Mixed Mode Transit Systems (United States) — NAICS 485111

An investor's primer. NAICS is the North American Industry Classification System, the U.S. federal government's standard code for classifying industries.

1. Overview

A "mixed mode transit system" is what most Americans simply call the local transit agency: an operator that moves people around a metro area using more than one mode at once — subways plus buses, or light rail plus buses plus commuter rail — on fixed routes and schedules.[1] Think of New York's subway-and-bus network, Boston's MBTA, Washington's Metro, or Chicago's CTA. The defining feature versus its industry siblings is the combination of modes under one operator.

The first thing to understand is that this is overwhelmingly a government-run public service, not a private, profit-seeking industry. The systems that dominate the category — the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) in New York, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), Los Angeles Metro — are public bodies. They do not issue stock and are not run to earn a profit. As a result, the federal business statistics for NAICS 485111, which count only private companies, capture a tiny sliver of the real activity (Section 3).[3]

That does not mean there is nothing to invest in. There is — but for both public-market and private investors, the money flows in through the supply chain and the financing, not through owning the agencies:

• Public-market routes: municipal bonds issued by transit agencies (the single largest and most direct exposure), shares of the equipment makers that sell buses and rail cars, and a handful of foreign-listed companies that operate transit under contract.
• Private-market routes: the private contract-operations firms (mostly owned by European state and pension capital), and infrastructure funds that finance transit projects and buy transit-services businesses.

Returns in the private layer depend more on labor execution, contract terms, safety records, asset ownership, and renewal rates than on fare growth alone.

2. What it is and how it is structured

In scope (NAICS 485111): establishments primarily engaged in operating local and suburban passenger transit within a metro area (and nearby non-urban areas) using more than one mode — for example one operator running bus plus subway plus commuter rail, or bus plus light rail.[1] A qualifying system may combine buses, subways, light rail, commuter rail, streetcars, or other local modes. Day-to-day work includes route and timetable planning, dispatch, fare collection, and maintenance of both vehicles ("rolling stock") and fixed infrastructure — track, stations, and depots.[1]

What it excludes. These adjacent codes matter because they split the transit world by mode; a single-mode operator is classified in one of them, not in 485111:

• 485112 Commuter Rail Systems — single-mode commuter rail.
• 485113 Bus and Other Motor Vehicle Transit Systems — single-mode bus/motor-vehicle transit.
• 485119 Other Urban Transit Systems — other single-mode urban transit.[2]
• 485210 Interurban and Rural Bus Transportation — intercity/rural bus (Greyhound-style), not local.[2]
• 485310 Taxi and Ridesharing Services and 485320 Limousine Service; 485410 School and Employee Bus Transportation; 485510 Charter Bus Industry; and special-needs/paratransit provided as a standalone service.[2]
• 482 Rail Transportation (freight and intercity passenger rail such as Amtrak) and 487110 Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation, Land sit outside subsector 485 entirely. 4884 Support Activities for Road Transportation is also separate.[2]

Ticketing platforms, vehicle manufacturers, consultants, maintenance providers, and ride-hailing companies are not 485111 operators unless operating a qualifying transit system is their primary activity.[1]

Ownership mix. The economically dominant owners are public agencies — states, cities, counties, and special-purpose transit authorities. In the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) 2024 National Transit Database (NTD) reporter universe, independent transit authorities were about 16% of reporting providers, nearly half were city or county government departments, and private operators — for-profit, nonprofit, and contracted providers — were about 25%.[7] Private companies participate mainly as contract operators hired to run all or part of a system, and as suppliers (vehicle makers, signaling, fare systems). Because of this, the operating company and the asset owner are frequently different entities: a private contractor may run a publicly owned fleet, depot, or rail line under a multi-year agreement, with the public agency keeping ownership, fare revenue, and the ridership risk. Private operators handle a meaningful minority of U.S. transit — more than 19% of passenger journeys (over a billion trips) as of 2018 — but almost always mode-by-mode under contract (and those single modes land in the single-mode codes above, which is part of why 485111 looks so small).[11]

