Limited-Service Restaurants (United States)

NAICS 2022 code 722513 — the fast-food, fast-casual, and counter-service end of the U.S. restaurant business. NAICS is the North American Industry Classification System, the standard the federal government uses to sort businesses by their primary activity. This primer is for a general investing audience and covers both public-market and private ways to participate in the industry.

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1. Overview

A limited-service restaurant is one where the customer generally orders and pays before eating — at a counter, a drive-thru window, a kiosk, or on an app — rather than being served at a table and paying afterward. Food can be eaten on-site, taken out, or delivered.[1] Think McDonald's, Taco Bell, Chipotle, Domino's, Wingstop, and the local burrito or sandwich counter. The category spans burger, chicken, pizza, sandwich, Mexican, and fast-casual "bowl" concepts.

It is one of the largest consumer industries in the country: roughly $358.9 billion in annual receipts across about 270,000 employer locations, employing nearly 5 million people.[2][3] It is also unusually accessible to investors for a service industry, because most of the big names are franchised chains — a structure that produces both publicly traded brand owners and a deep bench of private, family-owned, and private-equity-owned operators.

The industry is large, fragmented, labor-intensive, and driven by recurring, everyday demand. But returns depend less on broad industry growth than on execution: traffic, pricing, labor productivity, food costs, rent, site location, and brand strength. It is fiercely competitive, thin-margin at the individual store, and exposed to two costs that rarely fall — labor and food.

Two ways in. Public investors can buy the franchisor holding companies (McDonald's, Yum! Brands, Restaurant Brands International, Domino's, Wingstop) or the company-operated growth chains (Chipotle, CAVA, Shake Shack). Private investors show up in force — as franchisees who own the actual restaurants, as founders of independent concepts, and through private-equity firms (Roark Capital, JAB Holding, Blackstone) that own some of the biggest brands outright. Several marquee names — Chick-fil-A, In-N-Out, Raising Cane's — cannot be bought on any exchange.

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2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. NAICS 722513 covers establishments that primarily serve food where the customer orders and pays first. It includes fast-food restaurants, fast-casual restaurants, limited-service family restaurants, takeout restaurants, sandwich and deli shops, and limited-service pizza restaurants — whether dine-in, takeout, drive-thru, or delivery.[1]

Adjacent categories excluded from 722513 (this matters for sizing the industry and picking investments):

• 722511 Full-Service Restaurants — sit-down places where you are served and pay after eating (Olive Garden, Applebee's, independents).[1]
• 722514 Cafeterias, Grill Buffets, and Buffets.[1]
• 722515 Snack and Nonalcoholic Beverage Bars — coffee shops, doughnut, ice-cream, juice, and smoothie bars.[1] This is a critical caveat: Starbucks and Dunkin' are largely classified in 722515, not 722513, because they primarily sell beverages and snacks. So the federal 722513 receipts figure below does not include the coffee-and-doughnut giants, even though the trade press routinely lumps them into "fast food."
• 722410 Drinking Places (bars); 722310 / 722320 / 722330 food-service contractors, caterers, and mobile food services; and 492210 independent delivery services.[1]

Ownership is layered:

• Independent local restaurants.
• Company-owned chain restaurants (the brand owner runs the store).
• Franchisee-owned restaurants operating under a franchisor's brand, menu, technology, supply chain, and operating standards.

The defining feature is franchising. A franchisor owns the brand, recipes, and system; independent franchisees pay for the right to operate a location and follow the brand's standards. The franchisee generally funds store-level labor, equipment, working capital, and operating risk, while the franchisor earns royalties, fees, rent, advertising contributions, or supply-chain revenue.[9][11][13][14] McDonald's, for example, franchised about 95% of its restaurants at the end of 2024 — the parent mostly collects rent and royalties rather than flipping burgers itself.[9] A minority of chains (Chipotle, Raising Cane's, In-N-Out) run their stores company-operated instead. The result is a two-layer industry: a small number of powerful brand owners sitting on top of a vast, fragmented base of operators. The federal statistics do not provide a national percentage split among independent, company-owned, and franchised stores.

