Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries (U.S.) — NAICS 713

A Histometrics rollup primer for public-market and private investors. NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the U.S. government's standard code for grouping businesses by their primary activity. This page covers a three-digit subsector — one level up from the four-digit industry groups beneath it — and synthesizes across its three children rather than researching each from scratch. For any single group, read that child's primer.

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1. Overview

NAICS subsector 713 is the government's file drawer for out-of-home discretionary leisure — the places Americans pay to have fun outside the house. It bundles three four-digit industry groups that look nothing alike on the surface: amusement parks and arcades (7131), gambling (7132), and everything else you pay to do rather than watch (7139 — golf, ski areas, marinas, gyms, bowling, and a long tail of trampoline parks, escape rooms, and youth-sports clubs). Together they are a ~$162.5 billion, ~1.8-million-worker slice of the U.S. leisure economy [1][2].

Read as one market, "713" is misleading. Its three groups do not compete with one another, share no dominant operators, and run on different engines — a theme-park turnstile, a casino's house edge, and a gym membership are not the same business. What they do share is an economic shape worth stating up front: local, fixed-cost, capacity-selling venues — a ride, a slot pull, a tee time, a lane-hour — with high-margin food, drink, and extras layered on top, sold to a customer who is spending a want, not a need. Demand is discretionary and cyclical across all three; the deepest structural tailwind is the consumer's long shift from buying goods toward buying experiences.

The distinctive value of looking at 713 as a whole is the contrast across the three children — and one contrast dominates: the economic mass and the public-market access sit in different places. Participatory recreation (7139) is nearly two-thirds of the money, four-fifths of the jobs, and nine-tenths of the establishments, yet is overwhelmingly private. Gambling (7132) is under a quarter of the revenue but carries the deepest, most liquid roster of listed stocks. Amusement (7131) is the smallest group but the most concentrated, and the one with household-name public parents. This page leads with that comparison, then sizes the subsector as a whole.

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2. What's inside — the three children, and how they differ

Subsector 713 sits inside sector 71 (Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation) and splits into three four-digit industry groups. ("Share of level" is share of the subsector's ~$162.5B in 2022 receipts. HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a concentration score running toward 10,000 as a market concentrates; the U.S. Department of Justice treats ~1,500 as the line for "unconcentrated." CR4 = combined revenue share of the four largest firms. PE = private equity, firms that buy whole companies; REIT = real estate investment trust, a listed landlord structure.)

Four things jump out of this table.

1. The big group by money is not the big group by listed access. Recreation (7139) is ~62% of receipts but is mostly private; gambling (7132) is ~23% of receipts yet offers roughly a dozen operator stocks plus two casino landlords. An investor who buys "the biggest part of 713" on the public market is really buying a minority of it.
2. Size rank flips with the yardstick. Gambling is the smallest of the three by establishment and job count but earns the most revenue per site (~$10.5M — few, capital-heavy casinos and machine routes) and pays its workers nearly double the subsector average (licensed dealers and cage staff). Recreation is the opposite: 91% of the establishments at ~$1.2M each and the lowest pay (a part-time, seasonal, tipped workforce).
3. Concentration runs the full spectrum. Amusement is genuinely top-heavy (a park oligopoly, HHI ~1,085); recreation is among the most fragmented activity in the whole economy (HHI ~15); gambling sits between the two on paper but is really a mosaic of protected local license markets. No single number describes "how concentrated 713 is" — see §3 and §8.
4. The health is uneven. The strongest demand stories (fitness, golf, top-tier parks, record casino win) coexist with structural problems (climate-threatened skiing, secularly declining bowling, a soft 2025–26 for arcades) — so the group is a barbell of healthy giants and troubled tails, not a single directional bet.

For everything each child excludes — casino hotels (NAICS 721120), racetracks (711212), state lotteries (government, NAICS 92), on-property hotels/restaurants/retail, and equipment manufacturing — see the child primers (7131, 7132, 7139).

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3. Size (this level's rollup figures)

These are our ground-truth federal statistics for NAICS 713. Dollar receipts are 2022 Economic Census (EC); the counts and payroll are 2023 County Business Patterns (CBP), so this is not a single-year income statement.

