Battery Manufacturing in the United States (NAICS 335910)

An investor's primer. Figures are for the U.S. industry defined by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 335910. Reported facts are cited; forward-looking statements are worded as judgments, not claims of fact.

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1. Overview

Battery Manufacturing covers companies that make the actual battery — the cell, module, or finished pack — whether it is a disposable AA in a remote, the lead-acid unit that starts a car, the lithium-ion cell inside an electric vehicle (EV), or the room-sized rack that stores power for the electric grid.

Why an investor should care: this is a mature, cash-generating manufacturing base (car starter batteries, forklift and telecom backup power) that has been strapped to one of the fastest-moving industrial build-outs in modern U.S. history. Tens of billions of dollars of "gigafactory" investment landed after 2022, chasing EV and grid-storage demand and the subsidies attached to it. As of 2025-2026 the industry is living through a whipsaw: grid-storage demand is at record highs while EV demand just lost its federal consumer subsidy, leaving some brand-new plants idling and others being repurposed [8][14][15].

• Public-market ways in: one solidly profitable industrial-battery maker (EnerSys); a cluster of small, mostly pre-profit next-generation cell and solid-state developers (QuantumScape, Enovix, Amprius, Solid Power, Microvast, T1 Energy); branded primary-battery exposure through Energizer Holdings (mixed with non-battery consumer businesses); and large diversified parents where batteries are one slice (Tesla in the U.S.; Panasonic, LG Energy Solution, Samsung SDI, SK, and CATL abroad).
• Private-market ways in: the biggest U.S. producers by tonnage are private — Clarios (the world's largest car-battery maker), East Penn, Exide/Stryten — plus the automaker–Korean joint ventures (JVs) that own most U.S. lithium gigafactories, and recyclers like Redwood Materials.

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2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope (what's in NAICS 335910). Establishments "primarily engaged in manufacturing primary and storage batteries" [4]. Battery chargers, inverters, and uninterruptible-power-supply equipment are generally classified elsewhere unless the establishment's primary activity is making batteries [5]. The code spans both families:

• Primary (single-use): alkaline AAA/AA/C/D/9V dry cells, lithium coin/button cells, watch and hearing-aid batteries.
• Storage / secondary (rechargeable): lead-acid car and industrial batteries, nickel-cadmium, and — the growth story — lithium-ion cells, modules, and packs for EVs, consumer electronics, and grid storage [4].

What it EXCLUDES (and the adjacent codes). The code captures the battery itself, not the surrounding supply chain. Closely related activities are classified elsewhere:

• Cathode/anode "active materials," electrolytes and other battery chemicals → chemical manufacturing (NAICS 325 series). This is a large and strategically important slice of battery value that sits outside 335910.
• Lithium, cobalt, nickel and graphite extraction → mining (NAICS 212 series).
• Electric-vehicle assembly → Automobile/Light-truck Manufacturing (NAICS 336110/336111).
• Capacitors and supercapacitors → NAICS 334416.
• Fuel cells (which generate power rather than store it) → miscellaneous electrical equipment (NAICS 335999).

How batteries are made. Lithium-ion cell production starts with slurry mixing, coating active material onto metal foil, solvent removal, roll pressing, and slitting. Electrodes and separators are then stacked or wound in a low-humidity environment, placed in a case or pouch, filled with electrolyte, and sealed. Cells undergo initial charging, aging, grading, and testing before module and pack assembly. Dry rooms, solvent recovery, formation equipment, automation, and quality control make this a capital- and energy-intensive process; Argonne notes that conventional electrode drying is especially energy-intensive and that recovery of the NMP solvent adds equipment and operating cost [6][7]. Lead-acid production has a different but equally industrial process: casting lead-alloy grids, applying lead-oxide paste, curing plates, stacking positive and negative plates with separators, welding the elements, adding sulfuric-acid electrolyte, formation charging, and testing. The process is closely linked to used-battery collection and secondary-lead smelting [9].

