Ship and Boat Building (United States) — NAICS 33661

A Histometrics rollup primer for public-market and private investors. NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the U.S. government's standard industry code. This is the 5-digit "industry" level; it contains two national industries — Ship Building and Repairing (336611) and Boat Building (336612).

1. Overview

NAICS 33661 is the whole of U.S. waterborne-vessel manufacturing, and it is really two very different businesses filed under one code. On one side is ship building and repair (336611) — the yards that build and maintain aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, cutters, and the handful of large commercial ships the U.S. still makes. It is, in practice, a defense industry: the Navy and Coast Guard are the buyers, and demand is set by the federal budget. On the other side is boat building (336612) — the factories that turn out powerboats, pontoons, fishing boats, sailboats, and yachts for households. It is a consumer-durables industry, sold through dealers and driven by confidence, wealth, and interest rates.

Why hold them together, and why an investor should care about the pairing: the two halves are almost perfect opposites. One is government-funded, top-heavy, supply-constrained, and pointing up on a decade of funded backlog — the two U.S. primes alone booked roughly $26 billion of ship revenue in 2025 [6][7]. The other is consumer-funded, fragmented, demand-cyclical, and in its third year of working off a pandemic boom — new powerboat retail units fell 8.8% in 2025, to 215,237 [20]. They share materials (steel, aluminum, resin), a skilled-trades labor pool, and a made-in-America footprint — but their cash flows move to entirely different drums. The distinctive value of looking at 33661 as a whole is precisely this contrast, which the sections below lead with.

2. What's inside — the two child industries and how they differ

Both children make things that float, but almost nothing else about their economics matches. The table shows the split of the level (federal figures; shares computed from the child data that rolls up into this code), the direction each is traveling, who owns the assets, and how an investor reaches them.

The one-line takeaway: ship building is fewer, bigger, richer establishments doing government work; boat building is many small factories doing consumer work. A ship yard averages roughly $60 million of revenue per establishment against about $18 million for a boat plant [1], and pays its workers markedly more (~$76,000 vs. ~$54,000 average annual payroll per employee) [2] — a reflection of nuclear-certified, security-cleared heavy manufacturing versus fiberglass-and-aluminum consumer assembly. Even Washington sizes them differently: the SBA's small-business threshold is 1,300 employees for ship building and 1,000 for boat building [30].

One number does not diverge, and it is the most interesting thing on this page. Revenue per worker is nearly the same on both sides — about $300,000 in ship building against about $330,000 in boat building (2022 receipts over 2023 employment, so treat it as an order of magnitude) [1][2]. The two halves extract similar output per head; what differs is how much of it goes to the worker. Ship building pays out roughly a quarter of revenue as payroll, boat building roughly a sixth — the gap between certified heavy trades and consumer-line assembly, not between productive and unproductive industries.

Acronyms used above: MRO = maintenance, repair, and overhaul; GD = General Dynamics; HII = Huntington Ingalls Industries; ETF = exchange-traded fund; HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a standard market-concentration measure; CR4 / CR8 = the combined revenue share of the four (or eight) largest firms; ASP = average selling price.

3. How big it is (the rollup)

Federal figures for the whole industry, from our ground-truth file for this level (Census County Business Patterns 2023 and the 2022 Economic Census):

So the combined industry is roughly a $47 billion, 150,000-worker manufacturing sector. The children reconcile almost exactly: 497 + 930 establishments = 1,427; 99,786 + 50,835 employees = 150,621; $7.58B + $2.74B of payroll = $10.32B; and $30.1B + $16.83B of receipts rounds to the level's $46.95B [1][2]. Firm counts are the one line that does not tie — 437 ship firms plus 845 boat firms is 1,282 against 1,278 at the level, a four-company gap consistent with a handful of companies operating in both industries but counted once here.

Concentration is a blend, and that is the point. The level's CR4 of 45.7% sits between the ship half's very concentrated 68.5% and the boat half's fragmented 26.7%; the same holds one rung down, with the level's CR8 of 53.5% sitting between 76.1% and 40.8% [1]. The four largest firms in the whole code are essentially the two ship primes plus a couple of large builders; the blended figure comes out lower than ship building's own because the denominator now includes the long, fragmented tail of small boat factories. The Census HHI for the level is suppressed, so we do not report a value — but the boat half's published 278.8 [1] against a ship half whose top four take two-thirds of revenue tells the story of a barbell: a protected oligopoly at one end, near-perfect competition at the other.

