Skiing Facilities (U.S.) — NAICS 713920

A Histometrics industry primer for public- and private-market investors.

1. Overview

Skiing Facilities is the business of operating ski areas: running the lifts, grooming and making snow on the trails, and selling the lift tickets, season passes, lessons, rentals, and mountain food-and-beverage that go with them. Under the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the federal code for this activity is 713920. It is a small, highly seasonal, capital-heavy slice of the U.S. leisure economy that punches above its size in visibility because a handful of destination resorts anchor mountain-town economies across Colorado, Utah, Vermont, California, and the Northeast.

The economic story of the past 15 years is the industry re-engineering itself around the season pass — selling a full winter of skiing months in advance, which converts weather-dependent day-ticket sales into locked-in, pre-paid revenue. That shift made the best operators more resilient and turned skiing into a scale-and-consolidation story. The core question for any owner is whether an asset can turn variable snowfall into durable cash flow through advance passes, pricing, ancillary spending, summer activities, and disciplined capital investment.

There are two ways in, and they look very different. The public route is thin: Vail Resorts (New York Stock Exchange, ticker MTN) is the only U.S.-listed pure-play mountain-resort operator, and EPR Properties (NYSE: EPR), a diversified experiential real-estate investment trust (REIT), offers indirect ski-property exposure as a landlord to operators [9][10][13]. The private route is where most of the industry actually sits — private-equity-backed Alterra Mountain Company, family-owned Boyne Resorts and POWDR, and hundreds of independent, municipal, and nonprofit ski hills [14][19].

2. What it is and how it's structured

The U.S. Census Bureau defines NAICS 713920 as establishments primarily engaged in operating downhill, cross-country, or related skiing areas, and/or operating ski lifts and tows. These establishments "often provide food and beverage services, equipment rental services, and ski instruction services" on-site [1]. So a lift ticket, a bowl of chili in the base lodge, a rental package, and a beginner lesson bought at the mountain typically all count inside this code. It captures ski areas without lodging as their primary activity, including four-season resorts that do not run their own hotels.

What it excludes — and this matters for sizing the industry — is most of the money a modern resort touches. Adjacent NAICS lines that carry ski-related revenue but sit outside 713920 include:

• Traveler Accommodation (NAICS 7211): hotels, condos, and base-village lodging — including resorts where lodging is the primary business [1].
• Food Services (NAICS 722): sit-down and quick-service restaurants off the mountain.
• Sporting Goods Retail (NAICS 459110): retail ski shops selling gear.
• Recreational Goods Rental (NAICS 532292): standalone equipment rental not tied to operating a ski area.
• Other recreation codes in the same family: Golf Courses and Country Clubs (713910), Marinas (713930), Fitness and Recreational Sports Centers (713940), and All Other Amusement and Recreation — snowmobiling, tubing hills, snowplay parks — (713990) [1].
• Manufacturing of skis, boards, and apparel (e.g., NAICS 339920 / textiles).

Ownership is mixed and layered — a resort's land, lifts, operating company, lodging, and real estate may all have different owners. Private families, private-equity-backed groups, one public company, municipalities, state authorities, and REITs all participate. Winter Park, for example, is owned by the City of Denver but operated by Alterra; several Vail-operated ski properties are owned by EPR Properties [10][19]. Structurally, the industry is a barbell: two giants at the top — Vail (public) and Alterra (private) — a second tier of multi-resort operators (Boyne, POWDR, Mountain Capital Partners, Pacific Group Resorts), and a long tail of hundreds of single-mountain family businesses, community nonprofits, and municipally owned rope-tow hills.

A feature nearly unique to this industry: most Western resorts don't own their mountains. Roughly 63% of America's skiable terrain sits on U.S. Forest Service land, with about 127 ski areas operating under federal Special Use Permits (terms up to 40 years) and paying the government on the order of $40 million a year in fees [21].

3. How big it is

Per our ground-truth federal statistics for NAICS 713920:

The seasonality is baked into the payroll: first-quarter (winter) payroll alone is $551 million — about 39% of the entire year's $1.42 billion — because employment swells in ski season and shrinks in summer [3]. The concentration data (Section 8) show a group of scaled firms rather than a single-firm market. The federal file does not report industry-wide capacity utilization, average ticket yield, profitability, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), or skier visits — those come from Vail's filings and industry bodies below, not from Census.