Ownership mix. Two very different worlds sit inside one code. The legacy segment — lead-acid car and industrial batteries — is a consolidated oligopoly of large private and one public firm (Clarios, East Penn, EnerSys, Exide/Stryten). The new lithium-cell segment is dominated by foreign-parent plants and JVs: most U.S. gigafactories are owned or co-owned by Korean (LG Energy Solution, SK, Samsung SDI) and Japanese (Panasonic) firms, by automakers (Tesla, GM, Ford, Toyota, Stellantis, Hyundai), or by a thin layer of venture-backed U.S. startups [1][2][10][11].

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3. How big it is

Our federal ground-truth figures for NAICS 335910:

Two things stand out. First, this is a highly concentrated industry — the four largest firms take roughly 70% of revenue and the top 50 take nearly 97% [1]. (The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the standard concentration statistic, is suppressed in the federal data, so we do not state a value.) Second, it is small on paper relative to the noise it makes — ~$28 billion of receipts and ~40,000 workers is a fraction of, say, the auto industry it feeds.

Real output has more than doubled. The Federal Reserve's real-output index for the combined battery industry reached 243.3 in June 2026 (2017 = 100), indicating U.S. output roughly 2.4 times its 2017 benchmark [12]. Note that this is an index of physical production, not revenue or capacity.

The undercount / timing caveat (important here). The $28.2 billion receipts figure is from the 2022 Economic Census — the year most gigafactory construction was still just an announcement. Since then U.S. EV-battery cell capacity alone was on track to roughly double, reaching about 421 gigawatt-hours (GWh) per year in 2025, with more than 1,000 GWh of capacity announced for 2028 [13]. Employment counted in 335910 has been rising with each plant opening (and falling with each idling). So these federal figures understate the industry's current and near-term scale, and third-party trackers that count the newer cell plants put U.S. battery-maker sales materially higher (industry-tracker estimates in the ~$50 billion range). Note also that a great deal of battery value is booked in the adjacent codes above (materials chemistry, EV assembly, mining), so 335910 measures the cell/pack step, not the whole battery economy. The current 335910 was created in the 2022 NAICS revision by combining the former 335911 (Storage Battery Manufacturing) and 335912 (Primary Battery Manufacturing), which can complicate historical comparisons [12].

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4. The investable universe

Batteries are an unusually indirect public market: the biggest U.S. producers are private, and the biggest public "battery" names are foreign parents or diversified giants. Pure U.S.-listed battery plays are mostly small and early.

U.S.-listed companies with meaningful battery-manufacturing exposure

Foreign parents behind most U.S. gigafactories trade on home exchanges: Panasonic (Japan); LG Energy Solution, Samsung SDI, SK (Korea); CATL and BYD (China).

Major private / JV / foreign-owned U.S. operators (not directly investable on U.S. markets)

Takeaway: if you want profitable, established U.S. battery exposure in public markets today, EnerSys is close to the only pure-play. Everything else is either an early-stage bet, a diversified parent, or private. Investors should distinguish commercial manufacturers from pre-volume development companies — QuantumScape's filings, for instance, describe industrialization through Volkswagen's PowerCo rather than an operating mass-production business [23].

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5. How the money works

Two business models sit under this code, and they earn money very differently.

Model A — established replacement-driven batteries (lead-acid, industrial, specialty). These behave like classic industrial manufacturing:

• Replacement/aftermarket demand is the engine. A car's starter battery (SLI = starting, lighting, ignition) dies every ~3-5 years regardless of the economy, so aftermarket volumes are steady and recession-resistant. Owners make money on stable margins over a large installed base, not on growth.
• Commodity pass-through and a closed loop. Lead is the main input and the main recovered output — U.S. lead-acid batteries are recycled at a ~99% rate, with a typical new battery containing 80% recycled material, giving makers a low-cost, semi-captive raw-material stream and a spread between scrap and finished-battery prices [9]. The industry trade association put U.S. lead-battery manufacturing capacity above 163 GWh annually as of August 2025 [9].
• Materials drive cost. EnerSys states that lead, lithium, nickel, cobalt, plastics, steel, and copper together account for more than half of its cost of goods sold [28]. In its fiscal-2026 filing, EnerSys estimated that a 10% increase in lead cost would have raised cost of goods sold by approximately $65 million; it hedges part of its lead exposure, but most contracts extend no further than a year [17].
• Unit economics: gross margins in the ~25-30% range are achievable at scale. EnerSys reported fiscal-2026 gross margin of 29.3%, but 25.1% excluding the Section 45X production credit, on $3.75 billion of net sales [18]. Cash generation funds dividends and buyouts — Clarios raised debt to pay its private-equity owners a ~$4.5 billion dividend in early 2025 [19].

