Theater Companies and Dinner Theaters (U.S.)

NAICS 2022 code 711110 — an investor's primer for public- and private-market audiences

NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the U.S. government's standard scheme for grouping businesses.

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1. Overview

This industry is the business of producing live theatrical performances — musicals, plays, operas, comedy, improv, mime, and puppetry — plus dinner theaters that bundle a show with a meal. It runs from Broadway blockbusters and their national tours, down to the resident nonprofit playhouse in a mid-size city and the castle-themed dinner show off the interstate.

Live theater is a culturally visible slice of the U.S. experience economy, but it is a structurally hard place to make money. Federal statistics put the receipts of producing companies at roughly $8.7 billion and paid employment near 69,000 [3][4]. The full cultural and economic footprint is larger once you add touring, tourism, dining, and the roughly $3.6 billion of activity the nonprofit theater field alone generates [8]. The tension that defines the industry — a big cultural presence sitting on thin, structurally squeezed economics — is what an investor needs to understand first.

Two ways in, and a predictability spectrum. There are essentially no pure-play public theater companies, and no theater-specific fund. The famous names — the Shubert, Nederlander, and ATG (Ambassador Theatre Group) theater empires; Broadway Across America; Medieval Times — are all private, nonprofit, or private-equity-owned [12][13][19][22]. Public-market exposure is therefore indirect, through diversified media, venue, ticketing, or hospitality companies where theater is a small piece (section 4). Direct exposure to the upside of a hit almost always means the private route — investing as a limited partner in a specific production, a high-risk, illiquid bet where roughly four in five shows never return their capital [10]. Cutting across both routes is a predictability spectrum: a venue, a subscription program, or a destination dinner show can generate recurring demand, whereas a single production is a hit-driven wager with a heavy downside.

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2. What it is and how it's structured

In scope (NAICS 711110): companies, groups, or theaters that produce live theatrical presentations — musicals, operas, plays, comedy, improvisational, mime, and puppet shows — plus dinner theaters that both produce a show and serve food and beverages on premises. A theater company may or may not operate its own venue [6].

The industry splits into three very different business models:

1. Commercial (for-profit) production — Broadway and its national tours. Money is raised from investors to mount a show; the goal is to recoup that capital and then profit from a long run, touring, and licensing.
2. Nonprofit resident theaters — the ~500 professional 501(c)(3) companies (regional playhouses, Off-Broadway institutions, opera companies) that live on a mix of ticket income and donations [8]. 501(c)(3) is the U.S. tax-code section for charitable nonprofits.
3. Dinner theater — a hospitality/entertainment hybrid where food-and-beverage margins matter as much as the show.

What it excludes (and the adjacent NAICS codes):

• Motion-picture theaters → 512131 / 512132 (film exhibition is a separate industry, not a comparable) [7].
• Dance companies → 711120; musical groups, orchestras, and recording artists → 711130; circuses, ice shows, magic, and other performing-arts producers → 711190.
• Promoters and venue managers that book shows but don't produce them → 711310 (promoters with facilities) and 711320 (promoters without facilities). This matters: many performing-arts centers and some Broadway landlords/presenters are classified as promoters (7113), not as theater companies (711110) — a key reason the 711110 receipts figure looks modest next to Broadway's headline grosses.
• Talent agents and managers → 711410; independent/freelance performers and writers → 711510; landlords that only lease a theater without operating it → 531120; and a restaurant with no live theatrical production → 722511 (full-service restaurants).

Ownership mix: unusually broad but overwhelmingly private and nonprofit — commercial producers, family-owned destination attractions, nonprofit resident theaters, community and amateur groups, public/university venues, and production-specific project entities. Commercial productions are typically structured as single-show limited partnerships or LLCs (limited liability companies). Venue ownership, show production, ticketing, and food service are often split across different companies. Publicly traded ownership is the rare exception, not the rule.

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3. How big it is

Core U.S. federal figures for NAICS 711110:

County Business Patterns (CBP) is the Census Bureau's annual count of businesses with paid employees; the Economic Census is its five-yearly full-industry survey; SBA = U.S. Small Business Administration.

