Scheduled Freight Air Transportation (NAICS 481112) — An Investor's Primer

1. Overview

Scheduled freight air transportation is the business of flying cargo — not passengers — over published routes on a fixed timetable. These are the all-cargo airlines whose planes take off on schedule whether they are full or half-empty, moving the highest-value, most time-sensitive freight in the economy: electronics and semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, fresh produce, e-commerce parcels, and aerospace and auto parts. Air carries a tiny share of world trade by weight but a large share by value, because only goods that can pay a steep premium for speed fly.

Why it matters: air freight is one of the purest real-time reads on global trade and industrial activity, and it is a capital-heavy, deeply cyclical business where results swing with trade cycles, fuel, and the amount of spare "belly" space in passenger jets. The central question for an owner is not simply how much cargo moves. It is whether an operator can fill aircraft reliably, price service above its fully loaded cost, and protect margins when fuel, labor, aircraft, or demand move against it.

Both ways of investing here are indirect. Public-market exposure runs mostly through diversified delivery and logistics companies plus the aircraft maker and lessors — there is no large, clean U.S.-listed pure-play. The two dominant U.S. air-cargo operators are the in-house airlines of FedEx and UPS, buried inside diversified express giants, and the largest dedicated freight carriers (Atlas Air, Air Transport Services Group) were taken private by investment firms in 2023–2025 [8][9]. The private route — through private-equity and infrastructure funds, aircraft leasing, contract (ACMI) capacity, maintenance, and private credit — is where much of the sector's ownership now actually lives.

2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) code 481112 covers establishments that provide scheduled air transportation of cargo only, over regular routes on regular schedules, including scheduled carriage of mail under contract [4]. The defining feature is the published timetable: the flight goes when scheduled, full or not.

Four business models operate under and around this code:

• Integrated express networks own the entire chain — pickup, sortation, air, and delivery — and sell guaranteed door-to-door service rather than "air freight." FedEx, UPS, and DHL Express are the major examples; the airline is one cost center inside the network [6][17][19].
• Dedicated (outsourced) freight carriers fly for others. Their core product is ACMI leasing — the carrier supplies the Aircraft, Crew, Maintenance, and Insurance, and the customer (Amazon, DHL, freight forwarders, the military) provides the freight and bears the commercial risk, paying a fixed rate per block hour. Atlas Air, ATSG's ABX Air and Air Transport International, and Kalitta Air are important examples; they also fly scheduled routes and charters [8][9][24].
• Feeder carriers operate smaller aircraft that funnel volume into the big networks. Air T's Mountain Air Cargo and CSA Air, for instance, fly contracted feeder routes for FedEx [18].
• Captive strategic networks — chiefly Amazon Air — use a mix of owned and leased aircraft but rely on third-party airlines to actually operate the flights [7].

What it excludes (and where those activities are counted instead):

• Air courier / express delivery — the integrated door-to-door parcel networks — are NAICS 492110, Couriers and Express Delivery Services. This is the big one: FedEx and UPS as enterprises are classified here, not in 481112 [4].
• Nonscheduled / charter freight (on-demand, no fixed route) is NAICS 481212, Nonscheduled Chartered Freight Air Transportation [4]. Much of the ACMI and charter flying done by carriers like Atlas and Kalitta falls here rather than in 481112.
• Scheduled passenger air transportation is NAICS 481111 — and critically, the cargo that passenger airlines carry in the belly holds of their planes is booked under passenger air, not here.
• Airport operations, cargo handling, and other air-transport support are NAICS 48811 and related codes [4].

This is not a government-dominated industry — it combines listed integrated networks, private-equity-backed operators, captive fleets, and family-owned carriers — although postal, defense, and other government contracts can materially affect individual operators.

3. How big it is (federal statistics)

By the U.S. government's own count, NAICS 481112 is a small industry. The figures below come from our ingested federal ground-truth data; they carry different vintages and universes, so they are not a single current-period financial statement.

A telling detail: annual payroll of $1.78 billion across 13,454 workers works out to roughly $132,000 per employee [1] — reflecting a workforce heavy with airline pilots and licensed aircraft mechanics, among the best-paid skilled jobs in transportation.

