Public Reference

Industry Primers

Bottom-up NAICS industry primers written for both public-market and private investors. Leaf industries are researched from the ground up; every group, subsector, and sector above them reads as a contrast across the industries beneath it.

2122 industries · 24 sectors · NAICS 2022

Researched with AI assistance from official U.S. statistics and independent sources, with citations on every page. Figures are not individually verified against pinned evidence — primers marked Evidence-verified are. Industry research, not investment advice. Methodology.

GroupNAICS 3272

Glass and Glass Product Manufacturing (United States) — NAICS 3272

A Histometrics rollup primer. NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the U.S. government's standard code for industries. This is the four-digit "industry group" for glassmaking. Relevant to both public-market and private investors.

1. Overview

NAICS 3272 is the four-digit industry group that covers all of American glass manufacturing — from the float lines that pour architectural window glass, to the furnaces that press tumblers and blow bottles, to the fabrication shops that cut, temper, and laminate purchased glass into windshields and insulated windows. It is a mature, capital-intensive, energy-hungry, cyclical materials sector: about $31.9 billion of domestic shipments in 2022 from roughly 1,349 firms running 1,541 plants and employing ~87,900 people.[1]

Two facts now anchor the level's shape. First, most of the value in glass is created after the furnace: the U.S. International Trade Commission recorded an average net-sales value of $0.34 per pound for U.S. primary float-glass producers in 2024 against $3.00 per pound for the processors who coat, temper, laminate, and assemble that same glass.[2] Second, every one of the underlying sub-industries is currently in some form of margin or volume pressure — only the structural drivers (energy codes, safety glazing, driver-assistance windshields, solar, container premiumization) are pulling upward.

The one thing an investor needs to know about this level is structural: the four-digit industry group (3272) contains exactly one five-digit industry (32721), and they are effectively the same thing. There is no second child to blend in, no aggregation choice to make — 3272 is 32721. Because of that, this page is deliberately short. It states this level's own federal figures and the shape of the sector, then hands you to the 32721 primer for the full detail: the four sub-industries, the company-by-company investable universe, the economics, and the risks.[23]

2. What's inside — and why this level equals its one child

The NAICS hierarchy narrows by digit: sector (2-digit) → subsector (3-digit) → industry group (4-digit, this page) → industry (5-digit) → national industry (6-digit). At most four-digit codes, the group splits into several five-digit industries and the rollup genuinely aggregates them. Here it does not. Industry group 3272 has a single five-digit child, 32721 (Glass and Glass Product Manufacturing), so every dollar, plant, and job at this level belongs to that one child. The two codes are one-to-one.[20]

The real diversity sits below 32721, at the six-digit level, where the sector fans out into four distinct national industries with four different economics, ownership structures, and ways in:[1]

  • 327211 — Flat glass (float lines: windows, facades, auto, solar). ~17% of receipts, ~14% of jobs. Concentrated: CR4 69.4%, HHI 1,437. No U.S. pure-play — private industrials or U.S. units of foreign majors.
  • 327212 — Other pressed & blown glass and glassware (tumblers, bakeware, lab and specialty glass). ~11% / ~12% — the smallest. Moderately fragmented: CR4 48.6%, HHI 766. A hollowed-out commodity core wrapped around a defensible specialty half.
  • 327213 — Glass containers (bottles and jars). ~21% / ~16%. The tightest oligopoly at this level: CR4 88.4%, CR8 94.7%. Holds the sector's only clean U.S. pure-play.
  • 327215 — Glass products made from purchased glass (fabrication: insulated glass units, tempered/laminated safety glass, windshields, mirrors, solar cover glass). ~51% / ~57% — bigger than the other three combined. Fragmented: CR4 35.7%, HHI 439 across 942 firms. Overwhelmingly private.

