Chocolate and Confectionery Manufacturing (U.S., NAICS 31135)

A Histometrics rollup primer for public-market and private investors.

1. Overview

This is the American chocolate factory floor: every establishment that makes chocolate or chocolate candy, whether it starts from raw cacao beans (the seeds of the cacao tree, the raw material for all chocolate) or from finished chocolate couverture (coating chocolate) it buys from someone else. It sits inside NAICS 31135 — the U.S. government's North American Industry Classification System five-digit "industry" for chocolate and confectionery making — and it splits into exactly two child industries: the integrated bean-to-bar processors (311351) and the purchased-chocolate specialists who buy coating and turn it into treats (311352).[3]

Why an investor cares: chocolate is a large, defensive, habit-driven consumer category. Americans eat roughly eight pounds of it per person each year and spend about $145 each, and demand holds up across economic cycles because a candy bar is an affordable "permissible indulgence."[1] But the two years to 2025 were a stress test. Cocoa — a single, imported, weather-exposed commodity the U.S. essentially cannot grow — rose roughly 310% between 2023 and late 2024, peaking near record highs (estimates range from ~$10,400 to near $13,000 per metric ton depending on contract and timing), compressing margins across every maker in the level and testing how much price shoppers will absorb.[2][7] The through-line of this whole industry is a tug-of-war between sticky brand-driven demand and one volatile raw material.

The distinctive thing about reading this level is the contrast between its two halves — they are very different businesses that the census happens to file next to each other. Section 2 leads with that comparison.

2. What's inside — the two child industries and how they differ

The level is not one homogeneous business; it is a small, integrated "bean" tier and a much larger, more fragmented "purchased-chocolate" tier stacked on top of each other. The bean processors sell chocolate as an ingredient and as finished bars; the purchased-chocolate makers buy that ingredient and turn it into boxed gifts, enrobed bars, and seasonal candy. Everything downstream — ownership mix, how you invest, hedging exposure — flows from that split.

Shares are Histometrics calculations from the child figures against the 31135 totals in Section 3.

The key surprise for investors: value (dollars, plants, jobs) concentrates in the purchased-chocolate tier — about three-quarters of the level — yet the marquee public companies (Hershey, Mars, Mondelez) live in the smaller bean-to-bar tier, because their core plants grind their own cocoa. So the larger half of this industry has the fewest large, pure public plays; you reach it mostly through Lindt, a micro-cap, or private ownership. The two tiers also differ in a way that matters right now: bean processors can hedge raw cocoa directly in the futures market, while purchased-chocolate makers absorb higher coating prices with a lag and far less protection.[7]

3. Size (this level's rollup figures)

Our ground-truth federal statistics for NAICS 31135, with the two children summing cleanly into each total:

Average pay across the level works out to about $54,000 per worker, and the average establishment employs roughly 34 people — these are real industrial plants and specialty factories, not candy-counter storefronts. (The firm count of 1,208 is slightly below the sum of the children's firm counts, 1,218, because some companies operate plants in both codes and are counted once at this level — a small sign of how integrated the top of the industry is.)

Concentration for the whole level (2022 Economic Census):[1]

• Top 4 firms: 51.2% of receipts
• Top 8 firms: 66.1%
• Top 20 firms: 78.9%
• Top 50 firms: 89.2%
• Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration gauge where under 1,500 counts as "unconcentrated"): 902.8

Note a genuine aggregation effect: the level's top-4 share (51.2%) is lower than either child's (53.4% and 58%). Combining two industries whose leaders are different firms spreads the top-4 concentration out. So the headline "unconcentrated" HHI understates how tightly held each tier actually is, and even more so the branded consumer market that sits on top of it (a handful of names — Mars, Hershey, Ferrero, Lindt — dominate the shelf).

Undercount caveat — important. These figures are a clean read on the manufacturing core, not the size of the chocolate market consumers see. Two structural reasons:

• Imports and retail markup are excluded. A large share of the chocolate Americans eat is imported (Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany), and none of that lands in the $19.66 billion. Market researchers size U.S. retail chocolate sales at roughly $28 billion in 2025, and all-confectionery retail at a record $55 billion in 2025 — different, larger denominators.[6][7] Do not read this level's shipments as the size of the American chocolate business.
• The artisan tail is under-measured. Hundreds of very small and sole-proprietor chocolatiers — both craft bean-to-bar roasters and Main Street gift-chocolate makers — fall below employer-survey thresholds or straddle the retail codes, so the true count of chocolate-making businesses is higher than 1,253.