The industry is highly fragmented. The four largest firms account for just 10.9% of receipts (the CR4, or four-firm concentration ratio), the top eight for 15.8%, the top 20 for 26.8%, and the top 50 for 40.6%; the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard 0–10,000 concentration gauge) is only 56.4 — near-atomistic competition [4]. The low pay-per-employee figure reflects heavy part-time, seasonal, and per-performance labor. Under the SBA's $25 million threshold, effectively the entire industry qualifies as small business [5].

The undercount caveat (important here). These federal business statistics materially understate the full activity of American theater:

• Tiny and volunteer operators are largely invisible. CBP counts establishments with paid employees; the vast population of community, amateur, school, and church theater — plus self-employed performers filing as nonemployer (no-payroll) businesses — falls outside these totals [3][7].
• Government and university theaters aren't counted as businesses. Public college and municipal producing theaters sit outside private-business statistics.
• Classification leakage. As noted above, much presenting/venue activity is booked under promoters (7113), so a Broadway season that grosses nearly $1.9 billion does not flow neatly into the 711110 receipts line.
• The supplied federal file also provides no industrywide profit, margin, attendance, capacity, or capital-spending figures — where those are absent we say so rather than estimate.

So treat $8.7 billion in receipts as the measured core of producing companies, not the full size of the live-theater economy. For scale on the pieces the business stats blur: Broadway's 2024–2025 New York season alone grossed about $1.89 billion on 14.7 million admissions at 91.2% of capacity [1], the 2025–2026 season held at a similar record (~$1.9 billion, ~14.6 million, ~90.8% capacity) [2], and the nonprofit theater field reports a ~$3.6 billion annual economic contribution across ~27 million attendances [8].

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4. The investable universe

There is no pure-play public company in this industry and no theater-specific ETF (exchange-traded fund). No large U.S.-listed company's reporting maps cleanly to 711110. The listed names below carry only partial, diluted live-performance exposure, ordered from most to least relevant — each is a small piece of a much larger business.

Movie-theater chains (e.g., cinema operators) are not comparables — film exhibition is classified separately under NAICS 512131/512132 [7].

Major non-listed owners and operators (where the real economics sit):

Bottom line: to own the equity upside of live theater, a public-market investor has almost nothing to buy directly; the genuine bets are private (production limited partnerships, or private-equity vehicles like the ATG situation) — covered in section 10.

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5. How the money works

The metrics that matter differ by model, and one point holds across all of them: reported box-office gross is not producer revenue or profit. Gross flows through ticketing fees, venue charges, rights and royalties, then labor, production, marketing, rent, and insurance before any cash reaches an owner or investor. The Broadway League explicitly distinguishes reported gross from net economics [1].

Commercial Broadway / touring (the hit-driven model). A producer raises capitalization — the upfront money to build and open a show. New musicals in 2024–2025 averaged roughly $19.5 million to capitalize (some blockbusters now push $25–30 million); plays run about $4–9 million [10]. Once open, the show lives or dies on its weekly operating margin: weekly gross minus weekly running costs (cast and crew salaries, theater rent, royalties, marketing, and the physical running of the production — well into six figures per week for a big musical). A show recoups only when cumulative weekly profits repay the original capitalization; until then, investors see nothing. The brutal base rate: only about one in five Broadway musicals ever recoups — roughly 80% of investors lose money — a ratio that has held for decades [10]. The winners pay for the losers through long runs, national tours, sit-down companies in other cities, and subsidiary rights (film, licensing, cast albums) [24].

Nonprofit resident theaters (the mixed-revenue model). These companies typically cover only ~40–60% of budget from earned revenue (tickets, subscriptions); the rest is contributed revenue — individual donations, foundation/corporate grants, government arts funding, and endowment draw [8]. The field's health metric is CUNA (Change in Unrestricted Net Assets — essentially the nonprofit's bottom line): in 2023, 61% of surveyed "Trend Theatres" ran a negative CUNA, the worst since 2009 [8]. Subscriptions and the donor base are the nonprofit equivalent of a subscription business's retention — and both have eroded since the pandemic.

