Coastal and Great Lakes Freight Transportation (U.S.) — NAICS 483113

An industry primer for investors. Reported facts are cited; forward-looking statements are framed as judgments.

1. Overview

This is the business of moving cargo by ship between one U.S. point and another — up and down the coasts, out to the non-contiguous states and territories (Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico), and across the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence system. In practice it is the domestic ocean-and-lakes freight fleet, and it is shaped less by geography than by a single law: the Jones Act (Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920), which reserves cargo moving between two U.S. ports for ships that are U.S.-built, U.S.-flagged, at least 75% U.S.-owned, and crewed by U.S. citizens or permanent residents [7][8].

Why this matters economically: the Jones Act turns a commodity service — hauling boxes, barrels and bulk — into a protected domestic franchise. Foreign-flag carriers cannot compete on these lanes, the compliant fleet is small and expensive to replace, and several key routes are effective duopolies. That produces unusually durable pricing power and steady cash generation on the winning lanes, offset by heavy capital intensity, cyclicality, and political risk to the protection itself. The investment case, whether public or private, is generally one of resilience and asset scarcity rather than rapid volume growth.

Ways to get exposure are limited. Only two U.S.-listed operators are meaningful — Matson (non-contiguous container liner) and Kirby (tank barge, mostly inland but with a coastal arm) — plus Canada-listed Algoma Central for Great Lakes reach [10][11][13]. The largest names in the industry — Crowley, TOTE, Pasha, Interlake — are privately held, so most of the sector is reachable only through private ownership, vessel leasing, or the debt market.

2. What it is and how it's structured

The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 483113 covers establishments that move freight by water in coastal waters, on the Great Lakes System (including the St. Lawrence Seaway), or on domestic deep-sea routes between U.S., Puerto Rican, and U.S.-territory ports — coastal barge operators and crewed-vessel chartering included [4]. Read plainly: it is the saltwater-and-lakes leg of the Jones Act coastwise trade.

Main sub-businesses inside the code:

• Non-contiguous container/roll-on-roll-off (RoRo) liners — scheduled ships to Hawaii, Alaska, Guam and Puerto Rico (Matson, Pasha, TOTE, Crowley).
• Coastal liquid-bulk vessels — Jones Act product tankers and articulated tug-barges (ATBs) moving crude, refined products and petrochemicals along the Gulf, East and West coasts (Kirby's coastal fleet, Overseas Shipholding Group, Crowley/Fairwater).
• Great Lakes dry-bulk "lakers" — self-unloading bulk carriers hauling iron ore, limestone, coal, cement, sand, grain and salt (Interlake, American Steamship, VanEnkevort, Central Marine).

A company may own its ships, charter them from another owner, manage vessels for third parties, or combine transportation with terminals, stevedoring and inland logistics — so vessel counts and legal-entity counts are not the same thing.

What it excludes (the adjacent codes):

• 483111 Deep Sea Freight Transportation — international ocean freight (U.S.-to-foreign or foreign-to-foreign): the global container/tanker trade, not the domestic one.
• 483211 Inland Water Freight Transportation — barge traffic on the Mississippi River system and Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. This is a much larger tonnage business (Kirby's ~1,100 inland barges live here, along with Ingram and American Commercial Barge Line) and is a separate code [13].
• 483114 / 483212 — coastal/Great Lakes and inland passenger transportation (ferries, excursion).
• 488330 Navigational Services to Shipping and marine cargo handling — harbor tug/docking, pilotage and stevedoring are separate transportation-support industries.

Ownership mix. The federal data give no clean public-versus-private split, but in practice the industry is heavily private and family/holding-company controlled. Saltchuk (a Seattle family holding company) owns TOTE Maritime, Foss, Young Brothers and — since 2024 — Overseas Shipholding Group [16][17]; Interlake and VanEnkevort are privately held Great Lakes fleets [21]; Pasha and Crowley are private. A small listed universe sits alongside family carriers, sponsor-backed platforms, pure vessel owners/lessors, and subsidiaries of diversified transportation groups. Government sealift (the Military Sealift Command and MARAD's Ready Reserve Force) uses similar ships but is public-sector activity, not counted in this industry's business statistics.