4. Investable universe — where value concentrates across the children

There is no large, pure-play U.S.-listed "chocolate manufacturing" stock. Exposure is bundled inside diversified global snack companies or locked in private hands, and — as Section 2 flagged — the public names cluster in the smaller bean-to-bar tier.

Public companies (tickers and scale reserved for here):

Major private and other owners (where most of the level's dollars actually sit):

• Mars, Incorporated — private, family-owned; total sales ~$54.6 billion (2024). M&M's, Snickers, Dove, Twix — a top-two U.S. chocolate maker.[18]
• Ferrero Group — private, Italian family; became the #3 U.S. chocolate manufacturer by buying Nestlé's U.S. candy business for $2.8 billion in 2018 (Butterfinger, Crunch, Baby Ruth, plus Ferrero Rocher, Nutella, Fannie May).[19]
• See's Candies — a 311352 gift-chocolate icon owned by Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A/BRK.B); accessible only by owning Berkshire.
• Blommer (owned by Japan's Fuji Oil since 2019), Cargill, ofi (Olam Food Ingredients) — large private/parent-listed merchant grinders supplying the 311351 ingredient layer.[14][15]
• Guittard — family-owned integrated California maker; hundreds of regional and craft chocolatiers — the fragmented private base of both tiers.

Bottom line for a stock investor: to own this level you mostly buy a diversified chocolate major (Hershey, Mondelez) or Lindt; to own the ingredient plumbing you buy Barry Callebaut; to own the larger gift/seasonal tier purely, you buy the RMCF micro-cap (with its attendant risks) or a private business.

5. How the money works

Every business in the level earns on the same spread — what it sells candy or chocolate for, minus what it pays for cocoa, sugar, milk, and energy — but the two tiers pull different levers.

• The cocoa spread is the whole story. Cocoa is bought globally and priced in futures, so margins move with a commodity no maker controls. When cocoa spiked, Hershey's full-year 2025 gross margin fell to 33.5% from 47.3% in 2024 — a nearly 14-percentage-point hit — while operating margin fell to 12.3% from 25.9%.[9] Barry Callebaut's FY2024/25 volume fell 6.8% to 2.125 million tonnes, yet revenue rose 49% in local currency to CHF14.8 billion as cocoa inflation flowed through cost-plus contracts; recurring net profit fell 36%.[14] The bean processors (311351) hedge raw cocoa directly in the futures market; the purchased-chocolate makers (311352) buy finished coating and absorb the higher price with a lag and less protection — the tier with the least hedging cover.[7]
• Price vs. volume ("realization"). Because retail prices lag cocoa costs, makers defend margin by raising prices and shrinking packs ("shrinkflation"). In 2025 chocolate dollar sales rose while unit volumes fell — seasonal chocolate units dropped about 13.7% — so growth was priced, not eaten.[2][9] The durable question for any owner is how much price a brand can push before shoppers trade down.
• Brand strength. Iconic brands (Reese's, Kit Kat U.S., M&M's, Lindt) command shelf space and pricing power — the real moat, strongest at the branded top of both tiers.
• The merchant-grinder model (311351). Barry Callebaut, Blommer, and Cargill earn a processing margin — a fee-like spread for turning beans into liquor, butter, and powder — plus capacity utilization. Their grinding volumes are a real-time demand signal for the whole level.
• The franchise twist (311352). In the RMCF-style model, the maker earns franchise royalties plus factory sales of coating and product to its own franchisees — approximately 71% of RMCF's revenue comes from manufacturing sales to franchisees and third parties.[17]
• Seasonality and working capital. The "big four" seasons — winter holidays (the largest, ~$7.5 billion across candy in 2024), Valentine's Day, Easter, and Halloween — drive roughly 62–63% of seasonal candy sales.[1][20] Makers build inventory ahead of each peak and carry markdown risk on unsold seasonal product.

