Sawmills (United States) — NAICS 321113

An investor's primer. NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the U.S. government's standard code for industries; 321113 is the specific code for sawmills.

1. Overview

A sawmill takes raw logs and cuts them into dimensional lumber — the 2x4s, boards, beams, timbers, and ties that frame houses and build almost everything made of wood. It is the first industrial step between a standing tree and a finished wood product, and it sits at the center of a roughly $41 billion U.S. industry.[4]

For an investor, the key thing to understand is that this is a commodity manufacturing business tied tightly to the housing cycle. Sawmills buy a volatile input (logs) and sell a volatile output (lumber), and they make money on the spread between the two, run through fixed, capital-heavy plants. When homebuilding is strong and lumber prices spike, well-run mills print cash; when mortgage rates rise and construction stalls, high-cost mills curtail shifts or close entirely. The cycle is severe and recurring.

There is a wrinkle for stock-market investors: most of the U.S. sawmill industry is privately held, and the biggest players are diversified timber-and-wood-products companies, not pure sawmill firms. Public-market exposure comes mainly through timber real estate investment trusts (REITs) and one large NYSE-listed producer; the purest lumber plays trade in Canada. Private investors, by contrast, can access the industry directly — through timberland, family-mill ownership, or private equity — and that is in fact where much of the industry's value sits.

2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. NAICS 321113 covers establishments primarily engaged in sawing logs into lumber, boards, beams, timbers, poles, ties, shingles, shakes, siding, and similar products; wood chips made at the sawmill are also included, and a mill may plane lumber it produced itself. A "sawmill" here is the primary breakdown of logs — the softwood mills of the South and West Coast that supply construction lumber dominate the economics, alongside thousands of smaller hardwood and specialty mills. The industry sits within NAICS subsector 321 (Wood Product Manufacturing) and the broader Manufacturing sector 31–33.[1]

What it excludes (adjacent NAICS codes an investor should not conflate with sawmills):

• 113310 Logging — harvesting the standing timber. This is the upstream supplier of logs, not the mill.
• 321114 Wood Preservation — pressure-treating lumber (e.g., for decks); a separate downstream step.
• 321912 Cut Stock, Resawing Lumber, and Planing and 321918 Other Millwork — remanufacturing rough lumber into finished stock, moldings, and flooring.
• 321211–321219 Veneer, Plywood, and Engineered Wood Products — plywood, oriented strand board (OSB, made from wood strands and adhesive), laminated veneer lumber, and glulam. Many large "lumber" companies also run these plants, but they are not sawmilling.
• 322 Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills — the main buyers of the wood chips sawmills produce.

Operating model. A conventional mill receives and sorts logs, debarks them, performs a primary breakdown into rough boards and cants, then edges, trims, grades, and sorts the lumber. Depending on the product, it may kiln-dry and plane the boards before packaging. Modern commodity softwood mills are high-throughput, scanner- and optimization-software-driven plants; smaller hardwood and specialty mills are more heterogeneous and may optimize for grade and value rather than maximum line speed.[2] It is worth noting that "lumber" is not one interchangeable commodity — species, region, grade, dimensions, moisture content, appearance, and certification determine the relevant price, so a headline framing-lumber index is not a reliable proxy for every establishment classified in 321113.

Ownership mix. The industry is a barbell. At one end sit a handful of large, capital-intensive producers running dozens of mills each; at the other, a long tail of small independent and family mills. Federal data count 2,439 firms operating 2,691 establishments — meaning most firms run a single mill, averaging roughly 30 employees.[3][4] Ownership spans public timber REITs, privately held family dynasties (Sierra Pacific, Idaho Forest Group, Hampton), a Koch Industries subsidiary (Georgia-Pacific), and Canadian-headquartered majors that have built large U.S. footprints.