3. How big it is

Our federal figures for NAICS 483113 (receipts and concentration are 2022 Economic Census; employment and payroll are 2023 County Business Patterns):

Two things stand out. First, average payroll per worker is high (~$122,000 [1]) — these are unionized, licensed mariners, not minimum-wage labor. Second, the national HHI of 503 reads as "unconcentrated" (below the 1,500 antitrust threshold), which is misleading: individual lanes are tight oligopolies even though no single firm dominates the whole coast-plus-lakes market.

Undercount and coverage caveats — important here. These figures are not a full industry valuation or profit pool, and the $10 billion receipts number understates the domestic waterborne freight economy an investor would picture:

• County Business Patterns excludes the self-employed, nonemployer businesses, firms without an employer identification number, and most government workers [5] — so small vessel operators, owner-operators and public entities are missed.
• The inland barge industry (483211) — far larger by tonnage — is a separate code and not in this number.
• Several of the biggest Jones Act ocean operators (Matson, Pasha) run island services that can straddle the 483111/483113 boundary depending on how they file; classification is fuzzy.
• The marquee names are private, so their scale appears only partially in Census firm counts and not at all in public filings.
• Government/military sealift and the Canadian-flag Great Lakes fleet (Algoma, Canada Steamship Lines) move cargo on the same waters but sit outside U.S. business statistics.

Physical scale, for context (not a revenue measure). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) reported roughly 143.8 million short tons of domestic coastwise traffic and 73.7 million short tons of domestic Great Lakes traffic in 2023 [6]. The Jones Act oceangoing, self-propelled cargo fleet had shrunk to roughly 90–100 vessels by the mid-2020s — about 56 tankers and ~23 containerships — plus 150-plus ATBs in the coastal trades; MARAD's fleet dashboard counts about 92 Jones Act-eligible oceangoing vessels, a fleet measure that is not the same as the NAICS business population [9]. U.S.-flag "lakers" typically move on the order of 80–90 million tons of Great Lakes dry bulk a year across roughly 40–50 vessels [24].

4. The investable universe

Public equity options are few: the count of U.S.-listed Jones Act operators has fallen from eight in 2008 to essentially two pure operators today [10].

Two labeling traps: Great Lakes Dredge & Dock (GLDD) is a dredging contractor, not a freight carrier, and does not belong here. And Overseas Shipholding Group (OSG) — long the largest U.S.-flag Jones Act crude/product tanker operator — is no longer public: it was taken private by Saltchuk in 2024, so treat its tanker operations as private-company exposure [16][17].

Major private / other owners (not publicly investable):

• Crowley Maritime / Fairwater — Puerto Rico and Central America liner, plus energy, tanker, tug-and-barge and government services; Fairwater is Crowley's Jones Act energy-and-chemical transport business formed from a Crowley–SEACOR combination [19].
• Saltchuk Resources — parent of TOTE Maritime (Alaska and Puerto Rico, entering Hawaii), Foss and Young Brothers tugs, and OSG, taken private in July 2024 for ~$950 million (~$653M equity, $8.50/share) [16][17][18].
• The Pasha Group / Pasha Hawaii — the #2 Hawaii carrier alongside Matson; runs new LNG-powered "'Ohana"-class containerships [20].
• Interlake Steamship — largest privately held U.S.-flag Great Lakes fleet (flagship Paul R. Tregurtha, 1,013.5 ft; christened the first new U.S.-flag laker in ~40 years in 2022) [21]; plus American Steamship / Grand River / Lower Lakes Towing, VanEnkevort Tug & Barge, and Central Marine Logistics.
• Mainstay Maritime (formerly Rand Logistics; ownership history includes Oaktree Capital and Duration Capital Partners) — U.S.-flag Great Lakes dry-bulk and liquid-cargo carrier [22].
• The CSL Group — privately owned Canadian marine company and a major Great Lakes–St. Lawrence self-unloader operator [23].
• Vessel lessors — financial owners such as Maritime Partners and American Shipping Company (AMSC) buy Jones Act tonnage and lease it to operators, separating ship ownership from operation.

