Textile Furnishings Mills (U.S.) — NAICS 3141

An investor's primer for public-market and private investors. Plain language. This is a rollup page: NAICS 3141 is an industry group that combines two very different businesses — carpet on the one hand, curtains and linens on the other. The value of this page is the contrast between them. For the fine detail of each, follow the child primers linked below.

---

1. Overview

NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) code 3141 — Textile Furnishings Mills is a four-digit "industry group" inside Manufacturing. It bundles the U.S. plants that make soft goods for floors, windows, beds, and tables: on one side, the mills that tuft and weave carpet and rugs; on the other, the plants that cut, sew, and finish curtains, draperies, and household linens (sheets, towels, comforters, tablecloths) [1][2].

For an investor, the group is best understood as two industries under one label that share a family resemblance but almost nothing else. Both are mature, slow-shrinking U.S. manufacturing bases; both are "converter" businesses that earn a thin spread between input cost and finished-goods price; both are being squeezed — but by different forces, and with very different market structures and ways to invest. Combined, the group ships about $12.67 billion a year and employs roughly 43,000 people across ~1,296 plants [3][4].

The whole group is small and largely private, and the two halves pull in opposite directions on almost every structural measure. That contrast — not the aggregate — is what this page is for.

---

2. What's inside — the two children and how they differ

The NAICS hierarchy narrows as codes get longer: sector 31–33 (Manufacturing) → subsector 314 (Textile Product Mills) → industry group 3141 (Textile Furnishings Mills) → two five-digit industries below. Those two children are:

• 31411 — Carpet and Rug Mills (broadloom carpet, carpet tile, area rugs) [1]
• 31412 — Curtain and Linen Mills (sheets, towels, comforters, curtains, drapery, table linens) [2]

Each of those five-digit industries has exactly one six-digit child (314110 and 314120 respectively), so the two halves of this group are the only real subdivisions there are [1][2]. They look alike on the label and diverge on the economics. The table below is the heart of this page.

Read the table this way. Carpet is the dollar giant of the group — three-quarters of the shipments from just one-sixth of the firms and under a fifth of the plants — because it is made in a small number of very large, capital-heavy mills. Curtains and linens are the firm-count giant — 1,004 mostly tiny cut-and-sew shops, five in six of them with fewer than twenty workers — but each is small, so the half adds up to only a quarter of the group's revenue [7][8]. Put differently: the average carpet firm is roughly 15 times larger than the average linen firm, a carpet worker produces nearly twice the shipment value of a linen worker, and is paid about a quarter more, reflecting machinery-driven output versus hand-labor.

The two halves are also being squeezed by different enemies. Carpet's problem is product substitution — American buyers trading soft flooring for luxury vinyl tile (LVT), laminate, wood, and tile. Estimates of how far that has gone differ by source and methodology: carpet's share of the U.S. flooring market by area is put somewhere in the 39–44% range for 2024, and the read on direction is genuinely contested — industry executives argue the slide is flattening toward an equilibrium, while Berkshire Hathaway's 2025 shareholder report describes the consumer move away from soft surface as an ongoing fact its own mill has had to adapt to [10][11][12]. Linen's problem is geography — the work has moved offshore, mostly to India and China, so imports dominate what Americans actually buy; a single Indian supplier, Welspun, is reckoned to account for roughly 45% of U.S. towel imports and 59% of U.S. sheet imports [13][14]. A carpet investor watches housing turnover and oil-linked fiber costs; a linen investor watches tariffs and cotton. Full detail lives in the 31411 primer and the 31412 primer.

---

3. Size — this level's rollup figures

These are the group's own federal ground-truth figures, and they tie out exactly as the sum of the two children — firms, plants, employment, payroll, and shipments all reconcile — confirming the group has no hidden third activity [5][6][7][8].

How to read the concentration numbers. CR4 is the share of shipments made by the four largest firms (CR8/CR20/CR50 extend that to the top 8/20/50). The HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is a 0–10,000 scale that squares each firm's market share and adds them up; U.S. antitrust agencies treat anything below ~1,500 as "unconcentrated." At the group level the HHI is ~616 — unconcentrated.

