Fruit and Tree Nut Farming (United States) — NAICS 1113

A rollup primer for investors, public-market and private. NAICS — the North American Industry Classification System — is the U.S. government's standard industry code set. Code 1113 is a four-digit industry group inside subsector 111 (Crop Production), which sits under sector 11 (Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting). Core figures are federal statistics carried up from the three child primers; forward-looking statements are labeled as judgments.

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1. Overview

NAICS 1113 is the code for every U.S. farm that grows fruit or tree nuts on the plant — oranges and other citrus, plus the far larger world of apples, grapes, strawberries, berries, and nuts — measured at the farm gate (the grove or orchard, before the packing house, juice plant, winery, or retail brand). Combined farm-gate value runs on the order of $30 billion a year (Section 3), which makes this one of the highest-value corners of American crop agriculture.[1][2][3]

The group bundles three very different stories under one code. Two of them are citrus — orange groves, and everything-else citrus (lemons, limes, grapefruit, mandarins) — and both are small and, on the Florida side, in outright decline from a cure-less tree disease. The third — noncitrus fruit and tree nuts — is roughly nine of every ten dollars in the group and a barbell of its own: some segments oversupplied, others (strawberries, pistachios, avocados) growing. Read the three together and the single most useful fact is how lopsided the group is: noncitrus dwarfs citrus, and inside citrus, California fresh fruit is rising while Florida juice collapses.

Underneath the differences the three children share one economic spine. These are perennial, real-asset, price-taker businesses: an owner sinks large capital into land, water, and long-lived trees or vines; waits years for a first crop; then earns on a brutal formula — yield per acre × the share that grades saleable × the price the market pays — while also collecting a second return from the appreciation of scarce, water-fed farmland. Labor and water are the two costs that decide who survives.

For an investor the structural headline is that this is a private industry. There is no U.S.-listed pure-play orange, citrus, apple, grape, berry, or nut grower. Every public route in is indirect — farmland real-estate investment trusts (REITs), diversified produce distributors, a few processors — and in each of them the crop is a minor slice. The real ownership sits with family farms, large private grower-packer-shippers, grower cooperatives, agricultural private equity, and institutional farmland funds. This primer's job is the contrast across the three children before treating the group as a whole.

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2. What's inside — the three child industries and how they differ

NAICS 1113 fans out into three five-digit "NAICS industries." Two are citrus and effectively equal their single six-digit child; one (noncitrus) is a large seven-child bundle. The table compares them on relative size, direction of travel, ownership character, and the (always indirect) public way in. Read the value shares as approximate — the crop-value figures come from different recent seasons and one child (noncitrus) is a rollup of seven crops itself.[1][2][3]

11132's value is a derived estimate: total U.S. citrus crop value (~$2.84B, all types) minus the ~$1.09B orange crop.[1] Shares are of a ~$30–31B group total.

What the contrast shows:

• The group is overwhelmingly noncitrus. Apples, grapes, strawberries, berries, and nuts together are ~$28B — about nine of every ten dollars in 1113. All of citrus, orange and non-orange combined, is under $3 billion.[1][2][3] An investor who thinks "fruit and nut farming" should mostly be thinking about 11133; citrus is the smaller, more troubled tail.
• They are not moving the same way. Orange groves are in a genuine, disease-driven contraction on the Florida side; non-orange citrus is mixed (fresh mandarins and lemons up, grapefruit down); noncitrus is a barbell of oversupplied and growing crops. A single "fruit and nut" thesis blurs three genuinely different trajectories.
• Geography splits the group, then re-unites it in California. Oranges and much of the value are ~75–90% California; noncitrus is California-centric for grapes, strawberries, almonds, pistachios, avocados. The big non-California exceptions are Washington apples and Wisconsin cranberries — which is why California water policy is a group-defining risk for most, but not all, of 1113 (Section 7). Florida and Texas citrus are the shrinking corner.
• Ownership rhymes across the three. Every child is fragmented in the field and concentrated in the middle. What sits in the middle differs — juice processors and a private grower-giant in oranges; a fresh-citrus co-op (Sunkist) and Wonderful in non-orange citrus; genetics licensors (Driscoll's), cooperatives (Blue Diamond, Ocean Spray), and Wonderful again in noncitrus — but the pattern is identical: the margin lives in genetics, brands, packing, water, and marketing, not in owning dirt.[4][5][6]

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3. How big it is — the group's rollup

Our ingested federal file for NAICS 1113 carries no statistics at all — no revenue, farm count, acreage, employment, or payroll for this exact four-digit node. We say so plainly rather than invent a figure. Every number below therefore comes from USDA (the U.S. Department of Agriculture) via the child primers, and is cited as such.