6. Demand drivers

• Gifting and everyday indulgence. Chocolate is a default gift and an affordable self-treat; demand is stable and mildly counter-cyclical. Seasonal gifting adds a large, relatively price-inelastic layer. 99.8% of U.S. households bought confectionery at least once in 2025.[6][20]
• Treating culture and affordability. All-confectionery retail sales hit a record $55 billion in 2025, with chocolate the largest slice (~$28 billion, roughly half).[6]
• Premiumization. Trading up to dark, single-origin, high-cacao, and craft products supports higher prices and margins — a tailwind for premium and artisan makers in both tiers.
• Better-for-you positioning. Reduced-sugar, portion-control, and clean-label formats shape mix.
• Population, income, and price. Broadly population- and income-driven, but 2024–25 showed demand can bend: record prices pushed unit volumes down even as dollar sales rose.[2]
• Substitution risk. Nonchocolate candy gained nearly $5 billion of sales between 2019 and 2024 — roughly 70% growth — as elevated cocoa costs encouraged smaller chocolate bars and greater use of nonchocolate seasonal flavors. Industrial customers can also substitute compound coatings that replace some cocoa butter with vegetable fats; Cargill has introduced a cocoa-free confectionery alternative manufactured in Ohio.[21]

Key headwind: GLP-1 (glucagon-like peptide-1) weight-loss drugs, now used in roughly one in six U.S. households, suppress appetite and are nudging demand toward smaller and better-for-you formats — a slow structural drag layered on top of price-driven volume softness.[9]

7. Regulation

• FDA standards of identity (21 CFR Part 163, "Cacao Products"). The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) legally defines what may be called "chocolate" — e.g., milk chocolate must contain at least 10% chocolate liquor and 12% milk solids; semisweet/bittersweet at least 35% liquor. Products that fall short can't use the word "chocolate" unqualified.[22]
• Labeling and food safety. Standard FDA rules apply — ingredient lists by weight, allergen declaration (milk, soy, tree nuts, wheat), Nutrition Facts — plus the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) on plant sanitation and preventive controls. FDA specifically treats dark chocolate labeled dairy-free as a surveillance concern because undeclared milk can cause serious reactions.[23]
• Heavy metals. Trace lead and cadmium in dark chocolate have drawn testing, California Proposition 65 litigation, and reformulation pressure — a live regulatory and reputational risk, weighted toward the dark/premium products.
• Trade and tariffs. The U.S. grows essentially no commercial cocoa, so trade policy is a direct cost input. In 2025 "Liberation Day" reciprocal tariffs imposed a 10% baseline plus country-specific rates on cocoa-origin countries (e.g., Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana ~15%, Indonesia ~19%), which Hershey estimated at $100–180 million a year in added cost; U.S. sugar is separately kept above world prices by the federal sugar program. In November 2025 the administration removed tariffs on cocoa and other agricultural imports, easing that pressure.[24][25][26]
• Sourcing and sustainability. The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), phasing in for large operators at end-2025, requires proof that cocoa is deforestation-free and traceable — a cost reaching any U.S. maker selling into or sourcing alongside Europe. The U.S. Department of Labor states that Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana supply 60% of global cocoa and that more than 1.5 million children work on cocoa farms in those countries; cocoa beans from both have appeared on the Department's child- or forced-labor list since 2009, and cocoa paste, butter, and powder were added in 2024.[27]

8. Consolidation

The branded top of this level is an oligopoly — Mars and Hershey, then Ferrero and Lindt — with Hershey alone holding roughly a third of the U.S. chocolate market historically.[13] Behind the brands, an even smaller set of merchant grinders (Barry Callebaut, Blommer/Fuji, Cargill, ofi) supplies the ingredient tier, giving the 311351 layer real leverage.

