Other Traveler Accommodation (U.S.) — NAICS 72119

A Histometrics rollup primer for public- and private-market investors.

1. Overview

NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) code 72119, "Other Traveler Accommodation," is the part of the U.S. lodging economy that is not a hotel, motel, or casino hotel. It gathers two very different worlds under one 5-digit roof: bed-and-breakfast inns (code 721191) and an "all other" catch-all — hostels, guest and dude ranches, guest houses and tourist homes, and housekeeping cabins and cottages (code 721199).[1] If you have booked a room in a restored Victorian inn, a bunk in a backpacker hostel, a week at a cattle-country ranch, or a lakeside cabin near a national park, you have used this level.

It is a small, fragmented, overwhelmingly private corner of hospitality. The employer businesses the government measures generate roughly $3.6 billion of receipts across about 4,300 firms — a rounding error next to the hundreds of billions branded hotels command — and the true footprint, including the tens of thousands of no-payroll owner-operators, is larger still (Section 3).[2][3] The single most important fact for an investor is that there is no durable, pure-play, publicly traded company in either child industry. The two most prominent attempts to build one — the venture-backed hostel chain Selina and the apartment-hotel operator Sonder — both failed (Section 4).[16][17] Public exposure is therefore indirect, through the booking platforms that distribute these room-nights; direct ownership is a private, small-business proposition.

What makes this level worth reading as a rollup is the contrast between its two halves. They are similar in headcount but opposite in economics: one is the most fragmented industry in the entire economy with no leader at all; the other is top-heavy, with four firms holding nearly half of measured revenue. Understanding that split is the whole game.

2. What's inside — the two child industries, and how they differ

The level splits cleanly into two NAICS industries. They are close in employee count (each ~12,000 workers) but diverge on almost everything else that matters to an investor — average business size, concentration, ownership, and how you would put money to work.

The key insight the rollup reveals: B&B inns are the more numerous half (54% of firms) but the smaller-revenue half (32% of receipts), because the average inn is tiny — about six rooms and roughly half a million dollars a year. The "all other" bucket has fewer businesses but they are 2.5× larger on average, and a handful of them are large enough to dominate. In fact, essentially all of the concentration you see at this 5-digit level comes from 721199: the top four firms in the whole of 72119 account for ~29.5% of receipts,[3] and that is almost exactly the top four of 721199 alone (43.6% × $2.47B ≈ the same dollars).[5] The B&B side contributes almost nothing to the top of the table — its biggest firm is a rounding error. One half is a flat plain of independents; the other is a few peaks over a long tail.

A shared boundary problem. Both children explicitly exclude peer-to-peer whole-home short-term rentals (STRs), which mostly get classified under 531110 (lessors of residential buildings), not here.[5-src] An Airbnb or Vrbo listing does not automatically belong to 72119. This is why the official figures below are a floor, not the full picture.

3. How big it is (the rollup)

Our ground-truth federal statistics for 72119 come from three programs across two reference years — County Business Patterns 2023 (CBP), the 2022 Economic Census (EC), and the Small Business Administration (SBA) 2023 size standard. They describe only the employer slice: businesses with paid employees and payroll. They are a coherent picture, not one period's income statement.

Two quick reads. The average employer business at this level turns over roughly $839,000 a year ($3.645B ÷ 4,347 firms), and average pay is about $35,200 ($857.5M ÷ 24,369) — low, seasonal, front-desk-and-housekeeping wages.[2][3] Under the SBA's $9 million cap, essentially every business in 72119 is a "small business" — a program definition, not an estimate of industry size.[6] The first-quarter payroll running at about 21% of the annual figure ($180.4M of $857.5M) hints at the strong seasonal labor swing common to leisure lodging.[2]

The undercount is central here — and it works differently on each side. CBP and the Economic Census count only businesses with paid employees (and exclude government-operated establishments).[2][3] The true economic footprint is far larger for two reasons that map onto the two children:

• Nonemployers dominate the B&B side. A classic inn — two owners, four to six rooms, no payroll — is a nonemployer business that never appears above. Industry estimates put the real B&B population near 17,000 inns generating on the order of $3.4 billion, versus the ~2,300 employer establishments and ~$1.18 billion the government counts — perhaps one inn in seven is captured.[8][9]
• Classification leakage dominates the "all other" side. The explosion of whole-home short-term rentals largely lands in residential leasing (531110), not here. As a scale check, U.S. short-term/vacation-rental spending was estimated near $68.6 billion in 2024 by one private research house — on the order of ~28× the $2.47 billion of measured employer receipts in 721199.[5-src]

So treat the $3.645 billion as a reliable floor for the businesses that call themselves inns, hostels, ranches, lodges, guest houses, and cabin clusters — and understand that "alternative lodging" as travelers actually experience it is a multiple of that. There is no official federal occupancy rate, average daily rate, revenue-per-available-room, or margin published for 72119 or either child — the operating benchmarks in Section 5 are industry rules of thumb, not government data.[22][24][25]

4. The investable universe — where value concentrates

Value at this level does not concentrate in listed equities that own the beds — because none exist. It concentrates in three places: the booking platforms that monetize the demand (public), a thin band of larger private operators, managers, and one nonprofit network (mostly in 721199), and a vast field of owner-operated real estate (both children, mostly nonemployer). We reserve tickers for this section and Section 10.

Public exposure (indirect proxies, not pure-plays). These are travel-arrangement, reservation-service, franchising, or hotel-real-estate businesses classified outside 72119; they carry the industry's demand or share its cycle without owning the niche.

Selling through the marketplace channel typically costs an operator a 15%–30% commission (nearer 15% on hostel/cabin channels, higher on some), which is why "book direct" is the industry's rallying cry across both children.[8][25]

The instructive failures (721199). The thesis that alternative lodging could be rolled up into a venture-scaled, branded, listed chain has failed twice. Selina Hospitality listed on Nasdaq via a SPAC (special-purpose acquisition company) at ~$1.2 billion in 2021 and collapsed into insolvency in 2024; its assets were bought cheaply out of administration by the private group Collective Hospitality and rebranded under the Socialtel name.[16][18] Sonder Holdings, a lease-heavy apartment-hotel operator, tried to rescue itself via a Marriott licensing deal; Marriott terminated it in November 2025 and Sonder filed for Chapter 7 liquidation days later.[17] These are cautionary base rates, not investable.

Larger private and other owners (mostly 721199). This is the thin top of the barbell that shows up in the concentration figures:

• Casago (with the Vacasa brand) — a private vacation-rental management platform running 40,000+ properties; it manages homes for owners rather than owning them (Vacasa was taken private and delisted in 2025).[21]
• Hostelling International USA (HI-USA) — the largest U.S. hostel network, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit that deliberately consolidated from ~136 hostels in 2001 to roughly 14 high-standard properties — a telling signal about scaled hostel economics in the U.S.[19]
• Collective Hospitality, Generator/Freehand (via Queensgate Investments), and AutoCamp (backed by Whitman Peterson; filed a Regulation Crowdfunding offering in 2026) — private operators of hostels and outdoor-hospitality units, some of which straddle adjacent recreational-camp codes.[18][32]
• Guest and dude ranches — an estimated 300–350 operate nationally, almost all family-owned and privately held.[20]

The long tail (both children, mostly nonemployer). This is where most establishments actually live and where 721191 concentrates almost entirely:

• Single-property B&B owner-operators — the ~17,000 inns, mostly couples; ~70% of owners are over 50; held in local LLCs, with no franchising and no dominant chain.[9][13]
• Independent cabin, cottage, guest-house, and single-hostel operators — thousands of micro-businesses not separately quantified in federal data.[2]
• A thin layer of trade and marketing structure sits on top — the Association of Lodging Professionals (ALP) and curated networks such as Select Registry — but these vet and market members, they do not own them.[30]

Bottom line: you cannot "buy the 72119 industry" on an exchange. For public exposure you are buying the booking rails (or, loosely, hotel majors and REITs) and sizing it as a broad travel bet. For the niche itself it is a private acquisition or a build — and which child you target dictates a completely different playbook (Section 10).

5. How the money works

Every operator here makes money the same fundamental way all lodging does — selling a perishable room- or bed-night — with metrics adapted to the format:

Revenue = available units × available nights × occupancy × average daily rate.