A rollup value figure (USDA, approximate). Summing the children's most recent farm-gate crop values lands near $30–31 billion a year: noncitrus fruit and tree nuts ~$28 billion (2024–25 seasons), plus the full U.S. citrus crop at ~$2.84 billion, of which oranges are ~$1.09 billion and all other citrus ~$1.75 billion.[1][2][3] This is an order-of-magnitude rollup, not an audited total — the crop years differ and noncitrus is itself a seven-crop estimate — but it is consistent with USDA/NASS (National Agricultural Statistics Service) reporting of roughly $18.9 billion across its tracked noncitrus fruit crops plus roughly $9.4 billion in tree nuts in 2024, and a citrus crop that has shrunk to under $3 billion.[1][3]

Structural context from the 2022 Census of Agriculture. For the fruit, tree-nut, and berry neighborhood — which is essentially all of 1113 — USDA counted 110,821 farms on 6.56 million acres with $34.2 billion in sales (up 20% since 2017), and 93% of them family farms.[7] Three states — California, Washington, Florida — made 83% of those sales, with California alone about $23.1 billion (~68%).[7] Most operators are small (78% had under $100,000 in sales-plus-payments; only 6% cleared $1 million), yet the few large operations produce most of the output.[7] Read the count and the dollars together: this is a small-business industry by headcount and a big-money industry by concentration.

The undercount caveat — it applies to the whole group. The federal business statistics that measure most industries — the Census Bureau's County Business Patterns, Economic Census, Statistics of U.S. Businesses, and Nonemployer Statistics — exclude crop production (NAICS 111) by design, and also omit self-employed and no-employee operators.[8] So there is no standard business-registry count of firms, employment, or payroll for 1113, and a missing number must never be read as zero. The authoritative source is instead USDA's Census of Agriculture and NASS crop surveys. Because most operators in every child are small and family-run, even USDA's counts under-capture the informal tail, while a simple farm count underweights the handful of large private growers where the dollars concentrate. The one federally ingested figure at the child level is the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) size standard, a government-contracting threshold (roughly $2–4 million in receipts depending on crop) — not a measure of market size.[9]

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4. Investable universe — where value concentrates across the children

There is no listed pure-play grower for any crop in 1113 — not oranges, not lemons, not apples, grapes, berries, or nuts. But the public proxies are strikingly consistent across all three children, and value concentrates in the same few places regardless of crop.

The one public thread that touches everything: farmland REITs. Gladstone Land (Nasdaq: LAND) and Farmland Partners (NYSE: FPI) own orchard and vineyard land — apples, grapes, strawberries, almonds, pistachios, citrus, olives — leased to operators, collecting rent plus land appreciation and (for LAND) banked California water.[10] They are the cleanest listed way to own the asset under the whole group without taking direct crop-price risk, but each crop is a small slice of a diversified portfolio; treat them as farmland-and-water plays, not fruit bets.

Where the listed exposure sits, by child:

• Noncitrus (the ~91%): diversified fresh-produce distributors — Dole (NYSE: DOLE), Del Monte (NYSE: DMC, formerly Fresh Del Monte / FDP), and Mission Produce (Nasdaq: AVO) — carry berry, strawberry, and (heavily) avocado exposure; processors — John B. Sanfilippo & Son (Nasdaq: JBSS) for nuts, Seneca Foods (Nasdaq: SENEA) and Keurig Dr Pepper (Nasdaq: KDP, via Mott's) for apples — trade on branded/processing economics; and micro-cap wineries — Willamette Valley Vineyards (Nasdaq: WVVI), Crimson Wine Group (OTC: CWGL) — are the closest grape-grower proxies but are tiny.[11][12][13]
• Non-orange citrus (~6%): Limoneira (Nasdaq: LMNR) is the lone near-pure listed name — best analyzed as lemons-plus-real-estate-and-water, not a pure grove company.[14]
• Oranges (~4%): essentially no clean listed operator. Alico (Nasdaq: ALCO) wound down Florida citrus and is now a land-transition story; Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO) and PepsiCo (Nasdaq: PEP) are trace beverage-side exposure as juice buyers; FCOJ (frozen concentrated orange juice) futures on ICE (the Intercontinental Exchange) offer direct but highly speculative price exposure.[15][16]