3. How big it is

Federal statistics for NAICS 321113 (U.S., our ground-truth sources):

Concentration. By the Census Bureau's measures the industry looks fragmented: the four largest firms account for just 22.2% of receipts, the top 8 for 35.7%, the top 50 for 59.3%, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration score where under 1,500 is "unconcentrated") is only 191.[4] That represents a modest increase from 2017, when the corresponding ratios were 21%, 31%, and 54% with an HHI of 159 — concentration has risen, but the full six-digit industry remains structurally fragmented.[5]

But there is an important caveat. Those figures pool all sawmills — including thousands of small hardwood and specialty mills — into one bucket, while the economically dominant subset is softwood construction lumber. Forisk estimated 2024 U.S. softwood-lumber capacity at 47.9 billion board feet, of which the ten largest producers controlled 24.1 billion board feet — roughly 50%. Weyerhaeuser led with 4.6 billion board feet, followed by West Fraser at 3.4 billion and privately held Sierra Pacific Industries at 3.3 billion.[6] So the construction-lumber segment that investors care about is far more concentrated than the raw 321113 concentration ratios imply.

Undercount note. Sawmilling is a real factory industry with paid employees, so the federal shipments figure is reasonably solid — this is not a case like logging or many services where government or sub-scale operators distort the numbers. The main blind spot is the fringe of very small "portable" band-sawmill and farm operations, some without paid employees, that fall below Census employer thresholds. They are numerous but tiny, and do not materially change the industry's $41 billion scale.[4]

4. The investable universe

There is no large U.S.-listed pure-play sawmill company. Public exposure comes through diversified producers and timber REITs; the cleanest lumber plays are Canadian-listed. Federal data confirm the largest single owners of U.S. capacity, several of which are private.[6][7]

Public companies (with U.S. sawmill exposure):

BBFT = billion board feet, the industry's volume unit; a board foot is 12" x 12" x 1".

Major private / other owners:

• Sierra Pacific Industries (SPI) — fourth-generation family-owned (Emmerson family); #2 U.S. producer, ~18 sawmills, and the largest private forestland owner in the U.S. (~2.4M acres).[17][23]
• Georgia-Pacific — subsidiary of privately held Koch Industries; #4 U.S. producer.[7][24]
• Idaho Forest Group, Hampton Lumber (Hampton Affiliates), Biewer Lumber, Roseburg Forest Products — large family/privately held producers rounding out the U.S. top tier.[6][7][25]

Corporate action: In October 2025, Rayonier and PotlatchDeltic announced an $8.2 billion all-stock merger of equals; the transaction closed in January 2026, creating the second-largest U.S. timber REIT with 4.2 million acres and seven wood-products facilities totaling ~1.2 BBFT of lumber capacity. The combined company trades under the Rayonier name (RYN).[18][19]

5. How the money works

A sawmill's profit engine is the lumber-to-log spread: the market price of the lumber it sells minus the delivered cost of the logs it buys, minus the cost of converting one into the other (labor, energy, drying, saw maintenance). Logs are the dominant cost — up to roughly 50% of total production cost — so log supply and log prices largely set the floor on margins.[16]

Four levers drive whether a mill makes money:

1. Lumber recovery (yield / "overrun"). How many board feet of saleable lumber a mill extracts from a given volume of logs. Small yield gains are hugely leveraged: as a rule of thumb, total production cost falls about 2% for every 1% gained in lumber recovery.[16] This is why the industry spends heavily on optical scanning and computerized sawing — the winners are the mills that waste the least wood.

2. Byproduct revenue. A log does not become all lumber — roughly half of each log ends up as chips, sawdust, shavings, and bark.[2][15] Far from waste, these are sold: chips to pulp and paper mills, shavings and sawdust for animal bedding and pellets, bark for landscaping mulch, and residuals as biomass fuel (some large mills run their own cogeneration power plants). This secondary revenue stream is a real margin cushion and often the difference between a profitable and unprofitable mill.

3. Capacity utilization. Mills are fixed-cost heavy, so they are most profitable running near full capacity. When lumber prices fall below cash cost, high-cost mills curtail shifts or shut — which is exactly what the industry has done through the current cycle.

4. The lumber price itself. Framing lumber is a traded commodity and violently cyclical. It spiked above $1,500 per thousand board feet (MBF) during the 2021 pandemic building boom, crashed, and by October 2025 sat around $903/MBF — up ~13% year-over-year but off its highs.[8] Prices are tracked by benchmarks such as the Random Lengths Framing Lumber Composite and traded via CME lumber futures. Because the spread between lumber and log prices can swing far faster than a mill's costs, quarterly earnings for lumber producers are notoriously lumpy.