The undercount caveat is large here, in two ways. First, on dollars: the $3.37 billion counts only ski-facility operating establishments. The full "ski economy" — lodging, restaurants, retail, rental, and real estate — is coded across other NAICS lines. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) put snow activities at $7.7 billion in value added in 2023 (the single largest conventional outdoor-recreation activity in Colorado, Utah, and Vermont), while an industry-advocacy estimate from Protect Our Winters and REI pegged the broader snow-sports economy at about $11.3 billion [24][25]. Second, on count and method: County Business Patterns (CBP) covers only establishments with paid employees — it excludes the self-employed, businesses without an Employer Identification Number, and most government employees, and undercounts some very small multi-unit operators [4]. The National Ski Areas Association (NSAA) counted 492 operating ski areas in 2024-25 [6]; the gap versus our 348 employer establishments reflects tiny seasonal, volunteer-run, municipal, and nonprofit hills, plus areas whose revenue rolls up into a lodging or resort establishment coded elsewhere. It is not a like-for-like comparison — NSAA counts ski areas broadly, while 713920 excludes lodging-dominant resorts.

Demand is measured in skier visits (one person skiing for any part of one day). U.S. resorts logged 61.5 million skier visits in 2024-25, the second-best season on record, trailing only the 2022-23 record of 65.4 million; the intervening 2023-24 season was a warm, low-snow 60.4 million [6][8]. NSAA leadership had described a three-year rolling average above 60 million as "a new baseline for the industry" [6] — but weather can still pull the industry well below that line: preliminary NSAA figures put 2025-26 at 52.6 million visits, a sharp decline after a poor Western winter (roughly 112 inches of average snowfall against a 169-inch ten-year average) [7]. The 2025-26 result is a reminder that passes cushion the top line but do not repeal weather.

4. The investable universe

Public companies

Public exposure is far narrower than the underlying operating industry: one liquid pure-play operator, plus one REIT landlord.

If you want direct equity in this industry through a public market, MTN is effectively the only clean choice; EPR is indirect (a rent stream, not resort operating economics). There is no U.S.-listed ski-resort ETF and no second listed pure-play operator (foreign-listed operators such as France's Compagnie des Alpes run European areas). Equipment makers, hotel companies, airlines, and travel platforms may benefit from skiing but are not direct NAICS 713920 investments.

Major private owners and operators

• Alterra Mountain Company — formed by affiliates of KSL Capital Partners and Henry Crown and Company; its destination list contains 19 properties, including 15 U.S. mountain destinations, and it owns the Ikon Pass network. Alterra raised roughly $3 billion in 2024 for upgrades and acquisitions [14].
• Aspen One / Aspen Skiing Company — a private Crown-family enterprise operating Aspen Mountain, Aspen Highlands, Buttermilk, and Snowmass, plus lodging, retail, rentals, and food and beverage; the Crown family also co-owns Alterra [18].
• Boyne Resorts — family-owned by the Kircher family, with 12 resort properties including Big Sky (Montana), Brighton, Loon Mountain, Sunday River, Sugarloaf, and the Summit at Snoqualmie [15].
• POWDR — a private adventure-lifestyle company (Cumming family) with seven mountain resorts including Copper, Killington, Eldora, Mount Bachelor, Snowbird, Boreal, and Soda Springs [16].
• Mountain Capital Partners — a private management and investment platform running more than a dozen ski areas, bike parks, and golf properties across the U.S. and Chile; sells the "Power Pass" [17].
• Independents, nonprofits, and public owners — NSAA's ownership roster also identifies smaller multi-mountain groups, regional families, public authorities, and municipal owners: the long tail of community and family ski hills [19].

5. How the money works

Ski economics use levers specific to the industry — not utility rate bases or REIT funds-from-operations. The basic model is:

skier visits × realized lift revenue per visit + lessons + rentals/retail + dining + lodging + summer and real-estate revenue.