But that group-level figure is misleading if you stop there, and this is the single most important caveat on this page. The combined number is diluted by blending two markets that don't compete with each other. Look inside and the picture splits: carpet is moderately concentrated — CR4 56.7%, HHI ~1,111, and the top twenty firms make 87.8% of shipments [5] — while linen is highly fragmented — CR4 21.1%, HHI ~192, and it takes fifty firms to reach 67.3% [7]. The aggregate ~616 and the aggregate CR4 of 41.8% describe neither real market. Always analyze the two children separately.

Undercount caveat (asymmetric). The federal counts measure U.S. employer plants, and the two halves under-report differently.

• Carpet: the mills are large and well-measured, so domestic production is captured reliably. The gap is imports — a large share of U.S. area-rug consumption is imported (led by China, India, and Turkey) and never appears as U.S. mill shipments [18]. For scale, Mohawk puts the U.S. carpet-and-rug market at approximately $11.2 billion inside a $33.2 billion U.S. floor-covering market, against $9.34 billion of Census mill shipments [15].
• Linen: there are two gaps. The same import gap, far larger here — and the estimates the children carry are not on one basis: USITC counted $15.4 billion of U.S. home-furnishing textile imports in 2021 [17], Mordor sizes the U.S. home-textile market at roughly $25 billion a year [16], and trade analysts put imports at the overwhelming majority (on the order of 90%+) of home textiles Americans buy [13][14]. Different years and different product scopes, so treat the direction as solid and the precise share as approximate. On top of that sits a thin-tail gap: sole-proprietor custom-drapery and workroom operators with no employees fall outside the employer-based count [8].

So the ~$12.67 billion is a fair measure of domestic mill production, but it materially understates total U.S. spending on these goods — most of which, on the linen side especially, is created offshore and imported.

---

4. Investable universe — where value concentrates across the children

Value in this group is lopsided and mostly private, and it concentrates differently in each half.

In carpet (31411) — most of the dollars, most of it private:

• Shaw Industries — the largest U.S. carpet maker, a wholly owned Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary that processes roughly 92% of its carpet-yarn requirements internally; immaterial to Berkshire, so not a real carpet play [20].
• Engineered Floors — the #3 producer at roughly $1.5 billion, private and family-owned [21].
• Mohawk Industries (NYSE: MHK) — the large-cap listed route (~$10.8B net sales, 2024), but a diversified global flooring company where carpet is one line among ceramic, laminate, LVT, and wood [22].
• Interface (NASDAQ: TILE) — the closest listed near-pure play (~$1.39B revenue, 2025), focused on commercial carpet tile [23].
• The Dixie Group (DXYN) — a speculative residential micro-cap (~$257M revenue, 2025) whose 2025 10-K carries a going-concern warning [24].

In curtains and linens (31412) — many firms, little listed U.S. exposure:

• There is no large, pure U.S.-listed home-textiles manufacturer. The closest U.S.-listed pure-play is small-cap Crown Crafts (CRWS) (~$87M revenue, 24.4% gross margin) [25][26]; Culp (CULP) gives adjacent exposure to home-textile fabrics — mattress ticking, upholstery — rather than finished linens (~$213M revenue) [27]; and Icahn Enterprises (IEP) wholly owns WestPoint Home, a diluted route through a diversified holding company (WestPoint earned an 18% gross margin in 2025) [28].
• The largest, most direct pure-plays trade in India: Welspun Living, Trident, Indo Count [14].
• Most domestic activity is private — WestPoint Home, Standard Textile, 1888 Mills (which runs the largest remaining U.S. towel mill, in Griffin, Georgia) [29], American Textile Company — or sits in direct-to-consumer (DTC) bedding brands (Brooklinen, Boll & Branch, Parachute).

The takeaway across both: roughly three-quarters of the group's revenue sits in carpet, but the best carpet assets are private (Shaw, Engineered Floors), and the best linen pure-plays are foreign (the Indian majors). Public U.S. exposure to the group as a whole is therefore thin, indirect, and in places distressed — one diversified large-cap, one commercial pure-play, one adjacent fabric maker, a holding-company sliver, and a micro-cap flagging going-concern doubt. Note also the scale mismatch: Mohawk alone books more revenue globally than the entire U.S. carpet industry ships domestically [15][22]. Full company tables with scale figures are in the 31411 and 31412 primers.

---

5. How the money works

Both children are converter/spread manufacturers, so the right lens is manufacturing economics — not retail markups, utility rate base, or real-estate metrics. Owners earn on the gap between the price of the finished good and the cost of inputs. But the cost structure differs, and that is the key economic contrast.

