Oilseed and Grain Farming in the United States (NAICS 1111)

A Histometrics rollup primer for public-market and private investors. NAICS (the North American Industry Classification System — the standard the U.S., Canada, and Mexico use to group businesses by activity) code 1111 is a four-digit "industry group" that gathers the seven U.S. industries that grow field crops for grain, oilseed, and pulse: soybeans, other oilseeds, dry peas and beans, wheat, corn, rice, and "other grain." This page synthesizes the seven child primers plus our ground-truth federal statistics for this level; its distinctive value is the contrast across the children — which are large, which are shrinking, who owns them, and how (or whether) you can invest. For any single crop, read its child primer.

1. Overview

NAICS 1111 is the economic heart of American row-crop agriculture. It is the group that contains corn and soybeans — the two crops that together made up 46% of all U.S. crop cash receipts in 2024 [10] — plus wheat, rice, and a tail of smaller oilseeds, pulses, and minor cereals. Taken together, farms specializing in these crops sold about $168.7 billion in 2022, roughly 31% of all U.S. farm sales, and worked about 69% of U.S. harvested cropland [1]. If you own a broad "U.S. agriculture" position, most of what you are exposed to lives inside this four-digit code.

Two facts define the group for an investor:

1. It is a set of commodity, price-taker businesses. Every child grows an undifferentiated crop sold at a price set on world markets and local basis (the gap between the local cash price and the futures price); none of these farmers can mark up their product. Margins are thin, cyclical, weather-exposed, and — in the current down-cycle — leaning heavily on federal support, with corn, soybeans, and wheat all priced below full cost of production for a fourth straight year through 2025/26 [4][13].
2. You cannot buy any of these farms on a stock exchange. Production is overwhelmingly private, family-held, and fragmented across hundreds of thousands of operations. There is no pure-play public company in any of the seven children. Public capital reaches the group indirectly — through input suppliers, grain merchants and processors, farmland real-estate investment trusts (REITs), and commodity funds. Private capital reaches it directly — by owning or leasing cropland, or through farmland funds.

Those two facts are true of all seven children. What makes this a real rollup rather than a pass-through is how sharply the children differ in size, direction, and access — the subject of Section 2.

2. What's inside — the seven children and how they differ

The group splits into seven five-digit industries. Six are single-crop (each has exactly one six-digit child and is effectively a pass-through to it); the seventh, 11119, is itself a two-child bucket pairing the Corn Belt's balanced corn–soybean rotation farm with a long tail of minor cereals. The table is ordered by economic size, largest first, using farm-gate crop value as the yardstick.

*Approximate shares of the group's farm-gate crop value, computed from USDA crop-value series in mixed years (corn 2022; soybeans, wheat, rice 2024; oilseeds, pulses 2025). They are a proxy for relative size, not an audited NAICS industry-group total, and they do not reconcile exactly with the $168.7B farm-sales figure in Section 3 (crop value measures a crop's output; farm sales measure all revenue of farms specialized in these crops). Corn's and soybeans' values also embed output grown on 11119 combination farms — see Section 3.

The through-line. All seven are the same kind of business — a large asset (land and machinery) earning a thin spread on bushels sold at a price the farmer does not set. But the group is extraordinarily lopsided: corn and soybeans together are roughly 85–90% of the crop value, wheat is most of the rest, and rice, the minor grains, the non-soy oilseeds, and the pulses are each a rounding error next to corn. An investor who "buys the group" is, in economic weight, overwhelmingly buying the corn–soybean complex of the Midwest.