The U.S. Small Business Administration's (SBA) size standard for NAICS 722513 is $13.5 million in average annual receipts — the threshold below which a firm counts as a "small business" for certain federal programs (affiliates may count toward eligibility). It is an eligibility rule, not a measure of industry size or quality, but it is a reminder that most franchisees are, formally, small businesses.[4]

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3. How big it is

Federal ground-truth figures for NAICS 722513:

Read these carefully. They are not a single clean market-size snapshot: receipts and firm counts are from the 2022 Economic Census, while establishment, employment, and payroll figures are from 2023 County Business Patterns.[2][3]

Undercount caveat. County Business Patterns counts only employer establishments, and Economic Census firm data cover firms with payroll, so a tail of one-person, no-employee operations is excluded — this modestly understates the location count, though little of the revenue, since the industry is overwhelmingly chain-heavy and employer-based. Our federal file contains no nonemployer estimate for this industry, so we do not state one.

A second nuance: the Census treats each independent franchisee as a separate firm. That is technically correct but makes the industry look far more fragmented than it behaves competitively (see Section 8).

For scale, the National Restaurant Association projected the entire U.S. restaurant-and-foodservice sector (all types) at about $1.5 trillion in 2025, with "limited-service" broadly defined at roughly $532 billion and total industry employment near 15.9 million.[6] That $532 billion exceeds the Census 722513 line because it is a later year, uses a wider sales concept, and folds in the snack-and-beverage bars (722515) that the strict NAICS code leaves out.[1][6]

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4. The investable universe

Because most large chains are franchised, the public "companies" you buy are usually franchisor holding companies — brand owners that collect royalties and fees — not the individual restaurants. Most also combine U.S. and international operations, multiple brands, and sometimes non-restaurant businesses, so they are best viewed as exposure vehicles, not pure NAICS 722513 proxies. A handful (Chipotle, Shake Shack, CAVA, Sweetgreen, Portillo's) instead own and run their stores directly.

Selected publicly traded companies ("system sales" is total sales across all restaurants, franchised and company-owned; figures are recent company disclosures):

Major private and PE owners (often bigger than the public mid-caps):

* Dunkin' and Baskin-Robbins are mostly classified as beverage/snack bars (722515), not 722513.

Bottom line: there are plenty of public plays, but some of the strongest brands in the category (Chick-fil-A, In-N-Out, Raising Cane's) are held tightly by founders and families and are not available on any exchange.

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5. How the money works

There are two different business models under this one NAICS code, and they earn money in different ways.

A) The franchisor (brand owner) — the capital-light, high-margin engine that public markets prize. Its revenue is mostly:

• Royalties — a percentage of each franchisee's sales (for most U.S. McDonald's operators, historically ~4%, rising to ~5% for new restaurants).[10]
• Rent — McDonald's owns much of the real estate under its restaurants and collects rent in addition to royalties, making rent a significant revenue line.[9]
• Initial franchise fees, advertising contributions, and sometimes supply-chain revenue.

Because the franchisor does not pay store-level labor or food costs, its margins are high and its cash flows are steady — they rise and fall with franchisee sales, not franchisee profits.[9] This is why McDonald's, Yum!, RBI, Domino's, and Wingstop are prized as "royalty" businesses.

B) The restaurant operator (franchisee or company store) — where the food actually gets made, and where margins are thin. The operator lives and dies by unit economics, the profit-and-loss of a single restaurant:

• AUV (average unit volume) — annual sales per restaurant. Higher is better; Chick-fil-A (~$7.5M) and Raising Cane's (~$6.6M) are best-in-class, versus a fast-food average well under $3M — Wingstop, for example, reported 2024 domestic AUV of about $2.1 million.[5][14][24]
• Same-store sales ("comps") — sales growth at locations open at least a year, split into traffic (guest count) and check (average spend). This is the single most-watched metric, because it strips out the effect of simply building more stores.
• The two big costs: food and packaging (often ~28–33% of sales) and labor (Chipotle, a company-operated chain, reported labor at 24.7% of revenue in 2024).[15] What is left after occupancy and overhead is a store-level margin typically in the mid-single to low-double digits. A few points of food or wage inflation can wipe out a franchisee's profit.

