself) → NAICS 336414, Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Manufacturing [1]. This is a crucial line: a 155 mm shell is in 332993; a Javelin or a Tomahawk is not.
• Small arms and ordnance accessories (the guns and launchers themselves) → NAICS 332994.
• Explosive chemicals (e.g., blasting caps) may be produced in NAICS 325920 even when their only end use is ammunition.

Production is a staged, qualified supply chain rather than one integrated factory. A conventional artillery round requires a forged or machined metal body, explosive fill, fuze, primer, and propelling charge. For medium-caliber ammunition, the Army describes steel or aluminum projectiles and cases, nitrocellulose-based propellant, lead and antimony in primers, and electronics in some fuzes [23]. A 155 mm M795 projectile body alone uses a 78-pound high-fragmentation-steel casing [24]. Components move to load-assemble-pack facilities, where explosives are cast or pressed, rounds are assembled and inspected, and finished lots are acceptance-tested.

Ownership mix — the defining feature. Most U.S. large-caliber munitions are not made in ordinary private factories. They come out of Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) plants: the government owns the land, buildings, and major equipment, and a private contractor runs the operation for a fee. Five U.S. Army Ammunition Plants anchor the base [5]:

Alongside these sit Government-Owned, Government-Operated (GOGO) arsenals staffed by federal civilians — notably McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (Oklahoma, the DoD's main bomb-loading site) and Pine Bluff Arsenal (Arkansas) — plus a growing set of newer contractor plants (General Dynamics in Camden and Mesquite; Nammo in Mesa) [5][11]. In 2025, General Dynamics opened two new load-assemble-pack lines at Camden, Arkansas, designed for a combined 50,000 high-explosive projectiles per month when fully operational [25].

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3. How big it is

Our federal statistics for NAICS 332993 (U.S. private-sector establishments):

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (a standard concentration score) is suppressed in the federal data, so we do not report it. But the concentration ratios tell the story plainly: four firms make roughly 87% of the revenue, and the top 50 firms make 100% of it — one of the most concentrated manufacturing industries in the country [3]. Qualitatively, many programs have only one or two qualified sources, and the Army formally tracks "single point failures" — items with one or no qualified producer [26].

Undercount caveat — read this before quoting the $4.17 billion. Federal business statistics count private employers. They miss, or only partly capture, the government side of this industry:

• GOGO arsenals (McAlester, Pine Bluff) run on federal civilian payroll and are classified under government, not NAICS manufacturing — their large-caliber output largely does not show up here.
• At GOCO plants, the government funds the buildings and machines, and much of a finished round's value flows through prime contractors' other accounting segments (missiles, combat systems) or through government budgets rather than this NAICS line.

So the roughly $4.2 billion and ~15,600 jobs undercount the true scale of U.S. large-caliber munitions activity. For a market-wide sense of size, private research houses put the global large-caliber ammunition market near $5.5 billion in 2024, growing toward $8 billion by 2030 — estimates, not census data, and worth treating as directional only [19].

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4. The investable universe

There is no U.S.-listed pure play in large-caliber ammunition. Exposure comes through diversified primes, where munitions are a minority of revenue. Approximate scale below refers to the segment that houses the ammunition work, not a standalone ammo business.

Major private and other owners (not directly investable):

• Day & Zimmermann / American Ordnance — private, family-owned; operates Iowa AAP and performs medium- and large-caliber load-assemble-pack work [5][29].
• Nammo — runs a 155 mm line in Mesa, Arizona, and is expanding U.S. capacity; not publicly listed — the Norwegian government and Patria each own 50% [20][30]. Kongsberg offers highly indirect exposure through its interest in Patria, but this is several layers removed.
• AMTEC/Amron — private specialist in medium-caliber cartridge cases; describes itself as the sole U.S. Defense Department producer of certain 20 mm, 25 mm, 30 mm, and 40 mm cases [31].
• Repkon USA — building the first new domestic TNT plant in Kentucky under Army contract [18].
• U.S. government arsenals (McAlester, Pine Bluff) — public facilities, not investable.