Bottom line for public-market investors: Matson is the only large, direct, U.S.-listed play; Kirby offers partial coastal exposure inside a mostly-inland story; Great Lakes and coastal-tanker exposure is otherwise private.

5. How the money works

Owners here make money on utilization × rate on expensive, long-lived, protected assets. Revenue comes through freight contracts, spot voyages, time charters, cargo-handling and sometimes terminal or logistics services, and the unit economics differ by sub-business:

• Liner (Matson, Pasha, TOTE, Crowley): revenue is freight rate per container — often per forty-foot-equivalent unit (FEU) or twenty-foot-equivalent unit (TEU) — times volume, plus fuel surcharges. On the protected non-contiguous lanes, scheduled service and scarce competition give real pricing power: Matson posted a low-teens net margin (~$445M on $3.34B in FY2025) despite a soft year, and its logistics arm adds asset-light fee income [11].
• Coastal liquid-bulk (Kirby coastal, OSG): revenue comes from time charters (a fixed day rate for the vessel and crew; the charterer typically pays fuel, port and canal costs), bareboat charters, and contracts of affreightment (COAs, priced per barrel moved). The swing variable is fleet utilization — the share of vessel-days actually earning. When pipelines are full and refiners run hard, spot day rates for larger coastal tankers have topped $100,000/day, and most tonnage locks in on term charters [29].
• Great Lakes dry-bulk (Interlake, ASC, VanEnkevort): revenue is per-ton affreightment contracts with steel mills, aggregate producers and utilities. The season runs roughly late-March to mid-January (locks and ice close the winter), so seasonality and a short earning window shape the economics. Self-unloading gear lets a laker discharge without shoreside cranes, widening the customer base.

Cost structure is dominated by U.S. crew wages, fuel/bunkers (often passed through via surcharge), drydock and regulatory maintenance (a Coast Guard survey cycle roughly every five years), depreciation on very expensive hulls, and insurance (protection-and-indemnity, hull), plus port, lock and canal charges. The defining capital fact: Jones Act ships must be built in U.S. yards, which cost several times the world price — a newbuild containership or tanker runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars. That high replacement cost is both burden and moat: it deters entrants and supports the resale value of existing tonnage. Vessels routinely work 30–50 years, so the scarcity of hulls — not marketing — is the real asset.

Metrics that matter: vessel/barge utilization; freight rate per ton, ton-mile or vessel-day; time charter equivalent (TCE), a daily earnings figure net of voyage costs; operating vs. drydock days; capacity in barrels, deadweight tonnage (DWT) or TEUs; contract coverage and renewal pricing; fuel-cost pass-through; and fleet age, maintenance backlog, leverage and replacement cost.

6. What drives demand

• Non-contiguous consumer economies. Hawaii, Alaska, Guam and Puerto Rico import nearly everything by sea. Demand tracks island population, tourism, construction, retail sales and military presence.
• Refined-product and crude flows (coastal tankers/ATBs). Refinery run rates, pipeline capacity, and price arbitrage between coastal markets — the Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts, or PADDs — set volumes. Rising U.S. clean-product exports have tightened the coastal fleet into 2026 [29].
• The steel and construction cycle (Great Lakes). Iron ore and fluxstone (limestone) feed integrated steel mills; limestone, cement, sand and slag feed construction; road salt is a winter staple. Great Lakes volume is a fairly direct read on Midwest steel and building activity — U.S.-flag lakers moved 78.2M tons in 2024 but only 71.3M tons in 2025 (−8.9%), with iron ore down from 43.9M to 39.1M tons as steel softened [24].
• Modal economics and substitution. Water is by far the cheapest way to move heavy, low-value bulk: one 1,000-foot laker carries the equivalent of about seven 100-car trains or ~3,000 trucks, and Great Lakes–Seaway shipping is estimated to save billions a year versus rail and road [25]. Water gains when highways and rail are congested or cargo is oversized, and loses when pipelines expand, rail improves, or plants relocate. The Great Lakes trade is also seasonal — ice, draft restrictions, the annual navigation window and lock schedules shape revenue timing.