But the small children carry the sharpest, most idiosyncratic stories — and they diverge in ways the giants do not:

• Direction splits the group. Canola is expanding on renewable-diesel demand [13]; rice acreage is contracting toward a multi-decade low [child 11116]; barley acreage hit its lowest since 1876 as beer demand sinks [16]; oats are ceding U.S. share to Canada [17]; sorghum swings on Chinese buying [15]. The big three (corn, soy, wheat) are consolidating steadily but structurally central.
• Biofuel is the cross-cutting demand driver, but through different crops: corn → ethanol; soybean oil and canola oil → biodiesel / renewable diesel [17][18]. This is the single biggest tailwind in the group.
• China is the pivotal export risk for exactly two children — soybeans and sorghum — and barely matters to the others [15][25].
• Water uniquely binds rice (flooded paddies, California groundwater limits); it is not a first-order issue for the dryland crops.
• Investment access differs enormously. Corn, soybeans, and wheat have deep, liquid futures and single-commodity funds; rice has a thin futures contract; among the minor grains only oats is listed; sorghum, barley, rye, the non-soy oilseeds, and the pulses have no liquid public instrument at all [22].

3. How big it is (this level's rollup)

Our ground-truth caveat first. Our ingested federal statistics file for NAICS 1111 is empty — it contains no establishment count, revenue, employment, or payroll metric for this four-digit code. We say so plainly rather than invent one. Every figure on this page is drawn from the cited USDA and company sources used in the seven child primers, labeled as such.

The closest thing to a group total. USDA's (the U.S. Department of Agriculture's) 2022 Census of Agriculture reports that farms specializing in grain and oilseed sold $168.7 billion in 2022 — about 31% of all U.S. farm sales, up 58% since 2017, on 69% of U.S. harvested cropland [1]. That "specialized grain-and-oilseed" category maps closely to NAICS 1111 and is the best available scale gauge for the whole group. It is farm sales (all revenue of those farms), a different and broader measure than the per-crop values in Section 2.

Two lenses that don't reconcile — and why. USDA tabulates farming by crop, while NAICS classifies each farm to a single industry by its primary commodity. So the corn crop's ~$88.5B value [1] includes corn grown on farms coded to the 11119 combination industry (where no single crop tops half of value), and the group's crop values cannot be cleanly summed into an industry total without double-counting. Read the numbers as an order-of-magnitude picture, not an audited ledger.

Farm counts by crop (2022 Census of Agriculture), to show relative footprint [1][5][child primers]:

Note the twist: soybeans out-acre corn but corn out-values it — corn earns far more crop value per acre, which is why it dominates the group's dollars while soybeans lead on land.

The only federal business figures we hold are the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) size standards — the receipts ceilings below which a farm counts as a "small business" for federal programs: $2.25 million for most children (soybeans, non-soy oilseeds, wheat, other grain), $2.5 million for corn, and $2.75 million for dry peas and beans [11]. Nearly the entire group falls under these — a direct statement of how the industry is structured: many operators, almost no giants.

Undercount caveat (important). Standard federal business statistics badly understate this group. County Business Patterns, Statistics of U.S. Businesses, Nonemployer Statistics, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages all exclude crop production (NAICS 111) and farm proprietors [16]. Because these farms are overwhelmingly non-employer sole proprietorships, family partnerships, LLCs, and trusts, any payroll- or establishment-based registry misses most of them. Size this group from USDA's Census of Agriculture and crop reports — which count farms and bushels — not from business registers that count companies with payroll.

4. Investable universe (where value concentrates across the children)

Value in this group concentrates in two places at once: overwhelmingly on the corn–soybean side by economic weight, and — for a public investor — entirely in the layers around the farm, because the farms themselves are private. The public universe is a menu of proxies, and crucially, the same handful of companies serves all seven children — none is a bet on any single crop. Tickers are for identification, not recommendation, and belong here rather than in the crop-neutral sections above.