The undercount — read this carefully. That ~$10 billion figure is not the size of U.S. air freight. It is the size of a narrow slice: the dedicated scheduled freight carriers. It leaves out most of the money because of how the classification works:

• FedEx and UPS are counted as couriers (NAICS 492110), not here. FedEx's overall revenue was about $87.9 billion in its fiscal 2025 (ended May 2025) [6], and UPS about $91 billion in 2024 [17] — and their in-house airlines are the two largest cargo fleets in the world [7]. None of that lands in the 481112 line.
• Passenger airlines' belly cargo is counted under passenger air (481111). In 2024, United earned about $1.7 billion, Delta about $822 million, and American about $804 million in cargo revenue [16] — all outside this code.

There is also ordinary survey coverage error: County Business Patterns covers establishments with paid employees and the Economic Census covers employer firms [1][2], so both can miss nonemployer and very small operators, outsourced activity, and foreign carriers serving the U.S. market. So the true U.S. air-freight economy is roughly an order of magnitude larger than the 481112 statistic suggests; broader market estimates put U.S. air freight in the range of $60+ billion a year [5]. Treat the $10 billion as "dedicated scheduled cargo airlines that aren't the integrators."

Even within that narrow slice, the industry is concentrated: the top 4 firms hold 67.9% of receipts, the top 8 hold 78.9%, the top 20 hold 91.1%, and the top 50 hold 98.6% [2]. These are revenue shares among employer firms — not capacity, profit, or flight-count shares. The federal Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration measure) for this code is suppressed and not available [2].

4. The investable universe

There are very few pure-play public cargo airlines. Realistic public exposure runs through diversified logistics companies, one Canadian pure-play, a small feeder holding company, the aircraft maker, and lessors. Because the listed companies bundle air with ground, parcel, logistics, or e-commerce, their company-wide revenue is not comparable with the federal NAICS receipts figure. Much of the dedicated U.S. freighter fleet is now privately held.

Public (or with public parents):

Private and other major owners:

• Atlas Air Worldwide — taken private in March 2023 by an Apollo-led group (with J.F. Lehman & Company and Hill City Capital) for about $5.2 billion including debt, $102.50/share [8]. Operates ~94 aircraft (Boeing 747/777/767) and the Polar Air Cargo joint venture with DHL [7].
• Air Transport Services Group (ATSG) — taken private by infrastructure investor Stonepeak in a $3.1 billion deal announced November 2024 and closed in 2025, $22.50/share [9]. The largest lessor of mid-size 767 freighters; subsidiaries ABX Air and Air Transport International fly a big share of Amazon Air.
• Kalitta Air — scheduled and on-demand all-cargo carrier, wholly owned by Conrad Kalitta [24]. Amerijet International — U.S. all-cargo carrier spanning scheduled, contract, and charter markets [25]. National Airlines and Western Global Airlines — privately held U.S. all-cargo operators.
• Passenger carriers' cargo divisions (Delta, United, American) — meaningful belly-cargo businesses, but classified under passenger air and a small share of each airline's revenue [16].

The clearest public exposure is through diversified companies; the clearest private exposure is through the operating platforms and the aircraft assets themselves.

5. How the money works

Owners make money on the spread between what they charge to fly a unit of cargo and what it costs to operate the aircraft — and the business models earn that spread differently.

Revenue comes from freight rates (set by origin, destination, weight, size, and service level), plus fuel and demand surcharges, accessorial charges, ACMI block-hour payments, aircraft leases, and charter revenue [6]. The cost base is unusually fixed: aircraft ownership or leases, pilots, maintenance, hubs, sorting systems, technology, insurance, and airport infrastructure must be funded even when volumes fall. Fuel and handling are more variable, but fuel surcharges can lag price moves — or push customers toward cheaper ground service [6][17].

Integrators (FedEx, UPS, DHL) don't sell air freight as a standalone product; they sell guaranteed door-to-door delivery. The airline is a cost inside a network, and profit comes from network density and yield management across the whole express system — filling planes and sort hubs, pricing premium/overnight service, and matching capacity to demand. Their scale (Memphis and Louisville super-hubs, hundreds of aircraft) is the moat.