How concentrated, in dollars: GD's Marine Systems booked ~$16.7 billion of 2025 revenue and HII's shipbuilding business ~$9.6 billion — about $26 billion between two companies [6][7]. Set against the level's $46.95 billion of 2022 receipts, that is on the order of half the entire code's measured revenue sitting in two listed names. The years do not match (2025 company revenue versus 2022 Census receipts, and the industry has grown since), so treat it as a scale check rather than a share — but it is the right mental picture of where the dollars in 33661 live.

Undercount caveat — read this. These are private-sector statistics, and the single biggest omission sits entirely on the ship side: the four government-owned "public" naval shipyards (Norfolk, Portsmouth, Puget Sound, Pearl Harbor) that perform the Navy's nuclear submarine and carrier maintenance in-house are not counted here — their tens of thousands of federal civilian workers (on the order of 37,000) are government activity, not private receipts [8][9]. Counting them, true national ship-and-boat-building employment is well above the ~150,000 private figure — closer to ~185,000+. A different lens on the ship side gives a different facility count again: MARAD tallied 145 private shipyards engaged in building and more than 300 engaged in repair as of February 2025 [11], against Census's 497 establishments — a reminder that "shipyard" and "establishment" are not the same unit. There is very little "tiny-operator" undercount: boat building's small factories are captured reasonably well, and small repair shops mostly file under boat building rather than escaping the code.

Scope, not undercount — and the same trap on both sides. The ~$16.8 billion boat-building line is factory shipments only; engines, trailers, dealers, service, and used boats sit in adjacent codes, which is why the trade group NMMA (National Marine Manufacturers Association) measures 2024 U.S. recreational-marine retail spending at $55.6 billion and the wider "boating economy" at roughly $230 billion supporting about 812,000 jobs across ~36,000 businesses [21]. The ship half has the identical problem in the other direction: headline "shipbuilding economic impact" numbers routinely fold in repair classified elsewhere, suppliers, and induced employment. Neither is NAICS revenue. Read impact studies as advocacy arithmetic and the Census lines as the industry.

Two more numbers frame how differently the halves are shaped. The boat side's installed base is 11,674,073 registered recreational vessels, of which 10,852,992 are mechanically propelled [29], and 78.3% of 2024 transactions were used boats (858,798 pre-owned against 238,117 new) [21]. The ship side's customer, by contrast, is trying to reach a fleet of 381 manned ships [10]. Eleven million assets versus a few hundred: that is the whole difference in one comparison.

4. The investable universe — where value concentrates across the children

Value in this code is lopsided toward the ship half by dollars, but toward the boat half by the number of clean public ways in — though that second advantage narrowed in 2026.

Ship half (336611) — a duopoly you can mostly only own two ways. By far the most revenue in the level flows through two U.S.-listed defense contractors: General Dynamics (NYSE: GD), whose Marine Systems unit ran ~$16.7 billion of 2025 revenue — about a third of GD, split $12.6B nuclear submarines, $2.9B surface ships, $1.2B repair and other services — and owns Electric Boat, Bath Iron Works, and NASSCO [6]; and Huntington Ingalls Industries (NYSE: HII), the pure-play with ~$9.6 billion of 2025 shipbuilding revenue and roughly 44,000 employees, owner of Newport News (the only U.S. builder of nuclear carriers) and Ingalls [7]. HII alone therefore employs close to 30% of the level's entire private workforce. GAO counts only seven builders of Navy battle-force ships in the whole country [5]. The mid-tier is increasingly foreign-owned — Italy's Fincantieri, Australia's Austal (A$1.35 billion of FY2025 shipbuilding revenue at a 1.9% EBIT margin, down from 2.9%) [14], Korea's Hanwha (which bought Philly Shipyard for $100 million and pledged $5 billion to expand it) [13], and Britain's BAE Systems for repair — reachable only through those foreign-listed parents. Ship repair is fragmented among private regional yards, and the largest ship-maintenance capacity of all — the four public naval yards — is not investable at any price.

