Promoters of Performing Arts, Sports, and Similar Events — With Facilities (U.S., NAICS 711310)

1. Overview

This is the business of putting on live events — concerts, festivals, sporting events, and fairs — in buildings the operator itself runs. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 711310 covers two related activities: (1) promoters who organize and stage events in arenas, stadiums, theaters, amphitheaters, or fairgrounds they manage; and (2) firms that manage and staff those venues and rent them out to other promoters [1]. In plain terms: the arena operators, amphitheater owners, and fair boards — the people who control both the show and the box that holds it. The category sits at the intersection of live entertainment, hospitality, ticketing, and commercial real estate.

Live entertainment has been one of the more resilient corners of consumer spending. Unlike recorded music or streaming, a concert or a game cannot be pirated, and demand for in-person "experiences" has grown even as goods spending softened. Live Nation, the sector's largest player, drew a record 159 million fans in 2025 and booked $25.2 billion in global revenue [2]. The trade-off is that the underlying business is capital-heavy, cyclical, dependent on a lumpy supply of touring stars, and — for the biggest player — under active antitrust attack.

There are two ways in. Public-market investors can buy a handful of listed operators (Live Nation, MSG Entertainment, Sphere Entertainment, and adjacent names). Private investors face a landscape dominated by privately held giants (AEG, Legends Global, Oak View Group), family firms, and government-owned facilities — meaning much of the real economic activity here never trades on an exchange. The best businesses in either channel tend to control scarce venues, keep a diverse event calendar full, and monetize everything around the ticket; single-venue projects loaded with debt and dependent on a few artists or teams are materially riskier.

2. What it is and how it's structured

In scope (711310): establishments that both promote events and operate the facility. Examples: a company that owns an amphitheater and books its own summer concert season; an operator managing a city-owned arena under contract and renting it to touring shows; a state or county fair that runs its own fairgrounds [1]. The activity bundle typically includes venue operation, event promotion, box-office/ticketing, and the premium-hospitality, concessions, parking, and sponsorship businesses layered on top.

What it excludes — and where that activity lives instead:

• Promoters without their own facilities → 711320. A concert or festival promoter who books events into buildings owned by others (the classic "touring promoter") is a separate code [3]. The line is thin and porous: the same corporate parent often does both.
• Sports teams and clubs → 711211. A pro or semipro franchise — even one that also operates its stadium — is classified as a team, not a promoter [3].
• Racetracks → 711212. Auto, horse, and dog tracks that host and promote races sit here [3].
• Performing-arts companies (the performers) → 7111. The theater, dance, or music troupe that produces the show, as opposed to the venue that hosts it [3].
• Convention, conference, and trade-show organizers → 561920, and landlords who merely lease a building without operating it → 531120 [3].

Ownership mix. This is not a tidy corporate sector. The federal data do not publish a public/private ownership split, but in practice three ownership types coexist:

1. A few vertically integrated giants (Live Nation; privately held AEG) that promote, own or book venues, and — in Live Nation's case — also sell the tickets.
2. Asset-light venue managers (Legends Global, Oak View Group) that run hundreds of arenas and stadiums under management contracts without owning them [4][5].
3. Government and quasi-public owners — cities, counties, stadium and convention-center authorities, and state/county fair boards — plus universities and nonprofit arts organizations, which together own an enormous share of the physical venues and either self-operate or hire a manager. Much of the "industry" is really public infrastructure operated on contract, with ownership and operation often split between different entities.

3. How big it is

U.S. federal statistics for NAICS 711310 (our ground-truth figures). They combine different reference years and should not be read as a single-year financial statement:

• Receipts: about $21.6 billion (2022 Economic Census) [6].
• Firms: 3,485 (2022); employer establishments: 4,274 (2023) [6][7].
• Employment: 144,748 workers; annual payroll: roughly $4.97 billion (2023) [7].
• Average pay works out to roughly $34,000 per worker [7] — low, because a large share of the headcount is part-time and seasonal event staff (ushers, concessions, security, ground crews) rather than full-time employees.
• SBA (U.S. Small Business Administration) size standard: a firm counts as "small" up to $40 million in average annual receipts [8] — a high bar, reflecting how many operators are genuinely small.