Consolidation is a recurring theme, repeatedly checked by one unusual structure: the Hershey Trust. It owns most of Hershey's super-voting shares and controlled approximately 79% of combined voting power at year-end 2025, with the Milton Hershey School as sole beneficiary. It has blocked every takeover run at Hershey — Mondelez's ~$23 billion approach in 2016 and a combination valued near $44 billion (including debt) rejected in 2024 as too low.[11][18] That effectively caps the largest logical U.S. deal (Mondelez + Hershey) and pushes M&A into bolt-ons and roll-ups instead:

• Lindt bought Russell Stover in 2014 (~$500M in sales), assembling Lindt, Ghirardelli, Russell Stover, and Whitman's under one U.S. roof.[13]
• Ferrero bought Nestlé's U.S. candy business in 2018 ($2.8 billion), instantly becoming the #3 U.S. chocolate maker.[19]
• Mars is acquiring Kellanova, and both Mars and Ferrero remain active bolt-on buyers.

For the fragmented base — most of the ~900 purchased-chocolate firms and the craft roasters — the exit path is acquisition by a strategic owner or by private equity / family buyers, a steady if unglamorous pipeline.

9. Risks

• Cocoa price and supply shock — the defining risk. Weather and disease in two West African countries drove the 2024 record and can recur; even after expected surpluses, analysts see a structurally higher floor (J.P. Morgan cites ~$6,000/tonne).[28][29] USDA reports that U.S. bean imports averaged approximately 425,000 metric tons annually from 2000 through 2022, then fell 22% in 2023 and another 26% in 2024 to 198,000 tonnes as prices spiked.[7] The purchased-chocolate tier (311352) carries this with the least hedging cover.
• Single-region supply concentration. 60%+ of cocoa comes from Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana; political, currency, or climate disruption there hits the entire level.[2][27]
• Margin compression / demand destruction. If input costs outrun what shoppers will pay, both margins and volumes fall — the 2025 pattern of falling units despite rising dollars.[9]
• Substitution. Nonchocolate candy gained nearly $5 billion in sales between 2019 and 2024; compound coatings and cocoa-free alternatives offer industrial customers another avenue away from expensive cocoa.[21]
• Trade/tariff whiplash. Cocoa can't be sourced domestically, so tariff changes flow straight to cost; policy reversed twice within 2025.[24][25]
• Health and demand drift. GLP-1 adoption and long-run sugar scrutiny pressure volume; heavy-metals litigation adds legal/brand risk.[9]
• ESG and reputational exposure. Child labor, deforestation, and traceability failures carry legal, regulatory (EUDR), and brand risk.[27]
• Small-player squeeze. Thin margins, private-label competition, and limited pricing power weigh on the long tail of family makers, especially in 311352.
• Operating risks. Aging plants, food-safety incidents, skilled-maintenance availability, seasonal labor requirements, and energy costs. Fuji Oil attributed Blommer's recent underperformance partly to old equipment, production interruptions, and labor scarcity; its restructuring included closing the Chicago plant.[15]
• Governance-specific. Hershey's dual-class Trust structure limits public shareholders' control and takeover optionality.[11]

10. How to invest and outlook

Public routes.

• Direct large-cap: Hershey (HSY) is the clearest U.S.-centric play; Mondelez (MDLZ) offers global chocolate inside a broader snack portfolio; Lindt (LISN/LDSVF) is the premium/North-American #3 and the best single proxy for the larger purchased-chocolate tier.
• "Picks and shovels": Barry Callebaut (BARN/BYCBF) gives spread-and-volume exposure to the whole level regardless of which brand wins, via grinding volumes. Fuji Oil (TYO: 2607) offers U.S. processor exposure through Blommer, though Fuji is diversified across oils, fats, and other food ingredients.
• Small/speculative: Rocky Mountain Chocolate Factory (RMCF) is the only near-pure U.S. listing in the gift tier — a genuine small business in stock form, currently operating at a loss, and correspondingly high-risk.
• Note: multiples and dividend yields for these names move with the cocoa cycle — they tend to look cheapest when margins are most compressed and cocoa is most expensive.

Private routes.

• Mars and Ferrero aren't investable in public equity; exposure comes through their bonds (both are active issuers) or supplier relationships. See's comes only via Berkshire.
• Direct ownership of a regional chocolatier or gift-chocolate brand — the fragmented ~900-firm base, most of which qualify for small-business acquisition financing under SBA size standards.[10]
• Franchising (RMCF-style) is a capital-lighter way to own a storefront under an established brand; PE roll-ups of specialty and gifting assets are an active bolt-on market.

