Agents and Managers for Artists, Athletes, Entertainers, and Other Public Figures (U.S., NAICS 711410)

1. Overview

This is the representation business: the agents and managers who negotiate contracts, book work, chase endorsements, and steer the careers of actors, musicians, professional athletes, authors, models, influencers, and other public figures. It is a relationship-driven, asset-light services industry. By its own reported revenue it is small, but it sits at a chokepoint over very large money — the talent it represents signs the sports contracts, film and streaming deals, tours, and brand endorsements that add up to tens of billions of dollars a year, and the agent typically keeps a slice of each one. [1][2][8]

Why it matters to an investor: representation is a high-margin "people business" with strong operating leverage — a signed star's earnings can grow for years while the cost of representing them barely moves — and the top tier is being rolled up by private equity into diversified sports-and-entertainment platforms. The central question is not factory capacity or inventory; it is whether a firm can retain its valuable clients and its best agents, grow client billings, add services, and collect its commissions reliably. [8][9]

Public versus private ways in: the dominant agencies are all private, and most are private-equity-owned. The one meaningful listed near-pure-play is Wilhelmina International (OTCQX: WHLM), a micro-cap model and talent management firm. Broader public exposure is indirect, through adjacent sports and live-entertainment companies such as TKO Group Holdings (NYSE: TKO) and Live Nation Entertainment (NYSE: LYV), or through the institutional investors that back the big agencies. Direct ownership of the marquee agencies themselves is a private-markets game. [9][10][11]

2. What it is and how it is structured

Scope. NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) code 711410 covers establishments that represent and/or manage creative and performing artists, athletes, entertainers, and other public figures — negotiating contracts, managing clients' business and financial affairs, and promoting their careers. Illustrative examples: celebrity, sports, literary, talent, and modeling agents and managers. [4]

Two distinct roles live under this one code:

• Agents procure and negotiate employment. In performing-arts states they are licensed (see Regulation), and if they represent union members they are "franchised" by the performers' union — which caps their commission, historically at 10%. [6]
• Managers (personal and business managers) advise and guide careers but, in principle, do not procure work. They are largely unlicensed and charge more — commonly 10%–30% of a client's gross earnings — governed by their contracts rather than the agent-franchise rules. [6][7]

The firm landscape. A barbell. At the top, a handful of private, multi-vertical mega-agencies — WME Group (William Morris Endeavor), Creative Artists Agency (CAA), United Talent Agency (UTA), and Wasserman — that combine representation with brand partnerships, sports marketing, publishing, licensing, content, and live events. In the middle and long tail, thousands of specialized boutiques (sports, music, literary, modeling, creator, executive) and solo agents or managers built around individual relationships.

What NAICS 711410 EXCLUDES (adjacent codes). The code covers the representation activity only, not the events or productions the talent works in:

• Independent (freelance) artists, writers, and performers working on their own account → 711510 (Independent Artists, Writers, and Performers). [4]
• Promoting or presenting live events (concerts, sports events) → 711310 / 711320 (Promoters of Performing Arts and Sports Events).
• Owning sports teams, or operating as athletes/entertainers → 711211 / 711212 and related codes.
• Providing services to models such as registries → 561311 (Employment Placement Agencies); supplying models as temporary staff → 561320 (Temporary Help Services). [4]
• Business managers whose work is primarily accounting/bookkeeping → 541219 (Other Accounting Services).

This boundary matters: when the big agencies expanded into owning leagues, media rights, and live events (for example the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) and World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE), now inside TKO), that revenue is reported under those other codes, not 711410. [9]

3. How big it is

Federal figures for 711410 (our ground-truth data):

That works out to roughly $2.3 million of receipts per firm, about 5 employees per establishment, and about $156,000 of annual payroll per employee — high pay per head, consistent with a commission-driven professional-services business. Reported 2023 payroll is roughly a third of 2022 reported commission revenue (a rough cross-year comparison across slightly different universes), leaving room for the outsized bonuses and profit that define the field. These are broad averages, not medians, margins, or productivity measures. [1][2]