Boat half (336612) — a usable public roster that just got shorter. Boats still offer more direct listed choices than most niche consumer manufacturers: the diversified giant Brunswick (NYSE: BC), whose Boat segment ran ~$1.5 billion in FY2025 but whose most durable earnings come from Mercury Marine propulsion, parts, and the Freedom Boat Club shared-access franchise (~440 locations, 60,000+ memberships) [22]; plus Malibu (NASDAQ: MBUU) at ~$808 million of FY2025 net sales [23] and MasterCraft (NASDAQ: MCFT) at ~$284 million [24]; and the diversified Winnebago (NYSE: WGO). The roster shrank in May 2026, when MasterCraft acquired Marine Products, folding Chaparral and Robalo into MCFT and removing MPX as standalone public exposure [24]. Two public retailers, MarineMax (NYSE: HZO) — 120+ locations including 70+ dealerships and 65 marina/storage facilities — and OneWater (NASDAQ: ONEW), offer the same demand cycle from the distribution side [26]. The catch remains: several of the highest-volume builders — White River/Bass Pro, Correct Craft (Nautique) — are private [27], and Marine Products characterized the manufacturing market as having nearly 100 sport/pleasure-boat producers with significant unit production, many privately held [25].

Net: if you want dollars-of-revenue exposure, it concentrates overwhelmingly in GD and HII — each listed boat builder's whole marine business is smaller than a single year's growth in GD Marine Systems. If you want a spread of tradeable pure plays with real operating leverage, the boat side is where they live, now two names rather than three.

5. How the money works

The two halves run on opposite financial engines, and understanding 33661 means holding both models at once.

Ship half — long-cycle government contracting. Owners earn from multi-year Navy contracts, not open-market sales. The health metric is funded backlog: HII ended 2025 with ~$53.1 billion ($17.8B at Ingalls, $29.9B at Newport News), and GD Marine Systems carried $64.2 billion of estimated total contract value [6][7]. Revenue is booked over time using an estimate-at-completion (EAC) of total cost; when a cost estimate rises, the builder takes an immediate profit charge — HII recorded $350 million of gross unfavorable cumulative catch-up adjustments in 2025, the single clearest illustration of how estimate revisions eat program profit [7]. Margins are thin: Newport News ran 5.1% and Ingalls 7.6% in 2025, with GD Marine Systems at 7.0% (up from 6.5%) [6][7]. The contract-type mix is the core risk dial — HII generated roughly 46% of 2025 revenue under fixed-price-incentive contracts, 50% cost-type, 3% firm-fixed-price, and 1% time-and-material [7]. Profit ultimately turns on throughput: ships delivered per year, gated by skilled trades. U.S. yards win essentially no commercial export work because building a large ship here costs an estimated 300–400% more than in Korea or Japan [12].

Boat half — cyclical durable-goods manufacturing. Revenue is units shipped × average selling price × mix, sold wholesale to independent dealers, on a largely fixed cost base — so the operating leverage is brutal in both directions. Malibu's gross margin fell from 25.3% in FY2023 to 17.7% in FY2024 and 17.8% in FY2025 [23]; Marine Products' EBITDA margin dropped from 13.5% in 2023 to 7.0% in 2025 as unit volume fell from 4,139 to 2,354 boats even though average gross selling price rose from $82,400 to $93,600 [25] — price and mix could not offset volume. Two channel dynamics matter: builders' wholesale shipments diverge from consumer retail registrations, so factories deliberately cut production to let dealers destock (why 2024–25 factory revenue fell faster than end demand); and dealers finance inventory with floor-plan loans advancing roughly 70–85% of value at prime plus a spread, with prime around 6.25% in early 2026 [28] — so higher rates hit both the consumer's boat loan and the dealer's carrying cost. The industry is doubly rate-sensitive.

The rollup's most counterintuitive finding sits here. At this point in the cycle, the "thin-margin" defense business is out-earning the consumer business. Brunswick's Boat segment produced a 2.1% GAAP operating margin in 2025, down from 4.1% [22] — below Newport News' 5.1% and less than a third of GD Marine Systems' 7.0% [6][7]. The usual framing (steady low-margin government work versus juicy consumer manufacturing) inverts at a trough: fixed-price defense risk is chronic and bounded, while consumer operating leverage is acute and unbounded. Any comparison of the two halves' profitability has to specify where in the cycle you are standing.

