Bus and Other Motor Vehicle Transit Systems (NAICS 485113): An Investor's Primer

1. Overview

NAICS code 485113 covers the businesses that run scheduled local and suburban bus service — the fixed-route city buses, bus rapid transit (BRT), and airport/rail-terminal shuttle lines that move people over set routes on set schedules within a metro area and its nearby suburbs.[1] (NAICS is the North American Industry Classification System, the U.S.-Canada-Mexico standard for grouping businesses by activity.) In plain terms: this is the "city bus" industry.

The single most important thing to understand up front is that this is overwhelmingly a government-run public service, not a quoted stock-market sector. The buses you see are almost always owned by a public transit agency — a city, county, or regional authority — funded mainly by taxes rather than fares. Federal business statistics, which count only private, for-profit companies, therefore capture a thin private slice: in 2023 they counted 41,501 employees at 523 establishments,[2] against roughly 388,000 people employed operating public transit nationwide.[7] The real money and activity sit inside government budgets, not corporate income statements.

That shapes how anyone gets exposure:

• Public-market investors have no U.S.-listed pure-play to buy. The routes are indirect: foreign-listed multinational operators that hold U.S. contracts, bus and equipment manufacturers (picks-and-shovels), and — most directly — municipal bonds issued by transit authorities.
• Private-market investors reach the industry through the infrastructure and private-equity funds that own the large private contract operators (the firms agencies hire to run their buses), plus adjacent bets like paratransit technology, microtransit, fleet finance, and depot electrification.

The profit motive lives almost entirely on the contracting side — private firms competing to operate and maintain publicly owned systems — and in the supply chain that sells buses, parts, and charging equipment. The investment variables that matter are contract quality, labor productivity, safety, fleet ownership, and renewal — not fare growth. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA, the U.S. Department of Transportation agency that funds and oversees transit) calls service an agency buys from an outside operator under a written contract "Purchased Transportation" (PT); the provider can be public or private.[8]

2. What it is and how it's structured

In scope (485113): establishments primarily running local/suburban passenger service by bus or other motor vehicle over regular routes and schedules, including scheduled BRT and scheduled airport or rail-terminal shuttle/commuter bus service.[1]

Explicitly excluded (each is its own NAICS code — the "bus" industry is deliberately fragmented across many codes):

• 485111 Mixed Mode Transit Systems — an agency operating bus and another mode (e.g., rail) together.[1]
• 485112 Commuter Rail and 485119 Other Urban Transit Systems (stand-alone rail, subway, streetcar).[1]
• 485210 Interurban and Rural Bus Transportation — intercity motorcoach (the Greyhound/FlixBus long-haul type).[1]
• 485410 School and Employee Bus Transportation — yellow-bus school routes.
• 485510 Charter Bus Industry — hired-out coaches for groups.
• 485310 Taxi / 485320 Limousine and ride-hail.
• 485999 Other Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation — most non-scheduled shuttle/other ground service.
• 487110 Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation, Land — tour buses.[1]

This fragmentation means a firm like the large private operators below books revenue across several of these codes at once (fixed-route bus, paratransit demand-response, shuttle, and sometimes school and rail), so no single code captures it.

Ownership mix — three layers:

1. Public transit agencies (the owners/customers) — nearly 3,000 report to the federal government.[6][7] They own the buses, depots, and brand, and either run service themselves ("directly operated") or buy it from a contractor ("Purchased Transportation").[8]
2. Private contract operators (the investable operating businesses) — a handful of multinationals plus regional firms that win competitively bid contracts to run and maintain agency service. Private contractors ran roughly 28% of U.S. transit service by vehicle revenue-hours in 2024.[10]
3. Suppliers — bus manufacturers, parts, fare and dispatch systems, and increasingly EV charging — sit adjacent (bus manufacturing is mostly NAICS 336120, heavy-duty truck/bus) but hold much of the listed-equity exposure.

The supplied federal data do not provide a clean public/private ownership split for 485113, so no precise mix should be inferred from the statistics alone.