3. How big it is

The federal business statistics — and why they drastically undercount this industry. The U.S. Census Bureau's County Business Patterns (CBP), which counts private-sector employer establishments, reports for NAICS 485111 (2023):[3]

The Census Bureau's 2022 Economic Census, also private-sector only, counts just 20 firms in the code with combined receipts of $8.9 million, and reports concentration among those firms: a four-largest-firm revenue share (CR4) of 65.8%, an eight-largest-firm share (CR8) of 83.6%, and a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard 0–10,000 concentration measure) of 1,638.[4] The Small Business Administration's (SBA) size standard for the industry is $29 million in annual receipts.[5]

These figures are real but nearly meaningless as a measure of the industry's true size, and the different programs and years should not be combined into a margin, revenue-per-employee, or market-size estimate. The reason for the undercount: public transit agencies are governments and are excluded from CBP and the Economic Census. Integrated multimodal operation is almost exclusively a government function; private firms are usually hired one mode at a time. So 485111 captures at most a few small private multimodal operators — not the MTAs of the world. The federal business data also does not report industry-specific profit, capital spending, fleet size, ridership, or farebox recovery for this code; those must be read from agency- and company-level data.

The real scale, from transit-specific data. The FTA collects an annual census of roughly 2,200 public transit agencies through the NTD.[6] By that yardstick, U.S. public transportation is roughly a $93 billion annual activity that directly employs more than 430,000 people (the NTD counts about 370,000 in direct transit operations).[8] In fiscal 2023, agencies spent about $65 billion on operations and $27.4 billion on capital; passenger fares brought in about $10.1 billion and other system revenue (advertising, etc.) about $6.4 billion, leaving roughly $76 billion covered by government subsidy.[9] Riders took 7.7 billion trips in 2024, up about 7% (491 million trips) from 2023 and back to roughly 85% of pre-pandemic (2019) levels — bus about 86%, rail about 72%.[8][10]

4. The investable universe

There is no U.S.-listed pure-play operator of mixed-mode transit — the operators are governments, and no listed company reports NAICS 485111 as a standalone segment. Public-market exposure is therefore diversified and imperfect, and comes in three flavors. Scale figures are approximate and move with the market.

A. Listed contract operators (foreign-listed).

B. Listed suppliers (the cleanest, most liquid exposure to the transit spending cycle).

C. Private / other owners (not equity-investable, but they define the market).

• Private contract operators: Transdev (owned ~66% by Germany's Rethmann Group, ~34% by France's Caisse des Dépôts; runs U.S. bus, paratransit, and rail),[20] Keolis (70% SNCF — Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français, France's national railway; 30% CDPQ/La Caisse, Québec's pension fund; U.S. commuter-rail and bus contracts),[21] RATP Dev (the international arm of Paris operator RATP — Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens; U.S. bus, paratransit, streetcar, rail),[22] MV Transportation (family-owned U.S. contractor, paratransit and fixed-route),[23] and Herzog Transit Services (privately held rail operations-and-maintenance).[24] The largest firms form the North American Transit Alliance (NATA), operating in 46 states.[11]
• The system owners themselves — MTA, WMATA, MBTA, SEPTA, CTA, LA Metro, and hundreds of smaller authorities — are public bodies. You cannot buy their equity, but you can buy their municipal bonds (Section 10). The MTA alone runs a roughly $19.9 billion annual operating budget and is one of the largest municipal-bond issuers in the country.[25]

5. How the money works

Because the owners are governments, "how owners make money" is really how systems are funded and where costs go — and, separately, how the private contractors and suppliers earn a margin. There are two distinct economic models.