Operators also watch initial investment, payback period, and cash-on-cash return. Wingstop, for instance, cited an average initial investment of roughly $535,000 (excluding real estate and pre-opening costs) and a company target of more than 70% unlevered cash-on-cash return in a new restaurant's second year — company targets, not guaranteed outcomes.[14] Note that capacity utilization is not a standard federal metric here; investors instead analyze peak-hour throughput, sales per labor hour, sales per square foot, and drive-thru speed.

The mental model: the brand owner sells shovels (royalties); the operator digs (thin-margin operations). Both sit inside NAICS 722513, but they carry almost opposite risk profiles.

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6. What drives demand

The core drivers are convenience, affordability, short wait times, drive-thru access, delivery, digital ordering, loyalty programs, menu innovation, and population and employment growth.

• Consumer spending power. Sales track employment, wages, and confidence. Fast food is somewhat defensive — when budgets tighten, some diners trade down from sit-down restaurants — but it is not recession-proof, because cash-strapped customers also eat at home more. For context, U.S. food-away-from-home spending (all restaurants and food-service outlets, not just 722513) reached about $1.52 trillion in 2024, equal to roughly 5.5% of disposable income.[7]
• The value equation. The industry's promise is cheap, fast, consistent food. When menu prices climb faster than groceries, customers push back. Food-away-from-home prices were about 3.4% higher year over year in June 2026, continued pressure on both consumers and operators.[8] In 2025, limited-service traffic actually declined even as dollar sales rose — growth came from price, not more visits — which triggered an industry-wide "value war" of $5 meal deals and app-only discounts.[35][36]
• Convenience and digital. Drive-thru, delivery, mobile order-ahead, and loyalty apps are now the battleground. Digital already tops ~60% of system sales at Taco Bell/KFC's parent and ~85% of U.S. Domino's sales.[11][13] Digital lowers labor per order and generates data for personalized offers — but it does not automatically improve margins; Chipotle reported digital sales at 35.1% of food-and-beverage revenue in 2024, and third-party delivery adds fees and complexity.[15]
• Demographics and habits. Smaller households, busy schedules, and younger, mobile-first eaters support takeout and delivery; an aging population and health trends cut the other way.

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7. Regulation

Limited-service restaurants sit at the intersection of franchise law, labor law, and food safety.

• Franchise disclosure. The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Franchise Rule (16 CFR Part 436) requires a franchisor to give a prospective franchisee a Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD) — a standardized packet of 23 numbered items on fees, litigation, and expected costs — at least 14 days before the prospect signs a contract or pays money. The FTC has been tightening scrutiny of franchisor conduct (undisclosed fees, gag clauses).[28]
• Wages. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sets the federal minimum wage at $7.25/hour plus overtime and tip-credit rules; employers must follow any higher state or local standard.[32] The landmark shift is California's AB 1228 ("FAST Act"), which since April 1, 2024 requires a $20/hour minimum for workers at fast-food chains with 60+ U.S. locations, with a state council empowered to raise it annually.[30][31] Early studies point to higher menu prices, some job losses, and faster automation.
• Joint-employer status. A long-running fight over whether a franchisor can be treated as the legal employer of its franchisees' workers (which would raise liability and unionization exposure). A 2023 National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rule that would have broadened this was struck down by a federal court in 2024, leaving the narrower prior standard in place for now — a win for the franchise model, but an issue that keeps returning.[29]
• Food safety and menu labeling. Food safety runs through a patchwork of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial rules; the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Food Code is a model that state and local authorities administer through inspections and permits.[33] Federal menu-labeling rules require chains with 20 or more locations operating under the same name to post calorie counts.[34]
• Other material rules: zoning, building and fire codes, health permits, alcohol licenses, accessibility under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), packaging restrictions, scheduling and paid-leave rules, immigration compliance, and data-security obligations.

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The federal concentration data looks almost comically fragmented. From the 2022 Economic Census:[3]

• Top-4 firms (CR4): 5.7% of receipts.
• Top-8 (CR8): 8.8%.
• Top-20 (CR20): 12.3%.
• Top-50 (CR50): 16.8%.
• Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) — a standard 0–10,000 concentration gauge where anything below 1,500 is considered "unconcentrated": a rock-bottom 13.5.