Dedicated carriers live or die on aircraft utilization and the structure of their contracts:

• ACMI / CMI leasing is the steadier, lower-risk model. The customer bears volume and yield risk and pays a fixed rate per block hour flown; the carrier just has to keep the plane flying reliably and control crew, maintenance, and insurance costs. Fuel is usually the customer's cost pass-through. Margins are thinner but more predictable.
• Scheduled and charter flying exposes the carrier directly to spot freight rates and cyclicality — higher upside in a boom, painful in a bust.

The metrics that matter are airline-cargo metrics, not passenger ones:

• Cargo tonne-kilometers (CTK) — the volume measure (one tonne carried one kilometer).
• Cargo load factor — how full the planes are. Globally this ran roughly 47–49% in 2025; on international routes, dedicated freighters filled about 64% of capacity while passenger belly space filled only about 40% [12].
• Yield — revenue per tonne-km (or per pound), sliced by service level and trade lane. Cargo yields eased through 2025 (down roughly 2.6% year-on-year by December) as capacity normalized from pandemic highs [12].
• Block hours / aircraft utilization — the revenue hours each expensive airframe flies.
• Fleet cost — ownership or lease of the aircraft, maintenance, fleet age, and increasingly pilot labor, which spiked after 2022 as freight pilots defected to better-paying passenger jobs.
• Customer concentration and contract renewal rates.

Our federal data provide no industry-wide load factor, yield, fuel-cost, or utilization figure; none should be inferred from the receipts or payroll numbers. Because freighters are heavy, capital-intensive assets, the business is sensitive to interest rates and to how efficiently a carrier finances and utilizes its fleet. Converted freighters (older passenger jets rebuilt to carry cargo, like the 737-800BCF and 767-300BCF) are far cheaper to acquire than new-build freighters and dominate the mid-size fleet [13].

6. What drives demand

Air cargo earns a premium when speed, reliability, security, or distance matter more than transport cost. The main pulls:

• Global trade and industrial production. Air cargo tracks world GDP and manufacturing cycles closely — it is often described as a leading indicator of trade.
• E-commerce, especially cross-border. Fast-fashion and marketplace platforms (Shein, Temu and others) built enormous trans-Pacific air volumes shipping small parcels directly to U.S. consumers — until 2025 trade-policy changes upended that (see Risks).
• High-value, time-critical goods. Semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and vaccines, perishables, and just-in-time industrial and aerospace parts are the bread and butter — cargo that must move in hours or days, not weeks.
• Postal and government cargo, plus emergency and inventory-restocking shipments.
• Belly capacity in passenger aircraft. This is a demand and supply factor. When passenger flying recovers (as it did strongly after 2022), enormous belly capacity comes back into the market and competes with dedicated freighters, pressuring yields [12].
• Supply-chain disruption. Ocean-shipping shocks (port congestion, Red Sea/Suez diversions) can push freight from sea to air, spiking demand.
• Fuel prices — a swing factor on the cost side rather than a demand driver, but central to profitability.

Global figures are a useful gauge even though they are not a direct measure of U.S. NAICS 481112. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) reported record global air-cargo demand in 2025: CTK rose 3.4% and available cargo tonne-kilometers (ACTK, the capacity measure) rose 3.7%, with international demand up 4.2% against international capacity up 5.1% [20]. But FedEx has flagged a customer shift toward slower, cheaper services and some production and inventory moving closer to end markets [6] — so U.S. domestic air freight faces more ground substitution than premium international freight. Volume growth alone matters less than yield, service mix, and network utilization.

7. Regulation

A U.S. cargo airline needs two separate federal authorizations:

1. Economic authority from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). For scheduled cargo carriers, a certificate for interstate or foreign all-cargo authority; the DOT's Air Carrier Fitness Division must find the applicant "fit, willing, and able" and a U.S. citizen [15].
2. Safety authority from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). An Air Carrier Certificate and Operations Specifications. Scheduled cargo airlines operate under 14 CFR Part 121, the same demanding rule set as large passenger airlines, covering certification, operating procedures, training, maintenance, and hazardous-materials programs [15].