3. How big it is

The public-agency reality (the true size). U.S. public transit delivered about 7.7 billion passenger trips in 2024, up 491 million from 2023 and back to roughly 85% of pre-pandemic (2019) levels; bus specifically recovered to about 86%, leading the fixed-route modes.[9] Roughly 388,000 people are employed operating, maintaining, and administering public transit,[7] and the sector runs on tens of billions of dollars of annual public spending.

The federal business statistics (the private slice only). Because government-owned agencies are not counted as businesses, the official 485113 figures describe the private/for-profit portion:

Note the mixed vintages: employment and payroll are 2023 (CBP); receipts and concentration are 2022 (Economic Census). These are point-in-time benchmarks, not a growth series.

The undercount caveat (important). CBP covers only employer establishments with paid employees and excludes public administration and most government employees; the Economic Census concentration data likewise cover only firms with payroll.[3][4] So these figures materially understate the industry for two reasons. First, the largest players — municipal and regional transit authorities — are government entities excluded from the count entirely. Second, even the private operators split revenue across neighboring NAICS codes (paratransit, shuttle, charter, rail), so no single code captures a firm like Transdev or MV Transportation. Read 485113's ~$4.05 billion of receipts as "the competitively contracted private bus-operations slice," not the size of American bus transit, which by public spending is well over ten times larger. The federal file does not include system-wide operating revenue, ridership, fleet value, capital spending, or industry margins, so those are not stated here. The concentration data do tell a clear story: the private operating market is dominated by a few large firms (top-4 ≈ 50%, top-50 ≈ 93%), while the HHI of 757.3 — below the ~1,500 "moderately concentrated" threshold antitrust regulators use — indicates it is not a single-firm monopoly nationally.[3]

4. The investable universe

There is no U.S.-listed pure-play bus-transit operator. Below are the realistic public and private routes; scale figures are approximate and group-wide (U.S. bus transit is only part of each).

Public-market operators (foreign-listed, U.S. exposure among many businesses):

Bus/equipment manufacturers (picks-and-shovels — adjacent NAICS, but the most liquid listed exposure):

Major private operators (the core of the industry — reached via private-equity and infrastructure funds, not public shares):

• Transdev North America — the largest private operator of U.S./Canada public transit after buying First Transit in 2023; ~400 million passenger trips a year and ~$2.6 billion combined North American revenue at the time of the deal.[18] Since 2025 the group is owned ~66% by Germany's family-owned Rethmann Group and ~34% by France's state investor Caisse des Dépôts.[19]
• Keolis North America — runs fixed-route bus and commuter-rail contracts across the U.S. (e.g., Orange County OCTA bus, Boston's MBTA commuter rail). Owned ~70% by French national railway SNCF and ~30% by Quebec pension fund CDPQ (Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec).[20]
• RATP Dev USA — the international arm of Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP), the Paris transit authority; operates fixed-route bus and related service for U.S. communities.[21]
• MV Transportation — the largest U.S.-owned private contractor and a leading paratransit provider; family-owned, serving public agencies across dozens of states.[22]
• Beacon Mobility and various regional operators — Beacon is a private-equity-backed roll-up (paratransit, student, and transit). RATP Dev, Keolis, Transdev, MV, and National Express/Mobico's transit arm form the "big" operators behind the North American Transit Alliance.[10]

Fixed income (the most direct public-market exposure): transit-authority municipal bonds — revenue bonds backed by dedicated sales/fuel/payroll taxes, or general-obligation (GO) bonds backed by a government's full faith and credit — are how bond investors actually finance this industry.

5. How the money works

Two very different economic engines sit inside 485113.

Public agencies (cost recovery, not profit). An agency's goal is to cover cost, not earn a return. Its revenue comes from fares, advertising, dedicated taxes, and local/state/federal support. In the broader U.S. public-transit system in 2023, directly generated revenue (fares plus advertising and other operating income) funded about 31% of operating expenses, federal funds 16%, and state and local sources the remaining 53%.[7] Fares alone cover much less: the farebox recovery ratio — fares divided by operating cost — has fallen to roughly 13–17% nationally in 2023 (down from about 30–36% before the pandemic), and as low as ~10% in California in FY2023.[11][12] The gap is filled by dedicated taxes (local-option sales taxes, fuel taxes, payroll/"mobility" taxes), general funds, and federal grants (mostly capital — buying buses and building depots — not day-to-day operations). On the cost side, labor is about two-thirds of operating expense, with fuel/energy, maintenance, and insurance the rest.[11] The operating metrics that matter: cost per vehicle-revenue-hour and per vehicle-revenue-mile, passengers (unlinked trips) per revenue-hour (productivity), on-time performance, and safety/incident rates — all tracked in the FTA's National Transit Database (NTD).[6]

