Other Pressed and Blown Glass and Glassware Manufacturing (U.S.)
NAICS 2022 code 327212 — an industry primer for public-market and private investors
1. Overview
This is the industry that melts sand into the glass you actually handle: the tumbler in a restaurant, the wine glass at a wedding, a Pyrex baking dish, a laboratory beaker, the tough "cover glass" on a smartphone, and the glass tubing that becomes a pharmaceutical vial. Formally, it covers establishments that make glass from raw materials and then press, blow, or shape it into glassware — everything except packaging containers (bottles and jars) and flat window-type glass, which are separate industries.[1][2]
Why an investor should care: it is a small, mature, capital-heavy U.S. manufacturing base — about $3.6 billion in domestic shipments in 2022[3] — that has been squeezed for two decades by cheap imports and expensive energy, yet still contains genuinely attractive, defensible niches (engineered specialty glass, pharmaceutical and laboratory glass) alongside a commoditized, distressed core (everyday drinkware and kitchenware).
Ways in differ sharply by segment. There is no U.S.-listed pure-play glassware manufacturer today: the two biggest domestic tableware makers, Libbey and Anchor Hocking, are both privately held after passing through bankruptcy.[4][5] Public-market exposure runs mainly through Corning Incorporated (NYSE: GLW), a diversified materials-science company whose specialty and laboratory glass fall inside this industry — but where glassware is a minority of a business dominated by telecom and AI optical fiber.[6] For most of the industry, ownership is private: private equity, distressed turnarounds, and industrial real estate. The details, tickers, and how-to-invest routes are in sections 4 and 10.
2. What it is and how it's structured
Scope. NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) code 327212 covers plants that melt silica sand or cullet (recycled crushed glass) and form it into pressed, blown, or shaped glass and glassware.[1][2] In practice the output falls into a few families:
- Tableware and drinkware — tumblers, stemware, mugs, barware, sold to foodservice (restaurants, bars, hotels) and retail.
- Kitchen and oven glass — bakeware, measuring cups, casseroles (the Pyrex/CorningWare family).
- Lighting and appliance glass — lamp shades, bulb and lighting components, appliance glass.
- Laboratory and scientific glass — beakers, flasks, test tubes, vials, tubing.
- Technical and specialty glass — display glass, cover glass for electronics, optical and pharmaceutical tubing, textile-type glass fibers made in a glassmaking plant, and other engineered formulations.[1][7]
What it excludes (this matters for comparing companies): flat glass such as windows and mirrors is 327211; bottles and jars are Glass Container Manufacturing, 327213; anything shaped from purchased glass rather than melted on site is Glass Product Manufacturing Made of Purchased Glass, 327215; glass-wool/fiberglass insulation is Mineral Wool Manufacturing, 327993; and fiber-optic cable made from purchased strand is 335921.[8] So the big container name O-I Glass and the big insulation name Owens Corning are adjacent to this industry, not inside it. NAICS is establishment-based, so a diversified corporation can have some plants in 327212 and others in several different codes.
Ownership mix. The domestic industry is concentrated in a handful of large, unionized furnace plants owned by private equity or by former lenders (Libbey, Anchor Hocking), plus one large public conglomerate (Corning) at the technical/laboratory end.[4][5][6] There is also a long tail of small specialty and studio/art glassmakers, but they are economically minor and many fall below Census reporting thresholds.
3. How big it is
Federal statistics for this specific industry (U.S. only):
| Metric | Value | Source (year) |
|---|---|---|
| Shipments / receipts | $3.61 billion | Economic Census (2022)[3] |
| Employment | 10,738 | County Business Patterns (2023)[9] |
| Establishments (plants) | 376 | County Business Patterns (2023)[9] |
| Firms (companies) | 349 | Economic Census (2022)[10] |
| Annual payroll | $706 million | County Business Patterns (2023)[9] |
| Top-4-firm revenue share (CR4) | 48.6% | Economic Census (2022)[10] |
| Top-8-firm share (CR8) | 64.1% | Economic Census (2022)[10] |
| Top-20-firm share (CR20) | 82.7% | Economic Census (2022)[10] |
| Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) | 766 | Economic Census (2022)[10] |
Read together: a small industry where the four largest firms make roughly half of all output[10], yet the HHI of 766 sits below the 1,500 threshold the U.S. Department of Justice treats as "unconcentrated"[10] — a few large plants at the top and a long fragmented tail beneath them.