But this dramatically understates real concentration, for one reason: the Census counts each independent franchisee as a separate firm. There are 166,733 "firms" largely because franchising splits big brands into thousands of small owners.[3] Measured by brand, the picture flips — McDonald's alone is roughly one-seventh of the sector's U.S. sales, and a dozen brand families (McDonald's, the Yum! trio, RBI's brands, Wendy's, Subway, Chipotle, Chick-fil-A) command an outsized share of traffic, advertising, and prime real estate. The honest read: fragmented ownership, concentrated brands — and individual food segments, trade areas, and consumer occasions can be far more concentrated than the national number suggests.

Consolidation is happening at the brand-owner layer, through regional-chain acquisitions, the growth of large multi-unit franchisees, franchisor refranchising, and — above all — private-equity roll-ups. Roark Capital now sits behind Subway (bought for ~$9.6B in 2024), Inspire Brands (Arby's, Sonic, Jimmy John's, Buffalo Wild Wings, Dunkin'), and more; JAB owns Panera; Blackstone took majority control of Jersey Mike's.[19][21][22][25] Scale can lower costs and strengthen brand visibility, but it can also add leverage, integration problems, brand dilution, and store cannibalization. The competitive frontier is now less about opening more stores in a saturated U.S. market and more about optimization — digital, throughput, cost — plus labor-saving automation (kiosks, AI drive-thru ordering) accelerated by rising wages.

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9. Risks

• Traffic / value risk. Price increases can protect revenue but reduce visits; persistent traffic declines force discounting that drags on margins.[35][36]
• Labor cost inflation. Wages are the operator's largest controllable cost and mostly move one way. State mandates like California's $20 floor can spread, and each increase compresses already-thin store margins; shortages, turnover, and union activity add pressure.[30]
• Food and packaging inflation. Commodities, supply disruptions, tariffs, weather, and disease outbreaks raise input costs. Food costs sit well above pre-pandemic levels (roughly a third higher than 2019 by some estimates), forcing price hikes that risk traffic.[37]
• Franchisee distress. When labor and food costs outrun sales, weaker franchisees fall behind on royalties, rent, and remodels — hitting franchisors indirectly and forcing closures.
• Real-estate risk. Rent increases, poor sites, long leases, remodel costs, and shifting traffic patterns can impair individual stores.
• Delivery economics. Third-party apps expand reach but take large commissions, often turning a delivery order into a marginal or money-losing one for the operator.
• Brand and food-safety risk. A single contamination or reputational incident can cut traffic across an entire system.
• Technology and capital-structure risk. Payment, loyalty, ordering, and cybersecurity failures can disrupt operations; debt-funded acquisitions and rich valuations magnify the downside.
• Regulatory swings. Joint-employer reinterpretations, wage councils, and franchise-rule changes can alter the economics of the whole franchise model.[28][29]
• Health / GLP-1 headwind (forward-looking). New weight-loss and appetite-suppressing drugs (GLP-1 medications such as semaglutide) are an emerging, hard-to-size risk to per-person food consumption; the effect is unproven at industry scale but worth watching.

Public-company filings themselves flag food safety, wage inflation, supply constraints, cybersecurity, third-party delivery, competition, and consumer-spending weakness as material risks.[15]

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10. How to invest and the outlook

Public routes. Start by identifying the operating model, because it dictates what matters:

• Franchise-heavy "royalty" compounders — MCD, YUM, QSR, DPZ, WING. Capital-light, high-margin, often dividend-paying exposure to system-sales growth. Analyze royalty growth, franchisee health, net unit development, and leverage. These tend to hold up better in downturns and are the lower-volatility way in.
• Company-operated growth stories — CMG, CAVA, SHAK, SG, PTLO. You own store-level economics directly, so margins swing more with labor and food costs. Analyze traffic, restaurant-level margin, labor productivity, and capital returns. Higher growth, higher volatility, and often rich valuations that compress first when growth cools.
• Delivery / supply-chain-led systems (e.g., Domino's) — analyze order frequency, delivery economics, franchisee dependence, and distribution margins.