Private contractors (where the margin lives). These firms win multi-year, competitively bid contracts to operate and maintain a public agency's service. The agency usually keeps the fare revenue and owns the buses and facilities, so the contractor is an asset-light services business.[8] Two common structures: cost-plus / management-fee (contractor bills its costs plus a fee — low risk, low margin) and fixed-price (a set rate per revenue-hour or a fixed sum — more risk, more upside if run efficiently). Contracts may include inflation indexation, performance incentives, service penalties, or minimum-service commitments. Contractors earn a thin, usually single-digit operating margin by managing driver recruitment and retention, wage costs, maintenance efficiency, fuel (often a pass-through), and — critically — safety and insurance claims, which can make or break a contract. The investor's scorecard here: contract wins and renewal rate, revenue-hours under management, margin, cash conversion, and driver vacancy/turnover. Whether the operator owns the fleet materially changes capital intensity; agency-owned fleets keep the operator asset-light.

Suppliers. Bus manufacturers earn on order backlog, units delivered, and gross margin, with the current wildcard being profitable execution of the shift to electric buses.

6. What drives demand

• Employment and in-person work. Bus ridership tracks service-sector and shift jobs that require showing up; it recovered faster than rail partly because bus riders skew younger and toward in-person occupations.[9] The rise of remote/hybrid white-collar work is a structural headwind — but it hit peak-hour commuter rail harder than all-day bus, while raising the value of flexible, off-peak, and healthcare-access routes.
• Fuel and car-ownership costs. Higher gas prices, parking costs, and vehicle prices push riders toward transit.
• Urban density and demographics. Bus demand concentrates in dense areas and among younger, lower-income, and carless riders, plus universities, major events, tourism, and airport traffic.
• Fare policy. Fare cuts and fare-free pilots can lift ridership (at a budget cost).
• Funding availability (the biggest structural driver). Because agencies buy service, the level of tax and grant funding directly sets how much service — and demand-satisfying frequency — exists. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) authorizes up to $108 billion for public transportation through FY2026, and FTA programs also fund bus replacement, facilities, and low-/no-emission vehicles.[27][25]

Forward-looking judgment: a lower but re-growing base — ridership likely keeps climbing back toward 2019 levels without overshooting soon, with bus outperforming commuter rail.

7. Regulation

Public transit is one of the most regulated corners of transportation because federal money comes with strings. Key regimes, mostly enforced by the FTA:

• Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) — fixed-route service triggers a legal duty to provide complementary paratransit (door-to-door service for those who can't use fixed routes); a major, growing cost and a big part of the private contract market.[23]
• Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) — 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 673 requires covered systems to maintain an Agency Safety Plan and a Safety Management System.[24]
• Drug and alcohol testing — 49 CFR Part 655 mandates pre-employment, random, post-accident, and other testing of safety-sensitive employees, including contractor staff.[23]
• Buy America — federally funded rolling stock and parts must meet U.S.-content thresholds (49 U.S.C. §5323(j); 49 CFR Part 661, with pre-award/post-delivery reviews), shaping where buses are built.[23]
• Section 5333(b) labor protections — federal transit funding effectively requires preserving existing collective-bargaining rights and shielding transit workers from being made worse off. This is central to any privatization: it limits how far a contractor can cut labor costs and is a frequent flashpoint with transit unions.[23]
• Commercial driver's license (CDL) and safety rules — federal licensing, hours, and safety requirements apply to drivers.
• Emissions and zero-emission mandates — the EPA and, more aggressively, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) drive fleet transitions. California's Innovative Clean Transit (ICT) rule requires all new transit buses purchased to be zero-emission from 2029, with full fleet turnover targeted by 2040; FTA's Low-No and Bus & Bus Facilities grants help pay for it (~$1.5 billion awarded in 2024).[25]

Compliance can be a competitive moat, but a serious accident, safety-plan failure, labor violation, or procurement breach can destroy a contract's economics.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The structure is unusual: each public bus system is a local monopoly — riders in a city have one agency, so operators don't compete for passengers. Competition instead happens in the contracting market, where operators bid to run agency service on price, labor execution, safety record, maintenance, technology, transition capability, and relationships with authorities. A contractor can have strong national scale and still lose a single local contract.

