Broadwoven Fabric Mills (U.S., NAICS 313210): An Investor's Primer

1. Overview

Broadwoven fabric mills are the factories that weave wide cloth — the denim in your jeans, the shirting in a dress shirt, the ticking on a mattress, the upholstery on a sofa, the ripstop in a military uniform, and a growing list of technical fabrics for cars, filters, and medical use. "Broadwoven" simply means woven wider than 12 inches, as distinct from narrow tapes and ribbons.[1] These mills sit in the middle of the textile chain: they buy yarn (spun elsewhere), weave it into fabric on looms, and often dye and finish it before selling to apparel makers, furniture and bedding makers, the auto industry, industrial buyers, and the U.S. military.

Why an investor should care: this is a small, mature, capital-intensive U.S. manufacturing industry that has been shrinking for 30 years under import pressure — but the survivors have moved up-market, and 2025 trade policy (the closing of the "de minimis" import loophole, higher tariffs, and forced-labor import bans) has turned into a genuine tailwind for domestic fabric demand for the first time in a generation.

The catch for public-market investors: there is almost nothing clean to buy on a stock exchange. The industry's largest and best players are private and family-owned. The handful of listed names are either micro-caps in restructuring or companies whose main business sits just outside the weaving code. Private and strategic investors — private equity, family holding companies, and downstream brands — own the real assets here.

A useful piece of history frames the whole industry: Berkshire Hathaway began life as a New England broadwoven cotton-and-rayon weaver. When Warren Buffett took control in 1965 the mills were already losing to imports; he redeployed the cash into insurance and shut the last textile operation in 1985.[2] The lesson still holds — commodity weaving is a capital trap, and durable returns in this industry come only from defensible niches.

2. What it is and how it's structured

In scope (NAICS 313210): establishments primarily engaged in weaving broadwoven fabrics and felts from cotton, wool, silk, or man-made (synthetic) fibers — denim, twills, sheeting, shirting, upholstery and mattress cloth, and many industrial/technical fabrics. Mills may weave only; weave and finish; or weave, finish, and further fabricate.[1] (NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the U.S. government's official industry taxonomy.)

Explicitly excluded — adjacent codes an investor should not confuse:

• Narrow fabrics (ribbons, tapes, ≤12 in.) and Schiffli embroidery → NAICS 313220.[1]
• Carpets and rugs → NAICS 314110.[1]
• Tire cord and tire fabric → NAICS 314994.[1]
• Yarn spinning and thread (the input to weaving) → NAICS 313110. This matters because some listed "textile" companies are really spinners, not weavers.
• Knitting (jersey, fleece — a different fabric-forming process) → NAICS 313xxx knit mills, not 313210.
• Standalone finishing (establishments principally engaged in finishing purchased broadwoven cloth) → falls elsewhere in NAICS 3132 or 3133, not 313210.

Operating model: A mill purchases or internally spins yarn, arranges thousands of longitudinal warp yarns on a beam, applies sizing where needed to reduce yarn breakage, draws the warp through heddles and a reed, and inserts transverse filling (weft) yarn on shuttle, rapier, projectile, air-jet, or similar looms. Dobby and jacquard mechanisms produce more complex patterns. Fresh cloth is inspected and either sold as greige goods or desized, scoured, bleached, dyed, printed, heat-set, preshrunk, or otherwise finished.[3] Loom speed, yarn quality, break rates, and changeover time are central operating variables.

Ownership mix: overwhelmingly private. The industry is a mix of (a) large family-owned diversified manufacturers (Milliken, Glen Raven), (b) private-equity-backed platforms built from heritage brands (Elevate Textiles, owner of Cone Denim and Burlington), (c) private family weavers (Mount Vernon Mills), and (d) a long tail of small independent and niche technical mills. Only a couple of pure-ish plays trade publicly.