For all of them, compare same-store sales split by traffic and price, AUV, closures, net unit growth, remodel spend, cash flow, lease obligations, and debt. Common valuation tools are the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E), enterprise value to EBITDA (EV/EBITDA — earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization), free-cash-flow yield, dividend yield, and net leverage — adjusting for franchising, leases, international exposure, and whether system sales are consolidated. There is no clean, pure-play "limited-service restaurants" index fund; broad consumer-discretionary funds hold the large caps, but exposure comes stock by stock.

Private routes.

• Own a franchise. The most direct private investment is buying and operating one or more units of an established brand — a real operating business with real operating risk, governed by the FDD you receive up front.[28] Underwrite the individual unit, not the brand's reputation: review initial investment, working capital, lease terms, labor and food assumptions, territory restrictions, closure history, supplier requirements, franchisee support, and a realistic downside case. Most franchisees are formally small businesses (the SBA size standard is $13.5M in receipts).[4]
• Private equity / private credit. The largest transactions (Subway, Panera, Jersey Mike's, Whataburger) run through PE firms; access is via those funds. Franchise businesses are also heavy users of private credit and whole-business securitization. For a PE stake, analyze purchase price, debt, fees, royalty durability, management incentives, and exit assumptions.

Outlook. Expect the value war to persist into 2026 as chains defend traffic with deals, keeping menu-price inflation subdued but pressuring margins.[36] The offsets operators are counting on are digital and loyalty (higher-margin, data-rich orders) and automation to blunt wage inflation. The best long-term businesses are likely to combine strong consumer value, repeat traffic, efficient formats, attractive unit economics, disciplined expansion, healthy franchisees, and manageable leverage. The structural demand — Americans' entrenched habit of eating food someone else prepared — is intact; the open questions are who keeps their share of it, and at what margin. Public-market returns will hinge heavily on the price paid; private-market returns will hinge on site selection, operating execution, financing, and exit discipline. Our federal file provides no industry-wide profit-margin or capacity-utilization measure, so those should be evaluated company by company.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, NAICS 2022 Definition — 722513 Limited-Service Restaurants (scope and exclusions). https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=722513&year=2022
2. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 (establishments, employees, payroll). https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2023/econ/cbp/2023-cbp.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census (receipts, firms, concentration ratios, HHI). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
4. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards (2023). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
5. QSR Magazine, "The 2025 QSR 50: Fast Food's Leading Annual Report" (2025). https://www.qsrmagazine.com/story/the-2025-qsr-50-fast-foods-leading-annual-report/
6. National Restaurant Association / PR Newswire, "Restaurant Industry Poised for Growth in 2025 … $1.5 Trillion in Sales" (2025). https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/restaurant-industry-poised-for-growth-in-2025-industry-expected-to-employ-15-9-million-people-and-reach-1-5-trillion-in-sales-302369638.html
7. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, "Food Prices and Spending" (food-away-from-home $1.52T, 2024; 5.5% of disposable income). https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/food-prices-and-spending/
8. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Consumer Price Index — June 2026" (food-away-from-home +3.4% YoY). https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_07142026.htm
9. McDonald's Corporation, 2024 Annual Report / Form 10-K (~95% franchised; rent-and-royalty model). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63908/000006390825000012/mcd-20241231.htm
10. Franchise Chatter, "McDonald's Franchise Review 2025" (royalty ~4%→5%). https://www.franchisechatter.com/2025/10/17/mcdonalds-franchise-review-2025-costs-fees-news-average-revenues-and-or-profits/
11. Yum! Brands, "Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Results" (brands, ~61,000 units, ~$7.5B revenue, ~60%+ digital). https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250205909067/en/Yum-Brands-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-Results