Reading across them, three contrasts define this level. Size is lopsided and sits on the wrong side of the furnace — the one industry that buys glass rather than melting it is more than half the dollars and jobs, which the $0.34-versus-$3.00 per-pound gap explains directly.[1][2] Concentration runs backwards from size — the smallest melting industries are the most concentrated, while the largest is the least, because big furnaces demand scale and fabrication does not.[1] And public access is scarce and uneven, so direct ownership of three of the four is essentially a private-markets proposition. That is the 32721 story, and this page does not repeat it — for the full four-way breakdown, read the 32721 primer.[23]

3. How big the level is

Federal ground-truth figures for NAICS 3272 (from our ingested statistics). Because the group equals its one child, these are identical to the 32721 figures:[1]

Metric Value Source (year)
Value of shipments / receipts $31.89 billion Economic Census (2022)
Firms (companies) 1,349 Economic Census (2022)
Establishments (plants) 1,541 County Business Patterns (2023)
Employment 87,874 County Business Patterns (2023)
Annual payroll $5.93 billion County Business Patterns (2023)
First-quarter payroll $1.49 billion County Business Patterns (2023)
Top-4-firm revenue share (CR4) 32.1% Economic Census (2022)
Top-8-firm share (CR8) 46.5% Economic Census (2022)
Top-20-firm share (CR20) 65.3% Economic Census (2022)
Top-50-firm share (CR50) 79.1% Economic Census (2022)
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) suppressed — not released for this level Economic Census (2022)

That works out to roughly $24 million of revenue per firm and average pay near $67,000 — a base of mostly mid-sized, well-capitalized manufacturers, not a cottage industry. The six-digit children reconcile cleanly to these totals on receipts, employment, plants, and payroll. The one exception is the firm count: the four children list 1,374 firms against the level's 1,349, because a company operating in two of the industries is counted once here. That small gap is expected, not an error.[1]

The HHI is suppressed at this level, so we do not report or estimate one; the federal data simply do not provide it. Among the children it is released for three — 1,437 for flat glass, 766 for glassware, 439 for fabrication — and suppressed for containers, where the released CR4 of 88.4% tells the story anyway.[1] What the released ratios do say is that the combined level is statistically unconcentrated: a CR4 of 32.1% sits well below the thresholds antitrust regulators watch. One correction the revised child forces: only two of the four sub-industries are genuinely concentrated (flat glass and containers). Glassware sits below the 1,500-HHI line the Department of Justice treats as unconcentrated, and fabrication is far below it.[1] The reason the whole looks fragmented is that the two real oligopolies have different champions, so no single firm looms large across the level.

Undercount caveat. This level is a clean measure of domestic production, not of the glass economy consumers touch. Glassmaking is too capital-intensive to run informally (there is no garage float line), so the usual small-operator undercount is minor. The gaps run the other way. Imports supply a large share of what reaches U.S. shelves — China alone was roughly 30% of U.S. glassware imports and about 28.7% of world glass-and-glassware exports in 2022, against 6.6% for the United States — so U.S. demand exceeds this $31.9B domestic output.[8] And adjacent-code activity is excluded: auto-glass replacement (Safelite) counts as retail/repair, though Safelite does own two U.S. windshield plants, so a sliver is in scope; building glazing installation is construction (238150); and some technical glass hides inside diversified conglomerates.[13][20]

Do not stack figures across the melt/fabricate boundary. The flat-glass case shows the trap precisely: USITC counted $2.419 billion of 2024 primary-producer shipments and $3.575 billion of fully domestic shipment value once processors' value-added is included, but the $5.028 billion of combined producer-plus-processor net sales double-counts glass sold by a domestic producer to a domestic processor.[2] Read $31.9B as the Census-reconciled domestic glass-manufacturing base, not the total glass economy — commercial market-research valuations for the same territory run far higher (roughly $32 billion for "U.S. flat glass," ~$12 billion for "U.S. container glass") because they price the finished downstream product and include imports.[21]

4. Investable universe — where value concentrates

There is no single ticker for "U.S. glass," and access is uneven across the four six-digit industries. In brief:

  • Containers hold the only clean U.S. pure-play: O-I Glass (NYSE: OI), the world's largest glass-container maker — 64 plants in 18 countries, FY2025 segment sales ~$6.3 billion. It is also a lesson in not confusing segment profit with owner economics: the Americas rebound to $549 million of operating profit sat inside a $129 million net loss for 2025, after $443 million of restructuring and impairment charges and $341 million of net interest on roughly $5 billion of debt.[9]
  • Flat glass has no U.S. pure-play — the big domestic float producers are private (Guardian/Koch, Cardinal) or U.S. units of foreign majors (Vitro, NSG, AGC, Saint-Gobain). Public investors get diluted exposure inside a multinational; direct ownership is private.[4]
  • Glassware's listed expression is diluted — Corning (NYSE: GLW), where the in-scope slices are Specialty Materials ($2.2B revenue, $367M segment net income in 2025) and Life Sciences ($972M revenue, $61M) inside a ~$15.6B company whose story is optical fiber and AI infrastructure.[6] The domestic tableware core (Libbey, Anchor Hocking, now holding Corelle) is private and post-bankruptcy.[7]
  • Fabrication — the biggest slice by far — is overwhelmingly private. The clean U.S. listing, Apogee (NASDAQ: APOG), is only ~19% glass (Architectural Glass did $283.7 million of FY2026 sales); Gentex (NASDAQ: GNTX) adds an automotive-mirror and dimmable-glass angle ($2.14B of its $2.53B 2025 revenue) blended with electronics.[12] The rest is private-equity roll-ups (Oldcastle BuildingEnvelope under KPS; Cardinal at ~$2.7B revenue across 49 locations) plus hundreds of small regional shops, with the vehicle-glass angle running through D'Ieteren (Brussels: DIE), controlling owner of Belron/Safelite (~€6.72B group sales in 2025).[13]