That market is consolidating into a few multinationals, layered over local contract markets. The landmark move was Transdev's 2023 acquisition of First Transit, which vaulted Transdev to #1 among U.S./Canada private operators.[18] Ownership of the leaders is strikingly foreign and state-linked — SNCF (French railways) behind Keolis, RATP (Paris) behind RATP Dev, Caisse des Dépôts (French state) and Rethmann behind Transdev — alongside U.S.-owned MV Transportation and PE-backed roll-ups like Beacon.[19][20][21][22] Barriers to entry are real: bonding capacity, safety and insurance track record, driver-recruitment scale, and local political relationships. The federal 485113 concentration data fit this reading — top-4 ≈ 49.8% of private-operator receipts, top-20 ≈ 83%, top-50 ≈ 93%, with an HHI of 757.3 signaling a national consolidator layer rather than one dominant firm.[3] Consolidation can cut insurance, procurement, technology, and back-office costs; the main danger is the "winner's curse" — winning a large contract at an uneconomic price, then facing wage, staffing, or fleet costs that can't be recovered.

Forward-looking judgment: expect continued consolidation and privatization pressure as cash-strapped agencies look to contracting for cost control — tempered by union resistance and Section 5333(b).

9. Risks

• The "fiscal cliff." Federal COVID-19 relief that propped up agencies is exhausted while fares remain below 2019 levels, opening large structural operating deficits: New York's MTA has projected multibillion-dollar annual gaps, San Francisco's BART a ~$143 million shortfall entering 2025, Washington's WMATA a ~$738 million FY2025 gap, and Chicago's RTA a ~$771 million shortfall that could force ~40% service cuts.[26] Deep service cuts would shrink the whole industry, contractors included.
• Political and funding dependence. Running on taxes and grants exposes the sector to legislative gridlock. The IIJA is authorized only through FY2026 — reauthorization is the single biggest funding uncertainty ahead.[27]
• Labor. Chronic bus-driver shortages and wage inflation squeeze both agency budgets and thin contractor margins, and can overwhelm fixed-price contracts.
• Contract loss / concentration (private operators). Contracts expire, get rebid, or return to public operation; losing or mis-bidding one large contract can swing results.
• Safety and liability. Accidents drive litigation, insurance losses, regulatory action, and reputational damage — ever-present margin risks.
• Fleet transition (EV) risk. Zero-emission mandates require heavy capital, charging and grid capacity, specialized maintenance, and training; early battery-electric fleets faced range, reliability, and charging issues, and the 2023 bankruptcy of manufacturer Proterra underscored supplier fragility. Execution risk rises when contracts don't fully pass through higher vehicle, facility, or energy costs.
• Demand volatility. Remote work, private cars, ride-hailing, route redesign, and fare evasion can move ridership and costs.
• Data risk. Public-employer operations and contracted services mean private-business statistics do not capture the full economic footprint (see §3).

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public-market routes (all indirect):

• Equities: the multinational operators — Mobico Group (LSE: MCG), whose WeDriveU arm is the closest listed operating proxy, and ComfortDelGro (SGX: C52) — offer diluted exposure to U.S. bus operations bundled with large non-U.S. and non-transit businesses; both carry company-specific issues (Mobico has been restructuring and selling North American units).[13][14] Suppliers — NFI Group (TSX: NFI) and REV Group (NYSE: REV) for transit buses, Blue Bird (Nasdaq: BLBD) for school buses — are the cleaner listed ways to bet on the bus fleet and its electrification, though they are manufacturers, not operators.[15][16][17]
• Fixed income: transit-authority municipal bonds are the most direct public-market exposure. Credit quality hinges on the dedicated-tax base and on how the fiscal cliff resolves.