Where the real ownership — and the margin — sits (private / cooperative), across all three children:

• Vertically integrated private giant: The Wonderful Company (Resnick family) spans the group — the world's largest almond and pistachio grower-processor (~250,000 acres), America's largest citrus grower via Wonderful Citrus (~74,000 acres, Halos mandarins), plus POM and major water assets.[17][6]
• Grower cooperatives: Sunkist (fresh citrus, 1,000+ growers), Florida's Natural (orange juice), Blue Diamond (~3,000 almond growers), Ocean Spray (~700 cranberry farmers, ~70% of U.S. cranberries), Tree Top (apples), Sunsweet (prunes).[5][6]
• Genetics and brand licensors: Driscoll's (private) controls proprietary berry varieties touching ~a third of the U.S. berry market — the highest-margin position in strawberries and berries.[5]
• Large private grower-packer-shippers and processors: U.S. Sugar/Southern Gardens and foreign-owned juice processors (Cutrale, Citrosuco) in oranges; Stemilt, Gebbers in apples/cherries; California Giant, Naturipe in berries; Setton in nuts.
• Institutional farmland and agricultural private equity: Nuveen Natural Capital (TIAA, ~$12.4 billion in farmland), Manulife/Hancock, and funds like Butterfly Equity and Paine Schwartz that buy scale and take players private.[18]

The practical takeaway: across all three children, the profit pool concentrates at the genetics, brand, packing/cold-chain, water, and marketing layers — not in raw acreage. Public investors get a diluted, land-or-processing view; capturing the actual crop economics is a private, operator's game.

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5. How the money works

All three children run on one shared logic, with citrus- and crop-specific twists.

Perennial, capital-heavy, long-payback. With the partial exception of strawberries (replanted often), these are permanent plantings. Trees and vines cost thousands to tens of thousands of dollars per acre to establish, take 3–7 years to reach full bearing (pistachios ~10–12; new orange groves ~4–5), then produce for two to three decades.[19] Capital is sunk, illiquid, and cannot be rotated out when prices fall — the source of the industry's recurring boom-and-bust and, in Florida oranges, of the decision to exit and monetize the land instead.

The revenue formula is the same everywhere: bearing acres × yield per acre × packout (the share that grades saleable) × realized price. Channel mix is decisive because fresh fruit typically earns two to three times what processing fruit does.[1] That single fact explains much of the group's map: California fresh oranges, lemons, and mandarins command a premium, while Florida's processing oranges — priced on pound-solids (juice-sugar content, measured as Brix) — sit at the low-value end and have been gutted by disease cutting both yield and Brix.

The central margin story: premium/branded versus commodity. In every child the money is in differentiation — Halos and Cuties mandarins over generic citrus; Honeycrisp and Cosmic Crisp apples over commodity Red Delicious; Napa Cabernet grapes over bulk Central Valley fruit; Driscoll's-branded berries over generic. Undifferentiated commodity fruit — and bulk juice — is chronically exposed to oversupply and price collapse. FCOJ futures spiking near a record $5.50/lb in December 2024 and then crashing below $2.25/lb by April 2025 is the commodity end of that story in one line.[16]

Labor is the dominant cost across the group. USDA's ERS (Economic Research Service) reports wages plus contract labor run about 40% of production expenses for fruit and tree-nut farms — the highest labor share of any farm type, versus 12% for all farms — because fresh fruit is hand-picked and hand-thinned.[20] Most large growers depend on the federal H-2A seasonal-guestworker visa, whose mandated AEWR (Adverse Effect Wage Rate, set by the U.S. Department of Labor) has risen sharply and structurally.[20]

Water is a fixed cost you cannot skip. Trees and vines must be watered every year or they die, so demand is inelastic; in California, where most of the group's value is grown, groundwater is being tightened (Section 7), and secure water is the true scarce asset separating high-value orchard land from cheap groundwater-only land.[17]

Two profit streams: crop margin and land. Operators earn the harvest margin; landowners earn rent plus land and water appreciation. That land-return component is why farmland REITs and institutional funds invest here even when crop margins are thin — and why, in distressed Florida oranges, the land has become more reliable than the fruit.