Concentration looks low on paper. The top four firms account for just 23% of the code's receipts (the four-firm concentration ratio, CR4), the top eight for 28.6% (CR8), the top twenty for 40% (CR20), and the top fifty for 55.6% (CR50); the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration gauge that sums the squared market shares) is 192 [6] — far below the ~1,500 level economists treat as "concentrated." That statistic sits oddly next to the widespread perception that live entertainment is dominated by one or two companies. Both are true, for three reasons: (a) the giants' revenue is spread across several NAICS codes — promotion-without-facilities, ticketing, sports, and large international operations that never enter this U.S. code; (b) government-owned venues are largely outside business-sector receipts; and (c) the code carries a long tail of thousands of small fairgrounds, civic auditoriums, and local venues that dilute measured concentration. Note also that the HHI here measures this code's receipts, not ticketing-market or artist-booking power, where concentration is far higher.

The undercount caveat matters here. The $21.6 billion figure materially understates the live-events economy. First, a large fraction of major arenas, stadiums, and convention centers are publicly owned, so their operations show up (if at all) as government activity, not business receipts. Second, the biggest revenue pools — ticketing fees, sports-team gate and media money, and international touring — are booked under other codes. Third, County Business Patterns (CBP, the source for the establishment/employment/payroll figures) counts only employer establishments; the many tiny sole-proprietor promoters with no paid staff are excluded. (As a scale-of-coverage warning, not an estimate for this code: across the broader Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation sector, nonemployer businesses were 91% of establishments in 2016 [9].) Treat 711310's official size as the measured footprint of the "operate-your-own-venue" slice, not the full scale of live entertainment. The federal file provides no industry-wide attendance, venue-utilization, average-ticket-price, or operating-margin figures — where those appear below, they come from company filings and trade data, not the federal extract.

4. The investable universe

Relatively few pure public plays exist, and most listed names straddle 711310 and its neighbors (teams, racetracks, ticketing, media, hotels, real estate). The cleanest fits are the venue-and-event operators; the rest are adjacent.

Major private and other owners (not directly investable on public markets):

• AEG (Anschutz Entertainment Group) — privately held; the world's #2 concert promoter; owns Crypto.com Arena (Los Angeles) and London's O2, and runs festivals including Coachella [18].
• Legends Global (the former ASM Global) — the largest venue-management firm, running 450+ arenas, stadiums, and convention centers worldwide under contract; majority-owned by private-equity (PE) firm Sixth Street, alongside affiliates of the New York Yankees and Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones [4][19].
• Oak View Group (OVG) — develops and manages 400+ venues (UBS Arena, Climate Pledge Arena, Co-op Live), with related hospitality and premium-sales businesses [5].
• Delaware North — family-owned and privately held; owns and operates TD Garden in Boston and provides venue hospitality and management services across many stadiums and arenas [20].
• Feld Entertainment — privately held; touring producer of Monster Jam, Disney on Ice, and Supercross, mostly in third-party arenas (so closer to 711320) [21].
• Government and quasi-public owners — municipal and county arena/stadium authorities, convention-center authorities, and state/county fair boards, which own a large share of the physical venues.

If you want broad exposure, note there is no dedicated live-events ETF; public exposure comes bundled inside consumer-discretionary and communication-services funds that hold LYV and its peers.

5. How the money works

Owners in this industry don't get rich on ticket face value — they get rich on everything around the ticket, and on keeping the building busy. It is a layered revenue-sharing system: promoters take the ticket revenue but pay the artist (via a fixed guarantee, a share of sales, or a split of profits); venue operators earn rent, ticket rebates, or a cut of sales plus all the ancillary revenue; and ticketing companies keep service fees while remitting the ticket proceeds to venues and promoters [2]. The relevant metrics:

• Event-days and utilization. A venue is a fixed-cost asset: mortgage/lease, staff, insurance, and maintenance run whether the lights are on or not. Profit is driven by how many event-days fill the calendar and how full each show is. An empty night is pure cost; a sellout drops nearly all incremental revenue to the bottom line (high operating leverage).
• Gross ticket revenue = attendance × average ticket price — but the promoter keeps only a share after paying the artist. A fixed artist guarantee shifts the downside risk (and the upside) onto the promoter. Margins on the ticket gross itself are thin: Live Nation's global Concerts segment ran an adjusted operating margin around 3% [2].
• Per-cap (per-fan) spending is where the money is. Food and beverage, premium seating, suites, VIP/club memberships, parking, and merchandise carry far higher margins than the ticket. Operators obsess over per-capita spend — dollars per attendee inside the building.
• Sponsorship, advertising, and naming rights provide steady, high-margin revenue tied to the venue rather than to any one show.
• Ticketing fees. For an integrated player, service and processing fees are a large, high-margin profit pool — the core of Live Nation's economics and the center of the antitrust fight. (Ticketing revenue is the fee, not the ticket's face value, which is passed through [2].) Live Nation's concert ticketing gross transaction value (GTV) reached about $26 billion in 2025 [2].
• Ancillary real estate. Building shops, restaurants, hotels, and offices around a venue (Atlanta Braves Holdings' The Battery is the model) turns event-day foot traffic into year-round rent.

For diligence, the numbers that matter are venue-level EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization), cash flow left after maintenance capital spending, and the length and exclusivity of lease, management, and ticketing contracts. Venue operation can be economically superior to pure promotion — more recurring ancillary revenue, less direct exposure to artist guarantees — though this varies by asset and contract. The headline is operating leverage plus ancillary capture: fixed-cost buildings that make their real money on per-fan spending, fees, sponsorship, and the density of the booking calendar — not on the printed ticket price.

6. What drives demand

• Discretionary income and the "experience economy." Live events are a want, not a need; spending tracks consumer confidence, but the long-run shift toward experiences over goods has lifted a rising floor under demand.
• The touring supply cycle. Demand is gated by content: a year with many megastar stadium tours is a boom, a light year is a bust. In 2025 the average North American stadium concert grossed about $7.1 million, up 19% year over year, on higher ticket prices [22] — but the supply of such tours is lumpy and artist-driven.
• Sports and the mega-event calendar. League schedules, playoffs, and championships anchor arena and stadium calendars, and hosting rights are near-term catalysts: the FIFA World Cup (soccer's global championship) comes to North America in 2026 and the Summer Olympics to Los Angeles in 2028, filling stadiums and civic venues.
• Demographics and price tolerance. Ticket prices have risen faster than inflation and demand has largely held, concentrated in higher-income and younger "experience-seeking" consumers — though must-see events price far better than mid-tier ones.
• New-venue and format cycles. Marquee new buildings (the Sphere; new arenas and entertainment districts) can expand the market and pull spending toward premium experiences.
• Sponsorship and tourism. Corporate marketing spend on naming rights and activations rises and falls with the ad cycle, and venue demand is tied to travel, hotel occupancy, and urban redevelopment. Better data and dynamic pricing let operators extract more from each seat.
• Weather and seasonality. Outdoor amphitheaters, festivals, and fairs are weather- and season-exposed; first-quarter payroll in the code (about $1.1 billion of the $5.0 billion annual [7], below an even quarter) is consistent with a summer-weighted calendar.

The main counterforces are household affordability, competition for leisure time and attention, cancellations, weather, security concerns, and an oversupply of new venues.