Where the public money actually sits:

• Grain merchants & processors — Archer-Daniels-Midland (NYSE: ADM), Bunge Global (NYSE: BG, enlarged by the ~$8B Viterra combination), and The Andersons (Nasdaq: ANDE) originate, store, ship, crush, and mill the crop, earning handling, basis, and crush margins that can widen when farm-gate prices are weak [21][25]. The privately held Cargill and Louis Dreyfus complete the "ABCD" trader group.
• Input suppliers — seed and crop protection via Corteva (NYSE: CTVA); fertilizer via Nutrien (NYSE: NTR), Mosaic (NYSE: MOS), and CF Industries (NYSE: CF); machinery via Deere (NYSE: DE) and AGCO (NYSE: AGCO). They sell into planted acres across every child regardless of which crop pencils out [21].
• Farmland REITs — Farmland Partners (NYSE: FPI), the most row-crop-diversified and the cleanest listed claim on the corn/soy/wheat/rice land base; Gladstone Land (Nasdaq: LAND), broader but skewed to specialty crops [19][20].
• Commodity & fund routes — single-crop funds Teucrium Corn (CORN), Soybean (SOYB), and Wheat (WEAT); the broad basket Invesco DB Agriculture (DBA); the agribusiness equity ETF (exchange-traded fund) VanEck Agribusiness (MOO); and CME Group (Nasdaq: CME), which runs the futures markets [22]. A sharp access contrast runs through the group: the corn/soy/wheat crops have deep listed futures; rice has thin rough-rice futures (ZR); among the minor grains only oats is listed; and sorghum, barley, rye, the non-soy oilseeds, and the pulses have no active U.S. contract at all [22].
• The few crop-specific listed proxies sit downstream, not on the farm: rice-branding majors Ebro Foods and Ricegrowers/SunRice; pulse processor AGT Food and Ingredients (TSX: AGTF), plus pea-protein makers Roquette, Puris, and Emsland as a demand signal for yellow-pea acreage [child 11116][child 11113].

Where the real ownership sits (private / cooperative): the operating farms themselves (overwhelmingly family-held); private merchants Cargill, Louis Dreyfus, and Scoular; the farmer-owned cooperative CHS Inc. and grower co-ops such as Riceland Foods; institutional farmland managers (Nuveen Natural Capital, Manulife) that lease large row-crop portfolios to tenants; and fractional-farmland platforms (AcreTrader, FarmTogether) [28]. Direct farmland ownership is the oldest and truest route to the land economics below.

5. How the money works

Every child runs the same equation. A grain or oilseed farm's profit is a thin spread on a big asset:

farm revenue ≈ harvested acres × yield per acre × realized price + crop-insurance proceeds + government payments

The metrics that matter are yield per acre, cost per bushel, revenue and cash rent per acre, net return per acre, the owned-versus-leased mix, working-capital adequacy, and the debt-to-asset ratio — farm-appropriate measures, not the regulated-utility rate base, REIT funds-from-operations, or mining all-in-sustaining-cost language used in other industries.

Costs are dominated by a few inputs. Across specialized grain-and-oilseed farms in 2022, production costs ran $119.0 billion, led by fertilizer ($23.2B, ~19% — the single biggest line and tied to natural-gas prices), then land rent, seed, and chemicals [1]. One structural cost difference across children: pulses fix their own nitrogen, so they need far less fertilizer — a real advantage that makes them the more attractive rotation choice in high-input-cost years [child 11113].

The margin is currently thin to negative — across the group. Corn, soybeans, and wheat all sat below full cost of production for a fourth straight year through 2025/26 [4][13]; on the minor-grain side, 2025 Sorghum-Belt bids fell as low as $2.35/bushel, below cost, after Chinese demand vanished [15]. When the crop loses money at the elevator, farm income leans on two federal backstops (Section 7), which in 2025 ballooned to a forecast $42.4 billion in direct government payments, up from $9.6 billion in 2024 [10].

Landowner vs. operator — the split that defines who profits. Two different returns hide inside "the industry." The operator earns the farming margin (thin and volatile). The landowner earns cash rent plus land appreciation — and U.S. cropland hit a record $5,830 per acre in 2025, up 4.7%, even as crop prices fell [11]. Because roughly a quarter to a third of farmed land is rented, rent is simultaneously a top cost for operators and the core yield for farmland REITs and private landowners. For a land investor, total return = cash rent (a low-single-digit yield) + appreciation: the crop is the coupon, the land is the bond. That split is why public investors (mostly landowners via REITs) and farm operators experience this group very differently — and why the cleanest listed proxy is a farmland REIT rather than an operating company.