Citizenship and foreign ownership. A U.S. air carrier must be a U.S. citizen under federal law: the president and at least two-thirds of the board and managing officers must be U.S. citizens, U.S. citizens must hold at least 75% of the voting interest (so foreign voting equity is capped at 25%), and the carrier must be under the actual control of U.S. citizens. Since 1991 the DOT has administratively allowed foreign holders to own up to 49% of total equity as long as they hold no more than 25% of voting shares [15]. This blocks a foreign airline from simply buying a U.S. cargo carrier.

Security and cross-border. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regulates cargo security, screening, and chain-of-custody through programs such as the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) [21]. For inbound international cargo, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) runs Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS), requiring advance shipment data for risk assessment before cargo reaches the United States [22].

International routes also depend on bilateral aviation agreements, foreign operating authority, customs rules, sanctions, and airspace access, which can limit all-cargo charter activity or determine which carriers may serve particular markets [23]. Rounding out the picture are FAA maintenance oversight, hazardous-materials rules, and environmental/noise rules that shape fleet economics — notably ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) CO2 emissions standards taking effect January 1, 2028 that push older freighter types toward retirement (see below). Regulation raises entry barriers and protects safety, but it also adds compliance cost and makes accidents, security failures, or certification problems potentially existential.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

• A domestic express duopoly. In integrated U.S. express, FedEx and UPS dominate; within the narrow 481112 code, the top four firms hold ~68% of receipts [2]. Competition is nonetheless lane-specific — one integrated network can dominate time-definite parcels while ACMI operators compete for aircraft capacity, military work, regional feeders, or forwarder contracts.
• Amazon changed the game. Amazon built its own captive air network, Amazon Air (~100 aircraft flown by contract operators, hubbed at Cincinnati/CVG) [7], reducing its reliance on FedEx and UPS. Amazon Air is not itself a certificated airline — it contracts the flying to ATSG's carriers, Atlas, and others — which made Amazon the single most important customer for the dedicated-freighter operators, and a source of both growth and dependency. UPS, in turn, is deliberately cutting low-margin Amazon delivery volume by more than half through 2026 [17].
• Private capital has consolidated the dedicated fleet. In two years the two largest listed dedicated cargo operators went private — Atlas to Apollo's group (2023) and ATSG to Stonepeak (2025) [8][9]. Infrastructure and PE investors treat freighter fleets, operating certificates, customer contracts, and maintenance platforms as long-duration, contracted, cash-generative infrastructure. That improves access to capital but reduces public disclosure and can add leverage.
• Attrition at the smaller end. Western Global Airlines filed Chapter 11 in August 2023 and restructured, cutting about $465 million of debt, after freight demand collapsed from pandemic peaks, belly capacity returned, and pilots left for passenger airlines [14].
• Tight new-freighter supply. Boeing plans to end 767 freighter production in 2027, and neither the 767F nor 777F will meet the 2028 ICAO emissions rules; the replacement 777-8F has slipped to around 2028 [13]. That scarcity supports the value of existing freighters and conversions — and is why adding aircraft ahead of demand (poor load factors, discounting, excess lease and maintenance cost) is the classic way to destroy value here.