Dinner theater (the hospitality hybrid). Revenue is a bundled ticket-plus-meal price, so per-guest spend and food-and-beverage margin sit alongside show economics; the bundle lifts revenue per guest but adds kitchen labor, food cost, inventory, and health-compliance complexity. Profitability leans on high occupancy, efficient kitchen operations, and repeat/tourist traffic.

Operating metrics an analyst actually watches (across models): paid-seat occupancy and capacity utilization; average paid ticket price and revenue per available seat; advance-sales pacing; weekly running cost versus weekly gross (the make-or-break line for a running show); break-even attendance and weeks-to-recoup; food-and-beverage spend per guest; subscription renewal and repeat attendance; and venue calendar utilization. Because costs are largely fixed — you pay the whole cast whether the house is half or fully sold — incremental ticket sales are extremely high-margin, which is why occupancy is the single most important lever.

The structural headwind — "Baumol's cost disease." It still takes the same number of actors the same number of hours to perform a play as it did a century ago, so the industry cannot raise labor productivity to offset rising wages. Costs (largely union labor — section 7) tend to climb faster than audiences will tolerate ticket-price increases. This is the deep reason nonprofit theaters chronically run deficits and commercial shows struggle to recoup — a forward-looking structural constraint, not a passing one.

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6. What drives demand

• Discretionary consumer spending. Theater tickets are a want, not a need; demand tracks household confidence and the broader economy, and NEA research has long found nonprofit theater attendance and finances vulnerable in downturns [26].
• Tourism and location. Broadway in particular is heavily tourist-dependent, so travel recovery and currency swings move the box office directly [1]. For dinner theaters and regional houses, local population density, hotel/restaurant traffic, and destination tourism drive footfall.
• Hit content and intellectual property. Recognizable IP (Disney titles, jukebox musicals, movie-to-stage adaptations) and star casting de-risk the sale. The market is increasingly blockbuster-dependent: a handful of hits carry the grosses while most productions struggle.
• The subscriber and donor base (nonprofits). Recurring subscriptions and philanthropic giving are the demand foundation for resident theaters — both weakened after 2020.
• School, group, and corporate bookings and reviews/social media, which shape advance sales.
• Substitution from at-home and other entertainment. Streaming, gaming, concerts, sporting events, and restaurants compete for the same evening and wallet; theater's edge is the shared, time-specific, in-person nature of the event.
• Demographics. Core theatergoers skew older and higher-income; building younger audiences is an industry-wide, unsolved challenge.

Forward-looking judgment: demand should stay durable for distinctive live experiences — especially branded, family-oriented, destination, and hospitality-integrated formats — but growth will be uneven, because consumers can defer discretionary purchases and a hit does not guarantee a repeatable one.

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7. Regulation

Theater is not a heavily licensed industry, but several regulatory and quasi-regulatory forces shape its economics:

• Labor unions set the cost floor. Collective bargaining, more than government, is the dominant "regulator." Actors' Equity Association (performers and stage managers), IATSE (stagehands and crew), the American Federation of Musicians, and the SDC (directors and choreographers) negotiate minimum salaries, benefits, and working conditions. Under the 2025 Broadway Production Agreement, the Equity weekly minimum rose toward ~$2,717, with annual increases and higher health contributions [11]. Baseline federal wage-and-hour rules under the FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act — minimum wage, overtime, recordkeeping, youth-employment limits) apply beneath the union contracts [25].
• Nonprofit tax status and charitable-giving policy. Resident theaters depend on 501(c)(3) status and the tax deductibility of donations; changes to charitable-deduction rules ripple straight through their contributed revenue [8].
• Public arts funding. The National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), state arts councils, and local agencies provide grants. This is a live risk: in May 2025 the NEA abruptly cancelled and withdrew grants to theaters nationwide, and the administration's budget proposed eliminating the agency entirely [23].
• Copyright and underlying-rights licensing. Scripts, scores, choreography, and source IP require performance, adaptation, and recording rights (via the Dramatists Guild framework and licensors such as Concord/MTI) — a real cost and gatekeeping layer [25].
• Accessibility, building, and safety codes. The ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act) requires accessible routes, wheelchair and companion seating, and comparable sightlines in assembly areas [25]; fire, occupancy, and zoning codes apply to every venue.
• Food, liquor, and special-attraction rules. Dinner theaters add health inspections, food-service rules, and liquor licensing; spectacle shows using animals, pyrotechnics, or weapons face extra safety, insurance, and animal-welfare requirements.
• Consumer-protection/ticketing rules (e.g., the federal BOTS Act on automated ticket-buying — Better Online Ticket Sales Act — and evolving resale-disclosure rules) touch the sales channel.