Private-market routes — infrastructure and PE funds own the contract operators (Caisse des Dépôts/CDPQ/SNCF/RATP behind Transdev, Keolis, RATP Dev; PE behind Beacon).[18][19][20] Direct plays include contract-operations firms, paratransit and microtransit technology (a faster-growing, higher-margin, less-unionized niche), fleet finance, and depot electrification/charging. Underwrite: contract duration, renewal history, termination and price-escalation clauses; customer concentration and rebid exposure; labor agreements, driver availability, safety record, and insurance claims; fleet ownership, maintenance and charging obligations, and replacement schedule; unit economics (cost per hour/mile, cash conversion); and whether growth comes from profitable contracts or underpriced bids.

Near-term catalysts to watch:

1. Fiscal-cliff resolution — whether states enact new dedicated taxes or bailouts determines service levels and contract volumes.[26]
2. Federal reauthorization beyond FY2026 — the IIJA authorized up to $108 billion for transit (about $91 billion guaranteed), the largest transit investment in U.S. history; what replaces it is the key catalyst for the whole sector.[27]
3. Ridership trajectory — a continued grind back toward 2019, with bus leading.[9]
4. EV mandate timelines and federal EV-bus grants — a multi-year capital tailwind for manufacturers and a cost pressure for agencies.[25]
5. Labor markets — easing driver shortages and wage trends directly move contractor margins.

Forward-looking judgment: Bus transit should remain an essential, policy-supported service with steady but generally modest growth and labor-intensive margins. The most attractive businesses are diversified operators with indexed contracts, strong safety and labor execution, disciplined bidding, and credible fleet-transition capability. Suppliers and infrastructure providers may capture more of the electrification cycle than operators if public contracts leave contractors carrying the cost risk.