6. Demand drivers

Demand runs through four channels — feed, food, biofuel, and exports — but the mix differs sharply by child, which is why the seven do not move together.

• Corn — livestock feed (~40%), ethanol (~35–40%), and exports (~15%, U.S. the world's top shipper) [child 11115]. Ethanol is policy-driven; the long-run wild card is whether electric-vehicle adoption erodes the gasoline demand behind it.
• Soybeans — historically ~half exported (overwhelmingly to China), domestic crush into high-protein meal, and the fastest-growing driver, crush into oil for biodiesel / renewable diesel [5][17].
• Non-soy oilseeds — food oil (canola, high-oleic sunflower), renewable diesel (the swing factor pulling record canola acreage), and protein meal [13].
• Wheat — mostly food; ~42% exported into a market where the U.S. share of world trade has fallen to ~11% as Black Sea exporters gained [6].
• Rice — 40–45% exported; a steady domestic food staple; premium California japonica (sushi-grade) punches above its acreage in dollars [child 11116].
• Pulses — global food staples plus the secular plant-based / pea-protein tailwind (North American pea-protein demand growing ~9%/year) [19].
• Minor cereals — each fragile and idiosyncratic: sorghum rides Chinese exports; barley is tied to shrinking beer demand; oats ride oat-milk growth the U.S. can't supply [15][16][17].

The two cross-cutting forces to watch: federal biofuel policy (the Renewable Fuel Standard pulling on corn, soybean oil, and canola oil at once) and China (the pivotal buyer of soybeans and sorghum). Both can move a large slice of the group's demand in a single policy or trade decision.

7. Regulation

Farming is lightly regulated as a business but heavily shaped by federal farm and energy policy, and the framework is essentially identical across all seven children — a rare point of uniformity:

• The Farm Bill safety net. Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC), run by USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA), set price/revenue floors for covered commodities — corn, soybeans, wheat, sorghum, barley, oats, dry peas, lentils, and the oilseeds (dry edible beans are a notable exception, relying on insurance) [12][child 11113]. The 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) raised statutory reference prices (e.g., wheat from $5.50 to $6.35/bushel through 2030) and strengthened ARC — materially supportive for crops sitting below breakeven [child 11114][12].
• Federal crop insurance via USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA) — subsidized revenue and yield policies covering most planted acres; the single largest farm-support mechanism [12].
• Biofuel policy — the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) sets biofuel volumes and is a direct demand lever for corn, soybean oil, canola oil, and sorghum; the 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit rewards low-carbon fuels (and treats canola's carbon score unfavorably — a live risk) [18][child 11112].
• Grain quality, pesticides, biotech, and land — the U.S. Grain Standards Act (Federal Grain Inspection Service); pesticide registration under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA, EPA); USDA/APHIS biotech oversight; the USDA National Organic Program; and foreign-ownership disclosure under the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA) [27].
• Water — the binding constraint for rice alone (Clean Water Act, California's Sustainable Groundwater Management Act), and increasingly relevant in the drier sorghum, wheat, and oilseed regions [child 11116].

Net: policy here is mostly a source of stability and modest upside — but also a dependency. A weaker safety net or lapse in ad-hoc aid would expose the underlying weakness in crop margins.

8. Consolidation

This is a fragmented group consolidating steadily, and the pattern repeats across every child: no farm has pricing power over bushels, so the competitive game is cost per acre and scale, fought locally over land, tenants, machinery, financing, and elevator access. Land is slowly moving into fewer, bigger hands — the midpoint corn farm grew from 200 acres in 1987 to 685 acres in 2017, and large farms' share of all cropland rose from 15% to 41% [24]. Wheat's farm count fell 43% since 2002; soybean farms fell 30,000+ in five years; rice farms fell ~60% in 25 years [child 11114][5][child 11116]. Record land values ($5,830/acre) reinforce the trend and raise the barrier for new entrants [11].