Foreign majors are the connective tissue — AGC, NSG/Pilkington, Saint-Gobain, Fuyao, and Xinyi each span float plus fabrication, so they give broad but currency-exposed, diluted exposure.[4][13] Two corrections the revised child makes to the traps list: Verallia (Paris: VRLA) is a genuine container pure-play but a poor route into this level, having sold its North American plants to Ardagh in 2014;[10] and Owens Corning is insulation and composites, having completed the sale of its glass-reinforcements business to Praana Group in May 2026.[22] Ardagh Metal Packaging remains cans, not glass.[10] A subtler trap: company revenue is not NAICS revenue — a vertically integrated group can hold a float plant, fabrication plants, window operations, and installation across four different codes, so treating consolidated sales as segment share overstates concentration.[20] The full company-by-company map is in the 32721 primer.[23]

5. How the money works

The economics split into melters and a fabricator, and the per-pound gap above is the cleanest expression of it.[2] The three melting industries (flat, glassware, containers) run furnaces at ~1,500°C around the clock for 10–15-year "campaigns," so fixed costs are high and hard to flex — an idle furnace is very expensive and incremental volume on a running furnace is very profitable. The child now quantifies both directions: flat-glass utilization fell from 92.9% (2022) to 84.4% (2024) while producer operating margin went from 10.8% (2024) to 6.4% in the first half of 2025;[2] in containers, O-I's Americas operating profit fell to ~$392M in the 2024 destocking, then rebounded ~40% to ~$549M in 2025.[9] Owners live or die by keeping furnaces full.

Energy is the swing cost, and the two measurements of it genuinely differ. USITC questionnaire data put purchased energy at 6.6% of net sales for flat-glass producers in 2024;[2] market-research figures reach ~14% of production cost across U.S. glassmaking.[14] That is a difference of denominator and scope rather than a factual dispute — read the mid-single-digit share of sales as the measured floor for large float producers and the low-teens share of production cost as the ceiling for more energy-intense melting. Natural gas dominates the fuel mix either way (roughly 73%, electricity ~24%), and each additional 10 percentage points of cullet (recycled crushed glass) cuts melting energy by about 2–3%.[14] The fabricator (327215) works differently — it is a spread business, earning the value-added margin between purchased-glass cost and fabricated selling price, with yield mattering more than in melting because a defect after coating or lamination destroys the purchased lite plus all the labor already invested.[17] The squeeze is visible: the producer price index for purchased-glass products rose ~7% year over year to June 2026, yet Apogee's architectural-glass margin still compressed sharply.[12][19] Across all four, product mix drives margin (coated/low-E, laminated, borosilicate, and branded glass beat commodity clear glass) and freight creates regional moats — though USITC found domestic and imported float highly substitutable where freight allows.[2] Full detail in the 32721 primer.[23]

6. Demand drivers

Glass is a derived-demand sector — it rises and falls with what the glass goes into. Construction is the single biggest driver, hitting flat glass and fabrication together (roughly 80% of flat glass flows to construction and autos);[14] autos drive flat glass and finished auto glass, with a replacement aftermarket that cushions the cycle; food and beverage drive containers, where the mix is now explicit (Q2 2025 shipments were 42.2% beer, 26.0% food, 9.7% wine, 5.0% ready-to-drink, so mainstream beer volumes dominate);[11] foodservice and consumer spending drive glassware; and electronics and life sciences drive the specialty end.[6] The near-term signal is soft: the AIA's Architecture Billings Index, which leads nonresidential spending by roughly 9–12 months, has trended down since early 2023.[17]