• Carpet mills are capital-and-fiber businesses. The big inputs are synthetic fiber/yarn (nylon, polyester, polypropylene) plus backing, dye, and energy. Because those synthetics are petrochemical derivatives, input cost tracks oil and natural-gas prices [30]. High fixed-cost tufting and dyeing lines mean capacity utilization drives profit — Mohawk's Flooring North America segment reported an operating margin of about 3.1% in 2025 against 6.3% in 2024, the decline attributed to lower volume and weaker fixed-cost leverage [15]. Leaders defend margin through vertical integration (Shaw extrudes and processes ~92% of its own yarn [20]) and premium mix. That capital intensity is why carpet shows ~$360k of output per worker.

• Linen mills are labor-and-cotton businesses. The value added is commoditized cut-and-sew work — cutting, hemming, finishing, packaging — over inputs of cotton, polyester, and freight [7]. On $3.33 billion of shipments the industry contributes about $1.76 billion of value added, roughly half the sales price, which is the arithmetic of a converter that buys its fabric [19]. Profit turns on winning and holding retailer private-label programs — Crown Crafts' two largest customers, Walmart and Amazon, were 66% of fiscal-2025 gross sales, with licensed product another 50% [26] — running plants full, and escaping pure commodity pricing through branded/premium or institutional (hotel and hospital) linens. The labor intensity is why linen shows only ~$192k of output per worker.

Where the margin actually is — the same lesson on both sides. The reported numbers say the commodity end is thin and the specialized end is not. In carpet, mass residential flooring earned a ~3.1% operating margin at Mohawk in 2025 while Interface's commercial carpet-tile business earned a 38.7% gross and 11.8% operating margin on price, mix, and fixed-cost absorption [15][23]. In linen, branded/licensed Crown Crafts ran a 24.4% gross margin against 18% at private-label-heavy WestPoint Home [25][26][28]. (Gross and operating margins are not comparable to each other — read each pair on its own basis.) The shared thread: both halves are thin-margin, volume-and-utilization games with limited pricing power in commodity product, and in both, the escape route is brand, specification, or channel. The difference: a carpet owner is most exposed to feedstock/energy and the flooring cycle; a linen owner to wages, cotton, and the ability to compete with imports. Detail is in each child primer, Section 5.

---

6. Demand drivers

The two halves share a housing-and-consumer backbone but diverge on their defining secular force.

Common drivers: housing turnover and existing-home sales (both are largely replacement/remodel products), new residential construction and household formation, and consumer discretionary spending (both trade down in downturns). Carpet adds a meaningful commercial leg — offices, hospitality, healthcare, education — where carpet tile has held up best [10]; linen adds an institutional leg — hotels and hospitals — that is more service-driven and defensible [2].

The divergence: carpet's defining headwind is substitution to hard-surface flooring (a shift in what buyers choose), while linen's is import penetration (a shift in where the goods are made). Both erode the domestic base, but a policy or price move that helps one — say, a tariff that reshores linen production — does little for the other.

What the incumbents are doing about it is itself a useful signal, and it runs in opposite directions. On the carpet side the response is diversification out of the category — Berkshire reports Shaw expanding into hard surfaces precisely because consumers moved there [12]. On the linen side the response is automation to defend domestic cost position — American Textile has announced robotics and AI-enabled production investments meant to speed output and improve consistency [31]. Neither is a growth story for the domestic mill base; both are attempts to hold ground. See each child primer, Section 6.

---

7. Regulation

Neither child is licensed or rate-regulated; both carry product-safety, labeling, environmental, and trade obligations, but the emphasis differs.

• Carpet (31411) faces the heavier environmental/product-stewardship stack, concentrated in California: Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) carpet-recycling assessments funding the industry nonprofit CARE (Carpet America Recovery Effort), which rose up to ~36% effective January 1, 2024 with further differential increases in 2025 [32]; restrictions on PFAS (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances) stain treatments; and voluntary indoor-air/VOC (volatile organic compound) certification. EPA's Textile Mills Effluent Guidelines (40 CFR Part 410) govern carpet-finishing wastewater, and an ongoing study may support revised PFAS-related requirements [34].
• Linen (31412) faces the heavier trade-and-labeling stack: flammability standards enforced by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), fiber-content/country-of-origin/care labeling under the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) testing for infant items, and — the big swing factor — trade policy, including Section 301 tariffs, the 2025 suspension of the "de minimis" ($800 duty-free) import exemption [35], and Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) cotton-sourcing diligence [36].