The three shared levers.

• Occupancy — share of available unit-nights sold. B&B rules of thumb run ~45%–55% off-season and 65%–85% at peak (most inns need ~60%–70% to break even); independent hostels typically run 60%–75% annually, the best into the mid-80s.[22][25]
• ADR (average daily rate) — revenue per occupied room or bed. Rough B&B ADR is ~$90–$130 rural and ~$160–$250 in tourist destinations; hostels price per bed in a shared dorm, which is what makes them cheap for the traveler and capital-efficient for the owner (one room, several paying guests).[22][25]
• RevPAR / RevPAB / RevPAU (revenue per available room / bed / unit) — occupancy × ADR — the single most-watched yield metric, because it blends how full you are with how much you charge.[22][25]

Where the two children's economics diverge.

• 721191 (B&Bs) are a real-estate-plus-hospitality lifestyle asset. Room rental is ~90% of revenue; breakfast is a cost center recovered through the rate; the owners' own labor is a core input, which is why seller's discretionary earnings (SDE) — total cash benefit to a working owner — is the key profit metric, and why buyers must re-price owner labor at a market management-and-housekeeping wage when underwriting.[22][23]
• 721199 (hostels, ranches, cabins) lean harder on ancillary revenue — food, beverage, bars, tours, lockers can be 15%–25% of a social hostel's take and is often where the profit sits — and on the asset model itself. The lesson of the failures is that long-term leases (fixed rent against variable, seasonal, discretionary revenue) are fragile; the durable models are asset-light management/franchise or low-leverage owner-operated real estate.[16][17][25]

Cost and margin, level-wide. Economics are dominated by fixed costs — mortgage or rent, property insurance, property tax, utilities — plus labor (which hostel operators try to hold under ~30% of revenue). Because fixed costs are high, a modest occupancy dip cuts cash flow disproportionately: the sector has real operating leverage. A permanent margin drag on both sides is OTA (online travel agency) commission, the reason direct-booking discipline matters everywhere.[22][25]

How the assets are valued and financed (private underwriting). B&Bs typically trade around an 8%–12% capitalization rate (net operating income ÷ price; ~10% a common benchmark), ~$50,000–$150,000 per guest room, ~0.5×–1.5× gross revenue, or 2×–3× SDE.[22][23] In 2025–26, commercial mortgage rates ran roughly 6.5%–8.5%, lenders wanted a 1.25×–1.35× debt-service-coverage ratio (DSCR), and seller financing shifted "from exception to expectation." A structural friction that recurs across the level: many of these properties are worth more as real estate than as businesses, which lengthens sale timelines and separates the two value sources at exit.[22]

6. What drives demand

Both children are discretionary leisure travel — among the first budgets consumers cut in a downturn — but they lean on partly different tailwinds:

• Experiential and "authentic" travel. The clearest shared tailwind: travelers increasingly want a specific place, a human host, and local experiences that big platforms can't standardize. B&Bs sell the restored-house-and-innkeeper version; hostels and ranches sell community, the outdoors, and activities.[12-cef][14-bb]
• Leisure, domestic road-trip, and outdoor tourism. Both track consumer confidence, disposable income, and gasoline prices (many guests drive in). Cabins, cottages, and lodges cluster around national parks, lakes, and mountains, so park visitation moves that sub-segment specifically.
• Budget and international inbound travel (weighted to 721199). Hostels live on price-sensitive, younger, and foreign backpackers; a weaker dollar and open borders help. The National Travel and Tourism Office projects international arrivals rising from 68.3 million in 2025 to 70.5 million in 2026 (with the 2026 FIFA World Cup a near-term catalyst) — a forecast, not an outcome.[28] Inbound weakness cuts the other way: industry sources flagged an estimated $12.5 billion decline in inbound visitor spending in 2025 as a B&B headwind.[22]
• Events and seasonality (weighted to 721191). Weddings, anniversaries, and festivals carry inns' shoulder seasons; revenue is highly seasonal and concentrated in scenic, historic, coastal, and wine-country destinations.
• Distribution and reputation. Search visibility, reviews, and marketplace listings expand reach for tiny properties — but deepen dependence on third-party rankings and booking economics for both children.[10][11][12]
• The macro tide. Broad U.S. travel-and-tourism real output rose 7.0% in 2023 after a 20.8% rebound in 2022 (Bureau of Economic Analysis) — a measure of tourism overall, not 72119, but the tide this niche floats on.[29]

Judgment: at this level, destination quality and property positioning explain more of the performance variation than national lodging growth. A differentiated inn, hostel, or lodge in a durable destination holds pricing power; an undifferentiated one competes mainly on price.