3. How big it is

Federal statistics for NAICS 313210 (our ground-truth figures):

A few things fall out of these numbers. The industry is tiny relative to the U.S. economy — about $3.6 billion of output, roughly 13,000–18,000 workers (depending on source), and fewer than 240 plants nationwide.[4][5][6] The employment range reflects different survey methodologies: Census County Business Patterns (establishment-based) reports 13,276 for 2023, while BLS industry employment data shows 18,412 for 2024.[4][5] Average pay works out to roughly $48,000 per worker, and the average mill runs about 57 employees — these are real factories, not garage operations.[4] The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) sets the "small business" line at 1,000 employees, a very high threshold that reflects how capital- and labor-heavy a weaving plant is.[7]

The scale of the contraction is historic. BLS data show employment fell 84.8% from 120,867 jobs in 2000 to 18,412 in 2024 — one of the largest employment contractions of any detailed U.S. manufacturing industry over that period.[5] The 2002 Economic Census reported 758 establishments, 80,530 employees, and $11.4 billion of shipments; by 2022 that had shrunk to 228 firms and $3.6 billion of shipments.[6][8] The surviving industry is a third of its size two decades ago.

The undercount caveat here runs the opposite way from most industries. Because these are permitted, taxed factories, the Census captures them well — there is no large informal or government-owned segment hiding from the data. Instead, the $3.63 billion figure understates how much cloth the U.S. actually weaves, because it counts only establishments whose primary activity is broadwoven weaving. Big diversified and vertically integrated firms — Milliken, Glen Raven, Elevate — weave as one step inside plants that the Census may classify under the company's primary product (performance textiles, chemicals, apparel), so some domestic weaving is booked under adjacent codes. For context, the broader U.S. textile-mill workforce was roughly 89,000 in 2024, and the entire textile-and-apparel supply chain (fiber to finished product) employed about 453,000 people with $60.9 billion of shipments in 2025 — 313210 is one narrow slice of that.[9][10]

4. The investable universe

Public companies are scarce and none is a large, pure U.S. apparel weaver. The best assets are private. The table below is the realistic listed opportunity set, from closest-fit to adjacent.

Major private and strategic owners (where the real industry lives):

• Milliken & Company (Spartanburg, SC; founded 1865) — one of the world's largest privately held materials-science and performance-textile manufacturers; 40+ facilities; woven-textile markets include protective clothing, transportation, aviation, and hospitality.[15]
• Glen Raven, Inc. (NC; founded 1880) — family-owned; flagship Sunbrella performance/outdoor woven fabrics; announced a $250 million expansion program targeting more than 30% additional production capability and more than 400 jobs — evidence that differentiated performance fabric can still attract substantial domestic investment.[16][17]
• Elevate Textiles (Charlotte, NC) — private-equity-backed platform holding Cone Denim, Burlington, and American & Efird; heritage denim through technical fabrics. Note: Elevate agreed to sell a majority stake in Cone Denim to Artistic Milliners in a transaction expected to close Q1 2026, and North Carolina's WARN register shows an Elevate facility closure affecting 150 employees by December 31, 2026 — the ownership and domestic footprint are in flux.[18][19]
• Mount Vernon Mills (private; ~180 years old; owned by the R.B. Pamplin group) — vertically integrated cotton weaver of twills, drills, duck, canvas, denim, flame-resistant, and ripstop fabrics for shirting, workwear, and outerwear; approximately 750 employees, six U.S. production facilities, and potential output of 90 million yards annually at its Trion, Georgia facility; acquired a North Carolina spinning and weaving facility in 2022 to expand vertical integration.[20]

Bottom line for a stock picker: if you want direct, sizeable exposure to U.S. broadwoven weaving, the public market cannot give it to you — you get a micro-cap (CULP), an adjacent industrial-fabric name (AIN), or an upstream yarn supplier (UFI). Meaningful ownership of the core industry is a private-market activity.

5. How the money works

A weaving mill is a fixed-cost, throughput business, and its economics are best understood the way you'd analyze any capacity-utilization manufacturer:

• Unit of production is the yard. Output is measured in linear or square yards of fabric and in loom-hours. Plants run looms around the clock; the enemy is idle capacity.
• Capital intensity and utilization drive margins. Looms, warping and slashing (yarn-preparation) lines, and dyeing/finishing ranges are expensive and long-lived. Because so much of the cost is fixed, capacity utilization is the single biggest swing factor in profitability — a mill running full is profitable; a half-empty mill bleeds. Low volume leaves depreciation, supervision, utilities, and maintenance spread over fewer yards; short runs and frequent style changes reduce loom uptime; yarn breaks, weaving defects, seconds, and rework directly reduce yield.
• The core spread is the "mill margin": fabric selling price minus the cost of purchased yarn/fiber, then minus conversion cost (labor, energy, maintenance, dyes and chemicals). Yarn is the largest variable cost — Culp, the closest public proxy, states that raw materials represent approximately 60–70% of its mattress-fabric production cost, including synthetic yarns, greige goods, adhesives, laminates, dyes, and chemicals.[12] The mill's job is to buy fiber well, waste little, and price fabric to hold the spread.
• Input-cost volatility whipsaws results. Cotton is a weather- and USDA-driven commodity; synthetic fibers (polyester, nylon) are oil-linked. When fiber prices spike, mills either pass the cost through (if their product is differentiated) or absorb it (if it's commodity cloth). The BLS broadwoven-mill producer-price index rose from 134.1 in January 2020 to 167.6 in April 2026 — that measures selling prices, not margins; input inflation, mix changes, and lower volume can coexist with higher prices and weak earnings.[21]
• Product mix decides who lives. Commodity apparel fabric earns razor-thin margins and loses to imports. Technical, performance, and protective fabrics — flame-resistant, filtration, medical, automotive, defense — carry higher, more defensible margins. The U.S. survivors deliberately shifted up-market.[22]
• Vertical integration captures more of the chain. Owning spinning → weaving → dyeing/finishing lets a firm capture more margin, control quality, and — increasingly valuable — certify origin for tariff and defense-procurement rules (see §7).
• It is cyclical. Demand tracks apparel, home furnishings (the housing and furniture cycle), auto builds, and defense budgets. Working capital swings with fiber prices and inventory. Culp's FY2026 results illustrate the dispersion: bedding reported $116.6 million of sales at a 9.2% gross margin; upholstery reported $86.9 million at a 17.7% gross margin — yet the company still used $9.4 million of operating cash during the year.[11]

The honest summary: at the commodity end this is a low-return, capital-hungry business (the Berkshire Hathaway lesson). Money is made by the firms that escape commodity weaving into branded performance fabrics, defense/Berry work, and integrated, traceable supply chains.

6. What drives demand

• Home furnishings — mattresses, upholstered furniture, curtains, and bedding. This is the most cyclical driver, tied to housing turnover, furniture sales, and consumer confidence; the 2024–25 furniture/housing slump directly pressured domestic fabric makers like Culp.[11]
• Apparel — jeans, workwear, shirting, uniforms. Domestic apparel fabric demand is structurally small because so much garment assembly has moved offshore, but trade rules (below) can pull fabric demand back onshore.
• Automotive — seating fabric, airbags, headliners; tracks vehicle production.
• Industrial and technical — filtration, geotextiles, medical gauze, protective and flame-resistant cloth, and engineered fabrics for paper machines and composites; the industry's growth segment.[22]
• Defense — steady, price-insensitive, domestic-only demand; the Department of Defense buys roughly $2 billion of military textiles, apparel, and gear a year, all of which must be U.S.-made.[23]
• Trade policy and "traceability" demand — the 2025 closure of the de minimis loophole and higher tariffs raise the cost of imported cloth and garments, and forced-labor import bans (which block Xinjiang cotton) push buyers toward traceable U.S.-made fabric. These are demand tailwinds — see §7.[24][25]

Product substitution is a risk to watch. Culp notes that knitted mattress fabrics have expanded from premium products into mid- and lower-price mattresses and are now used in nearly all compressed or boxed bedding; knit products offer greater design flexibility and higher gross-margin potential.[12] This is direct substitution away from some woven ticking — not simply growth in "textiles."

7. Regulation

Regulation is unusually central to this industry's economics, because trade and procurement rules are what create domestic demand.