Model B — lithium-cell gigafactories (EV and grid storage). These are capital-intensive, scale-and-subsidy games:

• Capacity utilization is everything. A gigafactory is a huge fixed-cost asset measured in GWh of nameplate capacity. Profit depends on running it full; a half-idle plant bleeds cash. The IEA estimates that most facilities may take more than five years after opening to approach nominal output [29]. That is exactly the risk playing out now as EV lines idle and get repurposed to grid storage [15][32].
• Cost per kilowatt-hour ($/kWh) is the scoreboard. Global lithium-ion pack prices fell to a record ~$115/kWh in 2024 and ~$108/kWh in 2025, driven by overcapacity, cheaper lithium iron phosphate (LFP) chemistry, and slowing EV growth [30]. Falling prices are great for buyers and brutal for high-cost producers.
• The 45X subsidy often IS the margin. Section 45X (the Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit) pays U.S. makers $35 per kWh for each cell, $10 per kWh for each module (up to $45/kWh for a cell-less module), plus 10% of the cost of domestically produced electrode active materials [33][34]. Against pack prices near $108/kWh, a ~$35-45/kWh production credit is enormous — for several U.S. cell makers the 45X credit exceeds their pre-subsidy gross profit, effectively underwriting the plant. That makes federal policy a first-order driver of profitability, not a footnote.
• Backlog and offtake. Cell makers sign multi-year supply (offtake) agreements with automakers and utilities; a firm order book is what justifies the up-front capital. When end-demand assumptions break (see EVs below), that backlog can evaporate.

For the early developers (QuantumScape, Solid Power, etc.), there is no current profit model — they burn cash on research and pilot lines, and their value rests on a future licensing or manufacturing ramp. Investors there are underwriting technology and time, not earnings.

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6. What drives demand

• Grid / battery energy storage systems (BESS) — now the growth engine. The U.S. installed a record ~57.6 GWh (about 18.9 gigawatts) of new storage in 2025, up 52% over 2024, with Texas overtaking California as the largest market [8]. U.S. utility-scale storage capacity averaged 33,209 MW in 2025, up from just 1,210 MW in 2020 [35]. Data-center and AI power demand plus solar pairing are pushing this hard, and stationary-storage pack prices fell to ~$70/kWh in 2025, the cheapest segment [30].
• Electric vehicles — the biggest but now most policy-sensitive swing factor. EVs were the original reason for the gigafactory boom. Global EV battery deployment reached 1.2 TWh in 2025, nearly 30% above 2024, but deployment stagnated in the United States and the U.S. share fell to about 10% [29]. That demand signal weakened sharply when the federal EV consumer credits ended (see Regulation) [14].
• Traditional automotive (SLI + 12V + start-stop). Every internal-combustion and hybrid vehicle still needs a lead-acid battery; this is the stable base under Model A.
• Consumer electronics — phones, laptops, power tools, wearables (the near-term market for silicon-anode makers like Enovix) [21].
• Industrial / backup power — forklifts and warehouse "motive power," telecom and data-center uninterruptible power supplies (UPS), and defense (EnerSys, Ultralife) [17].
• Other secular drivers — warehouse automation, electric forklifts, telecom densification, drones, marine, and rail applications, plus replacement demand from an expanding installed base.

Global battery demand exceeded 1.5 TWh in 2025, growing more than 35%, with stationary storage becoming a major incremental source alongside EVs [36].

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7. Regulation

Policy is unusually decisive for this industry — it moves both the cost side and the demand side.