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5. How the money works

Owners here do not sell into an open market and cannot freely set prices. The economics are contract-driven:

• Backlog and contract awards are the revenue engine. The order book — funded backlog and multi-year procurement authorizations — is what to watch, more than any "same-store" figure. Book-to-bill above 1.0 signals growth. The 2022–2025 surge shows up as rising ammunition and propellant volume in prime contractors' segment reports [12].

• The GOCO fee model is unusual. Because the government owns the plant and pays to modernize it, the operating contractor carries little capital of its own. It earns a management/operating fee plus performance incentives rather than a full product margin. That means low capital intensity and steady, but capped, returns — the operator does not own an appreciating asset base the way a utility or a landlord does. Newer commercially owned lines behave more like normal manufacturing, where the firm funds capacity and earns product margin.

• Margins are moderate, not spectacular. Defense munitions typically run roughly low-to-mid-teens operating margins; General Dynamics' Combat Systems segment, which houses its ordnance business, earned a 14.4% operating margin in FY2025 [27]. BAE's Platforms & Services segment — which includes vehicles, ship repair, weapons, and ammunition-plant operations — reported an 11.5% operating margin in 2025 [32]. Rheinmetall's global Weapon and Ammunition segment reported a 29.3% operating margin in 2025, though that segment includes non-U.S. weapons and protection systems and benefited from unusually strong European demand [33]. Fixed-price contracts push cost-overrun risk onto the contractor; cost-plus contracts protect margin but cap upside.

• Capacity utilization and throughput drive profitability. These are heavy, fixed-cost plants; the difference between 14,000 and 100,000 shells a month is enormous operating leverage — if the lines can actually run that fast. Additional volume absorbs overhead and lifts margins, while a post-war procurement trough leaves expensive capacity underused.

• Input costs matter and are volatile. A finished round is steel forgings plus energetics — explosive fill (TNT, RDX, HMX, newer IMX) and gun propellant (nitrocellulose). The U.S. has made no domestic TNT since 1986 and imports all of it; wartime demand pushed TNT from about $0.50/lb in the early 2000s to as much as $20/lb, squeezing margins and capping output regardless of how fast shell bodies are made [18]. Nitrocellulose is another critical bottleneck; the Army describes it as an ingredient in all propellants [34].

• Demand is cyclical and event-driven. Revenue tracks DoD budgets, active conflicts, allied restocking, and FMS — not consumer cycles. The business cycle is geopolitical and budgetary rather than conventionally economic. Wars and transfers draw down inventories; appropriations and contract awards follow; capacity then responds with a lag because equipment, buildings, suppliers, and lots must be qualified.

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6. What drives demand

• DoD budget and ammunition procurement accounts. Congressional appropriations (e.g., Procurement of Ammunition, Army) set the ceiling on what can be bought.
• Active conflicts and consumption rates. Ukraine's artillery-heavy war exposed how quickly stockpiles deplete and triggered a multi-year restock; Middle East operations add demand [6][8]. The Army's stated objective is capacity for 100,000 complete 155 mm shots per month by 2026, and the Army says monthly capacity has more than tripled since 2022 [35]. A "shot" includes the projectile, explosive fill, fuze, primer, and propelling charge — production of bare steel bodies alone does not equal complete rounds.
• Allied Foreign Military Sales. European rearmament means U.S. and allied producers are selling into a widened order book [7][20].
• Stockpile and "magazine depth" policy. War-reserve targets and worry about a potential high-intensity conflict with a peer power (China) drive orders to deepen inventories, independent of any current war [7].
• Multi-year procurement authority. When Congress lets the Pentagon commit to several years of buys at once, contractors gain the volume certainty needed to justify building capacity [6].
• Technology is changing the mix. Precision-guided weapons and drones can substitute for some massed unguided fire, but they do not eliminate conventional ammunition. They can instead raise demand for programmable medium-caliber ammunition, proximity fuzes, and airburst rounds used against drones and lightly protected targets [22]. The investment implication is likely higher electronics and fuze content per round, but also more semiconductor, qualification, and software complexity.