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6. Demand drivers

• Health, snacking, and "better-for-you" eating underpin long-run demand — berries as antioxidant "superfoods," nuts on the protein/plant-based wave (and almond "milk"), avocados on "good fats," premium eating apples and easy-peel mandarins as convenient snacks. But the tailwind is uneven: per-capita fresh-strawberry use rose ~45% in a decade and avocado use multiplied, while total U.S. per-capita fruit availability actually declined 14% from 2003 to 2021.[3][21] Growth is category-specific, not automatic.
• Juice is the structural loser. Orange-juice demand is in long-run decline — U.S. orange- and grapefruit-juice consumption fell about 57% from 2005–06 levels — which, combined with disease, is why the orange child is contracting while fresh citrus and noncitrus fruit hold up better.[15]
• Year-round availability, filled by imports — the defining double-edged force. Counter-seasonal supply from Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Brazil turned seasonal treats into 52-week staples (expanding the category) while competing directly with domestic growers (pressuring prices). Imports supplied 59% of U.S. fresh-fruit availability in 2023, up from 50% in 2007; Mexico supplies ~98% of U.S. strawberry imports and nearly all limes; Brazil dominates the juice-concentrate complex the U.S. is now a price-taker to.[22][23]
• Exports are strategic, especially for nuts. The U.S. exports well over half its almonds and pistachios and about a fifth of its fresh apples; Northwest cherries and pears lean on Asian markets. Foreign demand helps set the domestic price — making trade policy a demand lever, not only a risk (Section 7).[24]

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7. Regulation

The regulatory stack is broadly common across the three children, with crop-specific overlays.

• Plant health — the defining rule for the citrus half. USDA's APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service) and state agencies impose quarantines against Huanglongbing (HLB, "citrus greening"), a bacterial disease spread by the Asian citrus psyllid with no commercial cure. HLB destroyed most of Florida's orange crop, threatens California, and is the single biggest force on both citrus children.[25]
• Water — the binding constraint for most of the noncitrus value. California's SGMA (Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 2014) is progressively curtailing Central Valley groundwater pumping; the Public Policy Institute of California estimates 500,000+ acres fallowed by 2040, falling disproportionately on perennial crops. Because California grows the bulk of the group's value, SGMA is arguably its single most important structural force — but it barely touches Washington apples or Wisconsin cranberries.[26]
• Labor / immigration — the biggest cost lever. The DOL H-2A program governs the seasonal workforce (recruitment, wages, housing, transportation), and its AEWR wage floor rises annually; some states add farmworker overtime.[20]
• Food safety. The FDA's (U.S. Food and Drug Administration) FSMA (Food Safety Modernization Act) Produce Safety Rule sets on-farm standards for water, worker hygiene, and handling.[27]
• Pesticides. The EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) registers crop chemistries under FIFRA (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) and sets residue tolerances; loss of key chemistries raises costs.[28]
• Marketing orders and check-offs (USDA AMS — Agricultural Marketing Service). Federal orders fund research and promotion and set quality rules across the group — Florida citrus, California almonds/pistachios/walnuts, blueberry, peach, pear, olive, and date orders — though the cranberry order was terminated in 2024.[29]
• Grapes' overlay: the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) defines AVAs (American Viticultural Areas), the appellations that give vineyard land its premium.[13]
• Trade and tariffs. Retaliation directly hits export income; 2025 tariff actions were estimated to put over $3 billion of nut and fruit export value at risk.[30]

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8. Consolidation

The group's competitive structure is consistent across all three children: fragmented in the field, concentrated in the middle. Thousands of small growers produce the fruit, but a smaller set of players controls the scarce, scalable control points — genetics, brands, packing and cold-chain, marketing, export compliance, and water — where durable advantage and most of the margin live.

