Knit Fabric Mills (United States) — Industry Primer

NAICS 2022 code 313240. A Histometrics industry primer for public-market and private investors.

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1. Overview

Knit fabric mills take yarn and loop it into fabric — the stretchy, comfortable cloth in T-shirts, athletic wear, swimwear, underwear, mattress covers, medical bandages, and car-seat upholstery. Unlike woven cloth (think a dress shirt or denim), knit fabric is made by interlocking loops, which is why it stretches and drapes. This industry covers the mills that knit that fabric — and, in many cases, also dye and finish it — but not the factories that sew it into clothing.[1]

Why an investor should care: this is a small, mature, and consolidating slice of U.S. manufacturing. Domestic mills generated about $1.29 billion in receipts (2022) from roughly 100 establishments and 5,200 workers.[2][3] The bigger story is competitive: Americans consume far more knit fabric than U.S. mills produce, and imports — led by China — dwarf domestic output.[7] The mills that survive here have mostly stopped competing on commodity apparel cloth and moved into technical and specialty fabrics (defense, medical, automotive, industrial, mattress) where "Made in USA," speed, and quality control matter more than the lowest price.

Public vs. private ways in. There is essentially no pure-play, publicly traded U.S. knit fabric mill. The nearest listed names are Culp, Inc. (NASDAQ: CULP), whose mattress-fabric segment includes knitted fabrics but also wovens and sewn covers, and Unifi, Inc. (NYSE: UFI), an upstream yarn and recycled-fiber maker.[13][14][22] Most actual knitting is done by privately held, family-owned mills (Beverly Knits, Contempora Fabrics, Gehring Textiles, Apex Mills) or by divisions of large private materials companies (Milliken & Company).[6][10][12][23][24] For most investors, meaningful exposure is a private-market proposition — direct ownership, acquisition, or supplying the niche.

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2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) code 313240 covers establishments that do one or more of: knit weft (circular) fabric; knit warp (flat) fabric; knit and finish fabric; or make lace and lace goods. Mills may knit only; knit and finish; or knit, finish, and further fabricate fabric (but not into apparel). An establishment that knits fabric and then manufactures apparel belongs in NAICS 315120; a cut-and-sew producer using purchased fabric belongs elsewhere in apparel manufacturing. This boundary is essential because many commercial "knitting industry" estimates improperly combine fabric mills with garment factories.[1]

Two knitting methods define the technology:

• Weft / circular knitting — a single yarn loops horizontally around a rotating cylinder. Produces soft, very stretchy cloth: jersey for T-shirts, fleece, mattress ticking, seamless activewear.[9]
• Warp / flat (tricot, raschel) knitting — many yarns run lengthwise. Produces stronger, run-resistant, shape-holding fabric: swimwear, compression and shapewear, lace, mesh, automotive and industrial textiles, composite reinforcement.[9]

What it excludes (and the adjacent NAICS codes that catch it):

• Knitting yarn into finished garments → 315120 Apparel Knitting Mills (e.g., knit-to-shape sweaters, hosiery).[5]
• Spinning fiber into yarn/thread → 313110 Fiber, Yarn, and Thread Mills (this is where Unifi mostly sits).
• Weaving broadloom cloth → 313210 Broadwoven Fabric Mills.
• Standalone dyeing/finishing of purchased fabric → 313310 Textile and Fabric Finishing Mills.
• Sewing fabric into sheets, towels, bags, or technical products → the 314 Textile Product Mills group.

Ownership mix. Overwhelmingly private. The 2022 Economic Census counted 97 firms operating those ~100 establishments — meaning almost every firm runs a single mill.[3] Owners are typically founding families, second/third-generation operators, employee-owned ESOPs (Contempora Fabrics), or specialty-textile groups; a few mills are units of large private materials companies (Milliken, which owns performance-textile brand Polartec).[12][23][24] There are no cooperatives, little government ownership, and no dominant public roll-up. The SBA (U.S. Small Business Administration) treats a knit fabric mill as a small business up to 500 employees — a bar almost every U.S. mill clears, so this is by definition a small-business industry.[4]

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3. How big it is

Federal statistics (our ground truth):

That implies average pay of roughly $47,000 per worker and average receipts of about $13 million per firm — a small-scale, capital-intensive manufacturing profile.[2][3] Employment has declined for decades as U.S. textile output moved offshore; the 2012 Economic Census recorded 178 companies and 7,474 employees, indicating a roughly 30% contraction in establishments and employment over a decade.[25]

Two caveats on the numbers.