Permitting delays and compliance costs belong in both production budgets and venue underwriting.

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

Two opposite forces coexist.

Production is fragmented and atomistic. With a CR4 of ~11% and an HHI of 56.4 [4], no producer or company dominates the national revenue base. Thousands of small companies and one-off production entities compete for talent, audiences, and donors.

Distribution is a concentrated bottleneck. The scarce resource is Broadway theaters themselves — only ~41 eligible houses, and the "Big Three" landlords control roughly three-quarters of them (Shubert 17, Nederlander 9, ATG/Jujamcyn 5 ≈ 31 of ~41) [12][19][20]. That gatekeeping power over the most valuable stages is the real concentration in the industry, even though it doesn't show up in the receipts-based HHI. National firm concentration being low does not mean every local market is competitive: suitable theaters are scarce, and a strong venue controls access to audiences, dates, and production economics. Touring presentation is likewise consolidated around Broadway Across America (John Gore) and ATG [13][21].

The strongest competitive advantages are owned or controlled venues; valuable IP and licensing rights; reliable touring and distribution networks; audience data, subscription relationships, and ticketing reach; strong creative track records; destination locations with hospitality integration; and access to capital through production delays or weak sales.

Private-equity entry. The most notable structural shift is financial: Providence Equity Partners controls ATG, which in 2023 absorbed Jujamcyn's theaters — bringing institutional capital and a for-profit, scale-and-sell playbook into a business long run by family dynasties and nonprofits. ATG being prepared for a possible sale in 2026 would be the sector's marquee liquidity event [13].

Nonprofit fragility. The resident-theater field is not consolidating so much as contracting — layoffs, shortened seasons, and outright closures have accelerated since pandemic relief ran out [9].

Forward-looking judgment: consolidation is more likely in venues, ticketing, destination attractions, and IP licensing than among individual producers, whose creative supply stays fragmented because so many productions are project-specific.

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9. Risks

• Recoupment / hit-driven risk (commercial). ~80% of Broadway productions lose money; returns are binary and depend on producing a genuine hit [10].
• High fixed costs + Baumol squeeze. Union labor and running costs rise structurally faster than ticket prices can, compressing margins across the industry [11].
• Cost overruns in labor, construction, rights, marketing, and technology; wage inflation, tough union negotiations, and labor shortages; and high rent, lease, and venue-maintenance obligations.
• Cyclicality and tourism exposure. A recession or travel shock hits discretionary, tourist-heavy demand quickly [1].
• Tail/shutdown risk. Live theater has near-zero revenue when it can't gather audiences — the COVID-19 closures were an existential, sector-wide stop.
• Structural attendance decline (nonprofits). Post-pandemic audiences and subscriptions have not fully returned; 61% of surveyed nonprofits ran deficits in 2023 [8][9].
• Public-funding and donor risk. NEA grant cancellations and proposed elimination, plus donor fatigue, threaten the contributed-revenue base that keeps nonprofits solvent [23].
• Blockbuster dependency. Grosses are increasingly concentrated in a few hits; a weak slate drags the whole market.
• Safety, accessibility, food-service, liquor, animal-welfare, or insurance liabilities, especially for dinner and spectacle formats.
• Illiquidity and thin disclosure (private investors). Production stakes are illiquid limited-partnership interests with no secondary market and multi-year lockups [24].
• Misleading public comparisons. Where a listed company's theater results are buried inside a larger media, sports, music, or hospitality business, headline multiples can mislead.