9. Risks

• Cyclicality. Air cargo amplifies the trade cycle — volumes and especially yields swing hard. The pandemic boom (2020–2022) was followed by a sharp normalization that bankrupted or squeezed weaker carriers [14].
• Trade-policy and de minimis shock. The U.S. ended the $800 Section 321 "de minimis" duty exemption in 2025 — for China/Hong Kong on May 2, then for all countries on August 29 [11]. That exemption had underpinned an estimated ~1.4 billion low-value parcels a year, much of it flown from Asia. Trans-Pacific e-commerce air volumes fell steeply (some China lanes down ~60%) and U.S. inbound air cargo dropped materially through 2025 [11]. This is the sector's single biggest near-term demand risk.
• Ground substitution and belly-capacity competition. Nearshoring, expanded distribution centers, and a customer drift toward slower, cheaper service erode air demand [6]; recovering passenger flying floods the market with cheap belly space, undercutting dedicated-freighter yields [12].
• Fuel and cost inflation, plus pilot/mechanic labor scarcity and pay parity with passenger airlines — skilled workers are hard to replace quickly.
• Customer concentration. Dedicated operators lean heavily on a few customers — Amazon and DHL above all — so a lost contract, postal award, or military contract hits network economics hard [17][18].
• Fleet and capex risk. Aging fleets, expensive replacements, limited new-freighter supply, and the 2028 emissions rules force costly decisions [13].
• Capital intensity and interest rates. Heavy aircraft financing, conversions, and maintenance reserves make the sector rate-sensitive and can consume cash for years before returns appear.
• Safety, security, and geopolitics. Accidents, cargo-security failures, or certification problems can ground aircraft or damage a brand; tariffs, sanctions, wars, and airspace closures can reroute trade and cut volumes.
• Data risk. Federal statistics understate activity outside paid-employee establishments, and public-company reporting often bundles air freight with unrelated businesses [1][2].

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public routes. There is no clean, large U.S.-listed pure-play. Treat the listed names as different exposure packages:

• FedEx (FDX) and UPS (UPS) — the mainstream way in, but as diversified express/logistics companies where dedicated air is one part of a much larger ground-and-delivery machine [6][17].
• DHL Group (Frankfurt: DHL) — global air-express exposure through a non-U.S.-listed parent [19].
• Cargojet (TSX: CJT) — the closest listed pure-play scheduled cargo airline, though Canadian and mid-cap [10].
• Air T (AIRT) — more direct feeder exposure, but small and diversified [18].
• Boeing (BA) — the freighter OEM, a supply-side play on scarce new lift [13].
• Aircraft lessors (AER, AL) and, very indirectly, Amazon (AMZN) for its captive air network.

Private routes. After Atlas and ATSG went private, much of the dedicated U.S. freighter capacity is now owned by private-equity and infrastructure funds (Apollo, Stonepeak) [8][9], with Kalitta and others family- or privately held. Private-market access comes through those funds, direct aircraft ownership and leasing, engine and parts financing, maintenance/repair, airport cargo infrastructure, ACMI capacity contracts, or private credit secured by aircraft and contracted cash flows. Due diligence should center on customer contracts, aircraft age, lease obligations, maintenance reserves, regulatory standing, fuel pass-through, and realistic load-factor assumptions — a route that suits investors who want long-duration, contracted cash flows rather than daily equity volatility.