• Berry Amendment. Requires that textiles, clothing, and fabrics bought with Department of Defense funds be 100% U.S.-made — from fiber and yarn through weaving and finishing.[23][26] This is the single most important demand-support policy for domestic weavers, and it insulates a slice of the industry from imports entirely.
• Rules of origin in trade agreements ("yarn-forward"). Under USMCA (the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement) and CAFTA-DR (Central America), apparel qualifies for duty-free treatment only if the yarn and fabric are made within the member countries.[27] This means U.S. fabric is a passport to tariff-free garment trade — a structural source of demand for domestic weaving.
• De minimis repeal (2025). The exemption that let shipments under $800 enter duty-free — used to ship over 1.36 billion low-cost parcels in 2024, largely by Chinese e-commerce — was ended for all countries effective August 29, 2025, a change the domestic textile lobby had sought for years.[24][25] It raises the landed cost of imported finished goods and is a direct tailwind for U.S. fabric.
• Forced-labor bans (UFLPA / Section 301). Enforcement against Xinjiang cotton and ongoing forced-labor tariff investigations shift advantage toward suppliers who can prove a clean, traceable U.S. chain.[10]
• Product-safety standards. Mattress and upholstery flammability rules, children's sleepwear standards, and consumer-product safety requirements shape what fabrics can be sold.
• Environmental and worker safety. Dyeing and finishing generate regulated wastewater and air emissions under EPA's Textile Mills Effluent Guidelines (40 CFR Part 410); weaving alone is comparatively dry, but desizing, scouring, bleaching, dyeing, and finishing generate wastewater and treatment obligations.[28] OSHA's cotton-dust standard (29 CFR 1910.1043) imposes exposure controls, monitoring, and medical-surveillance requirements on cotton operations.[29] Stain-, water-, and oil-resistant chemistries also create potential PFAS reformulation, remediation, and litigation risk. These rules raise the cost of operating in the U.S. versus low-regulation competitors.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The industry is fragmented and only moderately concentrated, and it has been consolidating as weaker commodity players exit.

• Concentration is low-to-moderate: the top 4 firms hold about 34% of receipts, the top 8 about 46%, the top 20 about 71%, and the top 50 about 89%; the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration gauge where under 1,500 is "unconcentrated") is just 441.9.[6] So a handful of large firms lead, but no one dominates.
• Consolidation is by attrition and roll-up. The U.S. has lost dozens of mills over the past few years and is "down to its last ~100 cotton mills," with import competition the cited cause.[30] Survivors have either scaled up (Milliken, Glen Raven), rolled up heritage brands under private equity (Elevate Textiles), or specialized into defensible technical niches.[18][22]
• U.S. mills do not compete on price — Asian producers win on labor and energy cost. Domestic mills compete on speed-to-market, service, quality, intellectual property, and compliance (Berry, yarn-forward origin, forced-labor traceability). Automation and "Made in USA" positioning are the strategic response to a permanent cost disadvantage.[22]
• Import competition is structural and indirect. A U.S. facility must compete not only against imported fabric but also against imported finished garments, furniture, and bedding — imports of finished goods displace domestic fabric demand even when the fabric itself never crosses the U.S. border.

9. Risks

• Trade-policy reversal. The industry's recent tailwind is largely political. If tariffs ease or the de minimis loophole is reopened, the demand support evaporates.[24]
• Import competition remains structural. Even with tariffs, low-cost Asian platforms (and Chinese goods transshipped through Southeast Asia) continue to undercut commodity fabric.[9][10]
• Input-cost volatility. Cotton (weather/commodity) and oil-linked synthetics can spike faster than mills can reprice, compressing the mill margin.[21]
• Cyclical end-markets. Housing, furniture, autos, and apparel are all cyclical; a consumer downturn hits volumes and utilization at once (the 2024–25 furniture slump is the live example).[11]
• Customer offshoring. If garment or furniture assembly leaves the U.S., the fabric demand follows it out.
• Capital intensity and low returns. At the commodity end, high fixed costs plus thin margins is a capital trap — the reason so many mills closed and why Berkshire exited textiles entirely.[2]
• Product substitution. Knitted fabrics are displacing woven in some mattress and bedding applications, eroding a traditional woven end-market.[12]
• Compliance and environmental cost. U.S. labor, energy, and environmental rules structurally raise the cost of operating here. EPA wastewater rules and OSHA cotton-dust standards are ongoing compliance burdens.[28][29]
• Labor succession. Loom fixers, warp-preparation specialists, dyers, finishers, and textile chemists require plant-specific experience. Decades of closures have reduced the domestic training and supplier ecosystem.

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes (limited).