The coverage caveat — undercount runs the other way. Unlike industries dominated by tiny or informal operators, this one is capital-intensive (you cannot run a glass furnace out of a garage), so the Census captures domestic production fairly completely. The gap is different: these figures measure U.S. manufacturing, not U.S. consumption. Americans buy far more pressed and blown glassware than domestic plants make, because imports supply a large share of what reaches shelves — China alone accounted for roughly 30% of U.S. glassware imports and about 28.7% of world glass-and-glassware exports in 2022, versus 6.6% for the United States.[11] A second gap: some in-scope specialty and laboratory glass is buried inside diversified firms like Corning and never appears as a standalone "glassware" line.[6] So the industry's relevance to investors is wider than the $3.6 billion domestic number suggests.
4. The investable universe
There is no clean, U.S.-listed pure play. Public exposure is indirect (a diversified conglomerate) or foreign-listed; the core domestic tableware business is private.
| Company | Status / ticker | ~Scale | In-scope exposure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corning Incorporated | Public — NYSE: GLW | ~$15.6B total revenue (2025)[12] | Specialty Materials (display and cover glass) $2.2B revenue, $367M segment net income; Life Sciences (laboratory glass) $972M revenue, $61M segment net income (2025); the rest (optical fiber, etc.) is out of scope[6][13][14] |
| Libbey | Private (was NYSE American: LBY until 2020) | Leading U.S. foodservice glass tableware; ~$155M gross profit (2024)[15] | Almost entirely in-scope (drinkware, stemware, tableware)[4] |
| Anchor Hocking (Anchor Hocking Group) | Private — Centre Lane Partners; plant real estate owned by LCN Capital via sale-leaseback[5][16] | Lancaster, Ohio plant runs 3 of roughly 10 operating U.S. glass-tableware furnaces; announced up to $70M U.S. investment with a new Lancaster furnace expected to operate H1 2026, adding 200+ union jobs[17][18] | Entirely in-scope (bakeware, drinkware, tableware); a federal court's 2024 account identified Centre Lane as having obtained full ownership of Corelle Brands and transferred it to Anchor Hocking[19] |
| Nippon Electric Glass | Public — Tokyo: 5214 | Global display glass and tubing | Technical/specialty glass |
| Şişecam (Paşabahçe) | Public — Istanbul: SISE | Global glassware and glass | Tableware and specialty glass |
| Borosil / Borosil Scientific | Public — India (NSE) | Consumer and laboratory glass | Kitchen and lab glass |
| Gerresheimer | Public — Frankfurt: GXI | Pharmaceutical glass tubing, vials, ampoules | Specialty/pharma glass (some overlaps container coding) |
| Praana Group | Private (acquired Owens Corning's glass reinforcements May 2026) | $645M enterprise value; Owens Corning received ~$280M cash plus expected $50M–$70M from excess alloy sales[20] | Textile glass reinforcements made by establishments that melt the glass themselves (in-scope portion of reinforcements) |
Adjacent but NOT this industry: O-I Glass (NYSE: OI) makes glass containers (327213); Owens Corning (NYSE: OC) makes fiberglass insulation and composites (327993) and completed the sale of its glass-reinforcements business in May 2026.[8][20]
5. How the money works
The economics are those of a continuous-process, capital-intensive commodity manufacturer, and a few variables dominate.