Outlook (forward-looking judgment). The near term is a tug-of-war. On the downside, the end of de minimis and tariff-driven disruption knocked a real hole in trans-Pacific e-commerce air demand in 2025–2026, and normalizing yields plus returning belly capacity are pressuring the dedicated carriers [11][12]. On the upside, underlying air-cargo demand set records in 2024 and 2025 (CTK growing several percent year-on-year) [12][20], new-freighter supply is genuinely tight into 2027–2028 [13], and structural express/e-commerce growth continues even as its trade routing reshuffles. The likely path is a more cyclical, consolidated industry in which the integrators and a handful of privately owned dedicated operators capture most of the value, aircraft scarcity supports asset prices, and yields settle well below pandemic highs but above pre-2020 lows. The best returns should accrue to operators with dense networks, disciplined capacity, strong contracts, and flexible fleets; the weakest will be exposed to excess aircraft, weak pricing, high leverage, and customer concentration. For public investors that mostly means owning the diversified logistics and OEM names; for private investors it means the freighter and leasing assets that no longer trade on an exchange.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 481112 (establishments, employment, annual and Q1 payroll). https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2023/econ/cbp/2023-cbp.html
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration of Largest Firms, NAICS 481112 (firms, receipts, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI suppressed). https://data.census.gov/table/ECNSIZE2022
3. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 481112 = 1,500 employees), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
4. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS: 481112 Scheduled Freight Air Transportation" (industry definition and exclusions). https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=481112&input=481112&year=2022
5. Mordor Intelligence, "United States Air Freight Transport Market — Size & Forecast," 2025. https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/us-air-freight-transport-market
6. FedEx Corporation, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2025 (group revenue ~$87.9B; service-mix commentary). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1048911/000104891125000011/fdx-20250531.htm
7. Simple Flying, "FedEx vs. Amazon vs. UPS: Which Carrier Has the Largest Fleet?" and "The Largest Five US All-Cargo Airlines by Fleet Size," 2025. https://simpleflying.com/fedex-amazon-ups-largest-fleet-2025/
8. Apollo Global Management / Atlas Air Worldwide, "Investor Group Led by Apollo, Together with J.F. Lehman & Company and Hill City Capital, Completes Acquisition of Atlas Air Worldwide," March 2023. https://ir.apollo.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/435/investor-group-led-by-apollo-together-with-j-f-lehman
9. FreightWaves, "Stonepeak to buy air cargo company ATSG for $3.1B," November 2024. https://www.freightwaves.com/news/stonepeak-to-buy-air-cargo-company-atsg-for-3-1b
10. FlightGlobal, "Canada's Cargojet hauls record Q1 revenue," April 2025, and Cargojet Inc. (TSX: CJT) profile. https://www.flightglobal.com/air-transport/canadas-cargojet-hauls-record-q1-revenue-amid-decoupling-of-us-and-canadian-supply-chains/162721.article
11. Supply Chain Dive, "De minimis' end: how shippers are adapting," 2025, and Sourcing Journal, "Air Cargo Rates Set to Sink as De Minimis Gets the Axe," 2025. https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/de-minimis-change-2025-peak-season-impact/757600/
12. International Air Transport Association (IATA), Air Cargo Market Analysis, December 2025 (CTK, load factors, yields). https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/air-cargo-market-analysis-december-2025/
13. Air Cargo News, "Boeing delays 777-8F to 2028 and will end 767F production in 2027," 2025. https://www.aircargonews.net/boeing-delays-777-8f-to-2028-and-will-end-767f-production-in-2027/1078148.article
14. FreightWaves, "Western Global Airlines exits bankruptcy with better balance sheet," December 2023. https://www.freightwaves.com/news/western-global-airlines-exits-bankruptcy-with-better-balance-sheet
15. U.S. Department of Transportation, "U.S. Air Carriers — Licensing," and FAA, "Regularly Scheduled Air Carriers (Part 121)"; GAO-19-540R on foreign-ownership limits, 2019. https://www.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-policy/licensing/US-carriers
16. Air Cargo News, "Delta's 2024 cargo revenue up 14%" and related 2024 airline cargo-revenue reporting (United, Delta, American), January 2025. https://www.aircargonews.net/airlines/deltas-2024-cargo-revenue-up-14/1079536.article
17. Retail Dive / Reuters, "UPS to cut Amazon volume by more than 50%," Q4 2024 earnings (2024 revenue ~$91B; 2025 guidance ~$88.7B). https://www.retaildive.com/news/ups-amazon-volume-reduction-q4-2024-earnings/738770/
18. Air T, Inc., Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 2025 (Mountain Air Cargo, CSA Air feeder operations for FedEx). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/353184/000035318425000069/airt-20250331.htm
19. DHL Group, "Express" corporate-division overview, 2026. https://group.dhl.com/en/about-us/corporate-divisions/express.html
20. International Air Transport Association (IATA), "Global Air Cargo Demand Achieved Record Volume in 2025," January 2026. https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/2026-releases/2026-01-29-01/
21. Transportation Security Administration, "TSA Air Cargo Security" / Certified Cargo Screening Program, 2025. https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/15224_fctsh_its_cargo_v3_508c.pdf
22. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) Implementation Guide," 2025. https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/ACAS%20IG%20v2.3.4.3%20%28508%29.pdf
23. U.S. Department of Transportation, "International Economic Authority" (bilateral agreements and foreign all-cargo authority). https://www.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-policy/international-economic-authority
24. Kalitta Air, "Company Overview," 2026. https://www.kalittaair.com/about
25. Amerijet International, "About Us," 2026. https://amerijet.com/about-us/