The public-agency (funding) model. Operating money comes from a mix of (1) fares and other system revenue, (2) dedicated local taxes (very commonly a sales tax), (3) state grants and appropriations, and (4) federal grants. The single most-watched operating metric is the farebox recovery ratio — the share of operating cost covered by fares. Nationally it has fallen to roughly 13% since the pandemic, down from 30–35% before, because riders returned more slowly than costs rose.[9] In plain terms, fares now cover about one dollar in eight of the cost of running service; taxpayers cover the rest. Federal money is skewed toward capital, not operations — in 2023 the federal government funded about 43% of capital spending but only ~15% of operations.[8]

The purchased-transportation (contract) model. A public agency buys operating service from a private provider under a multi-year contract; the FTA tracks these buyer/seller relationships, procurement methods, assets supplied, contract duration, subsidies, and operating costs.[12] Private for-profit providers generally cannot receive federal formula funds (e.g., Section 5307) directly, but they can operate service under contract to an eligible public recipient.[13] Contracts pay the operator by vehicle-hour, vehicle-mile, passenger trip, or a management fee, often with incentives and penalties tied to on-time performance, missed trips, safety, and cleanliness. Asset ownership is decisive: if the agency supplies the vehicles, depots, and charging equipment, the operator is relatively asset-light; if the operator owns them, revenue potential rises but so do capital, financing, depreciation, and residual-value risk. Margins are thin, and the main risks are labor-cost pass-through timing and losing the contract at rebid.

The cost side. Transit is a labor business — operators, mechanics, and station staff dominate the budget, and the workforce is heavily unionized; labor availability and wage escalation usually matter more than fuel or electricity prices. Suppliers, in turn, earn on equipment orders — lumpy, tied to agencies' capital budgets and federal grant cycles, which is why the federal funding calendar (Section 7) drives their revenue.

Useful operating metrics (agency and contract level): unlinked passenger trips (UPT) — boardings, counting transfers separately; vehicle revenue hours (VRH) and vehicle revenue miles (VRM); vehicles operated in maximum service (VOMS) — the peak active fleet; cost per revenue-hour and cost per revenue-mile; subsidy per rider (about $7 in 2023, more than double 2019); farebox recovery; and, for contractors, renewal rates, mobilization cost, penalties, and operating margin.[9] On the capital side the crucial number is the state-of-good-repair backlog — the deferred cost of bringing aging track, tunnels, and vehicles up to standard, which the FTA estimates on the order of $100 billion nationally.[35]

6. What drives demand

• Commuting patterns. The biggest structural shift is remote and hybrid work, which permanently thinned peak-hour rail commuting — the main reason ridership has recovered unevenly (bus faster than rail). Non-commute trips, paratransit, university, airport, and event travel are generally more resilient.[8]
• Service quality. Ridership follows frequency and reliability — the agencies that added service recovered ridership fastest.[26]
• Cost of the alternative. Gasoline prices, car-ownership and parking costs, and road congestion push riders toward or away from transit.
• Demographics and access. Urban density, employment, student/university populations, and aging populations (which raise ADA paratransit demand).
• Capital programs. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) authorizes about $108 billion for public transportation through 2026 for formula grants, rail modernization, bus replacement, accessibility, and low- or no-emission vehicles — supporting a long capital cycle, subject to funding timing and local match risk.[35]
• Policy levers. Congestion pricing (New York began charging most drivers about $9 to enter lower Manhattan at peak in January 2025) both nudges people onto transit and raises dedicated capital money — it netted about $562 million in its first year.[27]

7. Regulation

Federal money comes with federal rules, administered largely by the FTA:

• Grant conditions and reporting. Agencies taking FTA formula funds (such as Section 5307 Urbanized Area Formula Grants) must report to the NTD.[6][13] Private operators generally participate through contracts rather than as direct recipients.
• Domestic sourcing. Buy America and the Build America, Buy America Act (BABA) impose domestic-content rules on vehicles, steel, iron, and manufactured goods bought with federal funds — a major reason U.S. bus and rail-car production is domestic.[30]
• Accessibility. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and FTA Part 37, fixed-route bus and rail systems must generally provide comparable complementary paratransit (curb-to-curb service for riders who cannot use fixed routes) — a large and growing cost line.[29]
• Safety. The Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) rule (49 CFR Part 673) requires federally funded operators to run a formal Safety Management System (SMS); rail transit is additionally overseen by State Safety Oversight agencies under 49 CFR Part 674.[28]
• Labor. Section 13(c) of the Federal Transit law protects transit workers' collective-bargaining rights as a condition of federal funding, reinforcing strong unionization; FTA drug-and-alcohol-testing rules also apply. State and local procurement, prevailing-wage, and environmental-review (NEPA) and civil-rights (Title VI) requirements shape bids and margins, plus state-level zero-emission bus mandates (notably California) that steer fleet purchasing.

