Offices of All Other Health Practitioners (U.S.) — NAICS 62139

A rollup investor's primer. Plain language, dual-audience: relevant to both public-market and private investors. This level synthesizes two child industries — 621391 (podiatrists) and 621399 (all other miscellaneous health practitioners) — and adds the federal figures for the combined level.

1. Overview

NAICS 62139 — "Offices of All Other Health Practitioners" — is the catch-all industry inside the federal map of outpatient clinician offices. (NAICS is the North American Industry Classification System, the standard U.S. scheme for grouping businesses by activity.) The larger family, industry group 6213 "Offices of Other Health Practitioners," gives its own five-digit code to chiropractors, optometrists, mental-health practitioners, and physical/occupational/speech therapists. Everyone else — podiatrists, plus a long tail of acupuncturists, dietitians, midwives, naturopaths, therapeutic massage therapists, and, increasingly, independent nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs) — lands in 62139.[3]

It splits into just two child industries, and they are very different animals:

• 621391 — Offices of Podiatrists. Foot-and-ankle doctors (Doctors of Podiatric Medicine, DPMs). A defined, licensed, mostly insurance-billed medical specialty. The smaller, more mature, more concentrated child.[3][5]
• 621399 — Offices of All Other Miscellaneous Health Practitioners. The residual "everything else" bucket — part wellness/cash-pay (acupuncture, nutrition, massage), part expanding mainstream care (NP/PA-led practices). The larger, faster-growing, more fragmented child.[3]

For an investor the level is worth understanding as a whole because it shares one economic engine — small, local, labor-intensive clinician offices whose profit turns on filling a schedule and collecting payment — but the two children reach that engine from opposite directions. Podiatry is a demographically tailwinded medical specialty being quietly rolled up by private equity (PE); "all other" is a sprawling consumer-and-clinical frontier riding the wellness boom and the legal expansion of who may practice independently.

The common thread on the investability side: neither child has a pure public-market operator. No listed company's primary business is running these offices. Public exposure is indirect in both — through device, wound-care, and health-plan companies around podiatry, and through telehealth and wellness-franchise companies around "all other." The real ownership opportunity is private in both, but the private playbook differs (Sections 4 and 10).

2. What's inside — the two children and how they differ

The distinctive value of this level is the contrast. Podiatry is roughly a fifth to a quarter of the level on every measure; "all other" is the rest. But the smaller child is the more concentrated, more medical, more reimbursement-dependent one, while the larger child is more atomistic, more cash-pay-flavored, and growing faster.

Read the concentration row carefully. Podiatry looks more fragmented by the numbers (HHI 11.1 vs. ~85), yet it is the child where a coherent PE roll-up thesis is furthest along. That is not a contradiction: podiatry is a single, homogeneous, well-defined specialty that is easy to aggregate, whereas "all other" is a grab-bag of unlike professions (a midwife and a hypnotherapist are not the same roll-up) whose modest concentration comes almost entirely from a few large telehealth brands, not from consolidated physical offices. Fragmentation and consolidability are different things.

3. How big it is (the level's rollup figures)

Federal statistics for NAICS 62139 as a whole. Note the reference-year split: employer establishments, employment, and payroll are County Business Patterns (CBP) 2023; firms, receipts, and concentration are the 2022 Economic Census. Do not read 2022 receipts against 2023 payroll as a margin.

The child figures sum cleanly into the level: establishments (7,523 + 36,107) and employees (35,977 + 135,707) match the level totals exactly, and receipts and payroll match to within rounding — a good sign the ground-truth numbers are internally consistent.[1][2]

Some ratios that describe the level's shape:

• ~$653,000 in receipts per employer firm ($23.70B ÷ 36,311) — but the two children differ: roughly $820,000 per firm at podiatry offices versus ~$616,000 at "all other," reflecting podiatry's higher surgical/procedural and ancillary billings.[1][2]
• ~$57,000 in annual payroll per employee — and, unusually, nearly identical across both children (~$57K each). Whatever else separates a podiatry office from an acupuncture clinic, the per-head payroll of their non-owner staff looks alike.[1]
• Fewer than four employees per office on average (about 4.8 at podiatry offices, 3.8 at "all other") — the profile of a small local service business, not a capital-heavy one.[1]