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10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market route (limited and indirect). There is no pure-play theater stock and no theater fund. The choice is really which adjacency you are buying: content and IP through a diversified media company (Disney, DIS); venue and produced-show exposure through a live-entertainment operator (MSGE); ticketing/promotion through a broader live-event platform (LYV); or hospitality/destination attractions through a mixed real-estate-and-entertainment company (RHP) [14][16][17][18]. In every case theater is a small slice, so enterprise value (EV), adjusted EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization), and free cash flow (FCF) should be normalized for one-off hits, seasonality, lease obligations, and the dominant non-theater segments before drawing conclusions. Public-market investors essentially cannot buy the theater industry as a clean theme.

Private-market routes (where the real exposure is):

• Invest directly in a production. Accredited investors can buy units in a specific Broadway or touring show's limited partnership/LLC. Expect high risk (one-in-five recoupment), illiquidity, and returns driven by long runs plus subsidiary rights (tours, licensing, film) [10][24]. This is the only way to own a hit's upside — and the most likely way to lose your stake.
• Private-equity / operator vehicles. The clearest institutional path is exposure to scaled operators — e.g., Providence Equity's ATG, whose mooted 2026 sale illustrates how PE now underwrites theater at scale [13].
• Real estate / venue economics. The durable value in Broadway sits with the landlords (Shubert, Nederlander, ATG); private and rarely accessible, but where the concentrated, rent-collecting economics live [12].
• Destination and hospitality operators, royalty/IP finance, and preferred equity or debt offer more repeatable, recurring-demand economics than a single show. Underwrite on advance sales, occupancy, ticket pricing, F&B margins, labor and rights costs, marketing efficiency, insurance, working capital, venue terms, and downside scenarios.
• Patronage (not an investment). Supporting a nonprofit theater is a tax-deductible donation, not a return-seeking investment — worth distinguishing clearly for anyone weighing "supporting theater" against "investing in theater" [8].

Near-term drivers and outlook.

• Commercial theater is at record nominal highs but not clearly healthier. Broadway's 2024–2025 season set an all-time gross record (~$1.89B) and the 2025–2026 season held near it (~$1.9B), yet attendance (~14.6–14.7M) still trails the pre-pandemic 2018–2019 peak — the records were driven substantially by higher prices, not more seats [1][2]. Rising capitalization and running costs keep recoupment hard even in a "record" year [10].
• The nonprofit field faces a structural reckoning. With relief money gone, deficits widespread, and public funding under direct threat, expect continued consolidation, shortened seasons, and closures absent new funding models [8][9][23].
• Financialization is the story to watch. Private-equity ownership of theaters and touring networks is reshaping who captures the economics; the ATG sale process is the near-term signpost [13].

Net: live theater is a culturally vital, resilient, but structurally low-margin industry. Public investors have almost no clean way in; private investors face hit-or-miss economics dominated by a handful of blockbusters and a concentrated set of theater landlords, with venue owners, destination operators, and diversified platforms offering more repeatable economics than any single show.