• Skier visits × yield per visit. Volume is capacity-constrained (a mountain holds only so many people) and weather-sensitive, so mature operators grow yield, not crowds.
• The season pass — the defining shift. Vail's Epic Pass (launched 2008) and Alterra's Ikon Pass (2018) sell a whole season upfront at a discount to walk-up prices. This pulls cash in before the snow falls, smooths bad-weather years, and builds loyalty. At Vail, pass products are about 65% of lift revenue and ~75% of visitation [9]. Industry-wide, season passes represented 49% of visits in 2025-26, versus 31% for daily and multi-day tickets [7]. The trade-off: pricing power is front-loaded, and the competitive battle shifts to renewals and the guest experience (crowding, parking, service).
• Non-ticket (ancillary) revenue. Resorts monetize the whole day — ski school, dining, rental, retail, private clubs, lodging, and summer recreation. Industry non-ticket spending hit a record of about $68 per skier visit [23]. At small and mid-size areas, non-ticket revenue can be 50-55% of total; at destination resorts, lift/pass revenue dominates but ancillary spend is the margin engine [23].
• Real estate. The largest resorts are also land developers, monetizing base-village condos, commercial space, and lodging — cash flow that lands outside NAICS 713920 but is central to resort returns.
• High fixed costs and heavy reinvestment. Lifts, grooming fleets, snowmaking, roads, insurance, and permits are expensive and long-lived; variable costs (seasonal labor, food, merchandise, payment processing) are smaller. The industry reinvested about $21 per skier visit in 2024-25 and planned roughly $560.7 million in capital spending for 2025-26, including 47 new lifts and 70 lift upgrades [6]. Once fixed costs are covered, incremental visits and pass sales are high-margin — this operating leverage is why good-snow years produce outsized profits and bad ones bite hard.

For Vail specifically, the model produced FY2025 net revenue of $2.96 billion, Resort Reported EBITDA (a cash-earnings proxy) of $844 million, and net income of $280 million, even as skier visits fell about 3% — pricing and ancillary spend offset the volume decline [10]. Private buyers should underwrite the same levers: skier visits, pass mix, realized lift yield, operating days, snowmaking and water availability, lift capacity and uptime, ancillary and summer spend, capital plans, permit terms, insurance, and cash conversion.

6. What drives demand

• Snowfall and weather. Still the biggest swing factor for day-ticket and ancillary revenue, even with passes cushioning the top line. The 2022-23 record (65.4 million visits) versus the low-snow 2025-26 slump (52.6 million) frames the sensitivity [6][7][8].
• Consumer discretionary health. Skiing is expensive and optional; visits track disposable income, confidence, and — for destination trips — airfare and travel budgets.
• The pass ecosystem and multi-resort networks. Epic and Ikon make a second, third, or tenth ski day essentially free at the margin, lifting visit frequency and building network effects that raise retention.
• Population near drive-to areas. Regional and drive-to resorts benefit from nearby population growth and lower trip friction.
• Lessons and youth conversion. Beginner instruction is the top of the funnel; converting and retaining new and younger skiers is the long-run demand question.
• Summer and four-season use. Mountain biking, sightseeing, hiking, and alpine attractions extend utilization beyond winter [9].
• Participation base. The core is roughly 9-10 million downhill skiers and 7-8 million snowboarders in the U.S. [30].
• International travel and currency. Destination resorts draw overseas visitors; exchange rates and inbound-travel trends move marquee mountains.

7. Regulation

Regulation is fragmented across federal, state, and local authorities, and the distinctive feature is land tenure.

• Federal land. Most Western resorts operate on U.S. Forest Service land under Special Use Permits, which govern what they can build and do, run up to 40 years, and carry fees tied to revenue [21]. Expansions, new lifts, snowmaking, water facilities, and terrain changes may require environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) [22]. Permit terms, fee formulas, and summer-use rules are therefore directly material to Western resort economics.
• Water rights for snowmaking are a growing regulatory and physical constraint in the arid West, where water insecurity is projected to worsen; Vail itself flags public-land approvals and water supply as business risks [9].
• Safety. States generally regulate ski-area operations and passenger tramways, often through state tramway boards. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B77.1 ropeway standard is written for adoption by government agencies; Ohio, for example, requires tramway registration and inspection and incorporates ANSI requirements [28][29].
• General operating load. Local zoning, environmental rules, wildfire policy, seasonal-labor and immigration rules (many resorts rely on visa-based seasonal workers), insurance requirements, and premises-liability law — which in most ski states includes statutes assigning inherent-risk responsibility to skiers.