7. Regulation

• Antitrust is the dominant regulatory story. In May 2024 the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and a coalition of state attorneys general sued Live Nation, alleging it illegally monopolizes live entertainment — pointing to exclusive ticketing deals covering hundreds of venues and its control of over 80% of primary ticketing at major concert venues — and asked the court to force a divestiture of Ticketmaster [23]. The case is ongoing (the DOJ docket now shows a proposed 2026 final judgment), and in April 2026 a jury in a related antitrust case found the company had illegally monopolized concert ticketing [23]. A forced break-up would reshape the sector's most valuable profit pool.
• Consumer-protection / pricing. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) finalized its "junk fees" rule in December 2024; it took effect May 12, 2025, requiring live-event ticket sellers to show the all-in price up front (mandatory fees included) rather than adding them at checkout, and barring misleading fee descriptions — though it does not cap the fees themselves [24]. The 2016 BOTS Act (Better Online Ticket Sales Act) bars ticket-buying bots, and various federal and state bills push further transparency in resale.
• Accessibility. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) governs ticket sales as well as buildings — venues must offer accessible seating on comparable terms of price, purchasing method, and availability, including on the secondary market [25].
• Copyright and licensing. Staging music, theater, and choreography requires public-performance and other copyright licenses for the protected works [26].
• Public financing and local rules. Because so many venues are publicly owned or subsidized, the industry intersects with municipal-bond finance, stadium-subsidy politics, local zoning and noise ordinances (especially for outdoor amphitheaters), fire codes and crowd-safety rules, liquor licensing, labor rules, and payment-card/data-security compliance for ticketing systems. Regulation bites hardest where one company combines venues, promotion, and ticketing, or where public authorities subsidize and contract for operations.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The defining structural feature is vertical integration. Live Nation combines promotion, venue operation, artist management, ticketing, and sponsorship under one roof — the model that made it dominant and the reason it is now a regulatory target [2][23]. AEG is the closest full-stack private rival.

Beneath the giants, the market splits in two: a handful of national platforms versus thousands of independents — local promoters, indie clubs, fairgrounds, and civic auditoriums that make up the long tail visible in the low measured concentration [6]. The scaled players win through structural bottlenecks: scarce sites in major population centers, long-term leases and management contracts, deep relationships with artists, teams, leagues, sponsors, and municipalities, and control of ticketing data and premium-sales capability.

Consolidation is proceeding on two tracks. In venue management, roll-ups have created scale players: Legends' acquisition of ASM Global (now Legends Global) built a 450+-venue network, while Oak View Group has grown past 400 — an asset-light model of running other people's buildings [4][5][19]. In sports and event IP, TKO combined UFC and WWE [15], and private equity is deeply embedded across the space (backing Legends, OVG, and historically Live Nation). The current frontier is a new-venue arms race — the ~$2.3 billion Sphere being the boldest bet that a differentiated building can command premium economics.

9. Risks

• Regulatory / antitrust overhang. A forced Ticketmaster divestiture or restrictions on exclusive deals would hit the highest-margin profit pool for the sector's largest company [23].
• Content dependency and lumpiness. A weak touring year — fewer megastar stadium runs — directly dents attendance and gross, and operators can't manufacture the supply.
• Talent concentration and bargaining power. A small number of artists, teams, or leagues can drive a disproportionate share of earnings, and stars increasingly capture more of the ticket gross, squeezing promoter and venue margins even as revenue grows.
• Fixed costs and leverage. Long leases, venue debt, staffing, and maintenance spending stay high when event volume falls. Venue development is expensive and cycle-sensitive; the Sphere's ~$2.3 billion cost shows how a single build can strain a balance sheet, and higher interest rates raise the cost — and risk of overruns, delays, and public opposition — on new projects.
• Consumer discretionary sensitivity. Live spending has been resilient but is still discretionary and would fall in a sharp downturn — with premium, high-priced tickets most exposed. Consumer backlash over fees, dynamic pricing, safety, or service can also dent demand.
• Event risk. Cancellations, weather, security failures, and crowd-safety incidents carry real liability, insurance, and reputational costs.
• Private-market opacity. Private operators disclose less, and may carry more leverage or related-party arrangements than public companies.
• Tail risk. The 2020–21 pandemic shutdown showed that live events can go to zero revenue overnight — a rare but catastrophic scenario for a fixed-cost business.