The through-line: the ship half is paid to execute a funded backlog; the boat half is paid to guess the consumer cycle right. Neither competes on open-market price the way most manufacturers do — the ship half is protected by law, the boat half by a ~95%-domestic footprint [20].

6. What drives demand

Ship half: the Navy budget above all — the 30-year shipbuilding plan targets 381 manned ships plus 134 large unmanned vessels at roughly $40 billion a year, over $1 trillion across 30 years, which CBO put at 46% above the preceding five-year average appropriation [10]. China's naval buildup and the AUKUS (Australia–UK–US) submarine partnership drive the biggest programs. A fleet-maintenance crisis is itself unmet repair demand: roughly 37–40% of the attack-submarine fleet is tied up in maintenance at any time, and by mid-2026 reporting 18 of 49 attack submarines could not deploy because the yards could not fix them [9]. Coast Guard recapitalization and a Jones-Act-protected commercial pipeline — more than 40,000 U.S.-flag vessels were engaged in domestic trade in 2022 [11] — round it out. Demand here is not the problem; capacity is. GAO estimated the industrial base needs 174,000 new workers over a decade, against three-to-five years for a skilled-trades employee to reach proficiency [5].

Boat half: consumer confidence, household wealth, and interest rates (which bite twice, at the buyer and at the dealer) [28], plus the used-boat substitution and trade-up cycle — 78.3% of 2024 transactions were pre-owned [21] — and a buyer base broader than the yacht stereotype: median owner ~54 but first-time buyers ~46, millennials ~31% of boaters, and about 61% of owners earning under $100,000 [31]. Seasonal and access factors (marina capacity, fuel prices, water levels) gate participation. NMMA attributed 2025's 8.8% unit decline to elevated rates, inflation, and subdued confidence, with freshwater fishing boats the most resilient major segment at −1.5% [20]. Demand here is the swing variable.

The two are essentially uncorrelated, and the recent payroll data shows it rather than asserting it: BLS put shipbuilding-and-repairing employment at 104,700 in November 2025 against 107,000 in December 2024 — essentially flat through a period in which boat-building payrolls fell from 44,800 (April 2024) to 40,900 (preliminary March 2025) [4]. A recession that guts boat sales barely touches a submarine program, and a defense-budget fight barely touches a pontoon buyer. That is what makes the combined code a portfolio of opposites rather than a single cycle.

7. Regulation

Regulation creates the ship market and constrains the boat market — with one genuine point of symmetry.

• Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act of 1920) — requires goods moving between U.S. ports to travel on U.S.-built, -owned, -flagged, and -crewed ships. This is what keeps any domestic commercial shipbuilding alive; critics call it a high-cost shield that produced irrelevance rather than strength, defenders call it essential industrial base [16].
• Defense & foreign-investment rules (ship side) — the Federal Acquisition Regulation and its defense supplement, ITAR export controls, and CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) review, which gated Hanwha's Philly Shipyard purchase and now governs the foreign-ownership wave reshaping the mid-tier [13]. The Navy is also funding a ~$21B, ~20-year rebuild of its four public yards (the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, SIOP) [8].
• Environmental rules — the one place the halves mirror each other. Both children are regulated hazardous-air-pollutant sources under NESHAP: a shipbuilding-and-ship-repair surface coating standard on marine coatings for 336611, and a boat manufacturing standard on styrene and methyl methacrylate from fiberglass resin, gel coat, and painting for 336612. The EPA separately regulates marine spark-ignition and diesel engine emissions, and the USCG (U.S. Coast Guard) sets recreational-boat construction and safety standards [19].
• Trade policy (both, asymmetrically) — Section 232 steel/aluminum tariffs raise input costs across the code; on the boat side Malibu estimated 18–20% of its FY2025 cost of sales was sourced outside the United States [23]. The ship side got its own 2025 action and its own reversal: USTR Section 301 port-entry fees on China-built and China-linked ships phased in from October 14, 2025, then were suspended for one year on November 10, 2025 [17]. Policy stimulus is stacked on top — Executive Order 14269 "Restoring America's Maritime Dominance," the bipartisan SHIPS for America Act (a ~250-ship Strategic Commercial Fleet and a 25% shipyard investment tax credit), and a Maritime Action Plan that puts U.S. global commercial output below 1% of new ships [18]. These are proposals and directives, not yet fully funded law.