The rollup is clean. The three children's receipts ($25.67B + $36.84B + $100.0B ≈ $162.5B), establishments (4,372 + 3,509 + 81,659 = 89,540), employees (233,871 + 134,287 + 1,426,535 = 1,794,693), and annual payroll (~$6.82B + ~$7.04B + ~$37.35B ≈ $51.2B) sum to the subsector totals almost exactly. The one exception is the firm count: 73,647 at the subsector level is slightly below the ~73,707 you get by adding the children, because firms that operate in more than one group are deduplicated and counted once here.[1][2]

Why the concentration numbers look near-zero — and why that is an illusion. A CR4 of 9.3% and an HHI of 39.3 would, taken literally, describe an almost perfectly competitive market. They do not. The figure is an aggregation artifact: the leaders of the three groups do not overlap. Disney and Comcast dominate parks, MGM and Caesars dominate casinos, Vail and Planet Fitness lead recreation segments — but no firm spans two groups, so folding three industries together dilutes every leader's share toward zero. The 713 HHI (39.3) is actually higher than its most fragmented child (recreation at 15.3) because the more concentrated amusement and gambling groups pull it up, yet it remains far below the parks-only figure of ~1,085 and the DOJ's ~1,500 line. Real competition here is local and segment-specific — a scarce casino license, a drive-time golf market, the only theme park within three hours — none of which a national number can capture. Read the subsector HHI as a reminder that 713 is not one market, not as evidence that it is a competitive one.

Undercount caveat — read before quoting $162.5 billion. These figures understate the true footprint of out-of-home leisure, for reasons that recur across every child and compound at the rollup:

• Government is largely excluded. CBP covers employer businesses, and both CBP and the EC largely exclude government establishments [3]. That removes municipal golf courses and pools, public and school rec centers, community ski hills, and the roughly 30% of U.S. marinas that are publicly owned [2][10].
• Nonprofit, nonemployer, sovereign, and informal operators fall out. The YMCA is among the largest fitness providers in the country; charitable bingo and single-table card rooms are nonprofit; sole-proprietor guides and owner-run docks have no payroll; and tribal casinos — sovereign government enterprises that include several of the largest single properties in the country — are only partly reflected anywhere in the federal business statistics [3][6].
• Receipts capture only the classified slice, not the whole venue or the whole activity. The largest adjacent forms are booked under other codes: casino-hotel resorts (most of the Las Vegas Strip) under NAICS 721120, and state lotteries as government activity. For scale against the $162.5B here: U.S. commercial gaming gross gaming revenue (GGR) — what casinos and sportsbooks keep from wagers, before costs — was roughly $78.7 billion in 2025 [5]; tribal gaming about $46.2 billion in fiscal 2025 [6]; state lotteries on the order of $100+ billion in annual sales [7]; the trade group IAAPA (International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions) sizes U.S. attractions at about $52.8 billion in direct revenue [4]; and Disney's Experiences segment alone reported $34.2 billion in fiscal-2024 revenue [8] — more than the entire 7131 group. Note these are different measures (GGR and segment revenue are not the same as classified receipts), so they mark scale, not a figure to add.

One more: because CBP counts jobs in the pay period including March 12, the 1,794,693 employment line is a seasonal trough for the outdoor-heavy pieces (parks, skiing, marinas, golf). Summer-peak headcount, swollen by part-time, student, and seasonal workers, runs materially higher.

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4. Investable universe (where value concentrates across the children)

The single most important fact for a stock-market investor: there is no security that gives you "NAICS 713." No firm spans the three groups, and there is no dedicated U.S. amusement-gambling-recreation exchange-traded fund (ETF, a listed basket of stocks). Listed access is deep in one group, moderate in another, and thin in the biggest.

Gambling (7132) is the deepest and most liquid public menu. Roughly a dozen U.S.-listed casino operators — MGM Resorts (NYSE: MGM), Caesars (NASDAQ: CZR), Wynn (NASDAQ: WYNN), Boyd (NYSE: BYD), PENN Entertainment (NASDAQ: PENN), Red Rock (NASDAQ: RRR), Churchill Downs (NASDAQ: CHDN), Bally's (NYSE: BALY) — though few are pure plays, because most also own hotels and straddle the casino-hotel code. Two casino landlord REITs, VICI Properties (NYSE: VICI) and Gaming and Leisure Properties (NASDAQ: GLPI), turn casino real estate into contractual rent. And the neighborhood layer has one clean listed pure-play, Accel Entertainment (NYSE: ACEL), the largest U.S. video-gaming-terminal route operator.