Solar remains the cross-cutting growth wedge, and it is now concrete but conditional. NSG converted its Rossford, Ohio float line to online-coated transparent-conductive-oxide glass for First Solar starting March 2025, and Vitro has proposed a new furnace in Texas for patterned, low-iron solar glass (DOE lists the proposed project at $67.7 million).[5] The caveat the child adds and the parent previously glossed: solar is not automatic growth for every float line — chemistry, iron content, texture, coatings, and customer qualification determine whether a plant can serve it at all.[2] Cyclicality also differs by child: in the 2007–09 downturn, shipments of non-container glass fell about 20% against about 4% for containers, so containers are the level's defensive leg on volume even as their long-run direction is downward.[14] Codes work the other way, lifting value per unit even when volume is mediocre — DOE puts windows at about 10% of building energy use and models 7–16% total-energy savings from high-R triple-pane replacement.[16]

7. Regulation

Regulation lands in four recurring places. Air emissions and decarbonization are the melters' burden — EPA reported 22 U.S. flat-glass plants emitting 2.95 million metric tons of CO₂-equivalent in 2019, nearly 70% of estimated direct industry emissions, and continuous furnaces fall under area-source NESHAP, Subpart N greenhouse-gas reporting, and the Part 426 effluent guidelines.[15] The child adds a correction worth carrying: environmental exposure is routinely overstated for fabricators, because the NESHAP primarily addresses glass-producing furnaces — fabricators face coating and frit permitting, wastewater, and customer environmental-product-declaration demands instead.[15] Trade remedies are the most active front, and the parent's earlier framing was imprecise. The USITC made its final injury determinations in March 2026; Commerce issued an antidumping order on Chinese float glass (margins of roughly 247–312%, published in the Federal Register in April 2026) and countervailing-duty orders on both China and Malaysia, while the Malaysian antidumping case was terminated on negligibility grounds.[3] Critically, that is a tailwind for domestic flat glass and solar reshoring and, within the same level, a substrate-cost headwind for independent fabricators who buy that glass.[3] Section 301 duties on Chinese glassware, Section 232 aluminum/steel tariffs, and Canada's 2025 duty on U.S. drinkware cut other ways.[8][17]

Safety and energy-performance codes are a demand creator, mainly for fabrication: the CPSC's 16 CFR Part 1201 is a mandatory federal safety-glazing standard, IBC §2406 specifies where tempered or laminated glass is required, and tightening energy codes (IECC, the ENERGY STAR residential-window specification effective October 23, 2023) push toward low-E multi-pane units — all raising glass content and value per opening.[16] Packaging and product-safety policy closes the set: glass is FDA-recognized as inert for food contact, and seven states have passed Extended Producer Responsibility laws on top of ten deposit systems, which raise cullet supply — deposit states achieve ~63% glass recycling against ~24% elsewhere, though EPA's national estimate still found only a 31.3% container-glass recycling rate.[11][15][18] The child primer covers the specific rules and citations.[23]

8. Consolidation

The competitive structure is the clearest sign that "one level" is really four businesses. Flat glass and containers are consolidated oligopolies — flat glass at CR4 69.4% / HHI 1,437 after PPG's 2016 exit to Vitro, Koch's full takeover of Guardian in 2017, and Cardinal's 2021 purchase of AGC's North American architectural business;[1][4] containers at CR4 88.4% / CR8 94.7% around O-I, Ardagh, and Anchor Glass.[1] Containers are now consolidating through balance sheets and furnace closures rather than acquisitions: O-I is mid-way through a "Fit to Win" program targeting ~$750 million of cost reduction and closing roughly 13% of capacity;[9] Ardagh's 2025 recapitalization wrote off or swapped about $4.3 billion of debt in an exchange S&P labelled a selective default, and Anchor Glass cut debt by more than 60%.[10]

Glassware has consolidated through distress and is now thin enough to be fragile — BLS puts industry employment down 72.9% since 2000 (40,186 → 10,905), and after the EveryWare/Anchor Hocking, Libbey, and Instant Brands bankruptcies, three of roughly ten surviving U.S. glass-tableware furnaces sit on a single Lancaster, Ohio site, partly offset by an announced investment of up to $70 million and a new furnace expected in H1 2026.[7][19] Fabrication is fragmented and consolidating from the bottom up (CR4 35.7%, HHI 439 across 942 firms), driven by private-equity roll-ups — KPS's buyout of Oldcastle BuildingEnvelope at a $3.8 billion enterprise value against 2020 EBITDA of $337 million, roughly 11× — and by vertical integration from float makers such as Fuyao, which has invested over $1.5 billion in U.S. capacity.[1][13] Those different champions in each segment are exactly why the combined level's CR4 is only 32.1%: a merger of two leaders within a segment would draw scrutiny; the combined level would not, on these numbers.[1]