• 45X production credit (supply side). The per-kWh manufacturing credit above runs at full value through 2029 and phases down through 2032 [33][34]. The 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) kept 45X but added Prohibited/Foreign-Entity-of-Concern (FEOC) restrictions: components made with "material assistance" from prohibited foreign entities (largely Chinese-linked) lose eligibility for tax years after July 4, 2025, and it tightened the definition of a creditable "battery module" [37]. Beginning in 2026, eligibility depends partly on the cost share of materials received from prohibited foreign entities, with the permitted share tightening over time [38].
• EV consumer credits repealed (demand side). OBBBA terminated the $7,500 new-EV and $4,000 used-EV credits (Section 30D and related) for vehicles acquired after September 30, 2025 [14][38]. Analysts expect a 25-30% dip in EV sales, which flows straight back into battery-plant utilization [14].
• Trade / tariffs. Chinese-made batteries face steep U.S. tariffs. Section 301 tariffs increased Chinese EV batteries and non-lithium battery parts to 25% in 2024, with non-EV lithium-ion batteries scheduled to reach 25% in 2026 [39]. This is a major factor in why so little LFP is U.S.-made despite China's ~80%+ LFP dominance [16].
• Environmental & safety. Lead-acid makers operate under strict EPA lead-air standards and battery-manufacturing effluent guidelines covering pollutants generated by electrode preparation, formation, washing, and ancillary processes [40]. OSHA identifies occupational lead exposure as the primary health concern in traditional battery manufacturing [41]. Lithium batteries create different risks: flammable electrolyte, electrical faults, thermal runaway, and difficult-to-extinguish fires. DOT regulates them as hazardous materials in transportation [42]. EPA says most discarded lithium-ion and primary lithium batteries are likely hazardous waste because of ignitability or reactivity and is evaluating battery-management standards under its RCRA "universal waste" rules, driven partly by recycling-facility fire risk [31][43].

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

• China dominates globally; the U.S. is a fast-growing but subsidy-dependent challenger. Chinese makers hold roughly 69-75% of the global EV-battery market depending on the metric; CATL alone is ~39% and is the only supplier above 30% share, with BYD second [16]. LFP chemistry — ~81% of global battery installations in 2025 — is effectively a Chinese near-monopoly where the cost advantage sits [16]. LFP captured nearly half of global EV battery demand in 2024, but almost all LFP cells used in U.S. and European electric cars were then sourced from China [44].
• Global capacity far exceeds U.S. scale. Global lithium-ion nameplate capacity exceeded 4 TWh at the end of 2025; China held more than 80%, while the United States and European Union each held approximately 6-7% [29]. The dominant technology and process know-how therefore remain largely with Chinese, Korean, and Japanese companies even when a factory is physically in the United States.
• America's build-out is largely foreign-technology, U.S.-located. Most new U.S. gigafactories are Korean/Japanese-owned or automaker JVs, employing U.S. workers on foreign process technology (or, in Ford's Michigan plant, CATL-licensed) [10][15]. That is deliberate industrial policy: capture the jobs and supply security even if the intellectual property is imported.
• A shakeout is underway. As EV demand cooled and prices fell, companies canceled a record ~$6 billion of announced battery projects in early 2025 (FREYR scrapped a $2.6 billion Georgia plant and pivoted to solar as "T1 Energy") [45]. GM's Ultium JV idled Ohio/Tennessee lines and cut over 1,300 jobs, Ford restructured its BlueOval SK JV and idled its Kentucky plant, and SK cut ~960 Georgia jobs [15]. Startups without cash or offtake are the most exposed.
• Legacy lead-acid stays a stable oligopoly — Clarios, East Penn, EnerSys, and Exide/Stryten aren't in the gigafactory scramble and keep earning on replacement demand [19].