Bottom line: 485113 is a large, essential, but overwhelmingly government-run industry. The investable exposure sits not in the buses themselves but in the private firms hired to run them, the manufacturers that build them, and the municipal debt that finances them — all of which currently hinge on how Washington and the states resolve transit's post-pandemic funding gap.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definition — 485113 Bus and Other Motor Vehicle Transit Systems, 2022 (definition and cross-references to 485111/485112/485119/485210/487110). https://www.census.gov/naics/?chart=2022&details=485113&input=485113
2. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns: 2023 (485113: establishments 523; employees 41,501; annual payroll $2,537,806k; Q1 payroll $620,615k). https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2023/econ/cbp/2023-cbp.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Establishment and Firm Size / Concentration (485113: firms 273; receipts $4,054,395k; CR4 49.8%, CR8 68.8%, CR20 83.0%, CR50 93.1%; HHI 757.3). https://api.census.gov/data/2022/ecnsize.html
4. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns: Coverage and Content (CBP excludes public administration and most government employees). https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/mu0800.html
5. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards, 2023 (NAICS 485113 standard: $32.5 million average annual receipts). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
6. Federal Transit Administration, The National Transit Database (NTD). https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd
7. Federal Transit Administration, 2023 National Transit Summaries and Trends (≈3,000 reporting agencies; ~388,000 people employed operating public transit; 2023 operating-expense funding split — directly generated ~31%, federal ~16%, state/local ~53%). https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/2024-10/2023%20National%20Transit%20Summaries%20and%20Trends_1.1.pdf
8. Federal Transit Administration, 2024 Annual Database Contractual Relationship (definition of Purchased Transportation). https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2024-annual-database-contractual-relationship
9. American Public Transportation Association, via Metro Magazine, "New APTA Data Finds Ridership Up to 85% of Pre-Pandemic Levels," 2025 (7.7 billion trips in 2024, +491m over 2023; bus recovered to ~86%). https://www.metro-magazine.com/10240981/new-apta-data-finds-ridership-up-to-85-of-pre-pandemic-levels
10. Metro Magazine, "Contractors Changing the Public Transit Model with Tech Integration," 2024/2025 (private contractors ≈28% of transit vehicle-revenue-hours in 2024; the largest operators / North American Transit Alliance). https://www.metro-magazine.com/articles/contractors-changing-the-public-transit-model-with-tech-integration
11. California Policy Center, "The Cost of Transit in California," 2024 (FY2023 California farebox recovery ~10%; labor ~two-thirds of operating cost). https://californiapolicycenter.org/reports/the-cost-of-transit-in-california/
12. The Antiplanner (Thoreau Institute), "Lower Fares, Higher Operating Costs," 2024, and Wikipedia, "Farebox recovery ratio" (national farebox recovery ~13–17% in 2023 vs ~30–36% pre-pandemic). https://ti.org/antiplanner/?p=22423; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farebox_recovery_ratio
13. Mobico Group plc, "Results for the twelve months ended 31 December 2024," 2025, and reporting on the 2025 sale of its North American school-bus business (group revenue ~£3.4bn; WeDriveU North American arm). https://www.mobicogroup.com/media/news-releases/2025/
14. ComfortDelGro Corporation, "FY2024 Results" (group revenue ~S$4.48bn; overseas expansion), 2025. https://www.comfortdelgro.com/press-releases/
15. NFI Group Inc., Investor Relations (New Flyer/MCI transit-bus manufacturing, incl. zero-emission models). https://www.nfigroup.com/
16. REV Group Inc., Company / Investor Relations (specialty-vehicle maker incl. transit and shuttle buses). https://www.revgroup.com/
17. Blue Bird Corporation, Company Overview (school buses, incl. low-/zero-emission). https://investors.blue-bird.com/company-overview/default.aspx
18. Transdev, "Transdev Completes Acquisition of First Transit," 2023 (leading U.S./Canada private operator; ~400 million trips/year; ~$2.6bn combined North American revenue). https://www.transdev.com/en/news/canada/press-release/transdev-has-completed-the-acquisition-of-first-transit
19. Transdev, "Finalization of the Evolution of the Transdev Group Shareholding Structure," 2025 (~66% Rethmann Group / ~34% Caisse des Dépôts). https://www.transdev.com/en/press-release/finalization-of-the-evolution-of-the-transdev-group-shareholding-structure/
20. Keolis, "Governance at Keolis," and "Keolis Secures OCTA Fixed-Route Bus Contract," 2023–2026 (~70% SNCF Group / ~30% CDPQ). https://www.keolis.com/en/our-governance; https://news.keolisna.com/keolis-secures-contract-as-octa-operating-partner
21. RATP Dev, "RATP Dev in the USA" (subsidiary of the RATP Group / Paris transit authority). https://www.ratpdev.com/en/usa/
22. MV Transportation, "MV Transportation Celebrates 50 Years of Service," 2025 (largest U.S.-owned private passenger-transport contractor; leading paratransit provider). https://mvtransit.com/news/mv-transportation-celebrates-50-years-of-service/
23. Federal Transit Administration, regulatory guidance — Buy America (49 U.S.C. §5323(j); 49 CFR Part 661), ADA complementary paratransit, Section 5333(b) labor protections, and drug/alcohol testing (49 CFR Part 655). https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance
24. Federal Transit Administration, Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans (PTASP), 49 CFR Part 673. https://www.transit.dot.gov/PTASP
25. CALSTART, "Zeroing in on Zero-Emission Buses (2025)," and California Air Resources Board Innovative Clean Transit rule (all new transit buses zero-emission from 2029, fleet transition by 2040; FTA awarded ~$1.5bn for ZEBs in 2024). https://calstart.org/calstart-releases-zeroing-in-on-zebs-report-2025/
26. TransitCenter, "Transit's Looming Fiscal Cliff," and GovTech, "U.S. Public Transit Faces Funding Crisis Amid Remote Work," 2024/2025 (MTA multibillion-dollar gap; BART ~$143m; WMATA ~$738m FY2025; Chicago RTA ~$771m and potential ~40% cuts). https://transitcenter.org/transits-fiscal-cliff-why-we-need-a-new-funding-paradigm/
27. Federal Transit Administration, The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), 2021, and reporting on the FY2026 reauthorization deadline (up to $108 billion authorized for transit, ~$91 billion guaranteed). https://www.transit.dot.gov/IIJA