A buyer must underwrite the permit and water position as carefully as the lift system and customer base.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The last three decades are a consolidation story. The modern era began with Vail Resorts' 1997 purchase of Keystone and Breckenridge; the pace accelerated after the Epic/Ikon pass wars, with Vail acquiring the largely drive-to Peak Resorts chain in 2019 and Alterra rolling up destination resorts and, in 2024, buying Arapahoe Basin [20]. Today Vail and Alterra form a rough duopoly at the top, each anchored by a mega-pass, while Boyne and POWDR (which have formed a marketing partnership spanning 19 resorts) and Mountain Capital Partners hold strong second-tier positions [20]. Scale matters because larger groups spread marketing, technology, pass distribution, procurement, and capital across many resorts, and a broader pass makes each member resort more valuable inside the network [9].

Federal concentration data show a fragmented headline picture over a consolidating reality: the four largest firms hold 41.7% of receipts (the CR4 ratio), the top eight 56.1%, the top 20 69.5%, and the top 50 82.4%; the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration gauge that rises toward 10,000 as a market concentrates) is a low 650.5 [2]. The low HHI reflects the hundreds of tiny independent hills in the long tail — but among destination resorts and pass ecosystems, market power is far more concentrated than those numbers suggest. Notably, U.S. operators posted net-zero acquisitions in 2024 for the first time since the consolidation wave began — a possible signal that the easy roll-up phase is maturing [20].

Forward-looking judgment: consolidation is likely to continue around high-quality regional assets that need capital, pass distribution, or a succession solution. It will not eliminate independent mountains — which still compete on convenience, affordability, authenticity, and less-crowded operations — but it may widen the performance gap between well-capitalized assets and weather- or capital-constrained ones.

9. Risks

• Climate change is the defining structural risk. U.S. ski seasons in 2000-2019 already ran 5.5 to 7.1 days shorter than in 1960-1979 despite snowmaking; models project seasons 14 to 33 days shorter by the 2050s under lower emissions and 27 to 62 days shorter under higher emissions, with annual economic losses estimated at $0.66-1.35 billion [26]. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports the snowpack season shortened at 80% of monitored Western sites between 1982 and 2023, by about 15 days on average [27]. The damage is uneven — lower-elevation and Midwest/Northeast areas are most exposed; high, cold, water-secure Western resorts are more insulated.
• Year-to-year weather variability still whipsaws visits, ancillary revenue, and margins even with passes — the 2025-26 drop to 52.6 million visits is the live example [7].
• Snowmaking dependence raises energy and water costs and collides with Western water scarcity [26].
• Consumer cyclicality. Discretionary, relatively expensive spending falls in downturns and when travel is disrupted [9].
• Operating leverage and capital intensity. High fixed costs make earnings sensitive to modest visitation swings; lifts, snowmaking, water systems, roads, and technology demand continuous reinvestment.
• Pass-model saturation and pushback. Aggressive pass pricing has drawn complaints over crowding, parking, and service; renewal rates and guest satisfaction are now the pressure points, and pricing power may be near its ceiling.
• Regulatory/land and water risk. Changes to Forest Service permit terms or fees, and delays from environmental review or water constraints, hit Western operators directly [9][22].
• Safety and liability. Lift failures, guest injuries, and maintenance lapses create litigation, insurance, and reputational costs [28][29].
• Labor and housing. Skilled patrol, instruction, lift, and hospitality labor is seasonal, and mountain-town worker-housing shortages squeeze operations.
• Private-market risk. Private assets may carry more leverage, disclose less, and have fewer exit options than public securities.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public route. For listed-market investors, direct operating exposure is effectively one name — Vail Resorts (MTN) — with EPR Properties (EPR) offering indirect ski-property real-estate exposure through a diversified REIT. MTN behaves as a cyclical, weather- and consumer-sensitive discretionary stock with a heavy real-estate and pass-driven cash-flow base. After share-price weakness, its dividend yield sat near 6% in 2025-26 — attractive on paper but a function of a depressed price and a payout management must defend through soft-snow years [12]. Diligence should go well beyond revenue growth: pass sales, skier visits, realized lift yield, ancillary spend, EBITDA margins, capital expenditure, debt, permit expirations, water security, insurance, and customer retention.