7. Regulation

Regulation is unusually central here — it is the source of both the moat and the biggest risk.

• The Jones Act. Cabotage protection is built around vessel documentation (administered by MARAD — the Maritime Administration — and the U.S. Coast Guard) and enforced by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which levies penalties for unlawful foreign-flag transport between U.S. points [7]. Presidential/DHS waivers can be granted in emergencies (e.g., hurricanes in Puerto Rico), and each waiver debate is a political flashpoint [8].
• U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Vessel inspection and certification, crew licensing, documentation, and safety/pollution standards; every hull runs on a survey/drydock cycle.
• Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). Passed after the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill (~11 million gallons), it mandated the phase-in of double-hull tankers, strict spill liability, financial-responsibility rules and pre-arranged spill-response organizations [26]. It reshaped the coastal tanker fleet.
• Environmental discharge and air rules. The Vessel Incidental Discharge Act (VIDA, 2018) sets national ballast-water and incidental-discharge standards (jointly EPA and USCG), broadly aligned with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Ballast Water Convention [27]. Air rules — IMO MARPOL and the North American Emission Control Area (ECA), which imposes stricter sulfur- and nitrogen-oxide limits on ships in designated coastal waters — push operators toward cleaner fuels and, increasingly, LNG propulsion [28].
• Canadian rules on the Lakes. Great Lakes voyages that touch Canadian domestic ports are subject to Canadian cabotage and safety rules as well.
• Infrastructure and funding. USACE dredges channels and operates the Soo Locks; a new Poe-sized lock is under construction to add redundancy at that single chokepoint. MARAD offers Title XI loan guarantees and small-shipyard grants to support domestic newbuilds.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

At the national level the market looks unconcentrated (CR4 35.9%, CR50 91.0%, HHI ~503 [2]), but those figures describe the whole NAICS code, not any one route. On the ground, individual lanes are oligopolies: Hawaii is a Matson/Pasha duopoly [20]; Puerto Rico is served mainly by Crowley, TOTE and Trailer Bridge; Great Lakes iron ore is split among a handful of fleets. On any given route, two or three carriers set the price.

The dominant structural trend is privatization and consolidation. Public Jones Act operators went from eight (2008) to essentially two [10]: OSG was bought by Saltchuk and delisted in 2024 [16]; vessel-leasing platforms such as Maritime Partners now separate ship ownership from operation; and Great Lakes fleets keep rolling up under holding companies — in 2026, Mainstay Maritime agreed to sell its Canadian operating companies and fleet to Algoma Central, concentrating on U.S. Jones Act operations [22]. The logic is consistent: capital intensity and cyclicality sit more comfortably in patient private/family hands than under quarterly scrutiny, and a buyer that can combine fleets, cut overhead, or acquire scarce compliant tonnage captures real synergies. The industry is also aging — much tonnage is 30–50 years old, and high U.S.-build cost slows renewal, which paradoxically supports the value of existing hulls.

Durable competitive advantages are: scarce Jones Act-qualified vessels; long-lived customer relationships and contract knowledge; self-unloading or specialized cargo systems; port, terminal and maintenance infrastructure; and scale in crews, dispatch, compliance and procurement.

9. Risks

• Cyclicality. Great Lakes volumes track steel and construction; coastal tankers track refining and energy flows; island liners track territorial economies — and a downturn can hit volumes and rates together (visible in the 2025 Great Lakes decline [24]).
• Policy risk to the Jones Act. Repeal or broad reform would erode the moat; expansive waivers do so temporarily. Critics estimate the Act adds on the order of ~$1.2 billion/year to Hawaii's economy and hundreds of millions to Puerto Rico shipping costs [30][31] — a standing political target. For incumbents the protection is the thesis, so this cuts both ways; a shortage of compliant vessels supports rates but can also cap customer growth.
• Fleet aging and shipyard scarcity. Few U.S. yards can build Jones Act ships, and they cost multiples of world prices, so recapitalizing an old fleet is slow and expensive.
• Fuel and cost inflation. Bunker volatility and rising crew, maintenance and compliance costs compress margins between charter resets when contracts lack effective pass-throughs.
• Customer and commodity concentration. Great Lakes carriers depend on a few large industrial buyers (steel mills, utilities); a plant closure, refinery outage or pipeline substitution can hit a route hard.
• Weather, chokepoints and accidents. Great Lakes ice closes the season; the Soo Locks are a single point of failure for 1,000-footers; hurricanes disrupt Gulf/coastal and Puerto Rico service; and collisions, groundings, fires, spills and cyber incidents create large liabilities.
• Balance-sheet and environmental capex. Vessel values are cyclical and debt service can bite when utilization falls, while ballast-water, emissions and double-hull rules impose recurring compliance spending.
• Information risk. Private operators disclose far less than public companies, complicating valuation and benchmarking.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public-market routes — analyze segment-level exposure, not consolidated results:

• Matson (MATX) — the only large, direct, U.S.-listed play: separate the protected Hawaii/Alaska Jones Act core (~51% of Ocean Transportation revenue) from the volatile China-expedited lane and the asset-light logistics arm [11][12].
• Kirby (KEX) — mostly inland barge, but the listed way to touch the coastal tank-barge cycle; watch coastal utilization, contract renewals and vessel supply, and keep coastal separate from the much larger inland business [13][14].
• Algoma Central (ALC, TSX) — Canadian-listed, the cleanest Great Lakes/Seaway exposure (Canadian-flag, technically outside U.S. NAICS 483113); watch dry-bulk volumes, fleet renewal and seasonality [15].
• Debt. Several operators issue bonds, and MARAD Title XI paper offers a lower-risk fixed-income angle. Note that global tanker or dry-bulk rate indices are poor proxies for route-specific U.S. domestic pricing.

Private-market routes. Because Crowley/Fairwater, TOTE/Saltchuk, Pasha, Interlake, VanEnkevort and Mainstay are private, most direct exposure is via private equity, family/holding-company ownership, or vessel-leasing platforms (e.g., Maritime Partners, AMSC) that own hulls and lease them to operators — a lower-operational-risk way to own the scarce, appreciating asset itself. Other angles: asset- or contract-backed private credit, terminals, shipyards and repair facilities, and backing consolidation platforms. The key diligence questions are whether the vessel is legally eligible for the intended trade, whether contracts cover fixed costs, whether customers are financially strong, and whether future drydock and replacement spending is funded.

Near-term drivers (forward-looking judgment). The coastal tanker/ATB market looks the tightest corner of the industry: high utilization, term-covered fleets and rising U.S. product exports have kept rates firm into 2026, and Kirby's own outlook points to mid-90% coastal utilization and higher contract pricing [14][29]. The Great Lakes are softer, hostage to the steel and construction cycle after a weak 2025 [24]. Matson guides 2026 operating income toward 2025 levels, with the China lane the main variable [11]. Longer term, the case rests on two things unlikely to change fast: the Jones Act moat and the scarcity value of a small, expensive, slowly-replaced fleet. The swing factor is politics — periodic repeal/reform pushes and waiver fights on one side, U.S. shipbuilding-revival efforts on the other. Overall the industry is best viewed as a durable, specialized infrastructure business: most attractive when bought at disciplined asset values, with strong contract visibility, where regulatory scarcity outweighs capital intensity.