9. Risks

The level's shared risks are cyclicality and operating leverage — now visible in three places at once (flat-glass operating margin at 6.4% in H1 2025, the Fed's glass-container industrial-production index down from 109.0 in 2022 to 80.6 in 2025, and Apogee's architectural-glass margin at 8.7% in Q1 FY2027 after 22.2% two years earlier);[2][12][19] energy shocks, an immediate margin event for the melters;[14] import competition and trade whiplash, which uniquely at this level means the same duty helps one child and hurts another;[3][8] capital intensity and decarbonization capex (O-I alone spent $432 million of capex in 2025, about 6.7% of net sales, and some awarded DOE decarbonization grants were reported cancelled in 2025);[8][9] and labor, a specialized and shrinking workforce — flat-glass production headcount fell from 4,762 (2022) to 4,355 (2024), roughly 90% of container hourly workers are unionized, and Libbey's Toledo plant saw a ~ten-week strike in 2025.[2][8][11] Substitution must be read per child: aluminum cans (with ~71% recycled content against ~23% for glass) take beverage share from containers, but in flat glass six of six producers and 35 of 36 importers told the USITC there is no substitute for the product — the risk there is design choice (less glazed area) rather than material replacement.[2][11] Segment-specific risks — balance-sheet fragility in glassware and containers, single-plant fragility where surviving capacity is thin, solar-demand dependence, quality and remake exposure in fabrication, and limited public access for three of the four sub-industries — are detailed in the 32721 primer.[23]

10. How to invest & outlook

For public-market investors the reachable theses are narrow: O-I (containers, the only clean pure-play, currently loss-making at the bottom line despite the segment rebound), Apogee and Gentex (fabrication, partial and in a margin trough), Corning (glassware, diluted into an optical-fiber/AI business), and a set of foreign majors (NSG, AGC, Saint-Gobain, Vitro, Fuyao, D'Ieteren) for indirect, currency-exposed exposure.[6][9][12][13] Verallia is a European pure-play, not a route into the U.S. level.[10] For private-market investors the sector's real depth — regional fabricators, roll-up platforms, distressed melters, and furnace-plant real estate — is a hands-on, capital-intensive, cyclically timed field, with the recurring diligence traps being understated maintenance capex, aging tempering furnaces, customer concentration, and remake and warranty history.[7][13][17] Investors here watch capacity utilization, energy and cullet costs, and volume/destocking trends more than a single yield or multiple; useful public read-throughs are the Fed's industrial-production index for glass containers, the producer price indexes for flat glass and purchased-glass products, and the AIA billings index.[17][19]

Near-term drivers to watch: interest rates and the building cycle (the master swing factor for over half the level, with the AIA index the leading tell);[17] trade policy (the float-glass orders finalized in March–April 2026, and their two-sided effect on melters versus fabricators);[3] solar reshoring (the strongest case in decades for new domestic capacity, but hostage to solar policy and to whether a given line can make qualifying glass at all);[2][5] and energy and cullet costs, with cullet supply increasingly a function of deposit and EPR policy.[11][14]

The judgment. Because NAICS 3272 equals its one child 32721, the investment view at this level is the child's view: "glass manufacturing" is not one investment — it is four, and the revised child sharpens rather than softens that. Fabrication is the largest, most fragmented, most privately owned child with the best structural growth story, but it is in a genuine cyclical squeeze — the structural case and the near-term numbers point in opposite directions, so an entry today is a bet on rates and codes, not on momentum. Containers offer the only clean public pure-play, but the honest reading is that profit has recovered while physical output has kept falling; the earnings rebound came from cost cuts and closed furnaces, not demand. Flat glass now has a final policy tailwind and a solar wedge, but it enters that tailwind with slack utilization and no clean public vehicle. Glassware is a hollowed-out commodity core — down more than 70% in employment since 2000 — wrapped around a defensible specialty and laboratory half where the returns actually are. For the full analysis, see the 32721 primer — this page is the level's headline and ground-truth stats; that page is the detail.[23]