The HHI of 289.9 is strikingly low — well under the ~1,000 mark that U.S. antitrust regulators treat as "unconcentrated." On paper this looks like a fragmented national market, and by firm count it is. Two cautions, though. First, these concentration figures cover the entire federal category — thousands of specialized and small firms — and should not be read as the market shares of the four best-known Hollywood agencies. Second, the statistic understates real market power: the top agencies dominate the high-value clients (film stars, first-round draft picks) even though the long tail splits the rest, and the industry's leverage comes from the downstream contracts it controls, not the commissions on its own books. [2]

The undercount caveat (important here). Three things make the federal numbers a floor, not a full picture:

1. Only commission revenue is counted. The $10.81 billion is what agents and managers keep, not what they move. Forbes estimates the top ten North American sports agencies alone earn up to ~$4.6 billion of commissions on more than $72 billion of active playing and endorsement contracts — and that is sports only, before film, music, publishing, modeling, and creators. [8]
2. Employer businesses only. County Business Patterns (CBP) counts establishments with paid employees; the Economic Census size data cover payroll firms. The large population of solo, no-employee agents and managers (nonemployer sole proprietors) sits outside these figures or is measured separately, and our data include no separate nonemployer count — so treat the totals as understating operator numbers. [1][5]
3. Managers and in-house work slip the net. Personal managers are largely unlicensed and may not classify as 711410; representation done in-house at studios, leagues, labels, or brands is not counted as a separate 711410 establishment; and the mega-agencies' non-representation businesses (owned leagues, live events, media rights) report under other codes. The economic activity organized by this industry is far larger than its own revenue line. [6][9]

Our data do not provide profit, operating margin, commission rates, cash flow, growth, or valuation figures for the category; where those appear below they come from company filings or third-party industry sources, not the federal statistics.

4. Investable universe

Pure-play public exposure is unusually limited. The dominant agencies are private; the listed options are one micro-cap near-pure-play plus adjacent and sponsor proxies.

Public / listed exposure

Private / other owners (the marquee agencies)

Endeavor Group Holdings (formerly NYSE: EDR) was the one large listed window into the agency business until Silver Lake took it private in 2025; its representation arms are now WME Group, while TKO stays public with a different mix of sports and event assets. The takeaway: to own the marquee end of this industry you generally have to be a private-equity fund, a strategic buyer, or a founder — not a public shareholder. [9][14]

5. How the money works

The core model is simple: agencies earn a commission on what their clients earn. A firm signs a client under an exclusive or nonexclusive agreement; it sources, negotiates, or manages employment, endorsements, sponsorships, appearances, publishing, licensing, and other opportunities; and it collects a commission or service fee when the client is paid. Wilhelmina's filings illustrate it plainly: clients pay for bookings, the agency deducts talent amounts and its commission, and service revenue is reported net of certain pass-through costs. [12] Economics then turn on four levers.

1. Commission rates (capped or negotiated).

• Union-franchised talent agents: generally 10% of covered earnings, with no upfront representation fees. [6]
• Personal and business managers: 10%–30%, unregulated — the higher take reflects broader career management. [6][7]
• Sports agents are capped by each players' union: roughly 3% in the NFL, 4% in the NBA and NHL, 5% in MLB, and about 10% in European soccer where there is no cap. (NFL = National Football League; NBA = National Basketball Association; NHL = National Hockey League; MLB = Major League Baseball.) Forbes uses these caps to estimate agencies' "maximum commissions." [8]

2. Operating leverage on a book of business. The client roster is the asset. Once a client is signed, incremental earnings (a bigger contract, a new endorsement, a hit film) generate commission at almost no added cost. Costs are overwhelmingly people, so a strong roster throws off high margins — but revenue is unusually portable, because the "asset" walks out the door every night. [1]

3. Beyond commissions. The value-creation story of the last decade has been agencies moving up the stack — taking equity in productions ("packaging"), owning content, live events, media rights, and even leagues (Endeavor's UFC/WWE). That is where private equity saw the upside and where the real margin expansion happened, much of it now booked under other NAICS codes. Note that the 2019–2021 fight between the agencies and the Writers Guild of America (WGA) ended packaging fees and forced divestiture of agency-affiliated production, pushing the model back toward commissions plus owned businesses. [9]