1. Commercial databases count more, not fewer. Vendors such as IBISWorld and SICCODE list ~230 "active companies" and ~6,000 employees for this code.[5][6] Those figures run higher than the Census because they sweep in adjacent, inactive, or loosely tagged businesses; the federal "primarily engaged" counts above are the authoritative baseline. This is not an industry that federal statistics undercount — there is no army of micro-operators or government-run activity hiding from the surveys.
2. Domestic output is a small slice of what America actually uses. The real undercount is of the market, not the mills: U.S. knit-fabric consumption was estimated near $1.4 billion in 2024, and imports (by volume, led by China; by value, India growing fastest) far exceed shrinking domestic production.[7] USDA reports that U.S. cotton mill use fell 6% in calendar 2025 to approximately 0.8 billion pounds, while apparent U.S. retail cotton use was 8.3 billion raw-fiber-equivalent pounds — the disparity reflecting the dominant role of imported finished textile and apparel products.[26] Judgment: the U.S. mill base is a specialty survivor, not the main supplier of the nation's knit fabric.

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4. The investable universe

There is no clean public pure-play. The table below lists the closest listed names plus the major private and specialty owners that define the domestic industry.

Notes for investors: Culp (CULP) is the most direct listed exposure but imperfect — its mattress-fabric segment includes woven fabrics and sewn covers alongside knits, and FY2025 segment gross margin was only 7.0%.[22] Unifi (UFI) is a micro-cap fiber company whose fortunes track recycled-polyester demand more than knitting per se, and it has been loss-making and restructuring (see §5). Global listed knitters exist mainly in Asia and are apparel manufacturers rather than fabric mills. So public-market exposure to U.S. knit fabric is thin and indirect; the genuine ownership opportunities are private.

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5. How the money works

A knit fabric mill is a conversion (spread) business wrapped around expensive machines. Owners make money on the gap between what they pay for yarn and energy and what they charge for finished fabric — multiplied by how hard they keep the machines running. The metrics that matter:

• Conversion margin / spread. Yarn is the dominant input cost — Culp states that raw materials represent approximately 60–70% of mattress-fabric production costs, identifying synthetic yarns, unfinished fabric, adhesives, laminates, dyes, and other chemicals as principal inputs.[22] Polyester and nylon prices track crude oil and petrochemical feedstocks; cotton tracks the crop cycle and cotton futures.[20][22] Because yarn is often a "pass-through" cost, mills protect margin by adding value — dyeing, finishing, printing, and specialty construction — rather than selling plain greige (undyed) cloth. Vertically integrated mills that knit and finish capture the most margin, which is why consolidation clusters around finishing (see §8).[11]
• Capacity utilization. Knitting machines and dyehouses are high-fixed-cost assets. Idle machine time destroys margin, so throughput and uptime are the core operating levers; mills throttle or idle lines when demand or power costs spike.[20] A mill can report similar sales at dramatically different margins depending on throughput and restructuring.
• Energy intensity. Textiles are energy-hungry: roughly 61% fuel, 39% electricity in U.S. mills, with electricity running the knitting and fuel/gas running the wet processing (dyeing/finishing).[20] Energy is one of the largest controllable costs and a structural disadvantage versus low-cost Asian producers.
• Product mix / niche premium. Commodity apparel jersey competes head-on with imports and earns thin margins; technical fabrics (Berry-Amendment defense cloth, medical, automotive, industrial, mattress) command higher, stickier prices and are the profit center of the domestic survivors. Culp notes that knit constructions offer higher gross-margin potential because of their design, texture, and functional flexibility.[22]
• Speed and small-batch service. The domestic value proposition is quick-turn, near-shore, low-minimum production — reorders in weeks, not months. This "reshoring / speed-to-market" advantage is how a U.S. mill justifies a price premium over an ocean container from Asia.
• Working capital. Owners carry inventory of yarn and greige fabric and finance the lag between buying yarn and getting paid for finished cloth; managing that cash cycle is central to a small mill's survival.