7. Regulation

There is no single federal regulator of 72119; the binding rules are mostly local and state, and B&Bs carry a heavier load than most because two regulatory worlds — lodging and food service — stack on top of each other.

• Zoning / land use. Commercial lodging in residential areas usually needs a conditional-use or special permit. For B&Bs specifically, a cap on guest rooms (a 5-room limit is common) and an owner-occupancy requirement are frequent.[29-bb]
• Food safety (mainly 721191). Serving breakfast triggers food-service permits and health-department inspection that ordinary rentals avoid.[28-bb]
• Building, fire, health, and accessibility codes (mainly 721199). Hostels with bunk dorms face specific fire-egress and occupancy rules. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) generally treats transient lodging as a public accommodation, but does not cover an owner-occupied establishment renting five or fewer rooms — an exception that turns on a property's exact facts and operating characteristics.[27]
• Short-term-rental (STR) ordinances — the defining regulatory trend of the decade. Cities are licensing, capping, or effectively banning STRs; New York City's Local Law 18 (enforced from September 2023) cut short-term listings by more than 90%. This chiefly hits 531110 whole-home rentals, but it reshapes the competitive field for inns, hostels, and lodges too — and increasingly sweeps small inns into STR regimes, actively redrawing the "B&B vs. STR" line jurisdiction by jurisdiction.[26]
• Occupancy / lodging taxes. Most states and many cities levy a transient occupancy ("bed") tax that operators must collect and remit; nothing about these formats exempts them.
• Land-based lodges and ranches. Guest ranches carry agritourism liability rules, and operations on or near public land can involve federal grazing or use permits and wildfire/insurance constraints.

The forward-looking swing factor is whether cities tighten or relax STR rules: tightening funnels travelers back toward licensed inns, hostels, and hotels; relaxation intensifies competition from individual hosts.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

This is where the two children look most different — and it is visible in the federal concentration data.

721191 is one of the least concentrated industries in the entire economy. Its top-4 firms hold just 2.3% of revenue, the top 50 hold 16.8%, and its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a 0–10,000 concentration score) is 6.2 — effectively zero. There is no market leader; competition is purely local and destination-based.[4]

721199 is a barbell. Its top-4 firms hold 43.6% of revenue, but moving from the top 8 (46.0%) to the top 50 (57.7%) adds only ~12 points — a few relatively large operators (large managers, multi-unit firms, the nonprofit network) atop a very long, thin tail. Its HHI was suppressed by the Census Bureau, so we do not report it.[5]

The rollup inherits 721199's shape at the very top and 721191's flatness below it. For all of 72119, the top-4 revenue share is 29.5%, the top-8 31.1%, the top-20 34.5%, and the top-50 39.4%; the level's HHI is suppressed.[3] As Section 2 noted, that top-4 figure is essentially the top four of 721199 alone — the B&B side adds bulk to the count of firms but nothing to the peak.

Consolidation runs on completely different tracks in the two halves:

• In 721191, consolidation is operational, not corporate — multi-property boutique operators, shared management/marketing platforms, and broker-intermediated ownership turnover as aging owners sell to lifestyle buyers. A workable roll-up is shared services with local autonomy, not a national brand.[22]
• In 721199, the corporate roll-up has been tried and has failed in public markets (Selina, Sonder). The surviving consolidators are private and are shrinking-to-profitability (Collective Hospitality buying Selina cheaply; HI-USA cutting from 136 to 14 hostels). Where consolidation is happening is in management, technology, and booking — Casago's 40,000-property platform, HomeToGo's move into management — not in bricks.[16][17][19][21]