8. Consolidation

• Ship half — concentrate, go foreign, and reshuffle programs. The top is a protected duopoly: Newport News is the sole nuclear-carrier builder, and it and Electric Boat are the only two submarine builders (teaming, not competing). The mid-tier is consolidating under allied foreign owners (Fincantieri, Austal, Hanwha) importing shipbuilding know-how the U.S. lost [13][14], while repair stays fragmented across 300-plus yards [11]. Barriers to entry — multi-billion-dollar dry docks, clearances, nuclear certifications, decades-deep trades — make greenfield entry almost impossible, so growth comes by acquiring existing yards. And consolidation here is not only mergers: the Navy canceled the Constellation-class frigate in late 2025 and then split a new Landing Ship Medium program between Bollinger and Marinette in 2026 [15]. A customer decision can remake a mid-tier yard overnight.
• Boat half — roll up brands, dealers, and volume, and now the pure plays themselves. Nationally fragmented (CR4 26.7%, HHI 278.8, ~845 firms) [1], but consolidating on three tracks: brand portfolios (Brunswick integrating boats + Mercury propulsion + Freedom Boat Club) [22], dealer roll-ups (OneWater with 30+ acquisitions, MarineMax) [26], and volume scale in value segments (White River/Bass Pro) [27]. The cycle pushed consolidation up a level in 2026: MasterCraft acquired Marine Products in May, combining ski/wake, pontoon, sterndrive, and saltwater-fishing brands under one listed company [24]. Individual segments are far more concentrated than the national average — MasterCraft reported a 19.2% share of performance sport/wake boats as of March 2025 [24] — and dealer concentration now cuts back at the builders: OneWater alone was 24.7% of Malibu's FY2025 consolidated sales, its ten largest dealers 42.8% [23].

Same code, opposite consolidation logics — and opposite triggers. The ship half concentrates because the physical capacity is irreplaceable and the customer decides who survives; the boat half concentrates because scale in brands and distribution beats a long tail of single-brand builders, and the cycle decides who sells.

9. Risks

Ship half: single-customer/political risk (budget fights, continuing resolutions, and outright program cancellation — Constellation is the live example) [15]; fixed-price and inflation losses booked immediately through EAC adjustments [7]; labor as the hard ceiling on throughput, with GAO finding that none of the seven battle-force builders was positioned to meet the Navy's delivery goals [5]; execution and schedule slippage compounding the maintenance backlog [9]; supply-chain bottlenecks in castings, forgings, and sole-source nuclear components; labor relations (~45% of HII employees under collective-bargaining agreements) [7]; policy whiplash (the USTR fees suspended weeks after taking effect) [17]; and a structural commercial cost disadvantage that only subsidies can close [12].

Boat half: cyclicality above all (discretionary demand plus fixed costs), double interest-rate sensitivity [28], channel-inventory whipsaw, limits on pricing power — Marine Products warned that risen ownership costs had impaired retail demand and could make further price increases harder even if materials inflate [25] — input-cost inflation and tariffs [23], dealer concentration, skilled-labor tightness (production cuts shed trained workers who are expensive to re-hire), environmental-compliance cost [19], and secular participation questions (aging owner base, electrification timing).

Shared across the code: skilled-trades scarcity, steel/aluminum/resin input inflation, and trade-policy volatility hit both halves. Note the diversification benefit — the risks that matter most to each child (defense-budget risk vs. consumer-recession risk) are largely independent, so a position spanning 33661 is less correlated than it looks. Note also the one place they may not be independent: both halves draw on the same welders, laminators, pipefitters, and electricians, and the boat half shed payroll through 2024–25 [4] exactly while the ship half was told it needs 174,000 additional workers [5]. Whether that is a labor transfer or two separate shortages is an open question worth watching, not a settled fact.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public routes. The two halves are bought differently and for different reasons:

• Ship (defense growth, thin margins): GD (diversified — ships are ~33% of the business) [6] or HII (the concentrated pure-play, highest Navy-budget sensitivity) [7]; foreign-listed parents (Fincantieri, Austal, Hanwha, BAE) for indirect mid-tier and repair exposure [13][14]; or aerospace/defense ETFs (ITA, XAR, PPA) that hold GD and HII. Treat these as backlog-execution and margin-recovery stories — record backlog is not the same as attractive margins, and a larger Navy budget does not automatically produce more delivered ships.
• Boat (consumer cyclical): Brunswick (BC) for scale plus steadier propulsion, parts, and boat-club earnings [22], or the higher-beta pure plays Malibu (MBUU) and MasterCraft (MCFT) [23][24]; Winnebago (WGO) for a diversified RV+marine wrapper; and retailers MarineMax (HZO) / OneWater (ONEW) for the demand cycle from distribution, with dealer and floor-plan risk instead of factory risk [26]. Marine Products (MPX) is no longer a standalone route following the May 2026 acquisition [24]. These trade as cyclicals — cheap on trailing earnings at the top, expensive at the bottom — so the multiple you pay across the cycle matters more than the headline yield; confirm current valuations before buying.

Private routes. Ship-side private exposure runs through private-equity and family-owned repair/specialty yards, the allied-capital wave (Hanwha's $5 billion Philly Shipyard build-out) [13], and the components/services supply chain; waterfront repair assets can behave like infrastructure, but underwriting has to price maintenance capital, environmental liabilities, and customer concentration. Boat-side private exposure runs through niche builders and dealer networks — many of the largest builders are private [27] — floor-plan/dealer private credit [28], boat clubs and fractional ownership [22], and marina/dry-storage real assets. On a boat-builder acquisition, the diligence that matters is retail sell-through versus wholesale shipments, field inventory aging, dealer concentration, floor-plan subsidies and repurchase obligations, and normalized margins across a full cycle.

Outlook (forward-looking judgment). The two halves are on different clocks but, unusually, on the same margin story. Ship building has demand it cannot meet — a decade-plus of funded submarine, carrier, destroyer, and unmanned backlog plus policy tailwinds (SHIPS Act, a proposed 25% shipyard tax credit, allied investment) [18] — so its question is whether labor and yard capacity can turn fast enough to convert backlog into deliveries; expect thin near-term margins as inflation-era fixed-price and first-of-class programs work through, with watch items in FY2026–27 appropriations, the submarine contract renegotiations, how Landing Ship Medium and the post-Constellation frigate plan settle [15], the Hanwha ramp, and the fate of the suspended USTR measures [17]. Boat building has capacity it cannot fully use — a third year of normalization left 2025 units down 8.8% and the environment cautious, hinging on interest rates, consumer confidence, and dealer-inventory health [20]. Both, in other words, are currently margin-recovery cases: one recovering from contract estimates, the other from volume. For an investor, 33661 is best read not as one industry but as a paired trade — a supply-constrained defense grower and a demand-cyclical consumer manufacturer, sharing a labor pool and a made-in-America footprint but almost nothing on the demand side, which is exactly why owning across the code diversifies rather than doubles a single bet.