Near-term outlook (forward-looking).

• Cocoa normalizing, not cheap. After the 2024 record, prices fell hard through 2025–26; StoneX projects global surpluses (~287,000 tonnes in 2025/26) as West African crops recover, and Q1 2026 prices ran roughly a third below Q1 2025.[28][29] That should repair margins into 2026 — the key bullish swing for the branded makers, and a bigger relief for the un-hedged 311352 tier.
• But demand is soft. Grindings fell ~6.7% in 2025 as high prices curbed consumption; the recovery in volumes is the open question.[28]
• Pricing lag works in reverse. As cocoa eases faster than retail prices, makers may enjoy a temporary margin tailwind before competition passes savings back.
• Longer run, treating culture, gifting seasonality, and premiumization have kept the broader category growing (all-confectionery retail projected toward ~$62 billion by 2030), with better-for-you innovation the main lever against the GLP-1 and health drag. These are forecasts, not certainties.[6]

The synthesis across the two children: this is a durable, brand-driven consumer industry whose dollars sit mostly in the fragmented purchased-chocolate tier but whose public exposure sits mostly in the integrated bean-to-bar tier — and whose returns, in either half, hinge on managing one volatile, import-dependent, geographically concentrated commodity. The 2024–26 cocoa cycle is the clearest recent illustration of both the shared risk and the eventual margin recovery.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration by Largest Firms and Selected Statistics, NAICS 31135 and 311352 (level receipts $19.66B; 311352 receipts $14.39B; 922 firms; level CR4 51.2%, CR8 66.1%, CR20 78.9%, CR50 89.2%; level HHI 902.8; 311352 HHI suppressed), 2022. https://data.census.gov/
2. ConfectioneryNews / BakeryandSnacks, Record cocoa prices reshape chocolate production; prices crash after 2024 record highs, 2025–2026. https://www.confectionerynews.com/Article/2025/05/09/record-cocoa-prices-in-2025-reshape-chocolate-production-and-global-markets/
3. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definitions — 31135 Chocolate and Confectionery Manufacturing; 311351; 311352, 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=31135&year=2022
4. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns (CBP), NAICS 31135 / 311351 / 311352 (level: 1,253 establishments; 42,020 employees; $2.28B annual payroll; $578.3M Q1 payroll), 2023. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
5. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Selected Statistics, NAICS 311351 (receipts $5.27B; 296 firms; CR4 53.4%, CR8 78.7%, CR20 93.2%, CR50 97%; HHI 960.7), 2022. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
6. National Confectioners Association, State of Treating 2026 (confectionery $55B in 2025; chocolate $28.4B / ~52%; 99.8% household penetration; ~$62B by 2030), 2026. https://candyusa.com/stateoftreating
7. USDA Economic Research Service, Charts of Note: Cocoa (West Africa 61% of world production; 310% price increase; U.S. imports fell 22% in 2023, 26% in 2024 to 198,000 MT), 2025. https://ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/110921
8. Expert Market Research / J.P. Morgan Global Research, Grindings down ~6.7% across major regions in 2025, 2025–2026. https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/commodities/cocoa-prices
9. The Hershey Company, 2025 Form 10-K (net sales ~$11.2–11.7B; gross margin 33.5% vs 47.3% in 2024; NA Confectionery segment margin 26.3% vs 32.3%; GLP-1 ~1 in 6 households; seasonal chocolate units −13.7%), 2025–2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/47111/000162828026008586/hsy-20251231.htm
10. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 311351 — 1,250 employees; 311352 — 1,000 employees), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
11. Bloomberg / CNBC, Hershey Trust controls ~79% of vote; rejects Mondelez takeover approach (2016 and 2024), 2024. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/12/09/hershey-stock-mondelez-takeover-offer.html
12. Mondelez International, 2025 Form 10-K (net revenue ~$38.5B; chocolate segment ~$12.7B / ~33%), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1103982/000162828026005345/mdlz-20251231.htm