---

Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 (NAICS 483113: establishments, paid employees, annual and Q1 payroll). https://data.census.gov/table/CBP2023.CB2300CBP
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration of Largest Firms (NAICS 483113: receipts, firms, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI). https://data.census.gov/table/ECNSIZE2022.EC2200SIZECONCEN
3. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards (2023). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
4. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definition — 483113 Coastal and Great Lakes Freight Transportation. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=483113&year=2022
5. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns Methodology (coverage/undercount). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
6. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, The U.S. Coastal and Inland Navigation System: 2023 Transportation Facts & Information. https://publibrary.sec.usace.army.mil/
7. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, What Every Member of the Trade Community Should Know About: The Jones Act (2024). https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/Jones%20Act%20ICP_Complete_04DEC24.pdf
8. Congressional Research Service, Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory Background (R45725). https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45725
9. U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), U.S.-Flag Fleet Dashboard / Fleet Data (2024–2026). https://www.maritime.dot.gov/data-reports/us-flag-fleet-dashboard
10. Seatrade Maritime, Public-listed Jones Act companies — an endangered species (2025). https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/shipping-finance/public-listed-jones-act-companies-an-endangered-species
11. Matson, Inc., Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2025 Results; 2026 Outlook (PRNewswire, 2026). https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/matson-inc-announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2025-results-provides-2026-outlook-302695334.html
12. Matson, Inc., 2025 Form 10-K (Jones Act share of Ocean Transportation revenue). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/3453/000110465926020944/matx-20251231x10k.htm
13. Kirby Corporation, 2024 Form 10-K (coastal fleet counts, segment mix, utilization). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/56047/000095017025022012/kex-20241231.htm
14. Kirby Corporation, 2026 First-Quarter Results (coastal outlook, contract pricing). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/56047/000119312526196337/kex-ex99_1.htm
15. Algoma Central Corporation, 2025 Annual Report. https://www.algonet.com/
16. gCaptain, Saltchuk Completes Acquisition of Overseas Shipholding Group for $950 Million (2024). https://gcaptain.com/saltchuk-completes-acquisition-of-overseas-shipholding-group-for-950-million/
17. Saltchuk, Corporate Structure / Who We Are (TOTE, OSG, Foss, Young Brothers). https://www.saltchuk.com/who-we-are/corporate-structure/
18. Maritime Executive, TOTE Expands Into Hawaii Trade (2024). https://maritime-executive.com/article/tote-expands-into-hawaii-trade
19. Crowley, Fairwater — the Newest Jones Act Energy and Chemical Transportation Provider — Formally Launches (2024). https://www.crowley.com/news-and-media/press-releases/fairwater-the-newest-jones-act-energy-and-chemical-transportation-provider-formally-launches/
20. gCaptain / The Pasha Group, Pasha Hawaii's LNG-Powered Jones Act Containerships (2024). https://gcaptain.com/pasha-hawaii-delivered-second-lng-powered-containership-for-jones-act-trade/
21. MarineLink / Interlake Steamship, Interlake Christens First New U.S.-flagged Laker in Nearly 40 Years (2022). https://www.marinelink.com/news/interlake-steamship-christens-first-new-499147
22. Mainstay Maritime, Who We Are and Agreement to Sell Canadian Operating Companies and Fleet to Algoma Central (2026). https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/mainstay-maritime-announces-agreement-to-sell-canadian-operating-companies-and-fleet-to-algoma-central-corporation-302699957.html
23. The CSL Group, Corporate Sustainability Report 2024. https://cslships.com/
24. Lake Carriers' Association, Cargo Reports — Year-in-Review 2024 and 2025 (U.S.-Flag Vessels) and U.S.-Flag Great Lakes Fleet. https://lcaships.com/cargo-reports-year-in-review-2024-u-s-flag-vessels/
25. Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway System, Economic Impacts (Soo Locks / modal savings). https://greatlakes-seaway.com/en/the-seaway/economic-impacts/
26. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management / National Academies, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). https://www.boem.gov/
27. U.S. EPA / Federal Register, Vessel Incidental Discharge Act (VIDA) — National Standards of Performance (2018/2023). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/18/2023-22879/vessel-incidental-discharge-national-standards-of-performance
28. U.S. EPA, Designation of the North American Emission Control Area for Marine Vessels. https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/designation-north-american-emission-control-area-marine
29. RBN Energy, Rock the Boat — the Jones Act Coastal Trade / Hellenic Shipping News, Trans-Atlantic clean tanker rates surge (2025–2026). https://rbnenergy.com/daily-posts/blog/jones-act-coastal-trade
30. Grassroot Institute of Hawaii, The Jones Act and Hawaii (cost estimate) (2020). https://www.grassrootinstitute.org/
31. Reason Foundation, Biden Administration Grants Puerto Rico a Waiver, but the Jones Act Should Be Repealed (2022). https://reason.org/commentary/biden-administration-grants-puerto-rico-a-waiver-but-the-jones-act-should-be-repealed/