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public routes. The listed set is small and each name is a different bet: LYV for broad, integrated live-entertainment exposure (with antitrust risk attached); MSGE as the cleanest venue-portfolio pure-play; SPHR as a concentrated wager on one immersive format; RHP for a REIT blend of iconic music venues and hotels; TKO for sports-entertainment IP; CHDN for racing-plus-gaming; BATRK/BATRA for a team-and-real-estate combination; VENU as a speculative micro-cap on venue building; and FWONK/FWONA and LLYVA/LLYVK for global motorsport and a Live Nation stake. There is no dedicated ETF, so passive exposure comes bundled inside consumer-discretionary and communication-services funds. Only in this section do the market's numbers matter: after separating each company's venue economics from its promotion, ticketing, hotel, media, team, and real-estate lines, review current share price, dividend yield, free-cash-flow yield, and enterprise value to EBITDA (EV/EBITDA) — but normalize first for event timing and unusually strong or weak tour years.

Private routes. Most of the real ownership is private: AEG, Legends Global, Oak View Group, and Delaware North are held by their owners and PE backers, reachable mainly through private-equity or infrastructure funds. Direct venue real estate, festival and venue limited-partner (LP) stakes, private credit secured by durable venue cash flows, concessions/ticketing-technology/sponsorship platforms, and municipal bonds tied to publicly financed arenas and convention centers are the other private entry points. Naming-rights and sponsorship spending is a corporate marketing line, not a direct investment. The core diligence questions are the same in any channel: Who owns the facility and who controls the calendar? How long do the contracts run and is ticketing exclusive? What happens when a marquee event is canceled? How much cash is left after talent, labor, insurance, rent, interest, and maintenance capital? Are related-party transactions material?