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Sources

1. The Broadway League. "Broadway's 2024–2025 Season Wraps with 14.7 Million Attendances and Grosses of $1.89 Billion" (91.2% capacity; reported gross vs. net economics). 2025. https://www.broadwayleague.com/press/press-releases/broadways-2024-2025-season-wraps-with-147-million-attendances-and-grosses-of-189-billion/
2. The Broadway League. "Broadway Season Statistics in Detail: 2025–2026" (~$1.91B gross; ~14.6M attendances; ~90.8% capacity). 2026. https://www.broadwayleague.com/research/statistics-broadway-nyc/
3. U.S. Census Bureau. County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 711110 (establishments 3,490; employment 68,930; annual payroll $2.696B; Q1 payroll $665.329M). 2025. https://data.census.gov/table/CBP2023.CB2300CBP
4. U.S. Census Bureau. Economic Census 2022, Concentration of Largest Firms, NAICS 711110 (firms 3,385; receipts $8.731B; CR4 10.9%, CR8 15.8%, CR20 26.8%, CR50 40.6%; HHI 56.4). 2025. https://data.census.gov/table/ECNSIZE2022.EC2200SIZECONCEN
5. U.S. Small Business Administration. Table of Small Business Size Standards, NAICS 711110 ($25 million receipts). 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
6. U.S. Census Bureau. "2022 NAICS: 711110 Theater Companies and Dinner Theaters" (industry definition). 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?chart=2022&details=711110&input=711110
7. U.S. Census Bureau. County Business Patterns methodology and 2022 Economic Census coverage (employer-only counts; nonemployer and government exclusions); NAICS 512131 Motion Picture Theaters. 2022–2026. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
8. Theatre Communications Group and SMU DataArts. "Theatre Facts 2023" ($3.6B economic contribution; ~27M attendances; 61% of Trend Theatres negative CUNA). 2025. https://www.culturaldata.org/learn/data-at-work/2025/theatre-facts-2023/
9. The Hollywood Reporter. "Theaters in Crisis: Layoffs, Cost Cuts Imperil Nonprofit Stage Companies Across U.S." 2023. https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/theaters-layoffs-cost-cuts-1235544048/
10. BroadwayWorld. "The $30 Million Musical Trend" (avg. new-musical capitalization ~$19.5M; ~20% recoupment / ~80% lose money). 2025. https://www.broadwayworld.com/article/The-30-Million-Musical-Trend-20250106
11. Actors' Equity Association / Playbill. "Actors' Equity Membership Officially Approves New Broadway Production Contract" (weekly minimum ~$2,717; health contributions). 2025. https://playbill.com/article/actors-equity-membership-officially-approves-new-production-contract
12. Variety / Playbill. "Three Dynasties Preside Over Broadway's Theater Houses" (Shubert 17, Nederlander 9, Jujamcyn 5). 2017. https://variety.com/2017/legit/features/broadway-theater-dynasties-1202579853/
13. Providence Equity Partners (ATG–Jujamcyn combination, 2023) and Deadline (ATG reported 2026 sale process). 2023/2026. https://www.provequity.com/news/ambassador-theatre-group-and-jujamcyn-theatres-agree-combine-operations
14. The Walt Disney Company. "Fiscal Year 2025 Annual Financial Report" (Disney Theatrical Group). 2025. https://investors.thewaltdisneycompany.com/files/doc_financials/2025/ar/2025-Annual-Report.pdf
15. Wikipedia. "The Lion King (musical)" and "List of highest-grossing musical theatre productions" ($2B+ Broadway, ~$11B worldwide). 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Lion_King_(musical)
16. Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. "2025 Form 10-K" (venues; Christmas Spectacular). 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1952073/000162828026005948/msge-20251231.htm
17. Live Nation Entertainment "2025 Annual Report" and Wikipedia/Variety "Broadway Across America" (Live Nation exited North American theatrical in 2008). 2008/2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broadway_Across_America
18. Ryman Hospitality Properties. "2025 Form 10-K" (Opry Entertainment; Grand Ole Opry, Ryman Auditorium). 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1040829/000110465926019035/rhp-20251231x10k.htm
19. The Shubert Organization. "About Us" (17 Broadway theaters plus Off-Broadway venues). 2026. https://shubert.nyc/about-us/
20. The Nederlander Organization. "About Us" (nine Broadway theaters; national/international network). 2023. https://nederlander.com/about-us/
21. The John Gore Organization. "About" (Broadway Across America, Broadway.com). 2026. https://www.johngore.com/about/
22. Wikipedia ("Dinner theatre," "Medieval Times," "List of dinner theaters"; Chanhassen largest single venue) and Dollywood/Herschend (Dolly Parton's Stampede, Pirates Voyage, Hatfield & McCoy). 2025–2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dinner_theatre
23. NPR / The Washington Post. "NEA hit with grant cuts after Trump administration's call for elimination." 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/05/03/nx-s1-5385888/sweeping-cuts-hit-nea-after-trump-administration-calls-to-eliminate-the-agency
24. Loeb & Loeb LLP. "The Basics of Investing on Broadway" (production LLCs/LPs, accredited investors, subsidiary rights). 2023. https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2023/12/the-basics-of-investing-on-broadway
25. U.S. Department of Justice, "2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design"; U.S. Department of Labor, "Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act"; U.S. Copyright Office, "What Is Copyright?" 2010–2026. https://www.ada.gov/law-and-regs/design-standards/2010-stds/
26. National Endowment for the Arts. "All America's a Stage" (nonprofit theater attendance/finances vulnerable in downturns). 2008. https://www.arts.gov/impact/research/publications/all-americas-stage