4. The metrics that matter. Investors and buyers track: gross client billings versus reported (net) agency revenue; the commission or "take" rate; aggregate contract value under management (CAA cites ~$15.9B of team-sport playing contracts plus ~$4.6B of non-playing/endorsement contracts); revenue per agent and per client; client and agent retention and churn; receivables aging and cash conversion; compensation as a share of net revenue; and diversification across commissions, advisory, brand marketing, events, licensing, and owned intellectual property so a single strike or down cycle doesn't sink revenue. The central fragility: star agents can defect and take clients with them, so key-person risk and roster retention quietly drive value. [8][12]

6. Demand drivers

Demand for representation rises with the size and complexity of the talent economy:

• A bigger, richer content market. Streaming-era content spending, an expanding live-events and touring business, and relentless sports media-rights inflation all enlarge the contracts agents commission. [8][10]
• More ways to monetize a client. Streaming, social media, podcasts, books, licensing, endorsements, touring, and branded content each add negotiable, commissionable income. [12]
• New client pools. Two are transformational. First, college athletes' name, image, and likeness (NIL): legalized in 2021, NIL spending now exceeds ~$1.5 billion a year and is projected toward ~$2.5 billion, and the House v. NCAA settlement lets schools directly share roughly $20 million each with athletes from 2025 — a brand-new market for agent representation. [20] Second, the creator/influencer economy, valued above $250 billion with creator ad spend projected near $43.9 billion in 2026, which has spawned its own talent-management industry. [21]
• Rising complexity and cross-selling. Negotiating across studios, platforms, leagues, brands, and publishers rewards firms that can offer sports, entertainment, music, brand, and licensing services to the same client.
• Women's sports and globalization of soccer, Formula 1, and international content widen the roster of commissionable clients. [8][20]

Editor's judgment: the fragmentation of audiences and distribution channels is a long-term tailwind for high-quality representation; the counterweight is cyclicality in advertising, film and television production, touring, and sports calendars.

7. Regulation

Federal oversight is light; the real weight is state licensing plus union self-regulation, with antitrust and AI as the live frontiers.

Entertainment.

• State talent-agency licensing. California is the pivotal regime: under the Talent Agencies Act, anyone who procures or attempts to procure employment for artists generally needs a license from the state Labor Commissioner — a line that repeatedly lands managers in disputes for "acting as an agent." New York similarly licenses covered employment agencies, with fines, suspension, or revocation for violations. [22][23]
• Union franchise agreements. The Screen Actors Guild–American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG-AFTRA), the WGA, and the Directors Guild of America (DGA) franchise agents, imposing the ~10% commission cap, a ban on upfront fees, and conflict-of-interest rules. The WGA's 2019–2021 campaign produced a Code of Conduct barring packaging fees and agency-owned production affiliates. [6][9]

Sports.

• Federal SPARTA (Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 2004) bars agents from making false statements or giving inducements to student-athletes and requires prompt notice to the athlete's school. In January 2026 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) opened its first-ever SPARTA enforcement inquiry, sending letters to 20 Division I universities — using a pre-NIL law to police the NIL marketplace. [24]
• State athlete-agent laws. Most states have adopted the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (registration, disclosure, athlete cancellation rights); California's Miller-Ayala Act adds a $100,000 surety bond and a 90-day athlete cancellation window. [24]
• Players'-union certification. The NFL, NBA, and MLB players' associations (NFLPA, NBPA, MLBPA) certify agents and set the fee caps noted above.

Antitrust and AI.