Margin volatility in practice. PotlatchDeltic's 2024 results illustrate the swing: its average lumber realization fell to $425 per MBF from $452, while its Wood Products adjusted EBITDDA moved to a $7.7 million loss from $20.5 million of profit — driven by lumber price, manufacturing cost, log cost, downtime, and residual-product effects.[26] West Fraser reports a 17% ten-year average adjusted EBITDA margin for its North American lumber business, but its own historical chart shows large swings around that average.[21] Margins should not be treated as stable.

For the timber-REIT owners (Weyerhaeuser, Rayonier), sawmilling is one part of a two-sided model: they earn on the timberland (the biological growth and sale of trees) plus the wood products conversion margin. This creates a natural partial hedge — a standalone mill dislikes rising log costs, while an integrated timberland owner can benefit from them — though basis risk remains because timber and logs are local markets while finished lumber prices reflect wider regional supply and demand. Because REITs are required to distribute most taxable income, these names are held partly for dividends — but the lumber-linked earnings underneath those dividends are cyclical, not bond-like.

6. What drives demand

Lumber demand is overwhelmingly a construction story, with U.S. wood-frame building the swing factor:

• New residential construction is the single largest end use — U.S. homes are framed in wood, so lumber consumption tracks housing starts closely. Single-family starts (more lumber-intensive per unit than multifamily) matter most. Housing starts ran roughly 1.36 million units in 2025, essentially flat versus 2024, with single-family down about 7%.[9] As of May 2026, starts were running at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 1.177 million units, including 882,000 single-family — illustrating the subdued near-term construction environment.[27]
• Repair and remodeling (R&R) — decks, renovations, additions — is a large, somewhat steadier source of demand that cushions the new-build cycle. The share has grown: home improvement rose from 33% of residential construction spending in 2007 to 44% in Q1 2025, partly because high mortgage rates discourage owners from moving.[28]
• Industrial and other uses — pallets, crating, fencing, and packaging.

The master variable behind all of this is interest rates. Mortgage rates drive housing affordability, which drives starts, which drives lumber. Working the other way is a widely cited structural tailwind: the U.S. is estimated to be short roughly 3.7–4 million homes after a decade of underbuilding, which supports demand over the long run even when high rates suppress it in the near term.[9][29]

Substitution risk is real but slower than commodity-price headlines suggest. Steel, concrete, masonry, and engineered systems compete with sawn lumber, but construction practices, codes, design conventions, and workforce skills create inertia. In a 2021 NAHB survey, wood framing represented 91% of new single-family homes completed in 2020, and 82% of builders identified a lack of crews experienced with alternative systems as a significant switching barrier.[30]

7. Regulation

Sawmills themselves are lightly regulated as factories, but they sit downstream of two heavily regulated domains:

• Timber supply and federal lands. The U.S. Forest Service manages the ~193-million-acre National Forest System, historically a major log source. Beginning in the late 1980s, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) — notably northern spotted owl protections — and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) sharply curtailed federal harvesting, especially in the Pacific Northwest, where federal timber output fell from over 1.1 billion cubic feet a year in the 1980s to roughly 160 million by the 2010s.[14] That constraint is the central reason mill capacity has migrated (see §8). Recent federal efforts to expand harvesting have so far not reversed the capacity decline.[14]
• Trade policy — the U.S.–Canada softwood lumber dispute. Canada supplies roughly a quarter of U.S. lumber, and the two countries have fought over it since 1982.[13] The U.S. imposes antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CVD) duties on Canadian softwood; Commerce's 2025 administrative review produced CVD rates ranging from 12.12% to 16.82% and AD rates from 9.65% to 35.53%, depending on producer.[11][12] Separately, a 10% Section 232 national-security tariff effective October 2025 stacked on top, holding the effective combined burden near 34.8% for many producers.[10][31] These duties raise the price of imported lumber, which broadly benefits U.S.-based mills and squeezes Canadian producers — though the same Canadian majors now own large U.S. mills, blurring the winners and losers.