Amusement (7131) is a household-name but shallow menu. Pure-play parks: Six Flags (NYSE: FUN) and United Parks & Resorts (NYSE: PRKS). Diversified giants where world-class parks are one segment: The Walt Disney Company (NYSE: DIS) and Comcast (NASDAQ: CMCSA). Real estate: EPR Properties (NYSE: EPR), an experiential net-lease REIT. The arcade side is essentially one U.S. stock — Dave & Buster's (NASDAQ: PLAY) — with the rest private.

Recreation (7139), the biggest group by money, is the thinnest public window. Listed operators exist in only three of its six segments: Vail Resorts (NYSE: MTN) in skiing; Planet Fitness (NYSE: PLNT), Life Time (NYSE: LTH), and Xponential Fitness (NYSE: XPOF) in fitness; and Lucky Strike (NYSE: LUCK, formerly Bowlero) in bowling. Golf, marinas, and the "all other" bucket have no pure-play — reached only indirectly through equipment/retail names (Acushnet, Topgolf Callaway; MarineMax (NYSE: HZO), Brunswick (NYSE: BC), OneWater (NASDAQ: ONEW)) or the landlord REITs.

The two cross-segment landlord REITs are the closest thing to a diversified "713-property" bet. EPR Properties owns theme-park land, ski real estate, and Topgolf-style venues; VICI owns casino real estate, championship golf courses, and the dirt under dozens of bowling centers. You buy the lease and the rent stream, not the operating cycle.

Most of 713 is private. Private equity and infrastructure capital are dominant owners across all three groups — Herschend and Merlin/Legoland in parks; Fertitta and Apollo-operated properties in casinos; KSL/Invited (golf), Blackstone/Safe Harbor (marinas), Alterra/Boyne (skiing), Equinox/Crunch (fitness) in recreation — alongside sovereign tribes, nonprofits, and tens of thousands of independents. The most common "investment" in the whole subsector is not a stock; it is owning and operating a single venue, a franchise unit, or the real estate beneath one. Tickers, multiples, and yields belong to the individual names and the child primers.

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5. How the money works

Despite the surface variety, 713 runs on one financial template with three revenue engines bolted onto it — and it is not the language of regulated utilities (rate base), pipelines, or mining (all-in sustaining cost).

The three engines:

• Amusement (7131): Revenue ≈ attendance × per-guest spend ("per-caps"), plus arcade game credits at near-zero marginal cost. Season passes convert one-time visitors into repeat guests and show up as deferred revenue (cash collected now, recognized as guests visit) — a leading indicator of the season ahead.
• Gambling (7132): GGR = handle × hold — the "handle" is total dollars wagered, "hold" the small statistical share the house keeps — earned reliably across huge volumes rather than on any single bet. The biggest non-negotiable cost is the state gaming tax, which ranges from single digits in Nevada to 35–50%+ elsewhere.
• Recreation (7139): sell perishable capacity, then layer high-margin extras. The anchor is time or space — rounds, skier visits, slips, memberships, lane-hours — an unsold unit lost forever; the profit sits in food and beverage, retail, lessons, rentals, and events.

What they share is more important than what differs:

• High fixed costs and extreme operating leverage. Land, buildings, rides, machines, lifts, docks, and base staff are largely fixed, so the incremental guest / bet / member is near-all-margin when the venue is full — and a soft season, a snow drought, or a shutdown drops straight to the bottom line.
• High-margin extras carry the economics. Food, drink, retail, and events routinely out-earn the anchor product across all three groups.
• The real estate is a separable second asset. A park's land, a casino floor, a golf course, or a bowling box can be owned, leased, or sold-and-leased-back independently of the operating business — which is exactly why REITs (VICI, EPR, GLPI) and infrastructure funds are in the picture, often via a "PropCo/OpCo" split that converts owned property into fixed rent.
• An asset-light layer earns the fattest margins. Managers and franchisors (Troon in golf, Planet Fitness, the game-supplier layer in gambling) run venues on other people's capital and capture royalties and fees at margins far above the operating unit.