• In citrus, consolidation is really contraction. Florida's orange-processor count fell from dozens to a handful, packing houses have closed, acreage keeps converting to housing, and Alico's 2025 citrus exit is the highest-profile "the risk no longer justifies staying" decision.[15] The center of gravity has shifted to California fresh citrus and a few large integrated growers (Wonderful Citrus, Sunkist).
• In noncitrus, consolidation is toward bigger, integrated operators. Large grower-packer-shipper-marketers and vertically integrated platforms — The Wonderful Company (~250,000 acres), Mission Produce's 2026 acquisition of Calavo in avocados — keep gaining share, while proprietary genetics (Driscoll's) and cooperatives (Blue Diamond, Ocean Spray) aggregate supply without owning every farm.[6][17]
• Institutional and private-equity capital (Nuveen/TIAA, Manulife, Gladstone, Butterfly, Paine Schwartz) is steadily separating land ownership from farming across the whole group.[18]
• Water and downturn are consolidation engines. SGMA and the current price downturns in grapes and almonds are pushing water-short and thinly capitalized growers out, concentrating acreage among well-capitalized owners with secure water.[26]

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9. Risks

• Disease — HLB / citrus greening — existential for the citrus children, with no commercial cure; the reason Florida's orange industry has collapsed.[25]
• Water / SGMA — the existential structural risk for the California-heavy noncitrus majority; pumping cuts can strand orchards and slash land values.[26]
• Labor — rising H-2A/AEWR wages, workforce availability, and housing mandates squeeze the biggest cost line across every child.[20]
• Commodity price cycles and oversupply — because planting decisions bear fruit years later, the group chronically over- or under-plants; grapes, apples, blueberries, almonds, and bulk juice are all working through gluts.[2][16]
• Imports — year-round import supply (Mexico strawberries/limes/avocados, Peru blueberries, Brazil juice) expands categories but pressures domestic prices.[22][23]
• Trade and tariff retaliation — heavy export dependence, especially in nuts, makes trade policy a swing factor worth billions.[30]
• Weather and climate — freezes, hurricanes, hail, heat/sunburn, drought, and declining winter chill hours can slash a crop or its packout, with no quick replant fix on perennial plants.[15]
• Capital intensity and illiquidity — high establishment costs, long paybacks, and slow-selling land make these unforgiving assets when a poor crop, weak prices, and high interest rates hit together.
• Geographic concentration — California's dominance concentrates water, labor, and climate risk in one state; Washington apples and Wisconsin cranberries carry their own single-region exposures.
• Information / private-company risk — because business statistics omit crop farming (Section 3), market size, share, and private valuations are genuinely hard to verify; succession and key-person risk run through the family-owned base.[8]

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10. How to invest & outlook

Public routes (all indirect, and consistent across the group):

• Farmland REITs — Gladstone Land (LAND), Farmland Partners (FPI) — the one listed handle that spans all three children: own leased orchard/vineyard land and water, collect rent plus appreciation. A land-and-water play, not a crop bet.[10]
• Diversified produce and processors — DOLE, DMC, Mission Produce (AVO) for berry/strawberry/avocado demand; JBSS for nuts; Seneca and KDP for apple processing; LMNR for lemons; WVVI/CWGL for grapes. In each, the crop is a minor line; reserve valuation, dividend, and multiple analysis for a security-level review.[11][12][13][14]
• Commodity and trace exposure — FCOJ futures/options on ICE for direct (speculative) orange-price exposure; KO/PEP as trace juice-buyer proxies; ALCO as a Florida land-transition situation.[16][15]
• There is no ETF (exchange-traded fund) or listed company that isolates any of these crops' farming economics.

Private routes (where the industry actually is): direct orchard/vineyard/grove acquisition or leasing; equity in grower-packer-shipper platforms; farmland funds and institutional managers (Nuveen, Manulife); agricultural private equity and credit; grower-cooperative membership (available only by farming); and adjacent genetics, packing, cold-chain, water-rights, and mechanization businesses as picks-and-shovels bets. Underwrite title and water rights first, then bearing acreage and plant age, yield and packout history, variety and fresh-versus-processing mix, disease exposure (HLB for citrus), labor sourcing, customer contracts, insurance, debt service under weak-price scenarios, and an exit value grounded in both operating cash flow and land value. The metrics that matter are industry-specific — bearing acres, boxes/yield per acre, packout, on-tree price, pound-solids for juice, water security, and alternative-use land value — not utility rate base, REIT-style FFO multiples, or mining cost curves.