---

Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration Ratios and Statistics (NAICS 33661 and children 336611/336612: receipts, firms, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50; level and 336611 HHI suppressed; 336612 HHI 278.8). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
2. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 (NAICS 33661 and children: establishments, employment, annual and Q1 payroll; 336612 establishment-size distribution). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html; https://data.census.gov/table/CBP2023.CB2300CBP?codeset=naics~336612&g=010XX00US
3. OSHA, Regulatory Analysis citing 2022 Census County Business Patterns (NAICS 336611 establishment-size concentration: 12 establishments of 1,000+ employees hold ~70% of workers). https://downloads.regulations.gov/OSHA-2012-0038-0017/content.pdf
4. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics (ship building and repairing, December 2025 table; boat building, April 2025 table). https://www.bls.gov/ces/data/employment-and-earnings/2025/table1a_202512.htm; https://www.bls.gov/ces/data/employment-and-earnings/2025/table1b_202504.htm
5. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding: Challenges Impacting Shipbuilders' Ability to Meet the Navy's Goals, GAO-25-106286 (seven battle-force builders; 174,000 additional workers needed; three-to-five years to proficiency; none positioned to meet delivery goals). https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-106286/index.html
6. General Dynamics, 2025 Form 10-K (Marine Systems revenue ~$16.7B and ~33% of GD, 7.0% margin, $64.2B contract value, submarine/surface/repair split). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40533/000004053326000006/gd-20251231.htm
7. Huntington Ingalls Industries, 2025 Form 10-K (~$9.6B shipbuilding revenue, $53.1B backlog, Newport News 5.1% / Ingalls 7.6% margins, $350M catch-up adjustments, contract mix, ~45% collective-bargaining coverage); HII, "HII Increases Throughput, Expands Industrial Base" (~44,000 employees). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1501585/000150158526000006/hii-20251231.htm; https://www.hii.com/news/hii-increases-throughput-expands-industrial-base-through-distributed-shipbuilding
8. USNI News, "Navy Plans to Spend $21B Over 20 Years to Optimize, Modernize Public Shipyards," 2018; Naval Sea Systems Command, "Shipyards — About Us" (four government-owned public naval shipyards; SIOP). https://news.usni.org/2018/04/17/navy-plans-spend-21b-20-years-optimize-modernize-public-shipyards; https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Shipyards/About-Us/
9. 19FortyFive, "37 Percent of US Navy Nuclear Attack Submarines Can't Deploy Because the Yards Can't Fix Them," 2026 (fleet-maintenance backlog; 18 of 49 attack submarines; ~37,000 public-shipyard federal civilian workers). https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/07/37-percent-of-us-navy-nuclear-attack-submarines-cant-deploy-because-the-yards-cant-fix-them/
10. Congressional Budget Office, "An Analysis of the Navy's 2025 Shipbuilding Plan," 2025 (~$40B/yr, >$1 trillion over 30 years, 381 manned ships + 134 unmanned); "An Analysis of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2025 Shipbuilding Plan," 2024 (46% above preceding five-year average appropriation). https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61155; https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60732
11. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Commercial Shipbuilding: Actions Needed to Improve the Management of Initiatives to Support the Industry, GAO-25-107304 (MARAD count of 145 private building yards and 300+ repair yards, February 2025; 40,000+ U.S.-flag vessels in domestic trade, 2022). https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-107304/index.html
12. Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS), "MAP Spotlight: The U.S. Shipbuilding Industry" (~300–400% U.S. cost gap vs. Korea/Japan). https://chinaus-icas.org/research/the-us-shipbuilding-industry/
13. WorkBoat, "Hanwha closes $100 million Philly Shipyard acquisition," 2024 (CFIUS approval; close December 2024); Hanwha, "Hanwha announces $5 billion Philly Shipyard investment," 2025. https://www.workboat.com/hanwha-closes-100-million-philly-shipyard-acquisition; https://www.hanwha.com/newsroom/news/press-releases/hanwha-announces-5-billion-philly-shipyard-investment-as-part-of-south-koreas-commitment-to-us-shipbuilding-growth.do
14. Austal Limited, FY2025 Results (A$1.35B shipbuilding revenue; shipbuilding EBIT margin 1.9%, down from 2.9%). https://www.austal.com/media-releases/austal-reports-101-ebit-1134-million-fy2025-commonwealth-strategic-shipbuilding
15. Daily Press, "More details on Navy's decision to cancel Marinette contract," 2025 (Constellation-class frigate cancellation); USNI News, "Bollinger, Fincantieri Marinette Marine to Build Landing Ship Medium, Navy Says," 2026. https://www.dailypress.net/news/local-news/2025/12/more-details-on-navys-decision-to-cancel-marinette-contract/; https://news.usni.org/2026/02/18/bollinger-fincantieri-marinette-marine-to-build-landing-ship-medium-navy-says
16. Cato Institute, "New Data Lay Bare the Jones Act's Broken Shipbuilding Bargain," 2025 (Merchant Marine Act of 1920 build-domestic requirement). https://www.cato.org/blog/new-data-lays-bare-jones-acts-broken-shipbuilding-bargain