• Merger review. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and FTC merger guidelines matter as the industry consolidates; the 2023 guidelines explicitly consider whether a merger reduces competition for workers, creators, and suppliers, not just consumers. [25]
• Digital replicas. Artificial intelligence (AI) is a fast-moving rights issue: SAG-AFTRA agreements now require consent and compensation for many uses of a performer's digital replica, and California's AB 1836 restricts unauthorized digital replicas of deceased personalities. [26][27]

Net effect: a patchwork of state licenses and union rules rather than a single federal regulator — with NIL, antitrust, and AI likeness rights as the areas most in flux.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The story of the last decade is consolidation and institutional capital, playing out at three levels: elite agencies competing for marquee clients and senior "rainmaker" agents; specialist boutiques competing on personal attention and sector expertise; and digital-first firms competing for creators and emerging talent. Entry is relatively easy for a respected agent with relationships; scaling is hard, because a larger firm must preserve trust, manage conflicts, recruit rainmakers, and hold service quality.

• The "Big Three." After CAA acquired ICM Partners in 2022, the historic "Big Four" became three — WME, CAA, and UTA — which command an outsized share of top talent even as hundreds of boutiques persist. In one analysis of top film actors who list their agency, four firms held roughly 56% of the market. [28][29]
• Private equity took the top. Silver Lake took Endeavor (WME Group) private in 2025; Artémis (the Pinault family) bought majority control of CAA in 2023 from TPG; Goldman Sachs Alternatives backed Excel; EQT partnered with UTA; Providence Equity backs Wasserman, whose founder has launched a sale. Representation has become an institutional asset class. [9][13][15][16][19]
• Vertical integration. The leaders pushed beyond commissions into owning content, live events, media rights, and leagues (UFC/WWE via TKO), building diversified platforms rather than pure agencies. [9]
• The next roll-up: creators. The same playbook is running on the creator economy — boutique influencer agencies folded into "scaled media ecosystems," and advertising holding companies buying influencer platforms for first-party data. Creator-economy M&A hit record volume in 2025 and accelerated into 2026. [21]

The federal concentration figures square with this: scale exists at the top, but the low HHI and the large firm count confirm boutiques remain important. [2]

9. Risks

• Key-person and roster flight. Agents can leave and take clients; a rainmaker's defection can move real value overnight. This is the defining structural risk of the model.
• Client concentration and talent risk. Dependence on a few mega-clients, plus the career, injury, or reputational risk of individual stars.
• Cyclicality and labor stoppages. Advertising and discretionary entertainment spending are cyclical, and work stoppages hit commissions directly — the 2023 WGA and SAG-AFTRA strikes froze large swaths of Hollywood income for months. [9]
• Conflicts of interest. Representing competing clients, or combining representation with production, ownership, or brand businesses, invites disputes and regulatory scrutiny.
• Regulatory pressure. Union franchise fights, NIL and athlete-agent enforcement (the FTC's 2026 SPARTA inquiry), state licensing and trust-account disputes, and AI likeness rules can all reshape economics. [9][24][26]
• Leverage and opacity. PE-backed platforms can carry significant acquisition debt (the Endeavor/WME structure was built on it), and private-company financials are limited — diligence is harder and comparisons less precise. [9]
• Disintermediation (forward-looking). Direct-to-fan platforms, league revenue-sharing that routes money around agents, and AI-generated or AI-negotiated content could pressure the commission model over time.
• Federal undercounting of solo and nonemployer operators makes market-size comparisons imprecise. [1][5]

10. How to invest and outlook

Public routes (all indirect or micro-cap).

• Wilhelmina International (OTCQX: WHLM) — the closest direct listed comparable, but examine liquidity, client concentration, net-versus-gross revenue presentation, and its dependence on fashion and influencer bookings before treating it as a proxy for the whole industry.
• TKO Group Holdings (NYSE: TKO) — the largest listed company wired to a top agency (sister to WME under former Endeavor), though its value is UFC/WWE/IMG sports and live events, not agency commissions. [9][10]
• Live Nation Entertainment (NYSE: LYV) — adjacent live-entertainment exposure with artist-management ties. [10]
• Sponsor proxies — EQT AB (UTA) and Goldman Sachs (Excel) offer indirect exposure through diversified institutions; advertising holding companies offer exposure to the creator-agency roll-up. [15][16][21]
• Or invest in the downstream beneficiaries — streamers, sports leagues and rights holders, and endorsement-heavy consumer brands — that the agencies feed.