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7. Regulation

• Export controls — ITAR/USML. The State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) administers the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Category III of the U.S. Munitions List (USML) covers ammunition and ordnance; rockets, torpedoes, bombs, and mines can fall under Category IV; explosives and propellants fall under Category V; exports require licenses [17][36]. Some lower-sensitivity items shifted in 2020 to the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations (EAR), run by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) [17]. Export-policy changes, end-use restrictions, congressional review, and FMS timing can affect both addressable demand and working capital.
• Explosives licensing — ATF. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives licenses the manufacture, storage, and handling of explosive materials (18 U.S.C. Chapter 40) and controls the U.S. Munitions Import List (27 CFR Part 447) [17]. Commercial explosives manufacturing generally requires an ATF federal explosives license and compliance with storage, employee-possessor, security, recordkeeping, and inspection rules. Government agencies and contractors working exclusively under qualifying government contracts may benefit from statutory exemptions, but those exemptions are activity-specific rather than a blanket waiver [37][38].
• Government as owner and contracting authority. At GOCO plants the Army is landlord and customer; work runs under the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Cost Accounting Standards, and oversight by the Defense Contract Management/Audit Agencies. Buy-American and domestic-source rules apply.
• Safety and environment. Energetics are heavily regulated by OSHA (worker safety) and EPA; legacy contamination at WWII-era plants is a standing liability and a driver of the modernization spend. Past operations have created groundwater and soil liabilities involving perchlorate, energetic compounds, acids, and metals; EPA's Nammo facility order illustrates the potential for long-lived cleanup obligations [39].
• Security. Clearances and facility-security requirements gate who can participate.

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

This is an oligopoly by design. With four firms making ~87% of revenue [3], the GOCO structure and clearance/export barriers keep entry costs high. Qualification, technical-data rights, explosive-handling infrastructure, and customer acceptance are more important barriers than the nominal number of registered establishments [26]. Consolidation over the past generation left a short list of primes — Northrop absorbed Orbital ATK (itself the old Alliant Techsystems / ATK ammunition lineage) in 2018; General Dynamics built up GD Ordnance and Tactical Systems; BAE Systems runs the two big energetics plants.

The current twist is government-engineered new entry. To add capacity and avoid single points of failure, the Pentagon is funding second sources and inviting foreign producers onto U.S. soil: Rheinmetall and Nammo are standing up domestic 155 mm capacity, and Repkon is building the first new U.S. TNT plant in four decades [18][20]. The surge is driving new automated plants, multiple-source strategies, domestic chemical production, and modernization of World War II-era facilities. The Army reported more than 100 ammunition-plant modernization projects valued at $1.5 billion already in execution and identified nearly 400 projects valued above $10 billion in its longer-term plan [34]. So the competitive picture is unusual — consolidation at the top, deliberate diversification at the base, all steered by the single buyer.

The fragility of concentration is real: much of the base runs through single sources for critical inputs (one planned TNT plant, a handful of propellant and energetics sites), so one plant's failure ripples across the whole system.

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9. Risks

• Execution risk is not hypothetical. A DoD Inspector General report in July 2026 found that General Dynamics' new Mesquite, Texas plant had, roughly two years after being built with $469 million, produced zero 155 mm metal parts meeting specification — a key reason the Army was making only ~36,000 rounds a month against a 100,000 goal, and now projects only ~71,000/month by late 2026 [9]. Ramping heavy munitions plants is hard and slips.
• Budget and political risk. The boom rests on appropriations and supplemental funding that can lapse. A Ukraine ceasefire or a defense-budget squeeze could open a demand air-pocket after capacity has been built. Appropriations and continuing-resolution delays can affect cash flow and timing.
• Supply-chain and input risk. Imported TNT, thin energetics and propellant sourcing, aging WWII-era facilities, and a shortage of skilled explosives workers all cap how fast output can rise [18]. In 2024 the Army said the existing TNT supply chain was entirely dependent on foreign sources and awarded a contract with a $435 million ceiling to establish domestic TNT production in Kentucky [40].
• Labor constraints. Capacity bottlenecks include machinists, chemical operators, maintenance trades, explosives handlers, quality personnel, and engineers at geographically isolated plants. Defense News reported that it takes years to recruit and train skilled personnel and that labor shortages had already hampered attempts to surge some munitions [41].
• Monopsony and margin risk. One dominant buyer sets terms; fixed-price contracts can turn cost overruns and inflation into losses.
• Safety, environmental, and liability risk. Explosives handling carries catastrophic-accident and long-tail contamination exposure. Aging infrastructure, accidents, and environmental outages can remove irreplaceable capacity; many core plants date from the 1940s, and explosive operations require separation distances and specialized storage that make capacity slower and more expensive to replace than ordinary machining.
• ESG and financing friction. Some investors and lenders screen out weapons makers, which can affect valuation and capital access — though this stigma has eased since 2022.
• Eventual excess capacity. Government funding can make new production assets look capital-light to an operator, but investors need to determine who bears idle-capacity, maintenance, and workforce-retention costs after emergency demand normalizes.