17. White & Case, "USTR issues final Section 301 actions in China shipbuilding investigation," 2025 (port fees from October 14, 2025); Holland & Knight, "USTR Port Fee Suspension: What You Need to Know," 2025 (one-year suspension from November 10, 2025). https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/ustr-issues-final-section-301-actions-china-shipbuilding-investigation; https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/11/ustr-port-fee-suspension-what-you-need-to-know
18. King & Spalding, Executive Order 14269 "Restoring America's Maritime Dominance," 2025; S.1541 — SHIPS for America Act of 2025 and Office of Senator Mark Kelly section-by-section (25% shipyard investment tax credit; ~250-ship Strategic Commercial Fleet); The White House, Restoring America's Maritime Dominance: Maritime Action Plan, 2026 (U.S. share of global new-ship output below 1%). https://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/executive-order-restoring-americas-maritime-dominance-revitalizing-the-us-shipbuilding-and-maritime-industry; https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1541/text; https://www.kelly.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/SHIPS-for-America-Act_Section-by-Section_4.30.2025.pdf; https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Restoring-Americas-Maritime-Dominance.pdf
19. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Shipbuilding and Ship Repair (Surface Coating) NESHAP; Boat Manufacturing NESHAP; "Regulations for Emissions from Marine Spark-Ignition Engines"; U.S. Coast Guard recreational-boat construction and safety standards. https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/shipbuilding-and-ship-repair-surface-coating-national-emission; https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/boat-manufacturing-national-emission-standards-hazardous-air; https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-emissions-marine-spark-ignition-engines; https://newboatbuilders.com/pages/fuel.html
20. National Marine Manufacturers Association, "2025 New Boat Retail Sales," 2026 (215,237 units, −8.8%; freshwater fishing −1.5%; ~95% of boats sold in the U.S. built domestically). https://www.nmma.org/press/article/25432
21. National Marine Manufacturers Association, "2024 Industry Sales by Category and State Report: Total Spending $55.6B," 2025 (238,117 new vs. 858,798 pre-owned boats, 78.3% used); "Recreational Boating's Economic Impact Soars to $230 Billion," 2024 (~812,000 jobs, ~36,000 businesses). https://www.nmma.org/press/article/25236; https://www.nmma.org/press/article/24334
22. Brunswick Corporation, Form 10-K FY2025 (Boat segment ~$1.5B revenue and 2.1% GAAP operating margin vs. 4.1% in 2024; Mercury Marine; Freedom Boat Club ~440 locations and 60,000+ memberships). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/14930/000001493026000027/bcorp-20251231.htm
23. Malibu Boats, Inc., Form 10-K FY2025 (~$808M net sales; gross margin 25.3% FY2023 → 17.7% FY2024 → 17.8% FY2025; OneWater 24.7% and top ten dealers 42.8% of FY2025 sales; 18–20% of cost of sales sourced outside the U.S.). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1590976/000159097625000080/mbuu-20250630.htm
24. MasterCraft Boat Holdings, Form 10-K FY2025 (~$284M net sales; 19.2% performance sport-boat category share as of March 2025) and Form 8-K (Marine Products acquisition completed May 15, 2026). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1638290/000095017025111682/mcft-20250630.htm; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1638290/000119312526226778/d123539d8k.htm
25. Marine Products Corporation, Form 10-K 2025 (EBITDA margin 13.5% in 2023 → 7.0% in 2025; units 4,139 → 2,354; average gross selling price $82,400 → $93,600; ~100 sport/pleasure-boat producers; ownership-cost warning). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1129155/000110465926021478/mpx-20251231x10k.htm
26. MarineMax, Inc., investor overview, 2025 (120+ locations, 70+ dealerships, 65 marina/storage facilities); OneWater Marine Inc., company overview, 2025 (30+ acquisitions since 2014). https://investor.marinemax.com/overview/default.aspx; https://www.onewatermarine.com/company/
27. White River Marine Group (Bass Pro Shops), press kit, 2025; "Nautique Boats / Correct Craft," Wikipedia, 2025. https://about.basspro.com/newsroom/press-center/white-river-marine-group/; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nautique_Boats
28. Crestmont Capital, "Floor Plan Financing: The Complete Guide," 2026 (70–85% advance rates; prime plus spread; prime ~6.25% early 2026); National Marine Manufacturers Association, "Dealer Floor Plan Financing FAQ." https://www.crestmontcapital.com/blog/floor-plan-financing; https://www.nmma.org/assets/cabinets/Cabinet214/dfp_faqs.pdf
29. U.S. Coast Guard, 2024 Recreational Boating Statistics (11,674,073 registered recreational vessels; 10,852,992 mechanically propelled). https://www.uscgboating.org/library/accident-statistics/Recreational-Boating-Statistics-2024.pdf
30. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards, 2023 (336611 = 1,300 employees; 336612 = 1,000 employees). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
31. Boat Brands, "Demographics of Boat Owners," citing NMMA research, 2026 (median owner ~54; first-time buyers ~46; ~61% earn under $100k; millennials ~31% of boaters). https://www.boatbrands.org/what-are-the-demographics-of-boat-owners/