Private route. This is where the industry mostly trades. The top tier is locked up by private equity (KSL Capital Partners behind Alterra) and family holding companies (the Crown family; Boyne's Kircher family; POWDR's Cummings). Realistic private structures are direct ownership of a ski-area operating company; real estate leased to an operator; private-equity or fund interests in scaled resort groups; asset-backed lending or infrastructure finance; and municipal or public-authority partnerships. Realistic entry points are smaller regional and community ski areas — which change hands periodically and can be turned around or folded into a pass network — and resort-adjacent real estate. Barriers to entry favor incumbents with scale: capital intensity, Forest Service permitting, snowmaking water rights, and long-run climate risk. Underwrite a normalized weather cycle, not a record snow year, and pay particular attention to water, snowmaking coverage, altitude, access to population centers, permit transferability, housing and labor availability, deferred maintenance, and the cost of future lifts.

Near-term signals (as of mid-2026). The latest public evidence is mixed. NSAA reported a sharp national visitation decline in 2025-26 (52.6 million), and in its June 2026 update Vail cut fiscal-2026 Resort Reported EBITDA guidance to $735-755 million and reported early 2026-27 pass unit sales down about 10% — company-specific figures, not a complete industry forecast, but a caution flag [7][11]. The open questions: whether visitation re-stabilizes near the ~60-million range or the 2025-26 slump signals a softer baseline; pass-price elasticity and renewal rates as the model matures; snowfall, which still swings any given year's profit; consumer discretionary strength and international travel; and rising water, energy, labor, and housing costs in mountain towns.