The suppliers and buyers, by contrast, are highly concentrated — the top four seed firms hold ~56% of the seed market, and a handful of ABCD traders plus CHS dominate grain buying, crushing, storage, and export logistics [23][21]. So growers buy from concentrated sellers and sell to concentrated buyers, squeezed from both ends. Two structural stories to note: the Bunge–Viterra merger consolidated two of the largest global handlers [25], and the renewable-diesel boom is spurring new Northern Plains canola-crush construction that improves local basis for oilseed growers [13]. A crucial distinction for investors: consolidation of market channels (merchants controlling the pipes) is not the same as consolidation of farm ownership (a landlord accumulating acres) or farm operation — often three different parties.

9. Risks

The risk stack is shared across the group, in roughly this order of importance:

• Price / margin cyclicality — the dominant risk. Thin-to-negative operating margins are the base case across corn, soybeans, wheat, and the minor grains right now; a big harvest can depress prices even when a farm yields well [4][13][15].
• Trade / export shocks — the sharpest swing factor, concentrated in two children. China is the pivotal buyer of both U.S. soybeans and sorghum; in 2025 sorghum exports to China fell ~97% and soybean exports collapsed during a tariff standoff before a late-2025 deal [15][25]. The other children are far less China-exposed.
• Input-cost squeeze — fertilizer (~19% of costs, tied to natural gas), fuel, seed, rent, and interest can rise faster than crop prices [1].
• Policy dependence — a large share of 2025 farm income is transfer payments (ARC/PLC + insurance), not market income [10][12].
• Weather, water, and yield — drought, flood, heat, and disease can wipe out a season; water is existential for rice and increasingly tight in the dryland regions.
• Secular demand erosion (on the small children) — barley's malting demand is in structural decline with beer; U.S. oat production has ceded share to Canada [16][17].
• Basis, logistics, leverage, land-value, and succession risk — a strong crop can fetch a weak local price; expensive land and machinery plus seasonal cash flow make downturns severe; higher rates raise financing costs and can cool the record land values underpinning farm balance sheets and REIT valuations [11].
• Public-market mismatch — every listed proxy is diversified far beyond any one crop (or is a price fund carrying futures roll cost), so the shares are poor short-term reads on farm economics.

10. How to invest & outlook

Decide which economic link you want first — land, farming, or the supply chain — because they pay off differently and often in opposite directions.

Public routes (indirect, liquid):

1. Farmland REITs (FPI, LAND) — own the land, collect cash rent, ride appreciation; closest to a landowner's return. FPI is the more row-crop-diversified (best fit to the corn/soy/wheat core); LAND skews to specialty crops [19][20].
2. Input & equipment suppliers (CTVA, NTR, MOS, CF, DE, AGCO) — sell into planted acres; driven by farmer income, acreage, and the replacement cycle [21].
3. Grain merchants / processors (ADM, BG, ANDE) — earn handling, basis, and crush margins, often counter-cyclical to farm margins [21].
4. Commodity funds (CORN, SOYB, WEAT, DBA, MOO) — for the big three crops; among the small children only listed oats offers direct price exposure, and rice only via thin ZR futures — sorghum, barley, rye, the non-soy oilseeds, and the pulses have no liquid instrument [22].

Private routes (direct, illiquid): owning cropland and leasing to an operator; farmland funds and fractional platforms; operating a farm; grain-storage and crush infrastructure; or secured farm lending. These capture the two returns that matter most here — cash rent plus land appreciation — and are how nearly all the real ownership is held. Diligence the farm itself: title and lease terms, soil, water rights, yield history, local basis, storage and transport, tenant quality, crop insurance, operator succession, working capital, debt structure, and exit liquidity [28].