The undercount caveat — read before trusting any single number. These are employer statistics: they count only businesses with paid staff, and CBP also excludes most government employees. Both children are dominated by solo, self-employed practitioners — a podiatrist, an acupuncturist, a dietitian, a midwife working alone — who file as nonemployer businesses and are excluded from CBP and from the Economic Census employer counts.[26] Across health-practitioner categories, nonemployer businesses vastly outnumber employer establishments, and the effect is heaviest in the "all other" child, where sole practice is the norm. Our ground-truth file for 62139 contains no nonemployer total, so we state none and invent no adjusted market size. Treat the ~43,600 offices and ~$23.7 billion in receipts as a floor for the employer segment, not the full economic footprint. No industry-wide margin, payer-mix, utilization, or same-clinic-growth figures were supplied for this level, so none are asserted here.

4. Where value concentrates across the children

Two facts define the investable universe at this level, and they hold for both children:

1. There is no public pure-play in either child. No listed company reports operating these offices as its primary business. Every public name below is a diversified adjacency for which this industry is one channel among many; tickers, prices, and multiples belong only to those adjacencies, never to the offices themselves.
2. Value concentrates differently in each child — around devices, wound care, and payers for podiatry, and around telehealth, wellness franchises, and software for "all other."

Public adjacencies — podiatry side (621391). The bet is on rising foot-and-ankle procedure volumes and diabetic-limb-preservation spending, not on the office model:

• Foot/ankle implants and surgery: Stryker (SYK), Zimmer Biomet (ZBH) — which entered the ~$5B foot-and-ankle market via the ~$1.2B Paragon 28 acquisition completed April 2025 — Enovis (ENOV), and bunion-correction specialist Treace Medical Concepts (TMCI).[19][20][21]
• Diabetic-wound biologics: Organogenesis (ORGO) and diversified wound-care names.[22]
• Medicare-heavy health plans exposed via reimbursement (not ownership).

Public adjacencies — "all other" side (621399). The bet here is a consumer-telehealth and wellness thesis, driven by NP/PA labor, GLP-1 demand, and cash-pay memberships:

• Telehealth built on employed/affiliated NPs and PAs: Hims & Hers (HIMS), LifeMD (LFMD), Teladoc (TDOC).[14][15][16]
• Wellness and clinic-franchise analogs: The Joint Corp. (JYNT) — a chiropractic franchisor (chiropractors are excluded from 62139, but it is the closest listed model for consolidating cash-pay practitioner offices) — and Xponential Fitness (XPOF); plus patient-intake/payments software.[17][18]

Private markets — where both children actually trade. This is where ownership changes hands:

• Podiatry: PE-backed management services organizations (MSOs) — U.S. Foot & Ankle Specialists (an NMS Capital company advertising 200+ locations), Upperline Health (value-based lower-extremity care), Podiatry Growth Partners — plus physician-owned groups and individual practices.[6][7][8]
• All other: telehealth platforms, therapeutic-massage and acupuncture franchises (Massage Envy, Modern Acupuncture, Hand & Stone), wellness/med-spa PE roll-ups, and venture-backed nutrition and NP-led virtual-care startups (e.g., Nourish).[23][27]

A caution for both: advertised platform "location" and "provider" counts are not NAICS counts. Podiatry platforms often also fold in orthopedic surgeons, physical therapists, and wound centers; "all other" platforms mix therapeutic and non-therapeutic (spa/skincare, which sits in 812199) services. Diligence has to unbundle the mix.

5. How the money works

The level runs on outpatient professional-services economics, not utility rate base, REIT rent rolls, or manufacturing throughput. Across both children, the master equation is the same:

Revenue ≈ practitioners × billable visits × fee per visit. The binding constraint is utilization — how full each clinician's schedule runs. Skilled human hours are the input; an empty appointment slot cannot be inventoried and sold later. On top of the base visit sit two margin levers that differ by child:

• Payer mix. Podiatry is predominantly insurance/Medicare, so its top line is capped by fee schedules and by strict coverage rules (routine foot care is only covered with a qualifying systemic condition such as diabetes).[5] "All other" is split: a high-margin but discretionary cash-pay wellness base (acupuncture, nutrition, massage) plus a reimbursed clinical side where NPs and PAs billing Medicare are generally paid at 85% of the physician fee schedule for the same service.[10]
• Ancillary / product tail. Podiatry has the bigger one — custom orthotics, durable medical equipment (braces, diabetic therapeutic shoes), and advanced wound-care biologics dispensed at a markup, plus higher-paying surgical cases for surgically trained DPMs. "All other" leans instead on memberships, subscriptions, and franchise/MSO fee layers.[5]

Cost structure (both children): clinician labor dominates, then rent, front-desk and billing staff, malpractice/liability insurance, credentialing, software (electronic health records), supplies, and marketing. Capital intensity is low — which keeps barriers to entry low and moats local. Capital needs rise only when a platform adds an ambulatory surgery center, imaging, or an orthotics lab (mostly a podiatry phenomenon).

The metrics that matter across the level: revenue and collections per clinician per day; appointment utilization, cancellations, and no-shows; payer mix and reimbursement per visit; denial rate and days in accounts receivable; ancillary/membership attach rate; clinician turnover and vacancy time; same-location revenue for multi-unit operators; and overhead ratio — the whole roll-up thesis is that centralizing billing and purchasing across many small offices cuts overhead.[8]

Federal data publishes no practice-level margin, per-firm profit, utilization, or payer-mix figures for 62139 or its children, so any profitability numbers come from industry and compensation sources, not the Census — treat them as estimates. Broadly, chronic and senior care (diabetic foot, nutrition therapy, nurse-led chronic-care management) is relatively recession-resilient, while elective surgery, orthotics, sports care, and cash-pay wellness are more deferrable.

6. Demand drivers

Demand at this level is demographic and clinical, which makes it steady rather than cyclical — but the two children capture different tailwinds:

• Aging population (both). The U.S. 65-and-older population reached 61.2 million in 2024, 18.0% of the population.[13] Older patients need more foot, nutrition, mobility, and chronic-care management.
• Chronic disease (both). Diabetes — 38.4 million people (11.6%) by CDC estimate — is the dominant structural tailwind for podiatry (neuropathy, diabetic foot ulcers, the highest-value podiatric work) and a major one for nutrition and nurse-led care.[11] More broadly, 76.4% of U.S. adults report at least one chronic condition, widening the role of dietitians, nurses, and other non-physician practitioners.[12]
• Scope-of-practice expansion (chiefly 621399). Roughly 30 states plus D.C. now grant NPs full practice authority — the legal right to diagnose and prescribe without physician oversight — up from about 22 in 2020. Each expansion converts NPs from employees into potential independent owners, directly enlarging the "all other" child.[9]
• The obesity/GLP-1 wave (chiefly 621399). Surging weight-loss treatment drives nutrition counseling bundled with NP/PA medication management — the growth engine behind the public telehealth proxies.[14]
• The wellness boom (chiefly 621399). Cash-pay acupuncture, nutrition, and membership massage ride consumer discretionary spending — higher-margin but more budget-sensitive than medically necessary care.
• Succession and administrative pressure (both). Independent owners facing billing complexity, technology cost, and retirement create the deal flow for MSO consolidation in both children.[6]

The headwind, concentrated in podiatry: BLS projects only 2% podiatrist job growth 2024–2034 (slower than average), partly because primary-care and other clinicians absorb some routine foot care. The need is rising, but some of it leaks to non-podiatrists — a reason the smaller child grows more slowly than the larger one.[5]

7. Regulation

Regulation runs profession-by-profession and state-by-state, so it is unusually fragmented — but several themes cut across the whole level:

• State licensing and scope of practice. Every profession here is licensed by the states, and scope varies enormously — podiatry's surgical/ankle boundary differs by state; naturopathy is licensed in some states and unregulated in others; "nutritionist" title protection is contested. For 621399, NP/PA full-practice-authority law is the single biggest swing factor in whether independent offices can exist at all.[9]
• Medicare/Medicaid coverage and payment. Fee-schedule changes move revenue directly. Podiatry lives under strict routine-foot-care rules (covered only with qualifying conditions such as diabetes); "all other" lives under the 85% NP/PA payment rate, narrow acupuncture coverage (chronic low back pain only), dietitian medical-nutrition-therapy coverage, and Medicaid midwifery coverage.[5][10]
• Corporate practice of medicine (CPOM). Many states restrict non-clinician ownership or control of clinical practices. This is why PE money enters both children through the MSO/management-agreement structure — the investor owns the management company; licensed clinicians own the practice — rather than owning the clinical entity outright. It is a rising area of state legislative attention.[24]
• Privacy, billing, and telehealth. HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) governs protected health information across all these offices; the No Surprises Act requires good-faith estimates for self-pay patients; and the "all other" telehealth proxies additionally live and die by cross-state telehealth licensure and FDA policy on compounded GLP-1 drugs.[14]
• Compliance/clawback risk (heaviest in podiatry). CMS reports elevated improper-payment rates on podiatry routine-foot-care claims, driven mainly by documentation gaps (improper payment is not fraud). Billing accuracy is both an operating cost and an audit/recoupment risk.[5]

Investors should treat licensure and ownership structure as transaction-level diligence, not boilerplate.

8. Consolidation

By the federal numbers, NAICS 62139 is one of the least concentrated industries in the economy — but the level average hides a revealing split. From the 2022 Economic Census, at the level:[2]

• Four largest firms = 12.2% of receipts (CR4); top 8 = 13.9%; top 20 = 16.2%; top 50 = 19.6%.
• Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) = 51.4 — effectively zero national concentration (antitrust regulators treat anything under 1,500 as "unconcentrated").

Now the split. The level's CR4 of 12.2% sits between its children — podiatry's CR4 is just 4.8% (HHI 11.1) while "all other" is 15.8% (HHI ~85). In plain terms: the level's largest firms are almost entirely the largest "all other" firms — the telehealth and franchise brands — not podiatry offices. Podiatry, despite being the target of the more coherent roll-up campaign, remains statistically the more scattered of the two.

The consolidation stories differ by child:

• Podiatry (621391): a focused PE roll-up of a single specialty. Having already consolidated dermatology, dentistry, gastroenterology, and orthopedics, PE has turned to podiatry as an "under-tracked" next segment, building MSO platforms (USFAS, Upperline, Podiatry Growth Partners) with add-on deals through 2024–2025. Still early innings.[6][7][8]
• All other (621399): consolidation is structural and multi-channel, not scale-driven — telehealth aggregating NP/PA labor under national consumer brands, franchising of standardized cash-pay services, PE/MSO wellness roll-ups, and hospital employment of acupuncturists, dietitians, and midwives.[14][23]

In both, value creation comes from professionalizing billing, purchasing, marketing, and back office, not from national market power — barriers to entry are low and moats are local (reputation, referral relationships, location). And scrutiny is rising: a 2025 GAO report on physician-practice consolidation and a 2025 FTC settlement over PE-backed roll-up in anesthesiology (not podiatry, but a signal) put roll-ups on regulators' radar.[25]

9. Risks

Shared across the level:

• Reimbursement risk. Medicare fee-schedule cuts, narrowed networks, and tighter coverage decisions compress the reimbursed book — the 85% NP/PA rate and podiatry's routine-care rules are both exposed.[5][10]
• Regulatory/ownership (CPOM) risk. State corporate-practice rules can limit or invalidate PE ownership, MSO control, or fee arrangements in both children.[24]
• Labor is the product. Practitioner shortages, wage inflation, vacancy time, and burnout cap capacity and margin. Podiatry adds a thin training pipeline; "all other" adds broad clinician scarcity.[5]
• Low barriers, weak moats, local competition. Easy entry means persistent competition; low national concentration can conceal a dominant local operator or health-plan network.
• Roll-up/integration risk. Acquirers can overpay for owner-dependent practices whose patient relationships do not transfer, and lose producing clinicians or local referrals if centralization erodes clinical autonomy.[6][25]
• Data/undercount risk. The heavy nonemployer tail means public statistics are an incomplete map; diligence must be built bottom-up, one local market at a time.[26]

Child-specific:

• Podiatry: documentation/clawback exposure on routine-care claims; demand leakage to MD and primary-care providers (2% projected job growth); device- and wound-biologic reimbursement pressure hitting the public adjacencies.[5]
• All other: discretionary-demand cyclicality on the cash-pay wellness base; scope-of-practice reversal risk if physician groups slow NP independence; and heavy telehealth/GLP-1 policy exposure (compounded-drug crackdowns, telehealth-prescribing rules) concentrated in the public proxies.[9][14]

10. How to invest and outlook

Public route (indirect in both children). No listed company is this industry. Public investors buy adjacencies, and the two children point to different baskets:

• Podiatry-flavored: foot/ankle implant makers (SYK, ZBH post-Paragon 28, ENOV, TMCI), diabetic-wound biologics (ORGO), and Medicare-heavy health plans. These track surgical volumes, limb-preservation spending, and payer economics — not the office model — and each is diluted by non-podiatry lines.[19][20][21][22]
• "All other"-flavored: telehealth (HIMS, LFMD, TDOC), wellness/clinic franchises (JYNT, XPOF), and intake/payments software. Judge these on telehealth regulation, GLP-1 dynamics, and subscriber economics — they are a consumer-health-tech thesis, not the acupuncture/nutrition/midwifery trade.[14][15][16][17][18]

Private route (the direct one, in both children). Owning the level means owning offices:

• Podiatry: buy or build a practice; back or co-invest in an MSO platform (USFAS, Upperline, Podiatry Growth Partners); or provide real estate, equipment, or acquisition financing around them.[6][7]
• All other: own or build a practice blending high-margin cash-pay wellness with a reimbursed clinical anchor; roll up small clinics under an MSO (respecting CPOM); franchise in the therapeutic-massage/acupuncture lanes; or venture into NP-led virtual care and nutrition marketplaces.[23][27]

Underwrite the local unit economics first in either case: normalized owner compensation, same-clinic collections and visit trends, payer contracts and denial rates, clinician retention and succession, referral concentration, lease and compliance history, ancillary/membership economics, MSO/management-agreement terms and physician-control provisions, and cash conversion. A platform's advertised location count matters far less than organic collections, clinician productivity, retention, and cash flow.

Near-term drivers to watch:

1. NP full-practice-authority legislation — each new state enlarges the "all other" child's pool of independent owners.[9]
2. The GLP-1 cycle and its regulation — demand engine for nutrition and NP-led weight management; policy risk for the telehealth proxies.[14]
3. Medicare policy — routine-foot-care and wound-biologic enforcement (podiatry's biggest risk) and NP/PA/nutrition/acupuncture coverage decisions ("all other").[5][10]
4. The pace and pricing of PE roll-ups — especially whether early podiatry platforms exit successfully, the signal for whether this fragmented level finally consolidates.[6][25]