Standard environmental rules (Clean Air Act permits for boilers and dust, Clean Water Act, state forest-practices acts) apply. EPA notes that lumber kilns at major-source facilities fall within the plywood and composite wood-products hazardous-air-pollutant rules even when the facility principally produces lumber.[32] OSHA workplace-safety regulation is significant — the agency describes sawmilling as one of the country's most dangerous occupations because of moving logs, high-speed cutting equipment, dust, and noise.[33]

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

Three forces define the competitive landscape:

1. The great migration South. The defining structural shift is the movement of softwood lumber capacity from the West to the U.S. South. The South rose from about 25% of North American softwood capacity in 2009 to roughly 38% by mid-2024, while the Pacific Northwest shrank by nearly 11%.[8] The South wins because it has abundant, fast-growing, privately owned pine plantations and lower log costs — it is the one North American region with a genuine surplus of harvest-ready timber. Oregon is still the top single producing state (~5.1 BBFT, ~14% of national output), but the momentum is in the South.[8] West Fraser's own portfolio is an extreme example: U.S. South capacity rose from 11% of its total in 2004 to 53% in 2024, while British Columbia fell from 77% to 20%.[21]

2. Canadian majors building in the U.S. West Fraser, Canfor, and Interfor have spent years shifting investment from British Columbia — where beetle kill, wildfire, and policy have tightened log supply — into new and acquired U.S. South mills, both to access fiber and to sidestep import duties. This has made the U.S. producer base surprisingly international at the top.[6]

3. Capacity rationalization. Consolidation runs alongside brutal capacity cuts. Since 2023, more than 5 billion board feet of North American mill capacity has been idled or closed as low prices met high costs — over 3 BBFT in 2024 alone.[9] Seven new North American softwood mills began operating in 2024, but only one belonged to a top-ten producer, evidence that greenfield investment and consolidation can occur simultaneously.[34] The big producers are simultaneously acquiring, expanding, modernizing, and shuttering mills to concentrate output in the lowest-cost plants. The Rayonier–PotlatchDeltic merger (§4) is the latest large-scale combination.

9. Risks

• Cyclicality. This is the overriding risk. Earnings are hostage to housing starts and lumber prices, both of which swing hard with interest rates. Down-cycles force curtailments and can wipe out a year of profits.
• Price volatility. Lumber is among the most volatile of traded commodities; the lumber-log spread can invert quickly, and quarterly results are unpredictable.
• Log supply and cost. Access to affordable fiber is the key constraint — acute in the West (federal-land restrictions, wildfire) and a competitive advantage in the South. Fire, hurricanes, insects, drought, and harvest restrictions can constrain logs; conversely, a mill can be unable to exploit high finished-product prices if logging or trucking capacity is unavailable. Weyerhaeuser specifically reports fewer third-party harvesting and delivery contractors in some markets, with consequent increases in logging and hauling costs.[22]
• Trade-policy whipsaw. Duty rates on Canadian lumber move with each administrative review and can shift the competitive balance abruptly in either direction. Duties can improve U.S. mill pricing and capacity utilization but also raise building costs and suppress end demand.
• Physical and climate risk. Wildfire, drought, and insect infestations (e.g., mountain pine beetle) can destroy timber inventory and disrupt supply.
• Substitution. Steel and concrete compete in some construction; conversely, mass timber (see §10) is a substitution tailwind.
• Capital intensity and labor. Staying low-cost requires continuous automation investment, against a tight, aging skilled-labor pool. Rural locations, shift schedules, and demand for maintenance and controls skills complicate recruitment.[33]

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes:

• Timber REITs — Weyerhaeuser (WY) and Rayonier (RYN) — give diversified exposure to sawmilling plus timberland, with dividend income; understand that the lumber earnings inside them are cyclical.
• West Fraser (WFG) on the NYSE is the most direct large-cap lumber-producer exposure available to U.S. investors.
• Pure-play lumber — Interfor (IFP) and Canfor (CFP) — trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange for investors comfortable with a Canadian listing and currency.
• Sector ETFs such as iShares Global Timber & Forestry (WOOD) and Invesco MSCI Global Timber (CUT) offer diversified exposure, but they are broad forestry/paper baskets, not sawmill-specific. WOOD owns global forest-products, packaging, paper, and timber-REIT securities; CUT's index includes forest ownership and products using timber as raw material.[35][36]
• Commodity exposure via CME lumber futures gives a direct bet on the lumber price itself — high volatility, and not a proxy for owning a business.