Near-term drivers and base case. The setup into 2026 looks constructive on demand — record recent attendance, rising per-show grosses, and international fans surpassing the U.S. for the first time in 2025 [2][22] — with the FIFA World Cup 2026 and LA 2028 Olympics as multi-year catalysts for stadium and civic-venue use. Against that, watch three swing factors: the resolution of the Live Nation antitrust case (a potential Ticketmaster divestiture is the single biggest structural wildcard) [23]; how the FTC all-in-pricing regime affects headline ticket demand [24]; and interest rates, which govern the economics of the new-venue building cycle. The base-case judgment is constructive but selective: durable "experience economy" demand is real, but value will accrue disproportionately to scarce venues, diversified operators, premium hospitality, and technology-enabled distribution — so investors should not treat the whole NAICS category, or every new arena, as a single growth story against a genuinely lumpy content cycle and an unusually heavy regulatory cloud over the market leader.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau. "2022 NAICS Definition — 711310 Promoters of Performing Arts, Sports, and Similar Events with Facilities." census.gov. https://www.census.gov/naics/
2. Live Nation Entertainment / Music Business Worldwide. "Live Nation annual revenues top $25B in 2025 … adjusted operating profit of $2.4B" (2026). https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/live-nation-annual-revenues-top-25b-in-2025-up-2b-yoy-with-adjusted-operating-profit-of-2-4b/; Live Nation Newsroom, "Full Year and Fourth Quarter 2025 Results." https://newsroom.livenation.com/news/live-nation-entertainment-full-year-and-fourth-quarter-2025-results/
3. U.S. Census Bureau. NAICS classifications 711320 (promoters without facilities), 711211 (sports teams and clubs), 711212 (racetracks), 7111 (performing-arts companies), 561920 (convention/trade-show organizers), 531120 (lessors of nonresidential buildings), 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/
4. Sportico. "Legends Finalizes ASM Global Acquisition" (2024); TSNN, "World's Largest Venue Management Company Gets New Name" (Legends Global, 450+ venues). https://www.sportico.com/business/finance/2024/legends-asm-global-acquisition-1234794487/
5. Oak View Group. "Venue Management" (400+ venues managed worldwide). https://www.oakviewgroup.com/our-solutions/venue-management/
6. U.S. Census Bureau. "2022 Economic Census — Concentration by Largest Firms, NAICS 711310" (receipts ~$21.6B; firms 3,485; CR4 23%, CR8 28.6%, CR20 40%, CR50 55.6%; HHI 192.2), 2022.
7. U.S. Census Bureau. "County Business Patterns, NAICS 711310" (employer establishments 4,274; employment 144,748; annual payroll ~$4.97B; Q1 payroll ~$1.11B), 2023.
8. U.S. Small Business Administration. "Table of Size Standards, NAICS 711310" ($40 million average annual receipts), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
9. U.S. Census Bureau. "Nonemployer Statistics and County Business Patterns Data Tell the Full Story" (nonemployers were ~91% of Arts, Entertainment & Recreation establishments, 2016 — sector-wide coverage note, not a 711310 estimate), 2018. https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/09/three-fourths-nations-businesses-do-not-have-paid-employees.html
10. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. "Form 10-K, FY2024" (owns/operates/books 394 venues), U.S. SEC, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1335258/000133525825000028/lyv-20241231.htm
11. Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. "Fiscal 2024 Fourth Quarter and Full Year Results"; StockAnalysis.com, MSGE overview (FY2025 revenue ~$942.7M; market cap ~$3.4B). https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/msge/
12. Sphere Entertainment Co. "Form 8-K earnings release, FY2025," U.S. SEC (2025); Simply Wall St, SPHR overview (FY2025 revenue ~$1.2B). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1795250/000179525025000033/sphrex991-earningsrelease6.htm
13. Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. "Form 10-K, FY2025" (Grand Ole Opry, Ryman Auditorium, entertainment venues plus hotels), U.S. SEC, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001040829&type=10-K
14. Churchill Downs Incorporated. "2024 Fourth Quarter and Full Year Results" (FY2024 revenue ~$2.73B), GlobeNewswire, 2025. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/02/19/3029135/12388/en/Churchill-Downs-Incorporated-Reports-2024-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-Results.html
15. TKO Group Holdings. "Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results" (revenue $2.804B), 2025. https://investor.tkogrp.com/news/news-details/2025/TKO-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2024-Results/default.aspx
16. StockTitan. "Atlanta Braves Holdings (BATRK) Overview" (market cap ~$3.2B; TTM revenue ~$732.5M). https://www.stocktitan.net/overview/BATRK/
17. StockAnalysis.com. "Venu Holding (VENU) Overview" (FY2025 revenue ~$17.9M); Venu Holding Corp Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/venu/
18. Music Business Worldwide. "AEG Presents" company profile (world's #2 promoter; Crypto.com Arena, O2, Coachella). https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/companies/aeg-presents/
19. Legends Global. "Legends Completes Acquisition of ASM Global" (ownership: Sixth Street majority, with New York Yankees affiliates and Jerry Jones), 2024. https://legendsglobal.com/legends-completes-acquisition-of-asm-global/
20. Delaware North. "Food, Venue & Hotel Management Company" (family-owned; owns/operates TD Garden). https://www.delawarenorth.com/
21. Wikipedia. "Feld Entertainment" (Monster Jam, Disney on Ice, Supercross). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feld_Entertainment
22. Pollstar. "2025 Year End Business Analysis" (average stadium gross ~$7.11M per show, +19%; average ticket ~$216; international fans surpass U.S.), 2025. https://news.pollstar.com/2025/12/23/year-end-business-analysis-a-return-to-earth-2025-grosses-ticket-sales-drop-averages-increase-beyonce-oasis-coldplay-have-top-tours-venues-stadiums-rock/
23. U.S. Department of Justice / NBC News. "United States v. Live Nation Entertainment" (May 2024 DOJ + states suit seeking Ticketmaster divestiture; proposed 2026 final judgment; April 2026 jury monopolization finding). https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-and-plaintiff-states-v-live-nation-entertainment-inc-and-ticketmaster-llc; https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/livenation-illegally-monopolized-ticketing-market-jury-antitrust-trial-rcna273714
24. Federal Trade Commission. "FTC Announces Rule Banning Junk Ticket and Hotel Fees" (Dec 2024; effective May 12, 2025 — all-in ticket pricing). https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/12/federal-trade-commission-announces-bipartisan-rule-banning-junk-ticket-hotel-fees
25. U.S. Department of Justice. "ADA Requirements: Ticket Sales." https://www.ada.gov/resources/ticket-sales/
26. U.S. Copyright Office. "Performing Arts Works: Registration." https://www.copyright.gov/registration/performing-arts/