Live cautionary examples. Culp's mattress-fabric segment generated $7.9 million of gross profit on $113.9 million of FY2025 sales, a 7.0% segment gross margin; management attributed weakness to muted bedding and home-furnishings demand, weaker consumer spending, and housing-market conditions, responding by reducing fixed costs and consolidating knitting capacity.[22] Unifi (the upstream fiber proxy) shows similar pressure: revenue fell from about $623M (FY2023) to $582M (FY2024), and in Q4 FY2025 sales dropped another ~12% to $138.5M with a small gross loss and negative adjusted EBITDA.[13][14] Management responded by consolidating manufacturing and selling a facility to cut debt by roughly $43 million.[14] The read-through: soft apparel demand plus import competition compresses margins across the U.S. textile chain, and survival depends on cutting fixed cost and moving up-market.

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6. What drives demand

• Apparel and athleisure cycles. Knit fabric ultimately becomes clothing. Retail apparel demand, the athleisure/activewear boom, and fashion swings between knit and woven silhouettes drive volume.[7]
• End-market diversification. Beyond clothing, demand comes from automotive interiors, medical textiles, mattresses/bedding, military and industrial uses — often less cyclical and more defensible than apparel.[9][10] Culp notes that knitted mattress fabrics have migrated from premium mattresses into mid- and lower-priced products and are used in nearly all roll-packed bedding; roll-packed mattresses, e-commerce distribution, and consumer interest in sleep are supportive of demand.[22]
• Trade policy and relative import prices. Because imports set the competitive price, tariffs, currency, and shipping costs swing demand toward or away from domestic mills. Chinese fabric prices and the U.S. tariff wall are decisive (see §7).[7][18]
• Reshoring / "Made in USA" and supply-chain resilience. Post-pandemic interest in shorter, domestic supply chains, plus buyers wanting traceable, forced-labor-free cotton, supports niche domestic demand.[18]
• Government procurement. Defense and other federal buyers are required to buy U.S.-made textiles (see Berry Amendment, §7), a guaranteed floor of domestic demand.[15][16]
• Recycled and traceable synthetics. Downstream brand demand for recycled inputs supports U.S. yarn producers like Unifi, whose REPREVE fiber platform generated $175 million (31% of FY2025 sales).[14]
• Input and energy costs. Cheap natural gas and electricity, and stable polyester/cotton prices, make domestic knitting more competitive; spikes do the opposite.[20]

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7. Regulation

Knit fabric mills are lightly regulated as producers but heavily shaped by trade and procurement rules:

• Berry Amendment (10 U.S.C. §2533a). Bars the Department of Defense from buying fabric, fiber, and made-up textiles not 100% U.S.-origin end-to-end. This is a direct demand subsidy for domestic mills and the backbone of the technical/defense niche.[15][16]
• USMCA yarn-forward rule of origin. Under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, apparel qualifies for duty-free treatment only if the yarn and everything after it is made within the bloc — steering North American brands toward regional (including U.S.) fabric. A de-minimis allowance caps non-originating fiber at ~10% by weight. The industry lobbies to tighten these rules in the ongoing USMCA review.[18][19][21]
• CAFTA-DR yarn-forward framework. Under the Central America–Dominican Republic free trade agreement, qualifying knit fabric is subject to a fiber-forward rule, and apparel generally requires regional yarn, fabric formation, and assembly for preferential treatment. Commercial-availability exceptions permit certain inputs from outside the region, but the framework preserves Western Hemisphere demand for U.S. knitting capacity.[30]
• Section 301 China tariffs. Additional duties on Chinese textiles and apparel raise import costs and are broadly favorable to domestic producers; the industry pushes for enforcement.[18][21]
• De minimis loophole. The tariff exemption that let low-value (mostly Chinese) parcels enter duty-free was a major grievance; its closure is a policy tailwind the domestic industry welcomed.[18]
• Forced-labor enforcement (UFLPA). The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act blocks cotton goods tied to Xinjiang, nudging brands toward verifiable non-Chinese (including U.S.) supply.[18]
• Product-safety flammability standards. Apparel textiles must meet the CPSC (Consumer Product Safety Commission) Standard for the Flammability of Clothing Textiles, 16 CFR Part 1610; children's sleepwear and other end-uses carry stricter standards.[17]
• EPA effluent guidelines. Wet finishing carries meaningful regulatory exposure. EPA's Textile Mills Effluent Guidelines under 40 CFR Part 410 cover knit-fabric bleaching, mercerizing, dyeing, printing, resin treatment, waterproofing, flameproofing, and soil-repellent finishing at regulated direct dischargers. EPA is also studying textile-mill PFAS use and discharges; its 2024 preliminary plan found that PFAS, including legacy long-chain compounds, were present in some mill wastewater discharges.[31][32]
• OSHA cotton dust (clarification). A frequently misstated occupational rule: OSHA's definition discusses cotton dust generated through weaving or knitting, but the operative scope of 29 CFR 1910.1043 says the full standard does not apply to knitting operations or to handling already-knitted material. It principally applies to yarn manufacturing, slashing, weaving, and waste-house operations. A knit mill should be assessed according to its actual integrated processes rather than assumed to fall entirely under the cotton-dust standard.[33]
• Country-of-origin / labeling and environmental permits. Customs origin rules (19 CFR 102.21) govern labeling, and dyehouses hold state/federal wastewater and air permits for wet processing.[21]