Private-market routes are, unusually, where the bulk of the industry actually sits — Sierra Pacific, Georgia-Pacific, Idaho Forest Group, Hampton, and Roseburg are all private. Access comes through owning timberland (directly or via Timberland Investment Management Organizations, TIMOs), private-equity stakes in wood-products producers, or direct ownership of regional and family mills. For a private investor, the sawmill business is genuinely accessible in a way most industrial sectors are not. The decisive diligence is local rather than national: sustainable log supply within an economic haul radius, competing mill demand, species and grade mix, mill recovery, uptime, replacement capital, workforce depth, rail and truck access, kiln bottlenecks, and dependable outlets for chips, bark, and sawdust.

Outlook (forward-looking). The near-term picture is muted by high mortgage rates keeping housing starts flat and single-family construction soft; capacity closures have continued into 2026.[9] Beyond that, the industry's bull case rests on three legs: the large structural U.S. housing shortage eventually pulling starts higher as rates normalize; the continued cost advantage and capacity growth of the U.S. South; and elevated trade duties on Canadian imports supporting domestic mill margins. A newer demand source is mass timber — engineered products such as cross-laminated timber (CLT) used in taller commercial and multifamily buildings — which could add a structural leg of lumber demand over the coming decade. None of this dampens the core reality for investors: sawmilling remains a cyclical commodity business, best bought when the housing cycle and lumber prices are depressed rather than when they are booming.