The common external pressure on both: the platforms hold the demand. Airbnb, Booking.com, and Vrbo captured roughly 71% of global short-term-rental share in 2024 (Airbnb alone ~44%), monetizing the traveler regardless of who owns the bed — which caps independent operators' pricing power and keeps OTA commission a permanent tax across the level.[15]

9. Risks

• Discretionary cyclicality. Both children are leisure travel — among the first budgets cut in a downturn — with volatile, seasonal occupancy and pricing.
• Substitution and classification leakage to STRs. Airbnb/Vrbo supply caps pricing power and, because whole-home rentals mostly classify to 531110, keeps the official picture understated on the 721199 side.[5-src]
• Insolvency risk is demonstrated, not hypothetical (721199). Two of the highest-profile operators of the last five years went to zero for equity holders; lease-heavy, debt-funded models are fragile.[16][17]
• Owner-dependence and succession (721191). ~70% of B&B owners are over 50 and the business is tied to on-site owner labor; burnout and a thin, financing-constrained buyer pool are structural.[13][22]
• Margin compression. Rising insurance, property taxes, and utilities are outrunning achievable rate increases; industry sources reported B&B RevPAR growth stalling to ~0.2% by mid-2025.[22]
• Platform dependence. Heavy reliance on OTAs commoditizes the product and taxes the margin; a change in ranking, commission, or payment policy can swing an operator's economics.[25]
• Regulatory whiplash. Shifting STR ordinances, zoning fights, accessibility, and food-safety rules can raise costs or restrict operations market-by-market.[26][28-bb][29-bb]
• Climate, insurance, and capital intensity. Coastal, wildfire-, and flood-exposed destinations — where many premier inns and lodges sit — face rising or unavailable property insurance; owning the real estate is capital-heavy and higher rates tighten development, refinancing, and acquisition math.
• Illiquidity and exit (721191). Inns can take two to three years to sell at a price reflecting their best use, with the real-estate-vs-business gap narrowing the buyer pool.[22]
• Data risk. Federal employer statistics omit most tiny operators and leak whole-home rentals to 531110, while public-company filings isolate no 72119 line — neither source gives a complete read.

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Match the route to the child.

721191 (B&Bs) — a private, lifestyle-and-income acquisition. Buy and operate an inn (or buy the property and hire an operator), build a small regional portfolio around a common destination, or lend against acquisitions/renovations. Underwrite like commercial real estate: price on net operating income and a realistic cap rate (~8%–12%); rebuild occupancy/ADR/RevPAR from monthly records; normalize owner labor to a market wage; separate real-estate value from operating-business value; and verify permits, zoning, fire, food-service, ADA, insurance, and tax compliance. Expect owner labor, SBA-backed or seller financing, and a multi-year hold. Specialist inn brokers and the ALP network are the practical on-ramps.[22][23][30]

721199 (hostels, ranches, cabins) — a private acquisition or build, with a hard-won lesson. Own and operate (returns from RevPAB/RevPAU plus ancillary revenue and the underlying real estate); buy an existing cash-flowing lodge or ranch (nearly all qualify for SBA-backed financing under the $9M cap); or franchise/manage/lend asset-light rather than signing long fixed leases. The last cycle proved asset-light and disciplined beats branded-and-leveraged here; the branded-chain roll-up remains unproven. Some private hospitality companies reach smaller investors via Regulation Crowdfunding (e.g., AutoCamp), but those securities are illiquid, higher-risk, and not vetted on the merits by the SEC.[16][17][25][32]

Public route (indirect for either child). With no listed pure-play, treat ABNB, BKNG, EXPE — and, for specialists, HSW and HTG — as the cleanest read on demand, and HLT, WH, MAR, H, HST, APLE as looser lodging-cycle proxies. Analyze each on its actual fee model, geographic and accommodation mix, alternative-lodging exposure, balance sheet, and valuation before comparing share prices or yields. This is a bet on travel distribution and the lodging cycle broadly, not on 72119. What to avoid learning the hard way: newly public, lease-heavy alt-lodging "brands" — the Selina and Sonder outcomes are the base rate.[10][11][12][13][14][16][17][31]