Advocacy. The National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO) is the industry's voice on all of the above.[18]

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

• Concentration is moderate, not monopolistic. In 2022 the top 4 firms held 37.5% of receipts, the top 8 54.6%, the top 20 77.1%, and the top 50 95.7%; the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration gauge) was 494, well below the ~1,500 threshold regulators consider "moderately concentrated."[3] Translation: a handful of larger mills lead, but a long tail of small specialists remains — and antitrust is not the binding constraint here.
• The real competition is imports, not each other. Domestic mills compete less with one another than with Chinese, Indian, and other Asian fabric. Importantly, the most damaging competitor may be imported finished apparel rather than imported roll goods: a foreign-made garment embeds foreign fabric and eliminates the domestic garment producer that would have purchased U.S. fabric.[7][34]
• Consolidation runs through vertical integration. Survivors buy up finishing and adjacent capacity to control quality and capture margin. Example: Beverly Knits acquired Gentry Mills in 2022, forming Creative Dyeing & Finishing and adding to a group that already spanned knitting, ticking, finishing, and sewing.[11] Apex Mills acquired a former Hanesbrands facility in Stuart, Virginia, adding 240,000 sq ft of warp-knitting and dyeing capacity.[28] Roll-ups of family mills facing succession (aging owners, no heir) are the main M&A theme.
• Foreign acquirers entering. South Korea's Hansae acquired U.S. circular knitter Texollini in 2024, signaling foreign interest in domestic capacity.[29]
• Barriers to entry are capital and know-how. New circular/warp knitting lines and dyehouses are expensive, energy-permitted, and skill-dependent — which protects incumbents but also strands capital when demand falls.

Forward-looking judgment: expect continued attrition of commodity capacity and selective consolidation of specialty/finishing assets, with private buyers (families, PE, strategic materials groups, and foreign acquirers) as the natural consolidators.

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9. Risks

• Import competition and price deflation. The dominant, structural risk: cheaper imported fabric caps domestic pricing and volume; falling Chinese apparel prices bleed back up the chain. Finished apparel imports are often more damaging than fabric imports because a foreign-made garment eliminates the domestic garment producer that would have purchased U.S. fabric.[7][34]
• Demand cyclicality. Apparel and retail downturns hit knit-fabric orders directly; the Culp and Unifi results illustrate how fast soft demand turns into losses.[13][14][22]
• Input and energy cost swings. Polyester tracks oil; cotton tracks the crop; both, plus power, move margins that are already thin.[20][22]
• Policy reversal. The industry's tailwinds are policy-made — tariffs, Berry, USMCA, CAFTA-DR, de-minimis closure. A shift toward liberalization, or a weak USMCA renegotiation, would remove props from under domestic mills.[18][19][30]
• Succession and scale. Many mills are small and family-run; owner retirement without a buyer, or subscale operations that can't fund modernization, drive closures.[11]
• Capital intensity / stranded assets. High fixed costs mean a demand shortfall or a lost anchor customer can quickly make a mill unprofitable, with hard-to-redeploy machinery.[14]
• Customer concentration. Large bedding, apparel, automotive, and brand programs can represent substantial mill volume and may exert significant purchasing leverage.[22]
• Labor risk. Less about sheer headcount than the availability of knitting technicians, mechanics, dye-house personnel, color specialists, and quality staff. Older equipment and an aging trained workforce create downtime and succession risk. Automation reduces direct labor but increases dependence on scarce maintenance and programming expertise.
• Environmental and regulatory cost. Dyeing and finishing carry wastewater, chemical, and energy compliance costs that can rise with tighter rules; EPA is studying textile-mill PFAS discharges.[20][31][32]
• Substitution risk. Woven fabrics compete where dimensional stability or abrasion resistance matters; nonwovens compete in medical, filtration, and industrial applications; films, coated laminates, and molded components can displace textiles altogether. Knit mills defend their position through stretch, conformability, breathability, surface texture, low weight, and complex engineered constructions.