Private routes (where the marquee agencies actually are).

• Private-equity and family-office vehicles: Silver Lake (WME Group), Artémis (CAA), EQT (UTA), Goldman Sachs (Excel), Providence (Wasserman), and the funds circling the creator roll-ups. [9][13][15][16][19]
• Direct stakes in boutiques or creator-management firms, or in sports-rights and franchise funds that sit alongside the agencies.

Diligence questions that matter most in a private deal: What share of revenue comes from the top clients and agents? Are client contracts exclusive, renewable, and transferable? How much revenue is recurring or repeatable? Are reported revenues net of talent payments? How fast are commissions collected? How much growth is organic versus acquisition-driven? Are there unresolved licensing, labor, conflict, or reputational issues? Can the firm add services without creating conflicts?

Outlook (forward-looking). Constructive but selective. Near-term drivers point up: sports media-rights inflation, streaming content demand, the fast-growing NIL and creator markets, and the surge in women's sports all expand the pool of commissionable earnings, while private capital keeps consolidating the field into diversified platforms. [8][20][21] The offsets are real — strike risk, roster and key-person volatility, leverage on PE balance sheets, and regulatory attention to sports agents and AI likeness rights. [9][24][26] The best businesses should be those with diversified rosters, durable client relationships, strong agent retention, disciplined conflicts policies, and multiple monetization channels. Investors should not underwrite this industry from federal receipts alone — the data omit much of the smallest-operator universe, and private-company disclosure is thin. The likeliest path: continued concentration at the top, continued acquisition of the creator tier, and continued private ownership — meaning public investors will keep getting this industry mostly at one remove, through the sports, live-events, and advertising companies attached to it.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 711410 (establishments, employment, annual and Q1 payroll), 2025. https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2023/econ/cbp/2023-cbp.html
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Establishment and Firm Size / Concentration of Largest Firms, NAICS 711410 (receipts, firms, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI), 2022. https://api.census.gov/data/2022/ecnsize/groups/EC2200SIZECONCEN.html
3. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 711410, $17.5M), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
4. U.S. Census Bureau / NAICS, 2022 NAICS Definition — 711410 Agents and Managers for Artists, Athletes, Entertainers, and Other Public Figures (scope and cross-references), 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=711410&year=2022
5. U.S. Census Bureau, Nonemployer Statistics by Demographics: 2023 (context for nonemployer / solo operators), 2025. https://data.census.gov/table/ABSNESD2023.AB00MYNESD01D?q=711410
6. SAG-AFTRA, Agents & Managers — Frequently Asked Questions (10% franchised-agent commission cap; no upfront fees; agents vs. managers), 2026. https://www.sagaftra.org/contracts-industry-resources/agents-managers/frequently-asked-questions
7. Matador Talent, Talent Agent Commission Rates Explained — 2025 Guide (manager 10%–30% ranges), 2025. https://www.matadortalent.com/resources/agent-commission-guide
8. Brett Knight, The Most Valuable Sports Agencies 2025, Forbes, 2025 (CAA ~$1.14B, Wasserman ~$956M, Excel ~$783M commissions; top-10 ~$4.6B on ~$72B contracts; league fee caps). https://www.forbes.com/sites/brettknight/2025/07/31/the-most-valuable-sports-agencies-2025/
9. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 8-K: Silver Lake and Affiliates Complete Acquisition of Endeavor Group Holdings (take-private; representation reorganized as WME Group), 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1973266/000119312525060949/d928498d8k.htm
10. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, TKO Group Holdings, Inc. Form 10-K (UFC/WWE/IMG; media rights, events, licensing; ~$4.7B revenue), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1973266/000119312526071651/tko-20251231.htm