Sources

  1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration by Largest Firms (receipts, firm count, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI) and County Business Patterns 2023 (establishments, employment, payroll), NAICS 3272 / 32721 and the four six-digit industries 327211/327212/327213/327215. (Histometrics ingested federal ground-truth statistics.) https://data.census.gov/; https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
  2. U.S. International Trade Commission, Float Glass Products from China and Malaysia, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-704-705 and 731-TA-1671-1672 (Final), Publication 5715, 2026; and (Preliminary), Publication 5579, 2025 — per-pound values, capacity/utilization, cost stack, margins, labor, substitutability, and the producer/processor double-count. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/701_731/pub5715.pdf; https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/701_731/pub5579.pdf
  3. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, "Final Affirmative Determinations in the AD/CVD Investigations of Float Glass Products from China and Malaysia" (2026); U.S. International Trade Commission, "USITC Makes Final Injury Determinations in Float Glass Products Investigations," Press Release 26-024 (March 2026); U.S. Federal Register, "Certain Float Glass from the People's Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order" (April 2026). https://www.trade.gov/final-affirmative-determinations-antidumping-and-countervailing-duty-investigations-float-glass; https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2026/er0323_68244.htm; https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2026-04-06/2026-06647
  4. Vitro Architectural Glass, "Vitro completes acquisition of PPG's flat glass business" (2016); Koch Industries, "Koch Industries Completes Acquisition of Guardian Industries Corp." (2017); AGC Inc., "Notice Regarding Transfer of Architectural Glass Business in North America" (2021); Glass Magazine, "World of Glass 2025 Report." https://www.vitroglazings.com/about/news/vitro-completes-acquisition-of-ppg-s-flat-glass-business-and-announces-investment-in-new-jumbo-msvd-coater/; https://news.kochinc.com/media-resources/press-releases/koch-industries-completes-acqisition-of-guardian-i; https://www.agc.com/en/news/pdf/20210615e.pdf; https://www.glassmagazine.com/article/world-glass-2025-report
  5. NSG Group, "New U.S. Solar Glass Production Line" (Rossford, Ohio conversion, 2025); U.S. Department of Energy, "Applicant Self-Disclosed 48C Projects" (Vitro Texas patterned/low-iron solar glass project). https://www.nsg.com/en/media/ir-updates/announcements-2025/new-us-solar-glass-production-line; https://www.energy.gov/cmei/manufacturing/applicant-self-disclosed-48c-projects
  6. Corning Incorporated, Business Segments (2025) and 2025 Form 10-K (Specialty Materials and Life Sciences segment revenue and net income). https://www.corning.com/worldwide/en/about-us/corning-business-segments.html; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/24741/000002474126000124/glw-20251231.htm
  7. PR Newswire, "Libbey Emerges from Chapter 11" (2020); NBC News, "Instant Pot and Pyrex parent files for bankruptcy" (2023); PR Newswire, "LCN Acquires Anchor Hocking Glassware Manufacturing Facility" (2023); GlassOnline (Lancaster furnace count); Anchor Hocking press releases (investment announcement); Justia, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Centre Lane Partners, W.D. Pa. 2:2024cv01501 Doc. 42 (2024). https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/libbey-successfully-completes-financial-restructuring-and-emerges-from-chapter-11-301173650.html; https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/instant-pot-pyrex-parent-company-files-bankruptcy-vows-continue-sales-rcna89136; https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/lcn-acquires-anchor-hocking-glassware-manufacturing-facility-301966524.html; https://www.glassonline.com/anchor-hocking-to-close-glass-glassware-plants/; https://www.anchorhocking.com/press-releases/; https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/pennsylvania/pawdce/2:2024cv01501/314180/42/
  8. Glass International, "US trade group calls for tariffs on Chinese glass imports" (2024) — China import share and plant/job losses; Toledo Free Press, "Libbey Glass strike one of the longest in company history" (2025) — strike, Canadian drinkware duty, cancelled DOE decarbonization grants. https://www.glass-international.com/news/us-trade-group-calls-for-tariffs-on-chinese-glass-imports; https://toledofreepress.com/libbey-glass-strike-one-of-the-longest-in-company-history/