Regulation is not merely a compliance cost: safety records, trained workforces, and procurement expertise create barriers to entry that favor established operators.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The agencies don't compete with each other. Each is a geographic monopoly — one subway operator per city. Their real competition is the private car, and their real budget fight is political: winning enough dedicated tax and state support. Where competition exists, it is local and contract-based — an authority defines the service, issues a solicitation, and picks an operator on price, safety record, staffing plan, reliability, technology, and transition capability. Incumbents benefit from existing labor and depots, local knowledge, safety records, lower mobilization risk, and agency relationships.

The private markets around the agencies are consolidating. Contract operations are dominated by a few global players backed by deep state/pension capital — Transdev absorbed First Transit in 2023, and Mobico has consolidated its North American transit and shuttle operations under the WeDriveU brand.[15][14] On the supply side, transit-bus manufacturing has consolidated around NFI/New Flyer, Gillig, and Nova, and the EV-bus upstart Proterra went bankrupt in 2023 — a cautionary tale on the electrification transition.[16] Rail rolling stock is a global oligopoly (Alstom, Siemens, CAF, Stadler, and Asian makers).

The 2022 Economic Census concentration for the narrow 485111 code (CR4 65.8%, CR8 83.6%, HHI 1,638) sits in the range the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) call moderately concentrated (HHI 1,000–1,800), but that figure excludes public-sector activity and is not a full legal-market definition.[4][36] A recurring investor theme: because more than three-quarters of federal transit dollars ultimately flow to private contractors and vendors, the private supply chain is where the investable value concentrates — even though scale that improves bidding can also reduce the number of credible bidders competing for a public agency's contract.[8]

9. Risks

• The fiscal cliff. Federal COVID-relief funds that propped up operations after 2020 have largely run out, opening structural deficits: SEPTA faced a $213 million gap and briefly imposed a 45% service cut and a 21.5% fare increase; the MTA carries a roughly $1.5 billion structural deficit; Chicago's regional system faces about $770 million.[31][32] This is the industry's defining near-term stress.
• Ridership that may never fully return. If hybrid work is permanent, peak rail demand — the historical revenue engine — stays structurally lower.[8]
• Political and funding dependence. With farebox recovery near 13%, systems live on legislatively set subsidies that must be renegotiated repeatedly.[9]
• Labor cost inflation, driver shortages, strikes, and pension/retiree-health liabilities.
• Deferred maintenance — the state-of-good-repair backlog raises breakdown and safety risk.
• Federal policy risk. Administrations can withhold or redirect funds — as in the 2025–26 federal effort to end New York congestion pricing, which courts blocked in March 2026.[27]
• For contractors and suppliers: insourcing (an agency deciding to run service itself), rebid and contract-concentration risk, underpriced fixed-price bids, counterparty (agency credit) risk, and lumpy orders plus EV/technology-transition risk (per Proterra).

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes.

1. Municipal bonds — the most direct exposure. Transit agencies raise capital by issuing tax-exempt bonds whose credit typically rests on dedicated taxes and state support rather than fares, which makes the strong ones reasonably resilient. The MTA's 2025 capital commitments hit a record $15.8 billion, and it plans to issue on the order of $9–10 billion to fund its 2025–2029 capital plan.[25][33] Retail investors reach this market through municipal-bond funds and ETFs; larger investors buy issues directly. This is where "investing in transit" is most literally possible.
2. Listed suppliers — Wabtec (WAB), NFI Group (NFI), Alstom (ALO), Siemens (SIE), CAF, Stadler — give liquid, diversified exposure to the transit capital-spending cycle.[16][17][19]
3. Listed operators — Mobico Group (MCG) is the main listed play on U.S. contract operations, with Kelsian (KLS) a bus-weighted secondary; there is no U.S.-listed pure play, and FirstGroup has largely exited. Analyze the share of revenue actually earned from U.S. transit — a diversified parent's total revenue, dividend, or valuation multiple does not reflect NAICS 485111.[14][15][18]

Private-market routes.