Bottom line: NAICS 62139 is a ~$24-billion-floor, deeply fragmented collection of small clinician offices with durable demographic demand and no public pure-play in either of its two children. The smaller, mature podiatry child (~a quarter of the level) is a focused, early-innings PE roll-up story; the larger, faster-growing "all other" child (~three-quarters) is a sprawling wellness-and-independent-practice frontier whose only meaningful public exposure is a consumer-telehealth thesis. In both, the returns are earned privately — through operational improvement, revenue-cycle discipline, clinician retention, and careful underwriting — not from broad industry-wide volume growth.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau. County Business Patterns (CBP), 2023 — NAICS 62139 and children 621391 / 621399 (establishments, employment, annual and Q1 payroll). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/data/datasets.html
2. U.S. Census Bureau. 2022 Economic Census — Concentration of Largest Firms, NAICS 62139 / 621391 / 621399 (firms, receipts, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI). https://data.census.gov/table/ECNSIZE2022.EC2200SIZECONCEN
3. U.S. Census Bureau. 2022 NAICS Definitions: 62139 Offices of All Other Health Practitioners; 621391 Offices of Podiatrists; 621399 Offices of All Other Miscellaneous Health Practitioners. https://www.census.gov/naics/?year=2022
4. U.S. Small Business Administration. Table of Small Business Size Standards (621391 = $9.0M; 621399 = $10M average annual receipts). 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
5. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Occupational Outlook Handbook: Podiatrists (median wage; 2% growth 2024–2034; routine-care/coverage context; demand drivers). https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/podiatrists.htm
6. KPMG Corporate Finance LLC. Podiatry Physician Practice M&A Industry Update (fragmentation; 96% ≤5 physicians; PE roll-up; USFAS and backers). 2023. https://corporatefinance.kpmg.com/us/en/insights/2023/podiatry-physician-practice-ma.html
7. U.S. Foot & Ankle Specialists. Company site (NMS Capital portfolio; multi-state platform). https://us-fas.com/
8. Silversmith Capital Partners. Upperline Health — Portfolio (value-based lower-extremity care platform). https://www.silversmith.com/portfolio/upperline-health
9. American Association of Nurse Practitioners. State Practice Environment — Full Practice Authority (~30 states + D.C., up from ~22 in 2020). https://www.aanp.org/advocacy/state/state-practice-environment
10. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Advanced Practice Registered Nurses / Physician Assistants — 85% of the Physician Fee Schedule; incident-to billing. https://www.cms.gov/medicare/payment/fee-schedules/physician-fee-schedule/advanced-practice-non-physician-practitioners/advanced-practice-registered-nurses-aprns
11. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Diabetes Statistics Report (38.4M / 11.6% with diabetes). https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/148231/cdc_148231_DS1.pdf
12. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Trends in Multiple Chronic Conditions Among U.S. Adults, 2013–2023 (76.4% of adults, ~194M, with ≥1 chronic condition). 2025. https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2025/24_0539.htm
13. U.S. Census Bureau. Older Adults Outnumber Children… (65+ population 61.2M, 18.0% in 2024). 2025. https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025/older-adults-outnumber-children.html
14. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Hims & Hers Health, Inc. 2025 Form 10-K (telehealth NP/PA model; weight-management/GLP-1 exposure; subscribers). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1773751/000177375126000022/hims-20251231.htm
15. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. LifeMD, Inc. Q4 2024 Results / Form 8-K (virtual primary care and weight management; NP/PA labor). 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/948320/000149315225009690/ex99-1.htm
16. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Teladoc Health, Inc. 2025 Form 10-K. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1477449/000147744926000012/tdoc-20251231.htm
17. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Joint Corp. 2025 Form 10-K (chiropractic franchisor; closest listed cash-pay-clinic analog). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1612630/000161263026000022/jynt-20251231.htm
18. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Xponential Fitness, Inc. 2025 Form 10-K (wellness/fitness franchisor). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1802156/000180215626000016/xpof-20251231.htm
19. Zimmer Biomet. Completes Acquisition of Paragon 28 (April 2025; ~$1.2B; ~$5B foot/ankle market). https://investor.zimmerbiomet.com/news-and-events/news/2025/04-21-2025-140129567
20. Stryker. Foot and Ankle (implants, fixation, biologics). https://www.stryker.com/us/en/portfolios/orthopaedics/foot-and-ankle.html
21. Treace Medical Concepts, Inc. Full-Year 2024 Financial Results (Lapiplasty bunion systems). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1630627/000095017024121456/tmci-ex99_1.htm
22. Organogenesis Holdings Inc. Investor Relations (bioengineered skin substitutes for diabetic foot ulcers). https://investors.organogenesis.com/
23. Roark Capital / Massage Envy; Modern Acupuncture; Hand & Stone (therapeutic-massage and acupuncture franchisors; franchisee-owned local units). https://www.roarkcapital.com/portfolio
24. American Medical Association. Corporate Practice of Medicine (state restrictions on non-clinician ownership/control). https://www.ama-assn.org/media/7661/download
25. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Health Care Consolidation: Physician Consolidation (GAO-25-107450), 2025; and Federal Trade Commission, Settlement with Private Equity Firm in Antitrust Roll-Up Scheme (anesthesiology), 2025. https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-107450/index.html
26. U.S. Census Bureau. County Business Patterns Coverage / Nonemployer Statistics Program Overview (employer-only coverage; self-employed nonemployers excluded). https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/mu0800.html
27. Nourish. Nourish Raises $100M Series C (virtual dietitian platform; 10,000+ registered dietitians). https://www.nourish.com/blog/nourish-announces-series-c