The most common analytical error is to model "lumber" as one national commodity business. NAICS 321113 mixes industrial softwood mills, hardwood grade mills, and specialty producers; national Census concentration is low even though commodity-softwood capacity is concentrated; and almost every listed company bundles sawmills with timberland, panels, engineered wood, pulp, or distribution. Those boundaries materially affect any claimed market size, margin, valuation multiple, or commodity sensitivity.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Manual. https://www.census.gov/naics/reference_files_tools/2022_NAICS_Manual.pdf
2. USDA Forest Products Laboratory, "The Hardwood Lumber Manufacturing Industry," 2008. https://www.fpl.fs.usda.gov/documnts/pdf2008/fpl_2008_bergman002.pdf
3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns (NAICS 321113), 2023.
4. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — receipts and concentration measures (NAICS 321113), 2022.
5. U.S. EPA, Final Regulatory Economic Analysis for Plywood and Composite Wood Products NESHAP, Table 2-4 (2017–2022 concentration comparison), 2026. https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2026-06/plywood_eia_neshap_final_20260629.pdf
6. Forisk, "Top 10 North American and U.S. Lumber Producers in 2024," 2024. https://forisk.com/top-10-north-american-and-u-s-lumber-producers-in-2024/
7. Forisk, "Top 10 North American and U.S. Lumber Producers in 2025," 2025. https://forisk.com/top-10-north-american-and-u-s-lumber-producers-in-2025/
8. LANDTHINK / Forisk, "Local Log Markets and the Migration of Softwood Lumber Capacity Across North America," 2024. https://www.landthink.com/local-log-markets-and-the-migration-of-softwood-lumber-capacity-across-north-america/
9. Newswire / Madison's Lumber Reporter, "Lumber Prices and US Housing Starts Update: Full Year 2025," 2025. https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/lumber-prices-and-us-housing-starts-update-full-year-2025-830799563.html
10. Wood Central, "U.S. to Cut Canadian Lumber Duties by 10% — Rate Stays at 35%," 2025. https://woodcentral.com.au/u-s-to-cut-canadian-lumber-duties-by-10-rate-stays-at-35/
11. U.S. Department of Commerce (trade.gov), "Final Results of Softwood Lumber from Canada Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews," 2025. https://www.trade.gov/press-release/commerce-department-announces-final-results-softwood-lumber-canada-countervailing
12. U.S. International Trade Administration, "Commerce Department Announces Final Results: Softwood Lumber from Canada," 2025. https://www.trade.gov/press-release/commerce-department-announces-final-results-softwood-lumber-canada-countervailing
13. Congressional Research Service, "U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade: Current Issues for Congress" (R48781), 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48781
14. Congressional Research Service, "Timber Harvesting on Federal Lands" (R45688), 2022. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45688
15. Northern Woodlands, "Lumber, Chips, and Sawdust: For Sawmills, There's No Such Thing as Waste," 2006. https://northernwoodlands.org/articles/article/lumber_chips_and_sawdust_for_sawmills_theres_no_such_thing_as_waste
16. SawmillSmart, "How to Increase Sawmill Yield: Strategies, Technology, and the True Cost of Doing Nothing," 2026. https://sawmillsmart.com/articles/how-to-increase-sawmill-yield-in-2026-strategies-technology-and-the-true-cost-of/
17. Wikipedia, "Sierra Pacific Industries," 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Pacific_Industries
18. International Forest Industries / Rayonier Investor Relations, "Rayonier and PotlatchDeltic to Merge in $8.2 Billion All-Stock Deal," 2025. https://internationalforestindustries.com/2025/10/16/rayonier-and-potlatchdeltic-to-merge-in-8-2-billion-all-stock-deal-to-form-second-largest-u-s-timber-reit/
19. Rayonier Investor Relations, "Rayonier and PotlatchDeltic Announce Closing of Merger of Equals," 2026. https://ir.rayonier.com/news/news-details/2026/Rayonier-and-PotlatchDeltic-Announce-Closing-of-Merger-of-Equals/default.aspx
20. Wikipedia / StockAnalysis, "West Fraser Timber," 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Fraser_Timber
21. West Fraser, Q4 2024 Investor Presentation, 2025. https://www.westfraser.com/sites/default/files/2025-02/WFG%20-%20Q4%202024%20Investor%20Presentation%20-%20vFINAL_0.pdf
22. Weyerhaeuser, 2025 Form 10-K. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/106535/000119312526051422/wy-20251231.htm
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24. Georgia-Pacific, "About Us." https://www.gp.com/about-us/
25. Idaho Forest Group, "About Us." https://ifg.com/about-us/
26. PotlatchDeltic, 2024 Form 10-K. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1338749/000095017025019711/pch-20241231.htm
27. U.S. Census Bureau / HUD, New Residential Construction (May 2026). https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/current/
28. National Association of Home Builders, "NAHB Expects Remodeling Growth in 2026 and Beyond," 2026. https://www.nahb.org/news-and-economics/press-releases/2026/02/nahb-expects-remodeling-growth-in-2026-and-beyond
29. Freddie Mac, "Housing Supply: Still Undersupplied," 2024. https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/housing-supply-still-undersupplied
30. National Association of Home Builders, "Why Builders Stick with Lumber Despite Price Hikes and Shortages," 2021. https://www.nahb.org/blog/2021/07/Why-Builders-Stick-with-Lumber-Despite-Price-Hikes-and-Shortages
31. White House, "Proclamation: Adjusting Imports of Timber, Lumber, and Their Derivative Products into the United States," 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/adjusting-imports-of-timber-lumber-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united-states/
32. U.S. EPA, "Plywood and Composite Wood Products Manufacturing: Frequently Asked Questions." https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/plywood-and-composite-wood-products-manufacturing-frequently-asked
33. OSHA, Sawmill eTool. https://www.osha.gov/etools/sawmills
34. Forisk, "New Mills in 2024" (press release), 2025. https://forisk.com/wp-content/uploads/Press-Release_Mill-DB_20250304-final.pdf
35. iShares, Global Timber & Forestry ETF (WOOD). https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239752/ishares-global-timber-forestry-etf
36. Invesco, MSCI Global Timber ETF (CUT). https://www.invesco.com/us/en/financial-products/etfs/invesco-msci-global-timber-etf.html