The one regulatory thread now common to both: PFAS. It reaches the two halves at different stages. Carpet's exposure is legacy and physical — Shaw and Mohawk reportedly stopped using PFAS in U.S. carpet production in 2019 but still face disputes over historical releases around Dalton [33]. Linen's is prospective and administrative — stain- and water-resistant finishes fall under EPA's TSCA Section 8(a)(7) reporting rule, with deadlines of October 13, 2026 for most manufacturers and April 13, 2027 for small businesses reporting solely as importers [37]. In short: carpet's regulatory cost creep is mostly environmental, linen's mostly trade — but chemical rules are converging on both. Specifics and citations are in each child primer, Section 7.

---

8. Consolidation

The consolidation stories are almost mirror images, which is why the group HHI (~616) sits between them.

• Carpet has already consolidated. It is a Big Three-to-Four (Shaw, Mohawk, Engineered Floors, plus Interface in commercial) atop a fragmented tail, with roughly 85% of production within ~65 miles of Dalton, Georgia [9]. As volume shrank, weaker mills failed and were absorbed (Beaulieu of America's 2017 bankruptcy, its assets going to Engineered Floors), and private equity is separately rolling up flooring distribution and installation [5][38].
• Linen has barely consolidated domestically (CR4 21.1%, HHI ~192 [7]) but is highly concentrated globally among a few vertically integrated Asian giants — Welspun alone is estimated at ~45% of U.S. towel imports and ~59% of U.S. sheet imports [14]. Consolidation shows up as survivor scale among the few remaining U.S. mills, foreign acquisition of U.S. brands (Indo Count buying Wamsutta in 2024 is the template) [39], and premium DTC entrants capturing margin without owning plants.

Net: in carpet the consolidation has largely happened onshore, among manufacturers; in linen the concentration is real but sits offshore and in brands rather than in U.S. plants — which is why the domestic HHI reads "fragmented" while the shelf an American shopper sees does not. See each child primer, Section 8.

---

9. Risks

Grouping the two risk sets, the shared and distinct risks are:

Shared across the group:

1. Structural erosion of the domestic base (substitution for carpet; imports for linen).
2. Housing and discretionary cyclicality — both track home sales, construction, and consumer confidence.
3. Input-cost volatility — feedstock/energy for carpet; cotton/freight for linen.
4. Weak pricing power and thin margins in commodity segments — visible in Mohawk's ~3.1% Flooring North America operating margin in 2025 [15].
5. PFAS exposure — legacy litigation and remediation on the carpet side even for producers that stopped using it, new reporting obligations on the linen side [33][37].
6. Public-market thinness — the best assets are private or foreign, listed exposure is limited and often indirect, and the one U.S. residential carpet micro-cap carries a going-concern warning [24].

Distinct to each:

• Carpet: oil-linked fiber spikes; California-led environmental cost creep (CARE assessments up ~36% in 2024) [32]; genuine uncertainty over whether the hard-surface share shift has stabilized or is still running [10][11][12].
• Linen: trade-policy whipsaw (tariffs can protect finished-goods makers but also raise the cost of the imported fabric many converters buy); customer concentration among a few mega-retailers (66% of Crown Crafts' fiscal-2025 gross sales came from two) [26]; UFLPA sourcing compliance; currency competition from Asian majors.

Full discussion in each child primer, Section 9.

---

10. How to invest & outlook

Routes — pick your half.

• Carpet exposure (public): Mohawk (MHK) for diversified large-cap flooring, Interface (TILE) as the closest commercial carpet-tile pure play and the better-margin business of the two [23], Dixie (DXYN) as a speculative micro-cap now carrying a going-concern warning [24]; Berkshire (BRK.A/BRK.B) owns Shaw but immaterially [20].
• Linen exposure (public): Crown Crafts (CRWS) as the closest U.S.-listed pure-play, Culp (CULP) for adjacent fabric exposure, Icahn Enterprises (IEP) for diluted WestPoint Home exposure [28], and the Indian majors (Welspun Living, Trident, Indo Count) via international brokerage access. There is no dedicated U.S. home-textiles or textile-furnishings exchange-traded fund (ETF).
• Private routes (both halves — where most real money is made): direct mill ownership; for carpet, area-rug importing/distribution and flooring distribution/installation roll-ups; for linen, custom-drapery workrooms, hospitality/healthcare linen supply (more defensible, service-driven), and premium DTC bedding brands.