Because the anchor product differs, so do the key metrics — attendance and per-caps (parks), GGR/win-per-unit and hold (gambling), utilization/membership retention/revenue-per-slip (recreation). There is no single KPI for 713; underwrite each group on its own dashboard.

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6. Demand drivers

Every part of 713 sells discretionary, cyclical, experience-economy spending, and all three groups benefit from the consumer's structural shift from goods toward things they can do. Beyond that common floor, the demand clocks diverge — which is precisely why the subsector is more resilient than any one child:

• Amusement tracks the consumer cycle and novelty. A trip or a night out is a pure want; growth comes from new coasters and "lands," season-pass repeat visitation, and the widening adult "eatertainment" audience on the arcade side.
• Gambling runs on two different clocks. The casino floor rises and falls with employment, wages, and confidence, while the neighborhood layer grows by policy — each state that authorizes machines or new formats opens a greenfield market. Both face the same swing factor: whether the migration of play online (legal sports betting in 35+ states, iGaming in a handful) complements or cannibalizes the physical floor.
• Recreation is a spread of sub-stories. Golf is at a generational high (a record ~545 million rounds in 2024) with flat course supply [11]; fitness is near record membership (~1 in 4 Americans), with GLP-1 weight-loss drugs a net tailwind so far; marinas are supply-constrained by finite waterfront; skiing is weather-whipsawed and climate-threatened (U.S. visits swung from 61.5M to 52.6M year over year) [12]; bowling is a managed secular decline.

Common threads across all three: demand skews affluent, is local (a national headline does not rescue a weak local market), is sharply seasonal and weather-exposed for the outdoor pieces, and competes permanently with at-home substitutes — streaming, consoles, mobile games, and home fitness.

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7. Regulation

713 has no single federal regulator; instead each group sits under a different regime, and the contrast is stark.

• Gambling (7132) is the most heavily regulated consumer activity in the country. It is licensed state by state (Nevada is the model; licenses are scarce, expensive, revocable — and the main barrier to entry and competitive moat), with tribal gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) of 1988, overseen by the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), and federal anti-money-laundering (AML) rules enforced by FinCEN (the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network). Live fronts include state crackdowns on "sweepstakes" and skill machines.
• Amusement (7131) is a safety-and-liability patchwork. There is no federal safety regulator for permanent parks — the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) covers mobile carnival rides but, since a 1981 amendment, not fixed-site parks (the "roller-coaster loophole") — so oversight falls to ~44 state inspection programs, often adopting ASTM International consensus standards by reference. On the arcade side the recurring question is where an amusement game stops and illegal gambling begins.
• Recreation (7139) is an environmental, land-tenure, and franchise patchwork. Golf and marinas face water, wetlands, and stormwater rules; most Western ski resorts operate on U.S. Forest Service land under permits; fitness carries the heaviest business-regulation load (the Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rule, state health-club and auto-renewal statutes); and member-owned clubs use tax-exempt structures.

Overlapping all three: workplace safety (OSHA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), food-and-liquor codes, seasonal/H-2B labor law, and children's-privacy rules (COPPA) for loyalty apps. The through-line is that regulation here raises operating cost modestly but — crucially — protects incumbents by making new supply hard to build, whether the scarce resource is a gaming license, a coastal permit, or a Forest Service lease.

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8. Consolidation

Private-equity and infrastructure roll-up is the common engine across all three groups — but they start from very different concentration levels, so consolidation means something different in each:

• Amusement was already an oligopoly and got tighter. Cedar Fair and Six Flags merged in July 2024 into a ~42-park operator [9]; Herschend and Blackstone-backed Merlin/Legoland are large private challengers; on the arcade side Dave & Buster's bought Main Event and PE keeps buying chains.
• Gambling consolidates at the operator layer while REITs buy the buildings. A handful of scaled casino operators keep acquiring (Fertitta Entertainment's ~$17.6 billion agreement to acquire Caesars, announced 2026, is the live example [10]), the landlord REITs keep buying casino real estate via sale-leaseback, and the neighborhood layer is a two-player route roll-up (Accel and Oaktree-backed J&J Ventures).
• Recreation is ultra-fragmented and being professionalized segment by segment — KSL/Invited (golf), Blackstone/Safe Harbor (marinas), Lucky Strike (bowling), the youth-sports aggregators (all other) — with asset-light management and franchising outrunning ownership consolidation (Troon manages 900+ courses without owning the dirt).