13. Lindt & Sprüngli, Acquisition of Russell Stover (2014); Lindt North America is #3 chocolate manufacturer on the continent, 2014–2016. https://www.report.lindt-spruengli.com/14/ar/en/annual_report/acquisition_of_russell_stover.htm
14. Barry Callebaut, Full-year results fiscal year 2024/25 (~2.1M tonnes sold; CHF14.8B revenue; volume −6.8%; recurring net profit −36%), 2025. https://www.barry-callebaut.com/en/about-us/media/news-stories/barry-callebaut-group-full-year-results-fiscal-year-2024-25
15. Fuji Oil Holdings, Completion of Blommer acquisition (2019); Blommer restructuring presentation, 2019–2024. https://www.fujioil.co.jp/en/news/2019/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2019/01/29/20190129_en.pdf; https://www.fujioil.co.jp/en/pdf/ir/library/hosoku/240322_presentation_en.pdf
16. Tootsie Roll Industries, 2025 Form 10-K (net product sales $724.7M, +1.3%), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98677/000110465926021621/tr-20251231x10k.htm
17. Rocky Mountain Chocolate Factory, Fiscal Year 2026 Form 10-K (revenue $27.5M; operating loss $3.6M; 71% of revenue from manufacturing), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1616262/000119312526248296/rmcf-20260228.htm
18. Reuters / Transport Topics / Worldly Partners, Mars total sales ~$54.6B (2024); Mondelez–Hershey ~$44B incl. debt rejected, 2024–2025. https://www.ttnews.com/articles/mondelez-hershey-takeover; https://worldlypartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Mars-Inc.pdf
19. Food Dive / ConfectioneryNews, Ferrero completes $2.8B acquisition of Nestlé's U.S. candy business (2018), 2018. https://www.fooddive.com/news/nutella-owner-buys-nestles-us-candy-business-for-28b/514907/
20. National Confectioners Association / Statista, Seasonal candy in the U.S. — four seasons ~62–63% of seasonal sales; winter ~$7.5B in 2024; per-capita consumption, 2024–2025. https://www.statista.com/topics/2100/seasonal-candy/
21. Cargill / ConfectioneryNews, NextCoa cocoa-free confectionery alternative; nonchocolate candy gained ~$5B 2019–2024, 2024–2025. https://www.cargill.com/food-beverage/cocoa-chocolate/confectionery-alternative-to-chocolate
22. U.S. FDA / eCFR, 21 CFR Part 163 — Cacao Products (standards of identity); labeling of products purporting to be "chocolate", current. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-21/chapter-I/subchapter-B/part-163
23. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Dairy-Free Chocolate Products and Milk Allergens; FSMA Preventive Controls, current. https://www.fda.gov/food/sampling-protect-food-supply/dairy-free-chocolate-products-and-milk-allergens
24. Reason / CZ app (Czarnikow), 2025 reciprocal tariffs on cocoa-origin countries (10% baseline + country-specific); Hershey $100–180M cost estimate; cacao-exemption push, 2025. https://reason.com/2025/08/01/trumps-war-on-chocolate-theres-no-way-for-us-to-source-this-domestically/
25. FoodBev Media / FoodNavigator-USA, Trump administration removes tariffs on cocoa, coffee and other foods (Nov 2025), 2025. https://www.foodbev.com/news/trump-removes-tariffs-on-range-of-f-b-products-including-cocoa-coffee-and-beef
26. USDA Economic Research Service, Sugar and Sweeteners Policy (domestic prices above world prices due to allotments and TRQs), current. https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/sugar-and-sweeteners/policy
27. U.S. Department of Labor / osapiens / CBI, List of Goods Produced by Child Labor — Cocoa Supply Chains (Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana 60% of global cocoa; 1.5M+ children on cocoa farms; EU Deforestation Regulation), 2023–2025. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods/supply-chains/cocoa; https://osapiens.com/blog/bittersweet-the-influence-of-the-eudr-on-cocoa-production/
28. Expert Market Research / J.P. Morgan Global Research, Cocoa price trend 2026 (Q1 2026 down ~33% y/y); structural floor ~$6,000/t, 2025–2026. https://www.expertmarketresearch.com/price-forecast/cocoa-price-trends
29. StoneX, Cocoa market surplus projections (~287,000 t in 2025/26; ~267,000 t in 2026/27), 2025–2026. https://www.stonex.com/en/insights/cocoa-market-faces-life-after-crisis/