11. CompaniesMarketCap, TKO Group Holdings (NYSE: TKO) market capitalization (~$38.9B); Live Nation Entertainment overview, 2026. https://companiesmarketcap.com/tko-group/marketcap/
12. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Wilhelmina International, Inc. Form 10-K for 2024 (commission and service revenue; talent pass-through model), 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1013706/000168316825001932/wilhelmina_i10k-123124.htm
13. TPG / Pollstar, Creative Artists Agency and Artémis Announce Artémis (Pinault family) as New Majority Shareholder; ~$7B valuation (TPG prior owner), 2023. https://www.tpg.com/news-and-insights/creative-artists-agency-and-artemis-pinault-familys-investment
14. Silver Lake, Endeavor Announces Completion of Acquisition by Silver Lake (~$13B equity / ~$25B incl. TKO; $27.50/share), 2025. https://www.silverlake.com/endeavor-announces-completion-of-acquisition-by-silver-lake/
15. EQT, United Talent Agency and EQT Private Equity Announce Strategic Partnership, 2022. https://eqtgroup.com/news/united-talent-agency-and-eqt-private-equity-announce-strategic-partnership
16. Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Excel Sports Management Partners with Goldman Sachs to Fuel Global Growth (strategic investment; prior Shamrock Capital backing), 2025. https://am.gs.com/en-it/institutions/news/press-release/2025/excel
17. Pollstar, What the $7B Acquisition of CAA Means for the Live Industry, 2023. https://news.pollstar.com/2023/09/08/what-artemis-7b-caa-acquisition-means-for-the-live-industry/
18. The Big Lead / Billboard, Forbes' Most Valuable Sports Agencies 2025; Klutch (~$7B+ deals) and Roc Nation figures, 2025. https://www.thebiglead.com/forbes-most-valuable-sports-agencies-2025-ranking-release/
19. TheWrap, Wasserman to Be Renamed After Founder Casey Wasserman Launches Sale of His Stake (Providence Equity backing), 2026. https://www.thewrap.com/industry-news/business/wasserman-agency-renamed-after-founder-casey-sale/
20. Business of College Sports / Opendorse, State of NIL 2025 and House v. NCAA Settlement (NIL >$1.5B toward ~$2.5B; ~$20M per-school revenue sharing from 2025). https://businessofcollegesports.com/other/student-athlete-sponsorships-in-2025-nil-trends-to-watch/
21. RockWater, 2026 Creator M&A Outlook; The Great Consolidation: Creator Economy M&A (creator economy >$250B; ad spend ~$43.9B in 2026; record 2025 deal volume), 2026. https://wearerockwater.com/2026-creator-ma-outlook/
22. California Department of Industrial Relations, How to Obtain a Talent Agency License (Talent Agencies Act; Labor Commissioner), 2026. https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/talent_agency_license.html
23. New York State Department of Labor, Employment Agencies (licensing; penalties), 2026. https://dol.ny.gov/employment-agencies
24. Winston & Strawn, Sports Agents Under a Microscope: FTC Signals SPARTA Enforcement; Miller-Ayala Act; Uniform Athlete Agents Act (FTC's first SPARTA inquiry, January 2026). https://www.winston.com/en/insights-news/sports-agents-under-a-microscope-the-ftc-signals-potential-enforcement-of-long-dormant-sports-agent-law
25. U.S. Department of Justice / Federal Trade Commission, 2023 Merger Guidelines — Guideline 10 (competition for workers and other sellers), 2023. https://www.justice.gov/atr/merger-guidelines/applying-merger-guidelines/guideline-10
26. SAG-AFTRA, Artificial Intelligence Resources (consent and compensation for digital replicas), 2026. https://www.sagaftra.org/contracts-industry-resources/member-resources/artificial-intelligence
27. California Legislature, AB-1836: Use of Likeness — Digital Replica of Deceased Personalities, 2024. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240AB1836
28. Stephen Follows, How Concentrated Is Agency Power Among Top Movie Actors? (four firms ~56%), 2025. https://stephenfollows.com/p/how-concentrated-is-agency-power-among-top-movie-actors
29. IndieWire, CAA-ICM Merger: How WME and UTA Compare With Supersized CAA (2022 consolidation to the Big Three), 2022. https://www.indiewire.com/features/general/caa-icm-merger-1234738168/