The subsector's headline concentration hides all of this. The 713 HHI of 39.3 and CR4 of 9.3% (§3) reflect the fact that the leaders are group-specific and never overlap — not that the underlying markets are competitive. Look inside each group and you find a park oligopoly, a set of scarce local casino licenses, and a fistful of segment champions rolling up thousands of independents. The runway that remains is longest in the fragmented recreation and arcade tails, where the roll-up is far from finished.

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9. Risks

The three children's risks rhyme, so the subsector's risks are best read as a shared core plus group-specific spikes:

• Cyclicality (shared). Everything in 713 sells discretionary spending; none of it is defensive like a utility. Recurring-revenue models (season passes, memberships, dues, slip contracts) cushion but do not repeal the cycle.
• Operating and financial leverage (shared). High fixed costs magnify downturns, and many operators carry debt and — after sale-leasebacks — fixed rent to service through soft periods. Recent proof points span all three: Six Flags posted a large 2025 net loss on a merger-related goodwill impairment; casino operators run levered balance sheets under REIT rent; Lucky Strike posts net losses despite healthy operating cash flow.
• Capital intensity and deferred maintenance (shared). Coaster capex, slot-floor refresh, arcade-game obsolescence, greens and lifts and docks — lumpy, ownable-but-expensive assets whose deferred upkeep is a hidden liability in any acquisition.
• Weather and climate (group-specific). Acute for outdoor parks, skiing, marinas, and golf — skiing faces a one-directional climate headwind, coastal marinas rising storm and insurance costs — milder or even offsetting for indoor arcades and gyms.
• Regulatory and tax (group-specific). Gaming-tax hikes and compact risk for gambling; safety-and-liability tail risk for rides and alcohol; environmental, franchise, and antitrust exposure in recreation (a private monopolization suit already targets Lucky Strike).
• Digital substitution (shared, sharper in two groups). Streaming and console/mobile play at home pressure parks and arcades; legalized iGaming and mobile sportsbooks can cannibalize physical casino floors and machines; at-home fitness competes with gyms.
• Seasonal, low-wage labor (shared). A part-time, tipped, seasonal workforce (the ~$28,500 average pay reflects it) exposes operators to minimum-wage moves and seasonal availability.
• Measurement and disclosure (shared). Federal statistics undercount government, nonprofit, sovereign-tribal, and nonemployer activity, and private assets carry thin disclosure — quote the $162.5B as the private-employer core, not the whole of American leisure (§3).

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10. How to invest & outlook

Match the vehicle to the group — they are three different markets.

• Gambling (7132) offers the deepest listed exposure: leveraged, cyclical casino-operator equities (watch for hotel-heavy names that blend into the casino-hotel code); contractual, dividend-paying casino REITs (VICI, GLPI) at lower operating risk; and one route pure-play (ACEL) plus suppliers. Underwrite the license and market access before the growth story — the license is the moat.
• Amusement (7131) is a parks story on the public side: pure-plays (FUN, PRKS) for attendance-and-per-cap operating leverage, diversified giants (DIS, CMCSA) for best-in-class parks inside a media empire, and EPR for a rent stream. Normalize for seasonality, deferred season-pass revenue, and maintenance capex before leaning on EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) multiples. The arcade side is essentially one small-cap stock (PLAY) plus a large private opportunity.
• Recreation (7139) — the biggest group but the thinnest public menu — is a segment-by-segment choice (MTN for skiing; PLNT/LTH/XPOF for fitness; LUCK for bowling), with golf, marinas, and "all other" reachable only through equipment/retail proxies or the landlord REITs. Nearly all direct ownership is private: buy and operate a venue, back a franchise or management platform, own the real estate, or invest alongside the PE funds rolling up each segment.