Outlook (forward-looking judgment). The group is a barbell wrapped around a shrinking citrus core. Citrus (the ~10% tail) faces continued structural decline on the Florida side unless HLB science delivers a scaled cure — uncertain and years away — while California fresh citrus is more resilient. The dominant noncitrus ~90% is itself split: grapes, apples, blueberries, and (to a degree) almonds are working through oversupply, while strawberries, pistachios, avocados, and dates are the brighter demand stories. The durable winners across all three children look the same: operators and landowners with secure water, scale and mechanization, proprietary genetics or brands, efficient packing and cold chain, and access to premium and export channels. The losers are small, water-short, disease-exposed, undifferentiated, commodity-grade operations. Two forces dominate the next decade — water (SGMA) and labor cost inflation, both of which favor scale — with trade policy the live wildcard and HLB the existential overhang on citrus. For most investors this remains a private-markets and farmland industry; the public market offers only a diluted, secondhand view, and acreage alone is never a sufficient proxy for value.

For the full detail on each child — company-by-company universe, grove and orchard economics, demand, regulation, consolidation, and diligence checklists — see the primers for 11131 Orange Groves, 11132 Citrus (except Orange) Groves, and 11133 Noncitrus Fruit and Tree Nut Farming.

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Sources

Drawn from the three child primers (NAICS 11131, 11132, 11133); consolidated and renumbered for this level.

1. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Citrus Fruits 2024 Summary (Aug. 2025) — U.S. citrus and orange acreage, production, value; total citrus crop value ~$2.84B. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cfrt0825.pdf
2. USDA NASS, Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts 2024 Summary (May 2025) — grapes ~$6.19B; tree nuts ~$9.4B; berry values; ~21 noncitrus crops. https://esmis.nal.usda.gov/sites/default/release-files/zs25x846c/mc87rn20c/w37656321/ncit0525.pdf
3. USDA NASS, Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts 2025 Summary (Feb.–May 2026) — apples ~$2.82B, strawberries ~$4.4B; and Capital Press (reporting NASS), U.S. tree nuts, noncitrus fruits see value gains in 2024 (~$18.9B noncitrus fruit + ~$9.4B tree nuts). https://esmis.nal.usda.gov/sites/default/release-files/795891/ncit0526.pdf; https://capitalpress.com/2025/05/08/u-s-tree-nuts-noncitrus-fruits-see-sweet-value-gains-in-2024/
4. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Manual — definitions and scope of codes 11131, 11132, 11133 and their children. https://www.census.gov/naics/reference_files_tools/2022_NAICS_Manual.pdf
5. Driscoll's, About (proprietary berry genetics; ~1/3 of U.S. berry market); Sunkist Growers (fresh-citrus cooperative, 1,000+ growers); Ocean Spray (~700 cranberry farmers, ~70% of U.S. cranberries); Florida's Natural Growers (orange-juice cooperative). https://www.driscolls.com/about; https://sunkist.com/; https://www.floridasnatural.com/about
6. The Wonderful Company / Wonderful Citrus — America's largest citrus grower (~74,000 acres; Halos) and world's largest almond/pistachio grower (~250,000 acres); Blue Diamond Growers (~3,000 almond members). https://www.wonderful.com/who-we-are/; https://www.wonderfulcitrus.com/why-wonderful; https://bluediamondgrowers.com/about/
7. USDA NASS, 2022 Census of Agriculture Highlights: Fruit, Tree Nut, and Berry Production (ACH22-15) — 110,821 farms; 6.56M acres; $34.2B sales; 93% family; California ~68%. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2024/Census22_HL_FruitNutBerry.pdf
8. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns / SUSB / Nonemployer Statistics methodology — crop production (NAICS 111), nonemployers, and self-employed excluded from business programs. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
9. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards (2023) — receipts-based small-business thresholds for fruit and tree-nut farming codes. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
10. Gladstone Land Corporation (Nasdaq: LAND), Form 10-K / 2025 results (orchard-vineyard acreage and California water); Farmland Partners Inc. (NYSE: FPI), Form 10-K. https://www.gladstonefarms.com/investors/; https://farmlandpartners.com/
11. Dole plc (NYSE: DOLE), Form 10-K; Del Monte Corporation (NYSE: DMC, formerly Fresh Del Monte / FDP), Form 10-K and name change; Mission Produce (Nasdaq: AVO), Calavo acquisition (2026). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1857475/000185747525000008/dole-20241231.htm; https://investors.missionproduce.com/news-releases/
12. Seneca Foods Corp. (Nasdaq: SENEA), Form 10-K FY2025; Keurig Dr Pepper (Nasdaq: KDP, Mott's); John B. Sanfilippo & Son (Nasdaq: JBSS), 2025 Form 10-K. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/88948/000143774925020197/senea20250331_10k.htm; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/880117/000095017025110463/jbss-20250626.htm
13. Willamette Valley Vineyards (Nasdaq: WVVI) and Crimson Wine Group (OTC: CWGL) Form 10-Ks; TTB, American Viticultural Areas (27 CFR Part 9). https://www.ttb.gov/regulated-commodities/beverage-alcohol/wine/american-viticultural-area-ava
14. Limoneira Company (Nasdaq: LMNR), Form 10-K FY2025 — lemon acreage, cartons sold, real estate and water. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342423/000134242325000039/lmnr-20251031.htm
15. Alico, Inc. (Nasdaq: ALCO), Form 10-K FY2025 — citrus wind-down and land pivot; Southern Ag Today, "Citrus Greening, Hurricanes, and the Decline of the Florida Citrus Industry" (2024); USDA ERS Fruit and Tree Nuts Outlook (OJ consumption down ~57%). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/3545/000000354525000140/alco-20250930.htm; https://southernagtoday.org/2024/01/05/citrus-greening-hurricanes-and-the-decline-of-the-florida-citrus-industry/
16. Bespoke Investment Group, "The Rise and Fall of Orange Juice Futures" (2025); Barchart, "Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice Prices Are Surging" (2024/2025) — FCOJ futures on ICE. https://www.bespokepremium.com/interactive/posts/think-big-blog/no-more-juice-the-rise-and-fall-of-orange-juice-futures; https://www.barchart.com/story/news/20637910/
17. The Wonderful Company / Wonderful Pistachios & Almonds, Who We Are — ~250,000 acres, Kern Water Bank stake; California orchard-land vs. water-price spread. https://www.wonderful.com/who-we-are/
18. Nuveen Natural Capital (a TIAA company), Farmland (~$12.4B farmland AUM); Manulife/Hancock; agricultural private equity (Butterfly Equity, Paine Schwartz). https://www.nuveen.com/global/investment-capabilities/real-assets/farmland
19. UC ANR and Oregon State University orchard/vineyard cost studies (establishment cost; 3–7 years to full bearing; pistachios ~10–12; oranges ~4–5). https://ucanr.edu/site/california-pistachio-research/climate-cultivars
20. USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), Farm Labor (wages + contract labor ~40% of fruit/tree-nut production expenses vs. 12% all farms); U.S. Department of Labor, H-2A Temporary Agricultural Program (AEWR). https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-labor; https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/programs/h-2a
21. USDA ERS, Peeling Open U.S. Fruit Consumption Trends (total per-capita fruit availability −14%, 2003–2021) (Feb. 2025). https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2025/february/peeling-open-us-fruit-consumption-trends
22. USDA ERS, U.S. Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Supplies Continue to Rely on Imports (imports 50% in 2007 → 59% in 2023). https://ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/chart-detail?chartId=110713
23. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) Citrus: World Markets and Trade; IFPRI, Peru's rise as the world's leading blueberry exporter; CNBC, "How Brazil Stole Orange Juice from Florida" (2018). https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/citrus.pdf; https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/23/brazil-florida-orange-juice-tariff-trade-war.html
24. USDA FAS / ERS, Tree Nuts: World Markets and Trade (almonds ~70%+ exported; pistachios ~75%; apples ~a fifth of fresh crop). https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/TreeNuts.pdf
25. USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Citrus Greening and Asian Citrus Psyllid — infected trees die; no cure; quarantines. https://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant-pests-diseases/citrus-diseases/citrus-greening-and-asian-citrus-psyllid
26. Public Policy Institute of California / California DWR, Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) (500,000+ acres fallowed by 2040). https://water.ca.gov/Programs/Groundwater-Management/SGMA-Groundwater-Management
27. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), FSMA Final Rule on Produce Safety. https://www.fda.gov/food/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma/fsma-final-rule-produce-safety
28. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Pesticide Registration (FIFRA); Agricultural Worker Protection Standard. https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration
29. USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), Federal Marketing Orders (Florida citrus; almonds 981, pistachios 983, walnuts 984; blueberry/peach/pear/olive/date orders; cranberry order terminated 2024); PACA; National Organic Program. https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa
30. UC Agriculture and Natural Resources, New tariffs could cost U.S. nut and fruit industries over $3 billion (2025). https://ucanr.edu/blog/anr-news-releases/article/new-tariffs-could-cost-us-nut-and-fruit-industries-over-3-billion