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9. Risks

• Demand-policy whiplash. The single biggest risk just materialized: repeal of EV consumer credits is cutting EV demand and stranding capacity [14][15]. Battery demand is now unusually hostage to federal politics.
• Overcapacity and price deflation. U.S. cell capacity is on track to exceed domestic demand in 2026, and pack prices keep falling — good for buyers, margin-crushing for high-cost or under-utilized producers [30][32].
• Chinese competition and the LFP gap. China's scale, cost, and LFP monopoly set a global price floor U.S. makers struggle to match without tariffs and subsidies [16].
• FEOC/supply-chain squeeze. New rules cutting off Chinese-linked inputs protect the credit's intent but can raise costs or interrupt material supply for U.S. plants [37][38].
• Capital intensity and execution. Gigafactories cost billions and can lose money for years during ramp; the IEA estimates most facilities may take more than five years after opening to approach nominal output [29]. Early-stage developers dilute shareholders or face bankruptcy if commercialization slips [15][45].
• Technology disruption. Solid-state, sodium-ion, and other emerging chemistries could reset the cost/performance frontier and strand today's investments. A superior chemistry does not automatically make a good investment: bankability, manufacturing consistency, safety qualification, cycle life, and cost at scale matter more than laboratory energy density.
• Safety and liability. Thermal-runaway fires in EVs, storage sites, and recycling facilities carry recall and litigation risk [31][43].
• Subsidy cliff. 45X phases down after 2029; any producer whose economics depend on it faces a defined political and time risk [33][34].
• Commodity volatility. Lead, lithium, nickel, cobalt, and graphite prices swing materially; dependence on Chinese graphite and processed materials adds supply-chain risk [28].

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10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes.

• Profitable, defensive: EnerSys (ENS) is the closest thing to a diversified, cash-generative U.S. pure-play, anchored in industrial/replacement demand rather than the EV cycle [17][18].
• Early-stage / speculative growth: silicon-anode and solid-state names (ENVX, AMPX, QS, SLDP, MVST, TE, ABAT) are technology and ramp bets — high potential, mostly pre-profit, high dilution and failure risk [20][21][22][23][24].
• Primary / consumer: Energizer Holdings (ENR) provides mature household primary-battery exposure, diluted by non-battery consumer businesses [25].
• Diversified proxy: Tesla (TSLA) captures in-house cells plus fast-growing Megapack storage, but batteries are a fraction of the whole. Foreign parents (Panasonic, LG Energy Solution, Samsung SDI, SK, CATL) are the largest listed producers but trade abroad.
• Baskets: battery/clean-energy exchange-traded funds spread the single-name risk, at the cost of diluting exposure with miners and materials firms.

Private-market routes. The scaled U.S. producers are private — Clarios (watch for a possible IPO), East Penn, Exide/Stryten — reachable mainly through private equity, which already owns Clarios (Brookfield) [19][46]. Growth/venture capital funds the cell and recycling startups (e.g., Redwood Materials); JV and project-level equity backs the automaker gigafactories. Municipal/industrial-development and infrastructure investors participate through the plants' financing and offtake structures. The most attractive private opportunities may be less glamorous bottlenecks — formation equipment, dry-room systems, quality-control tools, separators, recycled feedstock, and contracted specialty cells — where returns need not depend on winning a commodity-scale EV cell price war.

Common misconceptions. First, "U.S. battery manufacturing" is not a single lithium-ion growth market — it is a combined statistical category containing a mature, circular, replacement-driven lead industry; branded disposable batteries; industrial and defense specialists; and a subsidized, globally competitive lithium-ion build-out. Second, factory announcements do not equal supply: nameplate gigawatt-hours, actual output, qualified yield, and profitable sales are different quantities. Third, domestic factories do not necessarily mean domestic technology or supply chains; much U.S. cell capacity is controlled by or dependent upon Asian producers and imported processed materials.