Outlook. Treat the group as two mature, structurally challenged domestic manufacturing bases that are not going to re-accelerate — the reasonable base case is a lower, more stable volume plateau, with returns coming from cost position, product mix, and cycle timing rather than growth. Carpet is the larger, more consolidated, more capital-intensive half whose swing factors are housing turnover, mortgage rates, oil-linked fiber costs, and whether the hard-surface share shift really is flattening [10][11][12]; linen is the smaller, fragmented, more labor-intensive half whose swing factors are the 2025–26 tariff and de-minimis regime, cotton prices, housing turnover, and automation investment [31][35]. Add to both watch-lists the PFAS calendar — legacy carpet disputes and the October 2026 / April 2027 TSCA reporting deadlines for treated textiles [33][37]. In both halves, the healthier pockets for investors are the premium, branded, commercial, and institutional niches — the margin data on both sides says so — not commodity mass-retail product. For the complete outlooks and near-term watch-items, read the 31411 Carpet and Rug Mills and 31412 Curtain and Linen Mills primers.

---

Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definition — 31411 Carpet and Rug Mills; and the Histometrics 31411 primer. https://www.census.gov/naics/
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definition — 31412 / 314120 Curtain and Linen Mills; and the Histometrics 31412 primer. https://www.census.gov/naics/
3. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration Ratios / Summary Statistics, NAICS 3141 (receipts ~$12.67B; firms 1,188; CR4 41.8%, CR8 51.9%, CR20 68.1%, CR50 82.0%; HHI 616.2). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
4. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 3141 (establishments 1,296; employment 43,233; annual payroll ~$2.092B; Q1 payroll ~$527.7M). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
5. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration Ratios / Selected Statistics, NAICS 314110 (shipments ~$9.34B; firms 184; CR4 56.7%, CR8 70.4%, CR20 87.8%, CR50 96.9%; HHI 1,110.9), via the Histometrics 31411 primer. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
6. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 314110 (establishments 237; employment 25,931; annual payroll ~$1.366B), via the Histometrics 31411 primer. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
7. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration Ratios / Summary Statistics, NAICS 314120 (shipments $3.33B; firms 1,004; CR4 21.1%, CR8 32.2%, CR20 52.3%, CR50 67.3%; HHI 192.1), via the Histometrics 31412 primer. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
8. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 314120 (establishments 1,059; employment 17,302; annual payroll $726.9M; Q1 payroll $180.3M; 896 establishments with fewer than 20 employees), via the Histometrics 31412 primer. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
9. New Georgia Encyclopedia, Carpet Industry (Dalton, GA; ~85% of production within 65 miles). https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/business-economy/carpet-industry/
10. Floor Covering News, Carpet: State of the Industry 2025 (2025). https://www.fcnews.net/2025/10/carpet-state-of-the-industry-2025/
11. Floor Daily, Residential Carpet's Resurgence: carpet's market share has stabilized (February 2025). https://www.floordaily.net/floorfocus/residential-carpets-resurgence-carpets-marketshare-has-stabilized-and-soft-surface-could-f
12. Berkshire Hathaway, 2025 Annual Report (shareholder letter; consumer shift away from soft-surface flooring; Shaw expansion into hard surfaces). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000119312526106284/d948018dars.pdf
13. Sheng Lu / U.S. Fashion Industry Association, State of U.S. Textile and Apparel Manufacturing, Employment and Trade (April 2025). https://shenglufashion.com/2025/04/07/state-of-u-s-textile-and-apparel-manufacturing-employment-and-trade-updated-april-2025/
14. Exencial Research Partners, Welspun Living Ltd (2025), citing OTEXA U.S. import data (~45% of U.S. towel imports; ~59% of U.S. sheet imports). https://exencialrp.substack.com/p/welspun-living-ltd
15. Mohawk Industries, Form 10-K for FY2025 (U.S. carpet-and-rug market ~$11.2B within a $33.2B U.S. floor-covering market; Flooring North America operating margin ~3.1% in 2025 vs 6.3% in 2024), SEC, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/851968/000085196826000011/mhk-20251231.htm
16. Mordor Intelligence, United States Home Textile Market — Size & Share Analysis (2025). https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/united-states-home-textile-market