- Capacity utilization is the master lever. A glass furnace runs 24 hours a day at roughly 1,500°C for a multi-year "campaign," then must be shut and rebuilt at a cost of tens of millions of dollars.[21][22] Fixed costs are high and hard to flex, so an idle furnace is very expensive and incremental volume on a running furnace is very profitable. Owners live or die by keeping furnaces full. Energy intensity rises as a furnace ages, creating additional pressure to maintain utilization or time rebuilds carefully.[23]
- Energy is the swing cost. Natural gas fuels most U.S. glass furnaces — roughly 73% of the broader glass industry's fuel mix according to U.S. Energy Information Administration data, with electricity supplying about 24% — and energy can reach about 14% of total production cost.[21][24] When gas prices spike, thin margins compress fast; there is little pricing power in commodity glassware to pass it through.[21]
- Other inputs: silica sand, soda ash, limestone, and cullet. Using more cullet lowers the energy needed to melt a batch — the U.S. Department of Energy found that each additional 10 percentage points of cullet can reduce melting energy by approximately 2.5–3% — so recycled-glass supply feeds directly into cost.[21][23] Cullet also reduces carbonate-related process emissions and refractory wear, but contaminated cullet (ceramics, metals, lead glass, heat-resistant cookware) can cause inclusions, breakage, and days of lost yield.[23]
- Product mix is the margin story. A plain restaurant tumbler is a low-margin, import-exposed commodity; decorated, branded, tempered/breakage-resistant, borosilicate, laboratory, and engineered specialty glass carry much higher margins. Value creation concentrates in brand, design, durability, and proprietary formulations rather than in cheap volume.
- Channels behave differently. Foodservice demand includes a steady breakage-replacement annuity — restaurants and bars re-order broken glasses regardless of the economy — which is more resilient than discretionary retail housewares. Business-to-business and technical channels (lighting, appliances, electronics, pharma, labs) track their own end-market cycles.
Because furnace decisions are made years ahead and cannot be dialed back quickly, the industry is prone to overcapacity when demand dips — the recurring cause of its bankruptcies.
6. What drives demand
- Foodservice and hospitality health — restaurant traffic, bar and hotel openings, and the constant replacement of broken glassware. The steadiest driver.
- Consumer discretionary spending, housing, and household formation — retail tableware, gifting, weddings, and at-home entertaining trends (the cocktail-and-barware boom is a real tailwind).
- Electronics cycle — smartphone, tablet, and display volumes for cover and display glass at the specialty end.[6]
- Life-science and pharmaceutical activity — research funding and drug production drive laboratory glass and pharmaceutical tubing/vials; laboratory glass saw a pandemic surge that has since normalized.[13][25]
- Glass-versus-plastic preference — sustainability and "clean/premium" perception favor glass (inert, recyclable, microwave- and dishwasher-friendly), a modest secular tailwind.
- Trade and reshoring — protective tariffs on imported glassware and "Made in USA" sentiment can pull volume back to domestic plants; retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports push the other way.[11][15]
- Cyclicality. Non-container glass is more cyclical than food-and-beverage packaging; EIA's historical comparison found that during the 2007–09 downturn, shipments in glass segments other than containers declined about 20%, versus about 4% for containers.[24]
7. Regulation
- Environmental / air emissions. Glass furnaces are significant emitters of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides, particulates, and carbon dioxide, and are regulated under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean Air Act — including source-specific air-toxics standards and Title V operating permits.[21][22] EPA's area-source National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) applies to plants operating continuous furnaces that produce at least 50 tons per year per furnace and use compounds containing covered metal hazardous-air pollutants.[26] EPA's greenhouse-gas reporting program (Subpart N) expressly includes continuous furnaces making pressed and blown glass; facilities meeting the reporting threshold must measure process and combustion emissions.[27] Decarbonization pressure is pushing the industry toward electric, hybrid, and hydrogen-capable furnaces, an expensive transition; federal support has been uneven, with some previously awarded U.S. Department of Energy industrial-decarbonization grants reported cancelled in 2025.[15]
- Water. EPA's effluent guidelines under 40 CFR Part 426 address glass-manufacturing wastewater streams and specifically include hand-pressed and blown glass.[28]
- Trade. Antidumping and countervailing duties, plus Section 301 tariffs, apply to various categories of Chinese glassware; conversely, retaliatory tariffs abroad — such as Canada's 25% duty on drinkware and foodservice glass in 2025 — raise costs for U.S. exporters.[11][15] Trade policy is a two-edged, fast-moving lever for this industry.