Across all three, apply standard equity analysis together — EV/EBITDA (enterprise value to EBITDA), free-cash-flow yield, net leverage including rent, same-store growth, and capital intensity — and remember there is no dedicated U.S. 713 ETF; index exposure comes only diluted inside broad consumer-discretionary and leisure funds. The two cross-segment landlord REITs (EPR, VICI) are the nearest thing to a diversified "713-property" position — you own the dirt and the lease, not the operating cycle.

Outlook — constructive but sharply bifurcated (our judgment, not a reported fact). The long-run case rests on a durable shared tailwind: the consumer's shift toward out-of-home experiences, which lifts all three groups and keeps PE consolidation running. But the weight and the health are unevenly distributed. The healthy giants — fitness at record participation, golf at record rounds, the strongest theme parks and casinos with real pricing power — coexist with genuine problems that no "leisure is growing" narrative fixes: climate-threatened skiing, secularly declining bowling, a soft 2025–26 for arcades and value-conscious consumers, and the open question of whether digital gambling complements or cannibalizes the physical floor. And the structural mismatch runs through everything: the economic mass sits in private participatory recreation, while the deepest listed access sits in gambling. The opportunity in 713 is therefore selective, segment-specific, and asset-and-price-driven — not a single directional bet on "leisure." That is exactly what the contrast at the top of this page implies. Full company-level detail and near-term watch-items are in the child primers (7131, 7132, 7139).

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Sources

Synthesized from the three child primers (NAICS 7131, 7132, 7139) and our ground-truth federal statistics for NAICS 713. Group- and company-level figures and full citation trails live in the child primers referenced below.

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration of Largest Firms, NAICS 713 and its children (receipts $162.52B; firms 73,647; CR4 9.3%, CR8 13.5%, CR20 21.6%, CR50 30.9%; HHI 39.3; child-level receipts and concentration). [Histometrics ground-truth federal statistics] https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
2. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns: 2023, NAICS 713 and its children (establishments 89,540; employment 1,794,693; annual payroll ~$51.22B; Q1 payroll ~$11.97B). [Histometrics ground-truth federal statistics] https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns Methodology and About the 2022 Economic Census (employer-only coverage; government, nonemployer, and most nonprofit establishments excluded; tribal enterprises only partly reflected). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
4. IAAPA (International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions), 2024 North America Economic Impact Study (U.S. attractions direct revenue ~$52.8B). https://iaapa.org/research/2024-iaapa-economic-impact-study-north-america
5. American Gaming Association, Commercial Gaming Revenue Hits $78.7 Billion in 2025. https://www.americangaming.org/
6. National Indian Gaming Commission, NIGC Announces $46.2 Billion in FY 2025 Gross Gaming Revenues (and the IGRA framework). https://www.nigc.gov/
7. Stateline, State lottery ticket sales nearly double to over $100B (2026). https://stateline.org/2026/04/09/state-lottery-ticket-sales-nearly-double-to-over-100b/
8. The Walt Disney Company, Fourth Quarter and Full Year Fiscal 2024 Earnings (Experiences segment revenue $34.2B). https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/press-releases/
9. Six Flags Entertainment Corporation (Cedar Fair–Six Flags merger completed July 1, 2024; ~42-park operator; 2025 net loss and goodwill impairment). SEC filings. https://www.sec.gov/
10. Caesars Entertainment, Caesars Enters Into Agreement to Be Acquired by Fertitta Entertainment (~$17.6B; announced 2026; subject to approvals). https://investor.caesars.com/
11. National Golf Foundation (record ~545 million U.S. rounds played, 2024), via Histometrics primer NAICS 71391. See primer-7139-DRAFT.md.
12. National Ski Areas Association (U.S. skier visits 61.5M in 2024-25 to 52.6M in 2025-26), via Histometrics primer NAICS 71392. See primer-7139-DRAFT.md.
13. Histometrics rollup primers with full source lists: NAICS 7131 (Amusement Parks and Arcades), NAICS 7132 (Gambling Industries), NAICS 7139 (Other Amusement and Recreation Industries). See primer-7131-DRAFT.md, primer-7132-DRAFT.md, primer-7139-DRAFT.md.