• Closest pure-play: Culp (CULP) — a micro-cap woven upholstery-and-mattress-fabric maker, but in multi-year decline, heavily offshore-sourced, and has outsourced its internal mattress weaving — so it is more a bet on a home-furnishings recovery and design/sourcing margin than a clean domestic-weaving play.[11][12]
• Adjacent technical weaving: Albany International (AIN) — a much larger, higher-margin maker of engineered woven fabrics for paper machines (plus an aerospace-composites arm). Not apparel and not in 313210, but the best listed way to own industrial weaving; more than 80% of Machine Clothing segment revenue comes from paper-machine clothing.[13]
• Upstream proxy: Unifi (UFI) — recycled-polyester yarn (REPREVE); a way to play rising demand for traceable U.S.-made synthetic fabric without owning a mill.[14]
• Reserve the usual public-equity metrics — market cap, valuation multiples, dividend yield — for these names; note that CULP is a micro-cap and the sector offers little index exposure.

Private-market routes (where the industry actually is).

• Direct or private-equity ownership of the private majors and niche technical mills (Milliken, Glen Raven, Mount Vernon are family-held and not for sale; Elevate-style platforms are the PE model).[15][16][18][20]
• Supplier, off-take, or credit relationships with domestic mills; exposure through downstream brands (furniture, bedding, workwear, defense apparel) or upstream fiber/chemicals.
• Distressed or non-core facility acquisitions; secured-credit and equipment opportunities during mill restructurings. Diligence should focus on loom-level utilization, product-level contribution margin, customer and SKU concentration, age and replacement cost of equipment, environmental liabilities, labor succession, qualification ownership, cost pass-through provisions, working-capital seasonality, and whether stated capacity is economically usable.

Near-term drivers and outlook (forward-looking). The base case is a stabilizing-to-modestly-improving domestic industry, not a growth story. The 2025 trade shifts — de minimis repeal, higher tariffs, and forced-labor enforcement — are the most favorable demand backdrop in years and should support onshore fabric orders if they persist.[24][25][10] Steady Berry-Amendment defense demand provides a floor.[23] Glen Raven's $250 million expansion program is tangible evidence that differentiated players see investable opportunity.[17] The durable strategic direction is up-market: technical, performance, protective, medical, and automotive fabrics where U.S. mills can defend margins, alongside "Made in USA" traceability.[22] Against that, results will stay cyclical (housing/furniture and apparel), input-cost-sensitive (cotton and oil-linked synthetics), and politically contingent (any softening of tariffs or de minimis would remove the tailwind). For most investors the practical takeaway is blunt: the public options are thin and idiosyncratic, the real assets are private, and the whole industry rewards defensible niches over commodity scale — exactly the lesson Berkshire Hathaway learned the hard way.[2]