17. U.S. International Trade Commission, Shifts in U.S. Merchandise Trade 2021 — Textiles ($15.4B of U.S. home-furnishing textile imports, 2021). https://www.usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/tradeshifts/2021/textiles
18. Tendata, Which Countries Are Major Importers and Exporters of Rugs? (2024). https://www.tendata.com/blogs/export/5491.html
19. Federal Reserve, Industrial Production Source and Description — Table 1.16 (value added, NAICS 314120, 2022). https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/SandDesc/table1.16.htm
20. Berkshire Hathaway, Form 10-K for FY2025 (Shaw wholly owned; processes ~92% of carpet-yarn requirements internally), SEC, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/ixviewer/ix.html?doc=%2FArchives%2Fedgar%2Fdata%2F1067983%2F000119312526083899%2Fbrka-20251231.htm
21. CT Acquisitions, Flooring PE Roll-Up Tracker 2026 (Engineered Floors #3, ~$1.5B), 2026. https://ctacquisitions.com/guides/flooring-pe-rollup-tracker-2026/
22. Mohawk Industries, Form 10-K for FY2024 (net sales ~$10.8B; three segments), SEC, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/851968/000085196825000023/mhk-20241231.htm
23. Interface, Inc., Form 10-K for FY2025 (revenue $1.39B; 38.7% gross margin; 11.8% operating margin), SEC, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/715787/000071578726000006/tile-20251228.htm
24. The Dixie Group, Form 10-K for FY2025 (revenue ~$257M; going-concern warning), SEC, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29332/000002933226000018/dxyn-20251227.htm
25. Crown Crafts, Inc., Investor Relations / FY2025–FY2026 Results (Nasdaq: CRWS). https://www.crowncrafts.com/investor-relations
26. Crown Crafts, Inc., 2025 Annual Report (two largest customers 66% of fiscal-2025 gross sales; licensed products 50%), SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/25895/000143774925021419/crowncraftars.pdf
27. Culp, Inc., 2025 Form 10-K (revenue ~$213M), SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723603/000095017025095233/culp-20250427.htm
28. Icahn Enterprises L.P., 2025 Form 10-K (WestPoint Home wholly owned; 18% gross margin in 2025), SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813762/000110465926019821/tmb-20251231x10k.htm
29. 1888 Mills, LLC, USA Manufacturing (largest remaining U.S. towel mill, Griffin, Georgia), 2025. https://www.1888millsglobal.com/usa-manufacturing
30. Floor Daily, Fiber Industry Update: PET product branding and raw material costs (synthetic fiber cost tied to oil/feedstock). https://www.floordaily.net/floorfocus/fiber-industry-update-pet-product-branding-and-ra
31. American Textile Company, American Textile Company Honored as Record Growth Continues (robotics and AI-enabled production investment), September 2024. https://www.americantextile.com/about/news/american-textile-company-honored-as-record-growth-continues/
32. Floor Covering News, California carpet recycling hike takes effect via CARE (up to 36% increase effective January 1, 2024), 2024. https://www.fcnews.net/2024/01/california-carpet-recycling-hike-takes-effect-via-care/
33. Associated Press, Forever chemicals taint water near carpet mills in Georgia (Shaw/Mohawk stopped PFAS use in 2019; ongoing disputes over historical releases), 2024. https://apnews.com/article/944a8878af446ec3171e1b3b836d506d
34. U.S. EPA, Textile Mills Effluent Guidelines (40 CFR Part 410; carpet-finishing wastewater; PFAS study underway). https://www.epa.gov/eg/textile-mills-effluent-guidelines
35. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Suspension of Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment — Fact Sheet (August 2025). https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/factsheet_suspension_of_duty-free_de_minimis_treatment.pdf
36. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Forced Labor — Frequently Asked Questions (UFLPA). https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced-labor/frequently-asked-questions
37. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, TSCA Section 8(a)(7) Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for PFAS (deadlines October 13, 2026 and April 13, 2027). https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managing-chemicals-under-tsca/tsca-section-8a7-reporting-and-recordkeeping
38. Chattanooga Times Free Press, One of America's biggest carpet makers files for bankruptcy (Beaulieu, 2017; assets to Engineered Floors). https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2017/jul/17/carpet-manufacturer-beaulieu-files-bankruptcy/
39. Business Wire, Indo Count Acquires U.S. Premium National Brand WAMSUTTA (2024). https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240419524102/en/