  9. O-I Glass, Inc., 2025 Form 10-K and "Full Year and Fourth Quarter 2024 Results"; Packaging Dive, "O-I Glass 'Fit to Win,' furnace closures and 2025 results." https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/812074/000110465926014319/oi-20251231x10k.htm; https://www.o-i.com/news/o-i-glass-reports-full-year-and-fourth-quarter-2024-results/; https://www.packagingdive.com/news/oi-glass-q3-2025-packaging-earnings/804817/
  10. Container ownership outside O-I: Verallia SA, company/investor profile and 2024–2025 results (Euronext Paris: VRLA); PR Newswire / Ardagh Group S.A., "Comprehensive Recapitalization Transaction" (2025) and Ardagh "Company Information"; Investing.com, "Ardagh Group downgraded to 'SD' after debt restructuring" (2025); PR Newswire / Anchor Glass, "Anchor Glass Completes Comprehensive Recapitalization" (2025). https://www.verallia.com/; https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ardagh-group-sa-announces-comprehensive-recapitalization-transaction-302514761.html; https://www.ardaghgroup.com/investors/company-information; https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/ardagh-group-downgraded-to-sd-after-debt-restructuring-93CH-4352364; https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/anchor-glass-completes-comprehensive-recapitalization-to-drive-next-phase-of-growth-302579696.html
  11. Glass Packaging Institute, Q2 2025 Shipment Report (end-market mix), Comments in Support of 25% Tariff (July 2022 — plant count, output, workforce, unionization), and Glass Recycling Facts (deposit-state recycling rates); The Aluminum Association, The Aluminum Can Advantage — Sustainability KPI Report (2024). https://www.gpi.org/sites/default/files/content-files/Q2%202025.pdf; https://www.gpi.org/sites/default/files/content-files/Testimony/JULY%205%2C%202022%20GPI%20Comments_In_Support_of_25__Tariff.pdf; https://www.gpi.org/facts-about-glass-recycling; https://www.aluminum.org/canadvantage
  12. Listed fabrication names: Apogee Enterprises, Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year ended February 28, 2026, Fiscal 2026 Annual Report (Architectural Glass $283.7M sales, 16.1% margin), and first-quarter fiscal-2027 results (segment margin 8.7%); Gentex Corporation, Form 10-K (2025) and 2025 results exhibit ($2.136B of $2.534B total revenue). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/6845/000000684526000023/apog-20260228.htm; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/6845/000000684526000039/fiscal2026annualreport.pdf; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/6845/000000684526000058/a53026fy27q1results.htm; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/355811/000035581126000010/gntx-20251231.htm; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/355811/000035581126000005/exhibit99112312025.htm
  13. Fabrication and vehicle-glass ownership: KPS Capital Partners, "Oldcastle BuildingEnvelope" investment page; CRH plc, "CRH Announces Completion of Building Envelope Divestment" ($3.8B enterprise value; 2020 EBITDA $337M); Craft.co, "Cardinal Glass Industries" and Cardinal locations page; Belron Group, "2025 Full-Year Results" (€6.72bn total sales; D'Ieteren-controlled); Wikipedia, "Safelite" (U.S. footprint and two windshield plants); Forbes / Fuyao Glass America, "China Auto Glass Maker Fuyao Opens New U.S. Plant" (2025). https://www.kpsfund.com/investments/active-investments/oldcastle-buildingenvelope; https://www.crh.com/media/press-releases/2022/crh-announces-completion-of-building-envelope-divestment/; https://craft.co/cardinal; https://www.cardinalcorp.com/company/locations/; https://www.belron.com/; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safelite; https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeschina/2025/07/30/china-auto-glass-maker-fuyao-opens-new-us-plant-eyes-smart-vehicles/
  14. Grand View Research, "Glass Manufacturing Market" (energy share of production cost); U.S. Department of Energy (OSTI), "Energy Efficiency Improvement Opportunities for the Glass Industry" and Glass Bandwidth Study (2017, cullet energy savings); U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Energy use in the glass industry" (fuel mix; 2007–09 shipment declines) and 2022 MECS Table 6.1; Glass for Europe, "Continuous energy supply is essential for the flat glass industry." https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/glass-manufacturing-market; https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/927883; https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2019/05/f62/Glass_bandwidth_study_2017.pdf; https://www.eia.gov/Todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12631; https://www.eia.gov/consumption/manufacturing/data/2022/pdf/Table6_1.pdf