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS Definition — 313210 Broadwoven Fabric Mills," 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=313210&year=2022
2. Wikipedia, "Berkshire Hathaway" (textile origins; Buffett 1965 acquisition; textile operations closed 1985), 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkshire_Hathaway
3. CottonWorks, "Weaving Basics" (warp preparation, sizing, loom operation), Cotton Incorporated. https://cottonworks.com/learning-hub/weaving/weaving-basics/
4. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns (CBP), NAICS 313210 — establishments (234), employment (13,276), annual payroll (~$639.8M), 2023. https://data.census.gov (CBP 2023)
5. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Industries with employment decreases from 2000 to 2024" (broadwoven fabric mills: 120,867 jobs in 2000 to 18,412 in 2024), 2025. https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2025/industries-with-employment-decreases-from-2000-to-2024.htm
6. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration and industry statistics, NAICS 313210: firms (228), receipts (~$3.63B), CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50 and HHI (441.9), 2022. https://data.census.gov
7. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Size Standards," NAICS 313210 (1,000 employees), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
8. U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census — NAICS 313210 (758 establishments, 80,530 employees, $11.381B shipments), 2002. https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/economic-census/2002/manufacturing-reports/industry-series/ec0231i313210.pdf
9. Sheng Lu, "State of U.S. Textile and Apparel Manufacturing, Employment and Trade (updated April 2025)," FASH455 / University of Delaware, 2025. https://shenglufashion.com/2025/04/07/state-of-u-s-textile-and-apparel-manufacturing-employment-and-trade-updated-april-2025/
10. Global Textile Times / National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO), U.S. textile supply-chain employment (453,122) and shipments ($60.9B), 2025; forced-labor tariff advocacy. https://www.globaltextiletimes.com/news/ncto-calls-for-stronger-us-trade-measures-to-combat-forced-labour-in-textile-imports/
11. Culp, Inc., Fiscal 2026 Results Press Release (net sales ~$203.5M; bedding ~$116.6M at 9.2% gross margin; upholstery ~$86.9M at 17.7% gross margin; used $9.4M operating cash), SEC filing, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723603/000119312526292684/culp-ex99_1.htm
12. Culp, Inc., Form 10-K Fiscal 2025 (raw materials 60–70% of mattress-fabric cost; knit substitution in mattresses; outsourced internal weaving), SEC filing, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723603/000095017025095233/culp-20250427.htm
13. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Albany International Corp. Form 10-K FY2025 (Machine Clothing segment ~$708M; >80% from paper-machine clothing; Engineered Composites ~$475M), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/819793/000162828026012906/ain-20251231.htm
14. UNIFI, Inc., "Fourth Quarter and Fiscal 2025 Results" (revenue ~$571.3M; REPREVE), 2025. https://investor.unifi.com/news-releases/news-release-details/unifir-makers-reprever-announces-fourth-quarter-and-fiscal-2025
15. Milliken & Company, "About Us — Textiles" (privately held; protective clothing, transportation, aviation, hospitality markets), 2026. https://www.milliken.com/en-us/textiles/knowledge-center/about-us
16. Wikipedia, "Glen Raven, Inc." (family-owned; founded 1880; Sunbrella), 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glen_Raven,_Inc
17. Glen Raven, "Glen Raven Announces Next Phase $250 Million Capacity Expansion" (>30% additional capability; >400 jobs), 2025. https://www.glenraven.com/glen-raven-announces-next-phase-250-million-capacity-expansion/
18. Wikipedia, "Elevate Textiles" (Cone Denim, Burlington, American & Efird; Charlotte, NC), 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elevate_Textiles
19. PR Newswire, "Artistic Milliners Acquires Majority Stake in Cone Denim" (transaction expected Q1 2026), 2025. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/artistic-milliners-acquires-majority-stake-in-cone-denim-302559898.html
20. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., "About Us" and "Apparel Fabrics" (vertically integrated; ~750 employees; six U.S. facilities; 90M yards capacity at Trion, GA; 2022 NC acquisition), 2025. https://www.mvmills.com/about-us/
21. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), "Producer Price Index: Broadwoven Fabric Mills (PCU313210313210)" (134.1 Jan 2020 to 167.6 Apr 2026), 2026. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCU313210313210
22. Akas Tex / U.S. textile industry analyses, "Made in USA: Technical Textiles, Reshoring, and Automation," 2025. https://akastex.com/made-in-usa-manufacturing-how-american-innovation-is-revolutionizing-technical-textiles/
23. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, "Berry Amendment" (100% domestic content for DoD textiles; ~$2B/yr military textile procurement), 2024. https://www.trade.gov/berry-amendment
24. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Suspension of Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment" (effective Aug. 29, 2025), 2025. https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/factsheet_suspension_of_duty-free_de_minimis_treatment.pdf
25. Just-Style, "US textile sector praises end of de minimis for all countries" (NCTO reaction; 1.36 billion de minimis shipments in 2024), 2025. https://www.just-style.com/news/us-de-minimis-textile/
26. Congressional Research Service, "Domestic Preference Statutes: The Berry Amendment and the Kissell Amendment" (IF13001), Congress.gov, 2024. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF13001
27. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "CAFTA-DR Textiles" (yarn-forward rule of origin); U.S. International Trade Commission, USMCA rules of origin, 2011/2022. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/may/cafta-dr-textiles
28. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Textile Mills Effluent Guidelines" (40 CFR Part 410), 2024. https://www.epa.gov/eg/textile-mills-effluent-guidelines
29. U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, "Cotton Dust Standard" (29 CFR 1910.1043), 2024. https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.1043
30. American Journal of Transportation (AJOT), "America is down to its last 100 cotton mills," 2024. https://www.ajot.com/news/america-is-down-to-its-last-100-cotton-mills