1. Infrastructure and private-equity funds own the contract-operations businesses (Transdev, Keolis, MV) alongside sovereign and pension capital, and increasingly buy transit-services assets.
2. Contract-backed credit and fleet leasing, depot/charging-infrastructure and vehicle financing, public-private partnership (P3) concessions, and fare-collection/scheduling/fleet-management technology. Key diligence questions: is the contract indexed for wages and fuel; who owns the assets; who bears ridership risk; how often is it rebid; how concentrated is revenue in one agency; and does the operator have a credible staffing and safety record.

Near-term drivers to watch.

• Resolution of the fiscal cliffs. The dominant 2025–2027 story is whether states strike durable funding deals. Pennsylvania so far provided only a one-time $394 million patch for SEPTA and no permanent fix — a pattern likely to repeat and a recurring source of headline risk.[31][32]
• Federal reauthorization. The IIJA's transit program (about $21.4 billion a year) expires September 30, 2026; the House has advanced a five-year, ~$580 billion successor (the BUILD America 250 Act), but the Senate has not, and a squeezed Highway Trust Fund makes flat or lower funding a real possibility.[34] The outcome sets the multi-year demand signal for every supplier in Section 4.
• Capital tailwinds. IIJA money for state of good repair and the Capital Investment Grants pipeline, plus fleet electrification mandates, should keep equipment demand firm even as operating budgets stay strained — a divergence worth noting: the suppliers' outlook can be healthier than the agencies'.[35]