- Product safety. Food-contact glass is subject to U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rules; California's Proposition 65 has historically targeted lead and cadmium in decorated drinkware; and thermal-shock/breakage standards apply to kitchen glass. Laboratory glass follows ASTM International specifications.[25]
- Worker safety. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulates heat exposure and respirable crystalline silica dust in these hot, hazardous plants. OSHA's general-industry silica rule sets a permissible exposure limit of 50 micrograms per cubic meter as an eight-hour time-weighted average and an action level of 25 micrograms per cubic meter.[29] BLS recorded a 2024 total recordable injury-and-illness rate of 2.5 cases per 100 full-time-equivalent workers in NAICS 327212, including 1.4 cases involving days away, restriction, or transfer.[30]
8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation
The dominant story is a long secular decline in domestic capacity colliding with imports. U.S. glass plants fell from about 35 to 21 between 2005 and 2015, and the broader glass sector shed close to 40,000 manufacturing jobs, as low-cost Chinese and other Asian producers took the commodity end of the market.[11] BLS data show the scale of the workforce decline: private-sector employment in NAICS 327212 fell from 40,186 in 2000 to 10,905 in 2024, a 72.9% drop — reflecting plant closures, automation, offshoring, and the disappearance of legacy lighting and consumer-glass capacity.[31]
Consolidation has come mainly through serial distress. EveryWare Global (Anchor Hocking and Oneida) went through Chapter 11 in 2015; Libbey filed Chapter 11 in June 2020 and emerged that November as a private company owned by its former lenders, with net debt cut below $150 million[4][32]; and Instant Brands — the Pyrex, CorningWare, and Corelle owner — filed Chapter 11 in 2023.[33] A federal court's 2024 account states that Centre Lane Partners subsequently obtained full ownership of Corelle Brands and transferred it to Anchor Hocking, consolidating the major domestic bakeware and household-glass brands under one private owner.[19] Ownership across the domestic core is now private equity and lender consortia.
The result is extreme concentration of surviving physical capacity: Anchor Hocking's single Lancaster, Ohio complex houses three of roughly ten glass-tableware furnaces still operating in the country.[17] That gives the remaining domestic players some tariff-sheltered pricing footing but also creates single-plant fragility. At the top, the four largest firms account for about 49% of output.[10]
The competitive split is clear: the commoditized drinkware and kitchenware segment is a cost-, scale-, and tariff-protection game against global majors (Arc, Şişecam/Paşabahçe, Bormioli Rocco, and others), while the engineered specialty and laboratory segment — led by Corning, Schott, Nippon Electric Glass, and DWK Life Sciences (Duran, Kimble, Wheaton) — competes on formulation, patents, and precision, and earns far better returns.[13][25]
9. Risks
- Energy shocks. A natural-gas price spike hits margins directly and cannot be fully passed through in commodity segments.[21]
- Import competition and trade whiplash. Cheap imports pressure the commodity core, while retaliatory tariffs abroad hit exports; the direction of trade policy can swing profitability either way.[11][15]
- Cyclicality and overcapacity. Foodservice, retail, and electronics demand are all cyclical, and furnaces cannot be idled cheaply — so downturns produce loss-making excess capacity. EIA historical data show non-container glass shipments declined about 20% in the 2007–09 recession versus about 4% for containers.[24]
- Balance-sheet fragility. The industry's history of leveraged buyouts and bankruptcies (Libbey, Instant Brands, EveryWare) shows how debt plus a demand dip forces restructuring.[4][33]
- Furnace and single-plant risk. Rebuilds are large periodic capex events, and with so few domestic furnaces left, a fire or furnace failure at one site is materially disruptive.[17]
- Labor. Unionized, aging, hot-work workforces bring strike risk — Libbey's Toledo plant saw a roughly ten-week strike in 2025, among the longest in its history.[15] Silica handling, hot surfaces, molten glass, cutting hazards, and shift work create ongoing safety exposure.[29][30]
- Substitution. Plastics, metal, melamine, and ceramics compete in some uses, though sustainability trends cut the other way.