Outlook (forward-looking judgment). The demand backdrop is constructive on both sides: experiential, budget, and outdoor travel are structurally growing, and international arrivals are forecast to rise into 2026 and beyond (FIFA World Cup a 2026 catalyst).[28] But the investment case is selective and bifurcating. In B&Bs, expect low-single-digit category growth (IBISWorld's combined B&B-and-hostel market grew ~1.9% into 2026), with upscale, experience-led, direct-booked inns holding pricing power while generic properties get squeezed between STR pricing and rising fixed costs.[8][22] In the "all other" bucket, the strongest businesses combine legal supply, distinctive demand, disciplined operating systems, and efficient direct distribution; the weakest are undifferentiated units dependent on one platform, one season, or optimistic permitting. The two biggest external swing factors — local STR regulation (which can redirect demand toward licensed operators) and the cost of capital (which decides whether lease- and debt-funded expansion survives) — apply to the whole level. Net: a small, resilient, deeply fragmented industry that rewards operator skill and location far more than scale, where the opportunity is attractive only when the purchase basis is conservative, the destination's demand is durable, owner labor is properly priced, and insurance and regulatory risks are fully reflected in the return target — and where the federal statistics will keep understating the activity for as long as most of it runs through individual hosts and the 531110 classification.

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Sources

Synthesized from the two child primers (721191 Bed-and-Breakfast Inns; 721199 All Other Traveler Accommodation) and our ground-truth federal statistics for 72119.

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definitions — 72119 Other Traveler Accommodation, and children 721191 / 721199 (definitions and adjacent exclusions). https://www.census.gov/naics/?year=2022
2. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 72119 (establishments 4,365; employees 24,369; annual payroll $857.526M; Q1 payroll $180.435M). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration of Largest Firms, NAICS 72119 (firms 4,347; receipts $3.645384B; CR4 29.5%, CR8 31.1%, CR20 34.5%, CR50 39.4%; HHI suppressed). https://data.census.gov/
4. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 & 2022 Economic Census, NAICS 721191 (2,367 firms; $1.176.8M receipts; CR4 2.3%, CR50 16.8%; HHI 6.2). Via child primer 721191.

5. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 & 2022 Economic Census, NAICS 721199 (1,980 firms; $2.468568B receipts; CR4 43.6%, CR8 46.0%, CR20 50.9%, CR50 57.7%; HHI suppressed). Via child primer 721199. 5-src. Grand View Research, U.S. Short-Term Vacation Rental Market (~$68.6B, 2024); siccode.com, NAICS for Airbnb & STRs (721199 vs 531110). https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/short-term-vacation-rental-market-report

6. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (721191 and 721199 = $9.0M avg. annual receipts), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards

7. (reserved)
8. IBISWorld, Bed & Breakfast & Hostel Accommodations in the US — Market Size (~$3.2B 2026; ~1.9% growth; OTA commissions 15%–30%), 2026. https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/market-size/bed-breakfast-hostel-accommodations/1663/
9. Prism News, Bed-and-breakfast inns fight back with charm, service and flexibility (~17,000 inns; ~$3.4B), 2024. https://www.prismnews.com/news/bed-and-breakfast-inns-fight-back-with-charm-service-and
10. U.S. SEC, Airbnb, Inc. Form 10-K (marketplace; ~$11.1B FY2024 revenue; ~491M Nights & Experiences Booked). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001559720&type=10-K
11. U.S. SEC, Booking Holdings Inc. Form 10-K (Booking.com distributes hotels, homes, apartments, B&Bs, hostels). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001075531&type=10-K

12. U.S. SEC, Expedia Group, Inc. Form 10-K (Vrbo whole-home alternative accommodations; ~$3.8B). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001324424&type=10-K 12-cef. EHL Hospitality Insights, How Airbnb and short-term rentals reshape rural and urban communities (STRs took ~15% share from hotels), 2024. https://hospitalityinsights.ehl.edu/airbnb-short-term-rentals-reshape-rural-urban-communities

13. Hostelworld Group PLC, investor reports (hostel-focused booking marketplace). https://www.hostelworldgroup.com/investors/