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10. How to invest and the outlook

Public-market routes (limited).

• Culp (NASDAQ: CULP) is the most direct listed exposure, but still imperfect — its operations include knitted and woven mattress fabrics, sewn covers, upholstery fabrics, and third-party sourcing. Its filings nevertheless provide unusually useful read-throughs on domestic knitting utilization, yarn costs, bedding demand, and restructuring. FY2025 mattress-fabric segment gross margin was 7.0%.[22]
• Unifi (NYSE: UFI) offers upstream exposure to polyester and nylon yarn consumed by knitters and weavers. It is more a wager on synthetic-fiber demand, recycled content, and Western Hemisphere textile production than on fabric-mill conversion margins — a loss-making micro-cap mid-restructuring, with real balance-sheet and turnaround risk.[13][14]
• Diversified exposure comes only through broad textile/apparel or industrials funds; there is no U.S. knit-fabric-mill ETF or pure-play basket.
• Listed knitters elsewhere (mainly Taiwan/Asia) are apparel makers, not U.S. fabric mills, and carry different (FX, sourcing) risks.

Private-market routes (where the real access is).

• Direct acquisition of family mills. Many owners are at succession age; specialty and finishing assets change hands via private deals and small-cap M&A.[11] The buy thesis is buying cash-flowing niche capacity at modest multiples and modernizing it.
• Specialty/technical roll-ups. Private equity and strategic materials groups consolidating dyeing, finishing, and technical-knit capacity — the Beverly Knits playbook.[10][11]
• Serving protected niches. Businesses anchored to Berry-Amendment defense, medical, automotive, and mattress demand enjoy stickier margins and a policy floor.[15][16]
• Reshoring plays. Equipment, quick-response domestic supply for U.S. brands, and traceable non-Chinese cotton/fiber all ride the "Made in USA" and supply-resilience theme.[18]

Diligence considerations. Private-market diligence should be establishment-specific: machine age and gauge mix, utilization by shift, conversion versus owned-yarn sales, order length, pounds or yards by construction, defect and rework rates, customer concentration, qualification pipelines, chemical inventory, wastewater permits, energy and water intensity, operator depth, and maintenance capital expenditure.

Near-term drivers (forward-looking).

• Tailwinds: higher tariffs on Chinese textiles, the closed de-minimis loophole, forced-labor enforcement, a potentially tighter USMCA (under review), CAFTA-DR yarn-forward preservation, and continued reshoring interest all favor domestic mills.[18][19][30]
• Headwinds: soft apparel demand, structurally cheaper imports, energy and input-cost volatility, and ongoing consolidation/attrition of subscale capacity.[7][14][22]