- Decarbonization cost. The shift to lower-carbon furnaces requires heavy capital, and federal support has proven unreliable.[15]
- Operational risks. Contaminated cullet can cause inclusions, breakage, downtime, and days of lost yield; gas or power interruption, refractory failure, mold shortages, and the loss of experienced furnace operators are additional vulnerabilities.[23]
10. How to invest and the outlook
Public-market routes. There is no U.S.-listed pure play. The principal large-cap with in-scope exposure is Corning (NYSE: GLW), whose Specialty Materials (display and cover glass, $2.2 billion revenue, $367 million segment net income in 2025) and Life Sciences (laboratory glass, $972 million revenue, $61 million segment net income) sit inside this industry — but Corning trades primarily as an optical-fiber and AI-infrastructure story, so glassware is a minority of its ~$15.6 billion in revenue and buyers should size their thesis accordingly.[6][12][13][14] Investors wanting closer-to-pure exposure must look to foreign listings — Nippon Electric Glass (Tokyo), Şişecam (Istanbul), Borosil (India), Gerresheimer (Frankfurt). The familiar "glass" tickers O-I Glass (OI) and Owens Corning (OC) are adjacent industries, not this one; Owens Corning completed the sale of its glass-reinforcements business to Praana Group in May 2026.[8][20]
Private-market routes. This is fundamentally a private industry now. The realistic angles are: private-equity ownership of domestic platforms (Anchor Hocking under Centre Lane Partners, which announced up to $70 million in U.S. investment including a new Lancaster furnace expected H1 2026)[18]; distressed and turnaround investing, given the sector's repeated restructurings; industrial real estate, notably sale-leasebacks of furnace plants (LCN Capital's purchase of the Anchor Hocking facility is the template)[16]; glass-reinforcements operations (Praana Group's acquired textile-glass business)[20]; and direct ownership of specialty, laboratory, lighting, and technical glassmakers, many of them family- or founder-owned and higher-margin than commodity tableware.
Near-term drivers to watch (forward-looking): natural-gas prices, which set the margin floor; the tariff regime, both protective duties on Chinese glassware and retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exporters; the pace of foodservice normalization after its post-pandemic swings; the glass-versus-plastic sustainability preference; reshoring momentum; the electronics and AI-glass cycle at the specialty end; and whether decarbonization capital gets federal support or falls entirely on owners.[6][11][15][21]
The judgment. This is a mature, slow-growth, import-pressured industry with two very different halves. The commodity core — everyday drinkware and kitchenware — is consolidated down to a few surviving furnaces, chronically distressed, and dependent on energy discipline and trade protection; it rewards operators, not growth investors. The specialty and laboratory half — engineered display and cover glass, pharmaceutical tubing, and lab glassware — is defensible, higher-margin, and tied to durable demand from electronics, healthcare, and research. For investors, the money is where glass is engineered, not where it is a cheap tumbler — and the cleanest public expression of that, imperfectly, is Corning.
Sources
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- U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — receipts/shipments, NAICS 327212 (via internal ground-truth statistics), 2022. https://data.census.gov/
- PR Newswire, Libbey Successfully Completes Financial Restructuring and Emerges from Chapter 11, 2020. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/libbey-successfully-completes-financial-restructuring-and-emerges-from-chapter-11-301173650.html
- Observer-Reporter, Back in business? (Anchor Hocking / Centre Lane), 2025. https://www.observer-reporter.com/news/local-news/2025/jul/24/back-in-business/
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- Glass International, US trade group calls for tariffs on Chinese glass imports, 2024. https://www.glass-international.com/news/us-trade-group-calls-for-tariffs-on-chinese-glass-imports
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- PR Newswire, LCN Acquires Anchor Hocking Glassware Manufacturing Facility, 2023. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/lcn-acquires-anchor-hocking-glassware-manufacturing-facility-301966524.html
- GlassOnline, Anchor Hocking to close glass glassware plants (Lancaster furnace detail), 2024. https://www.glassonline.com/anchor-hocking-to-close-glass-glassware-plants/
- Anchor Hocking, Press Releases (investment announcement), 2025. https://www.anchorhocking.com/press-releases/
- Justia, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Centre Lane Partners, U.S. District Court W.D. Pennsylvania, Case 2:2024cv01501, Document 42, 2024. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/pennsylvania/pawdce/2:2024cv01501/314180/42/
- Owens Corning, Owens Corning Completes Sale of Glass Reinforcements Business to Praana Group, 2026. https://newsroom.owenscorning.com/all-news-releases/news-details/2026/Owens-Corning-Completes-Sale-of-Glass-Reinforcements-Business-to-Praana-Group/default.aspx
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