Near-term outlook (a judgment, not a forecast). The setup across the group is weak crop economics propped up by policy and offset by strong land values. Crop margins are the poorest in years, with ARC/PLC plus insurance and the OBBBA reference-price increases doing much of the work of keeping row-crop farms in the black [10][12]. The medium-term backdrop favors the land owner over the crop grower — rents and land values kept rising even as prices fell [11]. The clearest structural tailwind is biofuel — renewable diesel pulling on soybean and canola oil, ethanol on corn [17][18]. The sharpest swing factors are China (does the soybean deal hold; does sorghum buying resume?) and U.S. biofuel mandates [15][18].

Bottom line. NAICS 1111 is the core of American row-crop agriculture, but it is heavily concentrated: corn and soybeans are the group, wheat is most of the rest, and rice, the minor grains, the non-soy oilseeds, and the pulses are small, divergent niches — some expanding on biofuel (canola), some contracting hard (rice, barley). Across all seven, the durable exposure for most investors is the land and the supply chain, not a bet on any single crop or a business you cannot buy. For the complete analysis of any child, read its primer.

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Sources

This rollup synthesizes the seven child primers (NAICS 11111, 11112, 11113, 11114, 11115, 11116, 11119) plus our ground-truth federal statistics file for NAICS 1111, which contains no ingested stat metrics. Figures are USDA crop and census data and company filings carried up from the children, labeled by source; they are not an audited four-digit industry total.

1. USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), 2022 Census of Agriculture — Grain and Oilseed Production Highlights (ACH22-13), 2024 (specialized grain/oilseed farm sales $168.7B, 31% of U.S. farm sales, +58% since 2017, 69% of harvested cropland; corn crop value ~$88.5B; production costs $119.0B; farm/acre counts). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2024/census22-grain-oilseed.pdf
2. USDA NASS, Crop Values 2024 Summary, Feb. 2025 (soybean ~$44.1B; wheat ~$10.9B; rice ~$3.4B farm-gate values). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cpvl0225.pdf
3. USDA NASS, Crop Values 2025 Summary, 2026 (non-soy oilseeds ~$1.6B; dry pea/bean complex; rice 2025; minor cereals ~$2.73B, 2024). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/cpvl0226.pdf
4. Capital Press, Wheat, corn, soybean prices are below breakeven, signaling fourth year of losses, 2026. https://www.capitalpress.com/2026/05/08/wheat-corn-soybean-prices-are-below-breakeven-signaling-fourth-year-of-losses/
5. USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), Soybeans and Oil Crops — Oil Crops Sector at a Glance, 2025 (270,851 soybean farms; consolidation; export/crush split). https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/soybeans-and-oil-crops/oil-crops-sector-at-a-glance
6. USDA ERS, Wheat Sector at a Glance, 2026 (export share ~42%; U.S. share of world trade ~11%). https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/wheat/wheat-sector-at-a-glance
7. USDA NASS / World-Grain, Record US, global corn output projected in 2025 (~186 bu/acre; ~16.7B bushels), 2025. https://www.world-grain.com/articles/21394-record-us-global-corn-output-projected-in-2025
8. USDA ERS, Rice Sector at a Glance, 2025 (export share 40–45%; price bifurcation). https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/rice/rice-sector-at-a-glance
9. USDA NASS, 2022 Census of Agriculture (farm and acre counts by crop; rice 3,824 farms; sorghum 13,591 farms). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2022/
10. USDA ERS, Farm Sector Income Forecast and Corn, soybeans accounted for 46 percent of U.S. crop cash receipts in 2024, 2025–2026 (direct government payments $42.4B vs. $9.6B in 2024). https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-sector-income-finances/farm-sector-income-forecast
11. USDA NASS, Land Values 2025 Summary, Aug. 2025; American Farm Bureau Federation (U.S. cropland $5,830/acre, +4.7%). https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2025/2025LandValuesCashRents_FINAL.pdf
12. USDA Farm Service Agency, Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) & Price Loss Coverage (PLC), 2025–2026; USDA Risk Management Agency, Federal Crop Insurance; 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) reference-price increases. https://www.fsa.usda.gov/resources/income-support/arc-plc
13. Agri-Pulse / Red River Farm Network, Canola acreage expands amid renewable diesel industry growth, 2026; American Soybean Association, The Rising Cost Squeeze, 2025 (below-breakeven crop margins). https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/22341-canola-acreage-expands-amid-renewable-diesel-industry-growth
14. Southern Ag Today / Oklahoma Farm Report, Grain Sorghum Exports to China at Their Lowest in Over a Decade, Nov. 2025 (sorghum bids ~$2.35/bu; China exports down ~97%). https://www.oklahomafarmreport.com/okfr/2025/11/13/grain-sorghum-exports-to-china-at-their-lowest-in-over-a-decade/
15. Agweek, U.S. barley acreage hit lowest level since 1876 as beer demand sinks, 2024. https://www.agweek.com/crops/cereal-grains/u-s-barley-acreage-hit-lowest-level-since-1876-as-beer-demand-sinks
16. Ambrook / Offrange, Farmers Aren't Keeping Up With Oat Milk Demand, 2025; Terrain (Farm Credit), Renewable Diesel: The Soybean Crush Engine, 2025 (~50% of soybean oil to biofuel). https://ambrook.com/offrange/supply-chain/oat-shortage-milk-demands
17. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2026 and 2027, 2026; American Farm Bureau Federation, 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit, 2025–2026. https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard/final-renewable-fuel-standards-2026-and-2027
18. USDA ERS, Vegetables and Pulses Outlook, 2026 (dry-bean/dry-pea prices down ~18%/~16%); Market.us/Straits Research, pea-protein market ~9% CAGR. https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/vegetables-and-pulses-outlook
19. Gladstone Land Corporation, 2025 Annual Report (Form 10-K), 2026. https://www.gladstonefarms.com
20. Company filings/results: Archer-Daniels-Midland; Bunge Global (incl. Viterra combination); The Andersons; Corteva; Nutrien; Mosaic; CF Industries; Deere; AGCO. https://www.deere.com/en/our-company/investor-relations/
21. Fund and futures descriptions: Teucrium Corn (CORN), Soybean (SOYB), Wheat (WEAT); Invesco DB Agriculture (DBA); VanEck Agribusiness ETF (MOO); CME Group rough-rice (ZR) and oats (CME/CBOT); no active U.S. sorghum/barley/rye/non-soy-oilseed/pulse contract. https://etfdb.com/etf/MOO/
22. Corteva, Inc., 2025 Annual Report; ETC Group, Food Barons (top four ≈ 56% of the seed market). https://investors.corteva.com/
23. USDA ERS, Farm Size and the Organization of U.S. Crop Farming (ERR-152) and Three Decades of Consolidation in U.S. Agriculture (midpoint corn farm 200→685 acres; large-farm cropland share 15%→41%). https://www.ers.usda.gov/media/8660/err-152.pdf
24. Investigate Midwest, China resumes US soybean purchases under trade deal, 2026; Bunge Global, Bunge and Viterra Complete Merger, 2025. https://investigatemidwest.org/2026/07/01/china-resumes-us-soybean-purchases-under-trade-deal-with-trump-but-future-for-farmers-remains-daunting/
25. Regulation bundle: EPA pesticide labels (FIFRA) and Worker Protection Standard; USDA AMS Federal Grain Inspection Service / U.S. Grain Standards Act; USDA FSA Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA), Conservation Compliance, and Conservation Reserve Program; USDA AMS National Organic Program. https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-labels/introduction-pesticide-labels
26. Private owners and platforms: Cargill; CHS Inc.; Louis Dreyfus Company; Scoular; Riceland Foods; Nuveen Natural Capital; Manulife Investment Management; AcreTrader; FarmTogether. https://www.cargill.com/agriculture
27. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards Matched to NAICS Codes, 2023 (soybeans/oilseeds/wheat/other grain $2.25M; corn $2.5M; dry pea & bean $2.75M). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
28. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns, Nonemployer Statistics, Statistics of U.S. Businesses; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, QCEW (all exclude NAICS 111 crop production / farm proprietors). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html