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10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes.

• Diversified U.S. primes — General Dynamics (GD) and Northrop Grumman (NOC) give the most direct large-caliber-ammunition exposure, but it arrives inside big segments (GD Combat Systems, Northrop Defense Systems); track those segments' munitions/ordnance backlog and margins in the 10-K/10-Q filings [12][13][27]. Boeing (BA), RTX, and Lockheed Martin (LMT) add bomb-, mine-, and torpedo-linked exposure that is minor relative to their platforms and missiles. L3Harris (LHX) provides narrower exposure through fuzing and ordnance systems.
• Foreign-listed munitions-heavy names — BAE Systems (LSE: BA. / OTC: BAESY) and Rheinmetall (XETRA: RHM / OTC: RNMBY) carry a heavier munitions weighting and are the closer thing to a "shells-and-propellant" bet, accessible to U.S. investors via ADRs/OTC.
• Defense/aerospace ETFs provide diversified, indirect exposure to the whole complex.

Private routes. Direct ownership of production is effectively closed to ordinary investors (clearances, ITAR, government-owned plants). The workable angles are suppliers into the ramp — forgings and machined components, energetics and chemicals, factory automation and tooling — and venture-stage munitions and energetics startups raising private capital to attack bottlenecks. Private-equity defense funds are the packaged version of this.

Acquisition diligence notes. Separate government-owned from company-owned equipment; confirm technical-data and production rights; identify every sole-source input; test whether backlog is funded; review fixed-price escalation terms; examine facility-clearance and foreign-ownership implications; and reserve for environmental, explosive-safety, and demilitarization liabilities. Reported contract ceilings should not be valued as backlog, and broad defense-company "munitions" sales should not be treated as NAICS 332993 revenue.

Near-term drivers to watch (forward-looking).

• Whether the 155 mm ramp actually hits its targets — it is currently behind, with ~71,000 rounds/month projected by September 2026 against the 100,000 goal [9].
• Execution of the Army's 15-year, $18.1 billion Organic Industrial Base modernization program, launched in October 2023 [10].
• The new domestic TNT plant (Kentucky, Army/Repkon, $435 million contract ceiling), not due to finish until ~2028 — a genuine relief of the tightest bottleneck [18][40].
• Durability of Ukraine and allied restocking demand versus ceasefire risk, and whether Congress extends multi-year procurement authority [6][7].

The judgment. The structural case is a real, forward-looking tailwind: expendable products, depleted stockpiles, allied rearmament, and explicit policy to deepen the industrial base point to multiple years of elevated demand. But this is a government-dependent, capacity-constrained, execution-challenged industry with one buyer — the upside is capped by fee-based economics and the downside is exposed to budget cycles and plant-ramp failures. For public investors it is best played as a thematic overweight inside diversified defense holdings, not as a standalone bet; for private investors, the money is in feeding the ramp rather than owning the shells.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau / NAICS Association, "2022 NAICS Definition — 332993 Ammunition (except Small Arms) Manufacturing," 2022. https://www.naics.com/naics-code-description/?code=332993
2. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Size Standards (NAICS 332993 — 1,500 employees)," 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
3. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 Economic Census — Concentration & Receipts, NAICS 332993," 2022. https://data.census.gov/
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