Bottom line (judgment). Mixed-mode transit is a large, essential, and structurally subsidized public service, not a profit-seeking industry — which is exactly why the federal business statistics show almost nothing. Investors don't buy the agencies; they finance them (municipal bonds), equip them (listed suppliers), or run pieces of them under contract (mostly foreign-listed or privately held operators). The strongest private businesses combine asset-light operations, long contracts with wage/fuel pass-throughs, diversified agency customers, and strong renewal records; the weakest take fixed-price contracts that demand heavy fleet or charging investment while leaning on peak-period commuting. The next two years hinge on two questions largely outside any company's control: whether states permanently plug the post-COVID operating gap, and how generously Congress reauthorizes federal transit funding in 2026.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS Definition: 485111 Mixed Mode Transit Systems." https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=485111&input=485111&year=2022
2. U.S. Census Bureau, "North American Industry Classification System — Sector 48-49 (Transportation), Subsector 485," 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/resources/archives/sect48-49.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns (CBP), NAICS 485111, 2023 (establishments, employment, payroll). https://data.census.gov/table/CBP2023.CB2300CBP
4. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census, "Concentration of Largest Firms" (firms, receipts, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI), NAICS 485111. https://data.census.gov/table/ECNSIZE2022.EC2200SIZECONCEN
5. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Small Business Size Standards" (NAICS 485111, $29 million receipts), effective March 17, 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
6. Federal Transit Administration, "The National Transit Database (NTD)," 2024. https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd
7. Federal Transit Administration, "2024 National Transit Summaries and Trends" (reporter-universe composition), 2026. https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd
8. American Public Transportation Association, "2024 Public Transportation Fact Book" (ridership, industry size, employment, federal share). https://www.apta.com/wp-content/uploads/APTA-2024-Public-Transportation-Fact-Book.pdf
9. Federal Transit Administration, "2023 National Transit Summaries and Trends" (operating/capital expense, fare revenue, farebox recovery, subsidy per rider), 2024. https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/2024-10/2023%20National%20Transit%20Summaries%20and%20Trends_1.0.pdf
10. American Public Transportation Association, "Public Transportation Ridership Update" (7.7 billion trips, 2024). https://www.apta.com/resource/public-transportation-ridership-update/
11. MV Transportation / North American Transit Alliance, "Six Leading Private Transit Operators Join Forces," 2020. https://mvtransit.com/news/Six-Leading-Private-Transit-Operators-Join-Forces-to-Promote-Transit-Innovation-in-North-America/
12. Federal Transit Administration, "2024 Annual Database Contractual Relationship," 2025. https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2024-annual-database-contractual-relationship
13. Federal Transit Administration, "Urbanized Area Formula Grants — Section 5307." https://www.transit.dot.gov/funding/grants/urbanized-area-formula-grants-5307
14. Mobico Group (formerly National Express), "Our Businesses" and GlobalData company profile (2024 revenue). https://www.mobicogroup.com/about-us/our-businesses/
15. Transdev, "Transdev Completes First Transit's Acquisition," 2023 (and FirstGroup's U.S. transit exit). https://www.transdev.com/en/news/canada/press-release/transdev-has-completed-the-acquisition-of-first-transit
16. Macrotrends, "Wabtec (WAB) Market Cap" (and Proterra 2023 bankruptcy context). https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/WAB/wabtec/market-cap
17. NFI Group, 2024 annual results (revenue). https://www.nfigroup.com/investors/
18. Kelsian Group, "About" and "Kelsian Secures Key Contract Extension in Colorado," 2024. https://www.kelsian.com/about
19. Alstom, "Alstom in the United States." https://www.alstom.com/alstom-united-states
20. Transdev, "Governance" (Rethmann Group ~66%, Caisse des Dépôts ~34%). https://www.transdev.com/en/group/governance
21. Keolis, "Governance at Keolis" and Keolis North America, "Keolis Rail" (SNCF 70%, CDPQ/La Caisse 30%). https://www.keolis.com/en/our-governance
22. RATP Group, "RATP Dev in the USA." https://www.ratpdev.com/en/usa/
23. MV Transportation, "MV Transportation Celebrates 50 Years of Service," 2025. https://mvtransit.com/news/mv-transportation-celebrates-50-years-of-service/
24. Herzog, "Rail Transit Operations and Maintenance Company." https://www.herzog.com/location/rail-transit-operations-maintenance-company/
25. The Bond Buyer, "New York MTA plans municipal bond borrowing"; NYC Council MTA budget brief (FY2025 operating budget ~$19.9bn), 2025. https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/new-york-mta-plans-municipal-bond-borrowing-for-2025
26. Eno Center for Transportation, "Pandemic Ridership Recovery and Agency Adaptations," 2024. https://enotrans.org/article/pandemic-ridership-recovery-and-agency-adaptions/
27. New Jersey Monitor, "Judge rejects Trump bid to end congestion pricing" (first-year net ~$562m; March 2026 ruling), 2026. https://newjerseymonitor.com/2026/03/03/judge-trump-congeston-pricing-ruling/
28. Federal Transit Administration, "Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans (PTASP)," 49 CFR Parts 673 and 674. https://www.transit.dot.gov/PTASP
29. Federal Transit Administration, "Part 37 — Transportation Services for Individuals with Disabilities" (ADA complementary paratransit). https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/civil-rights-ada/part-37-transportation-services-individuals-disabilities
30. Federal Transit Administration, "Buy America" (and Build America, Buy America Act). https://www.transit.dot.gov/buyamerica
31. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, "SEPTA to Restore Full Service & Implement Fare Increase"; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, "$394 Million Capital Funding," 2025. https://www.septa.org/news/septa-restores-full-service-fare-increase/
32. TransitCenter, "Transit's Looming Fiscal Cliff" (MTA and national deficit context), 2024–2025. https://transitcenter.org/transits-fiscal-cliff-why-we-need-a-new-funding-paradigm/
33. Office of Governor Kathy Hochul, "MTA Sets Record With $15.8 Billion in Capital Commitments in 2025," 2025. https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-mta-sets-record-158-billion-capital-commitments-2025
34. Congressional Research Service, "Surface Transportation Reauthorization: Public Transportation" (R48644); Bipartisan Policy Center (~$21.4bn/yr; Sept 30, 2026 expiry; BUILD America 250 Act), 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48644
35. Federal Transit Administration, "The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act" (transit funding, State of Good Repair, Capital Investment Grants). https://www.transit.dot.gov/IIJA
36. U.S. Department of Justice / Federal Trade Commission, "2023 Merger Guidelines" (HHI concentration thresholds), 2023. https://www.justice.gov/atr/merger-guidelines