Bottom line. U.S. knit fabric mills are a small, mature, policy-sensitive manufacturing niche — about $1.3 billion and ~100 mills — that has survived by abandoning commodity apparel cloth for specialty, technical, and defense fabrics.[3][15] For public investors, direct exposure barely exists; for private investors, the opportunity is real but hands-on: buying, modernizing, and consolidating family-owned specialty mills, ideally anchored to protected or reshoring-driven demand. The near-term direction hinges less on fashion than on trade policy — and current policy is, on balance, leaning the domestic industry's way.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau. "NAICS 313240 — Knit Fabric Mills (definition)." 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=313240&year=2022
2. U.S. Census Bureau. "County Business Patterns, NAICS 313240." 2023. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau. "2022 Economic Census — Concentration and receipts, NAICS 313240." 2022. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
4. U.S. Small Business Administration. "Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 313240 — 500 employees)." 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
5. IBISWorld. "NAICS Code 313240 — Knit Fabric Mills." 2025. https://www.ibisworld.com/classifications/naics/313240/knit-fabric-mills/
6. SICCODE. "NAICS Code 313240 — Knit Fabric Mills (companies, trade values)." 2024. https://siccode.com/naics-code/313240/knit-fabric-mills
7. IndexBox. "United States' Knitted Fabric Market to Reach 145K Tons and $2 Billion by 2035." 2024. https://www.indexbox.io/blog/knitted-fabric-united-states-market-overview-2024-11/
8. Sheng Lu / FASH455. "State of U.S. Textile and Apparel Manufacturing, Employment and Trade." 2025. https://shenglufashion.com/2025/04/07/state-of-u-s-textile-and-apparel-manufacturing-employment-and-trade-updated-april-2025/
9. Apex Mills. "Comparing Warp and Weft Knitting Techniques." 2024. https://www.apexmills.com/media_post/warp-vs-weft-knitting/
10. Beverly Knits. "USA Circular Knit Technical Textile Manufacturer." 2026. https://www.beverlyknits.com/
11. Textile World. "Beverly Knits Inc. Acquires Gentry Mills; Forms Creative Dyeing & Finishing LLC." 2022. https://www.textileworld.com/textile-world/knitting-apparel/2022/10/beverly-knits-inc-acquires-gentry-mills-forms-creative-dyeing-finishing-llc/
12. Milliken & Company. "Company profile." 2025. https://www.milliken.com/
13. Unifi, Inc. "Makers of REPREVE Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal 2024 Results." 2024. https://investor.unifi.com/news-releases/news-release-details/unifir-makers-reprever-announces-fourth-quarter-and-fiscal-2024
14. Unifi, Inc. "FY2025 Form 10-K." 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100726/000095017025111331/ufi-20250629.htm
15. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration. "The Berry Amendment." https://www.trade.gov/berry-amendment
16. Congressional Research Service. "Domestic Preference Statutes: The Berry Amendment and the Kissell Amendment." https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF13001
17. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission / eCFR. "16 CFR Part 1610 — Standard for the Flammability of Clothing Textiles." https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-16/chapter-II/subchapter-D/part-1610
18. National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO). "USMCA rules, de minimis, and enforcement statements." 2025. https://ncto.org/
19. ArentFox Schiff. "New Textile and Apparel Rules for the USMCA (yarn-forward)." https://www.afslaw.com/perspectives/alerts/new-textile-and-apparel-rules-the-usmca
20. Fibre2Fashion. "Energy Costs Impact on Textile Manufacturing." https://www.fibre2fashion.com/market-intelligence/texpro-textile-and-apparel/textile-guide/11425/energy-cost-impact-textile-manufacturing
21. U.S. Customs and Border Protection. "Textile and Apparel Products — rules of origin and Section 301." https://www.cbp.gov/trade/nafta/guide-customs-procedures/provisions-specific-sectors/textiles
22. Culp, Inc. "FY2025 Form 10-K." 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723603/000095017025095233/culp-20250427.htm
23. Contempora Fabrics. "About Us." https://www.contemporafabrics.com/about-us/
24. Milliken & Company. "Milliken & Company to Acquire Polartec from Versa Capital Management." https://www.milliken.com/en-us/news/milliken-company-to-acquire-polartec-from-versa-capital-management
25. U.S. Census Bureau. "2012 Economic Census, NAICS 313240." https://data.census.gov/table/ECNBASIC2012.EC1231A2?codeset=naics~N0000.00&q=ec1231
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27. Culp, Inc. "Culp to Transfer Stock Exchange Listing to Nasdaq." https://culpinc.gcs-web.com/news-releases/news-release-details/culp-transfer-stock-exchange-listing-nasdaq
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29. Knitting Industry. "Hansae Acquires US Circular Knitter." 2024. https://www.knittingindustry.com/hansae-acquires-us-circular-knitter/
30. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration. "Summary of CAFTA-DR FTA Textiles." https://www.trade.gov/summary-cafta-fta-textiles
31. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Textile Mills Effluent Guidelines." https://www.epa.gov/eg/textile-mills-effluent-guidelines
32. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Preliminary Effluent Guidelines Program Plan 16." December 2024. https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2024-12/preliminary-plan-16_december2024_508.pdf
33. U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. "29 CFR 1910.1043 — Cotton Dust." https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.1043
34. U.S. International Trade Commission. "Knit Fabric Industry Summary." https://www.usitc.gov/publications/other/pub2735.pdf