12. Restaurant Brands International, Q4/FY2025 press release (system-wide sales +5.3%). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1618756/000161875626000006/qsr_20251231xpressrelease.htm
13. Domino's Pizza, "Fourth Quarter and Fiscal 2024 Financial Results" (U.S. retail sales +5.3%, ~85% digital, ~99% franchised globally). https://ir.dominos.com/news-releases/news-release-details/dominos-pizzar-announces-fourth-quarter-and-fiscal-2024
14. Wingstop Inc., 2024 Form 10-K / FY2024 results ($4.8B system sales; 2,563 units; ~$2.1M domestic AUV; ~$535K initial investment; 70%+ target cash-on-cash). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1636222/000163622225000008/wing-20241228.htm
15. Chipotle Mexican Grill, 2024 Form 10-K / FY2024 results ($11.3B revenue; 3,726 units; labor 24.7% of revenue; digital 35.1%). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1058090/000105809025000014/cmg-20241231.htm
16. CAVA Group, 2024 Form 10-K. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1639438/000162828025007882/cava-20241229.htm
17. Shake Shack, 2024 Form 10-K (~$1.4B revenue; company-operated + licensed). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1620533/000162053325000016/shak-20241225.htm
18. The Wendy's Company, 2024 Form 10-K. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/30697/000003069725000003/wen-20241229.htm
19. Roark Capital, "About Roark." https://www.roarkcapital.com/about
20. Panera Bread, "Our History" (JAB ownership). https://www.panerabread.com/en-us/company/our-history.html
21. Nation's Restaurant News, "Acquisition deals in 2024 include big players like Subway and Jersey Mike's" (Roark/Subway ~$9.6B; JAB/Panera ~$7.5B). https://www.nrn.com/mergers-acquisitions/acquisition-deals-in-2024-include-big-players-like-subway-and-jersey-mike-s
22. QSR Magazine, "Subway Finalizes Sale to Roark Capital" (2024). https://www.qsrmagazine.com/story/subway-finalizes-sale-to-roark-capital/
23. Chick-fil-A, "Am I Able to Purchase Chick-fil-A Stock?" (privately held). https://www.chick-fil-a.com/customer-support/who-we-are/our-leaders/am-i-able-to-purchase-chick-fil-a-stock
24. Restaurant Business Online, "Raising Cane's sales are going through the roof" (~$5.1B sales, ~$6.6M AUV, ~900 units). https://www.restaurantbusinessonline.com/financing/raising-canes-sales-are-going-through-roof
25. Blackstone, "Jersey Mike's to Partner with Blackstone" (2024). https://www.blackstone.com/news/press/jersey-mikes-to-partner-with-blackstone-to-accelerate-leading-franchisors-continued-growth/
26. Little Caesars, "Little Caesars Franchise" (Ilitch family ownership). https://franchise.littlecaesars.com/
27. Five Guys, "Frequently Asked Questions" (privately held). https://www.fiveguys.com/support-hub/faqs/
28. Federal Trade Commission, "Franchise Rule" (16 CFR Part 436; FDD, 23 items, 14-day rule). https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/rules/franchise-rule
29. Restaurant Business Online, "Federal judge strikes down new joint employer rules" (2024). https://www.restaurantbusinessonline.com/financing/federal-judge-strikes-down-new-joint-employer-rules
30. California Department of Industrial Relations, "Fast Food Minimum Wage FAQ" (AB 1228, $20/hour, effective April 1, 2024). https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Fast-Food-Minimum-Wage-FAQ.htm
31. California Legislature, "AB-1228 Fast Food Restaurant Industry" bill text (2023–2024). https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240AB1228
32. U.S. Department of Labor, "Minimum Wage" and Fact Sheet #2 (FLSA; $7.25/hour; restaurant/fast-food rules). https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage
33. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, "Food Code 2022." https://www.fda.gov/food/fda-food-code/food-code-2022
34. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, "Menu and Vending Machine Labeling" (20+ locations). https://www.fda.gov/food/nutrition-food-labeling-and-critical-foods/menu-and-vending-machine-labeling
35. Restaurant Business Online, "Restaurants are still losing traffic, even if they keep price hikes low" (2025). https://www.restaurantbusinessonline.com/financing/restaurants-are-still-losing-traffic-even-if-they-keep-price-hikes-low
36. CNBC, "Restaurants' hottest menu item in 2025 was 'value.' That won't change next year" (2025). https://www.cnbc.com/2025/12/28/value-meals-restaurants-mcdonalds-chilis-taco-bell.html
37. Barmetrix, "Restaurant Inflation: 2025 Trends, Data, and What to Do" (food costs vs. pre-pandemic). https://www.barmetrix.com/blog/restaurant-inflation