  15. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Glass Manufacturing Area Sources: NESHAP," "Subpart N — Greenhouse Gas Reporting for Glass Production," "Glass Manufacturing Effluent Guidelines (40 CFR Part 426)," "2019 Flat Glass Plant Carbon Intensities Fact Sheet," and "Glass: Material-Specific Data" (recycling rates); U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, "Respirable Crystalline Silica — General Industry." https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/glass-manufacturing-area-sources-national-emission-standards; https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/subpart-n-glass-production; https://www.epa.gov/eg/glass-manufacturing-effluent-guidelines; https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-06/2019%20Flat%20Glass%20Plant%20Carbon%20Intensities%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf; https://www.epa.gov/facts-and-figures-about-materials-waste-and-recycling/glass-material-specific-data; https://www.osha.gov/silica-crystalline/general-industry-info
  16. eCFR, "16 CFR Part 1201 — Safety Standard for Architectural Glazing Materials"; SGCC, "What is safety glazing" (ANSI Z97.1, ASTM F3007, IBC §2406); ENERGY STAR, "Residential Windows, Doors, and Skylights" (specification effective October 23, 2023); U.S. Department of Energy, "Windows" and "Latest in Zero Energy Windows: Thin Triples and More" (7%–16% modeled savings). https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-16/chapter-II/subchapter-B/part-1201; https://sgcc.org/blog/what-is-safety-glazing; https://www.energystar.gov/products/res_windows_doors_skylights; https://www.energy.gov/cmei/buildings/windows; https://www.energy.gov/cmei/better-buildings-residential-network/articles/latest-zero-energy-windows-thin-triples-and
  17. Glass Magazine / USGlass, "2026 Construction Industry Forecast" and "2026 Top Glass Fabricators Report" (demand, tariffs, input inflation, fabrication economics); American Institute of Architects, "July 2026 Consensus Construction Forecast" (Architecture Billings Index); National Glass Association, "2025 Annual Report"; Autofreak, "Auto Glass Repair Claims Rise with Advanced Sensor Integration" (ADAS recalibration). https://www.glassmagazine.com/article/2026-construction-industry-forecast; https://www.aia.org/resource-center/july-2026-consensus-construction-forecast; https://www.glass.org/2025-annual-report; https://autofreak.com/auto-glass-repair-claims-adas-sensors-2026/
  18. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, "Food Packaging & Substances That Come in Contact with Food" (glass GRAS for food contact); Proskauer Rose LLP, "The 2025 Guide to EPR Packaging Compliance" (seven EPR states). https://www.fda.gov/food/food-ingredients-packaging/food-packaging-other-substances-come-contact-food-information-consumers; https://www.proskauer.com/alert/the-2025-guide-to-epr-packaging-compliance
  19. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED): "Industrial Production: Glass Container Manufacturing (IPG327213A)"; "Producer Price Index by Industry: Flat Glass Manufacturing (PCU3272113272111)"; Producer Price Index for glass products made from purchased glass (229.870 June 2026 vs. 214.761 June 2025). U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: "Industries with employment decreases from 2000 to 2024" (NAICS 327212) and nonfatal injury/illness incidence-rate tables. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IPG327213A; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCU3272113272111; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release/tables?eid=135599&rid=46; https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2025/industries-with-employment-decreases-from-2000-to-2024.htm; https://www.bls.gov/web/osh/table-1-industry-rates-national.htm
  20. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS — 3272 Glass and Glass Product Manufacturing" (scope and child definitions); NAICS Association, "NAICS 327215 definition and cross-references (327211/327212/327213/327993/238150/332321)." https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=3272&input=3272&year=2022; https://www.naics.com/naics-code-description/?code=327215
  21. Straits Research / IMARC, "United States Flat Glass Market Size"; Grand View Research, "U.S. Glass Packaging Market"; Mordor Intelligence, "United States Container Glass Market" (downstream market valuations, for contrast with federal production figures). https://straitsresearch.com/report/flat-glass-market/united-states; https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/glass-packaging-food-beverages-market-report; https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/united-states-container-glass-market
  22. Owens Corning, "Owens Corning Completes Sale of Glass Reinforcements Business to Praana Group" (2026). https://newsroom.owenscorning.com/all-news-releases/news-details/2026/Owens-Corning-Completes-Sale-of-Glass-Reinforcements-Business-to-Praana-Group/default.aspx
  23. Histometrics primer, Glass and Glass Product Manufacturing — NAICS 32721 (the single child leaf primer; full four-way sub-industry breakdown, investable universe, economics, regulation, consolidation, risks, and how-to-invest detail summarized here).