Near-term outlook (judgment, not fact). The industry looks set to split in two. Grid storage is the clear near-term winner — record installations, the cheapest cell prices, AI/data-center power hunger, and idled EV lines being repurposed toward it should keep BESS demand strong [8][32]. EV-battery capacity, by contrast, faces a painful digestion period after the credit repeal: expect under-utilization, further consolidation, and a shakeout of weaker startups into 2026-2027 [14][15][32]. The legacy lead-acid base should keep quietly compounding on replacement demand. Longer term, the key swing variables are whether 45X and tariffs hold, whether U.S. makers can close the LFP cost gap, and whether solid-state/sodium-ion technologies arrive on schedule — each of which could reshape who makes money in this industry.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Selected Sectors: Concentration Ratios (NAICS 335910, Battery Manufacturing) (2022). Receipts, firm count, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
2. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 (NAICS 335910) (2023). Employment, establishments, annual payroll. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
3. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 335910) (2023). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
4. U.S. Census Bureau / NAICS Association, NAICS 335910 Battery Manufacturing — 2022 definition (2022). https://www.naics.com/naics-code-description/?code=335910&v=2022
5. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS definition. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=33&input=33&year=2022
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7. U.S. Department of Energy, Battery Manufacturing Process Description. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nepapub/nepa_documents/RedDont/EA-1709-FEA-2010.pdf
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16. Carbon Credits, China Now Controls 69% of the Global EV Battery Market as CATL and BYD Surge in 2025 (2025); International Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2025 — Electric Vehicle Batteries (LFP 81% share) (2025). https://carboncredits.com/china-now-controls-69-of-the-global-ev-battery-market-as-catl-and-byd-surge-in-2025/; https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/electric-vehicle-batteries
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21. Enovix, Form 8-K Q4 2025 (~$31.8M 2025 revenue, 23% non-GAAP gross margin). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1828318/000182831826000005/envx8k-q42025x2252026ex991.htm
22. CompaniesMarketCap / Macrotrends, market capitalizations for QuantumScape (QS), Amprius (AMPX), T1 Energy (TE) (2026). https://companiesmarketcap.com/quantumscape/marketcap/
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25. Energizer Holdings, SEC Filing. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1632790/000163279026000038/enr-20251231.htm
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32. Solar Power World / Energy-Storage.news, U.S. Became an Oversupply Market for ESS Battery Cells (2026). https://www.solarpowerworldonline.com/2026/01/almost-overnight-the-us-became-an-oversupply-market-for-ess-battery-cells/
33. IRS, Final Regulations on Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit ($35/kWh cell, $10/kWh module, $45/kWh module without cells). https://www.irs.gov/irb/2024-51_IRB
34. Energy-Storage.news, US Finalises 45X Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit for Batteries, Solar; Congressional Research Service, The Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit, IF12809. https://www.energy-storage.news/us-finalises-45x-advanced-manufacturing-tax-credit-for-batteries-solar/; https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12809
35. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, Table 6.07.C (utility-scale storage capacity). https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=table_6_07_c
36. International Energy Agency, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (global battery demand >1.5 TWh, >35% growth). https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/market-overview
37. Miller & Chevalier, OBBBA Brings 45X Changes, Though Not Wholesale Repeal (FEOC/PFE restrictions) (2025). https://www.millerchevalier.com/publication/obbba-brings-45x-changes-though-not-wholesale-repeal
38. Congressional Research Service, R48538 (EV credit termination, prohibited-foreign-entity provisions). https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48538; https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48538.html
39. U.S. Trade Representative, Section 301 Tariff Actions on China (25% on EV batteries 2024, non-EV lithium-ion to 25% in 2026). https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/us-trade-representative-katherine-tai-take-further-action-china-tariffs-after-releasing-statutory
40. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Battery Manufacturing Effluent Guidelines. https://www.epa.gov/eg/battery-manufacturing-effluent-guidelines
41. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Battery Manufacturing. https://www.osha.gov/battery-manufacturing/
42. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Lithium Batteries. https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/lithiumbatteries
43. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Lithium-Ion Battery Recycling FAQ. https://www.epa.gov/hw/lithium-ion-battery-recycling-frequently-asked-questions
44. International Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2025 — Electric Vehicle Batteries (LFP sourcing). https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/electric-vehicle-batteries
45. Inside Climate News, EV Battery Manufacturing Capacity Will Rise When 10 New Plants Come Online (record ~$6B of cancellations; FREYR Georgia) (2025). https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20022025/inside-clean-energy-ev-battery-manufacturing-capacity/
46. Brookfield, About Us — Private Equity (Clarios ownership). https://www.brookfield.com/about-us/capabilities/private-equity