Long-run judgment. Consolidation and the pass model have made the leaders more durable and cash-generative, but climate change is a slow, one-directional headwind. Returns are likely to bifurcate: high-quality, capitalized, four-season resorts with strong pass affiliations should gain resilience, while lower-elevation, snowmaking-dependent, or underinvested assets steadily lose ground and may require restructuring, new ownership, or public support.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS Definition — 713920 Skiing Facilities." https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=713920&year=2022; data profile: https://data.census.gov/profile/713920_-_Skiing_Facilities?codeset=naics~713920
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — "Selected Sectors: Concentration of Largest Firms for the U.S.: 2022" (receipts, firm count, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI). https://api.census.gov/data/2022/ecnsize/groups/EC2200SIZECONCEN.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 (establishments, employment, annual and first-quarter payroll). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
4. U.S. Census Bureau, "County Business Patterns Methodology" (coverage limits / undercount). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
5. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Size Standards," 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
6. National Ski Areas Association / Ski Area Management, "U.S. Ski Areas Report 61.5M Skier Visits for 2024-25" (visits, capital spending, reinvestment per visit), 2025. https://www.saminfo.com/news/sam-headline-news/u-s-ski-areas-report-61-5m-skier-visits-for-2024-25-second-best-season-on-record; https://mailchi.mp/nsaa/2025-may-skier-visits-media
7. National Ski Areas Association, "U.S. Ski Industry Reports Visitor Data for 2025-26 Season" (52.6M visits, snowfall, pass share), 2026. https://mailchi.mp/nsaa/2026-may-skier-visits-media
8. Ski Area Management / NSAA, "'Roller Coaster' 2023-24 Season Sees 60.4 Million Skier Visits," 2024. https://www.saminfo.com/news/sam-headline-news/roller-coaster-2023-24-season-sees-60-4-million-skier-visits
9. Vail Resorts, Inc., "Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended July 31, 2025" (revenue streams, pass share of lift revenue/visitation, risk factors). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/812011/000081201125000104/mtn-20250731.htm
10. Vail Resorts, Inc., "Reports Fiscal 2025 Fourth Quarter and Full Year Results and Provides Fiscal 2026 Outlook" (revenue $2.96B, Resort Reported EBITDA $844M, net income $280M), 2025. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/vail-resorts-reports-fiscal-2025-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-results-and-provides-fiscal-2026-outlook-302569969.html
11. Vail Resorts, Inc., "Reports Third Quarter Fiscal 2026 Results" (FY2026 EBITDA guidance $735-755M; early 2026-27 pass units down ~10%), 2026. https://investors.vailresorts.com/news-releases/news-release-details/vail-resorts-reports-third-quarter-fiscal-2026-results-provides
12. StockAnalysis, "Vail Resorts (MTN) Statistics & Valuation," 2026 (market cap, dividend yield). https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/mtn/statistics/; Macrotrends, "Vail Resorts Dividend Yield History." https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/MTN/vail-resorts/dividend-yield-history
13. EPR Properties, "Ski" (experiential ski-property portfolio), 2026. https://eprkc.com/portfolio/experiential/ski/
14. Alterra Mountain Company, "Destinations" and "Announcing Alterra Mountain Company." https://www.alterramtn.co/en/destinations; https://www.alterramtn.co/en/news/announcing-alterra-mountain-company; KPCW, "Deer Valley owner raises $3 billion," 2024. https://www.kpcw.org/ski-resorts/2024-01-31/deer-valley-owner-raises-3-billion-to-improve-properties-acquire-new-ones
15. Boyne Resorts, "About" and "Mountain Destinations," 2026. https://www.boyneresorts.com/about; https://www.boyneresorts.com/destinations
16. POWDR, "Adventure Lifestyle Company," 2026. https://www.powdr.com/
17. Mountain Capital Partners, "Ski Resort Management," 2026. https://www.mcp.ski/
18. Aspen One / Aspen Skiing Company, corporate release, 2023. https://aspen.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/ASPEN-ONE-RELEASE-FINAL_7.17.23.pdf
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21. The Storm Skiing Journal, "A Complete List of Ski Areas on United States Forest Service Land," 2023 (≈63% of terrain, ≈127 areas, fees). https://www.stormskiing.com/p/a-complete-list-of-ski-areas-on-united; Better Trail, "Ski Resorts and Public Land," 2023. https://bettertrail.com/public-lands/ski-resorts
22. U.S. Forest Service, "Special Use Permits" (NEPA review). https://www.fs.usda.gov/r06/umpqua/permits/special-use-permits
23. Bocconi Students Investment Club, "Mountains of Money: The Economics Behind Modern Ski Resorts" (ancillary ≈$68/visit; small-area non-ticket share), 2024. https://bsic.it/mountains-of-money-the-economics-behind-modern-ski-resorts/
24. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Outdoor Recreation Satellite Account, U.S. and States, 2023" (snow activities $7.7B value added), 2024. https://www.bea.gov/news/2024/outdoor-recreation-satellite-account-us-and-states-2023
25. Protect Our Winters / REI Co-op, "Climate Change Threatens $11.3 Billion Snowsports Industry," 2023. https://www.rei.com/blog/snowsports/climate-change-threatens-11-3-billion-snowsports-industry-protect-our-winters-report-says
26. Environmental and Energy Study Institute, "On Thin Ice: Rethinking the Future of Winter Sports in a Changing Climate" (season-shortening projections; $0.66-1.35B losses), 2024. https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/on-thin-ice-rethinking-the-future-of-winter-sports-in-a-changing-climate
27. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Climate Change Indicators in the United States" (snowpack season length, Western sites 1982-2023), 2023. https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators
28. National Ski Areas Association, "Ropeway Information" (ANSI B77.1 tramway standard). https://www.nsaa.org/NSAA/Programs/ASC_B77/Ropeway_Information/
29. Ohio Revised Code, "Chapter 4169: Skiers, Ski Area, and Passenger Tramway Safety." https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/chapter-4169
30. Grand View Research, "U.S. Skiing And Snowboarding Market — Industry Report" (participation base), 2024. https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/us-skiing-snowboarding-market-report