14. HomeToGo SE, 2025 annual report (vacation-rental marketplace; Interhome management integration). https://ir.hometogo.de/ 14-bb. Fox Business, Inn Business: More Baby Boomers Turn to Bed and Breakfast Ownership (~70% of owners over 50, ~80% couples). https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/inn-business-more-baby-boomers-turn-to-bed-and-breakfast-ownership

15. Skift, Short-Term Rentals: Airbnb's Dominance and Booking's Gains (big three ~71% share 2024; Airbnb ~44%; Vrbo ~9%), 2025. https://skift.com/2025/03/14/short-term-rentals-airbnbs-dominance-and-bookings-gains-in-1-chart/

16. Skift / CoStar, Selina Sold Out of Insolvency (SPAC ~$1.2B 2021; insolvent 2024; delisted), 2024. https://skift.com/2024/08/27/selina-sold-out-of-insolvency-5-weeks-after-collapse-exclusive/
17. Marriott International / Sonder Holdings / CNN Business, Marriott terminates agreement; Sonder Chapter 7 wind-down (Nov. 2025). https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/11/business/sonder-bankruptcy-marriott-deal-ends
18. WYSE Travel Confederation / PhocusWire, Collective Hospitality converts Selina properties to Socialtel, 2025. https://www.phocuswire.com/selina-hotels-socialtel-collective-hospitality-hostel
19. Wikipedia / HI USA, Hostelling International USA (nonprofit; ~136 hostels in 2001 → ~14 today; largest U.S. network). https://www.hiusa.org/find-hostels
20. Wikipedia / DudeRanch.com, Guest ranch (est. 300–350 U.S. guest/dude ranches). https://duderanch.com/what-is-a-dude-ranch/
21. Casago / Skift, Casago Completes Acquisition of Vacasa (closed 2025; combined entity manages 40,000+ properties; VCSA delisted). https://casago.com/casago-completes-acquisition-of-vacasa/
22. The B&B Team, Navigating the New Normal: The State of the Inn and B&B Transfer Market in 2026 (cap rates, DSCR, mortgage rates, seller financing, RevPAR ~0.2%, inbound decline). https://bbteam.com/blog/inn-bb-transfer-market-2026/
23. DealStream / Dana Moos, Bed & Breakfast valuation rules of thumb (cap rates, per-room value, gross-revenue and SDE multiples), 2024. https://dealstream.com/industry-guides/bed-and-breakfasts/rules-of-thumb
24. Revenue Hub / BusinessDojo, Bed & Breakfast operating benchmarks (avg ~6 rooms; occupancy 45%–85%; ADR $90–$250; room rental ~90% of revenue), 2024–2026. https://revenue-hub.com/calculate-room-rate-revenue-metrics/
25. Cloudbeds / FinancialModelsLab, Hostel Revenue Management & KPIs (occupancy 60–75%, RevPAB, ancillary 15–25%, OTA fees ~15%, labor <30%). https://www.cloudbeds.com/revenue-management/hostels/
26. NYC Mayor's Office of Special Enforcement, Registration Law / Local Law 18 (host registration; >90% listing drop after Sept. 2023). https://www.nyc.gov/site/specialenforcement/registration-law/registration.page
27. ADA.gov / U.S. DOJ, ADA Guide for Places of Lodging (owner-occupied establishment renting five or fewer rooms is exempt; coverage turns on operating characteristics). https://www.ada.gov/resources/lodging-guide/

28. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Travel and Tourism Office, International Visitor Forecast (68.3M arrivals 2025 → 70.5M 2026 → 85.2M 2030; FIFA World Cup 2026 catalyst; forecast, not outcome), 2026. https://www.trade.gov/travel-tourism-industry 28-bb. Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO), Bed and Breakfast Laws and Regulations (food-service regulatory layer). https://www.afdo.org/resources/bed-and-breakfast-laws-and-regulations/

29. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Travel and Tourism Satellite Account for 2018–2023 (real output +7.0% in 2023; +20.8% in 2022), 2025. https://apps.bea.gov/scb/issues/2025/02-february/0225-travel-tourism-satellite-account.htm 29-bb. Marin County / City of Sacramento / Montgomery County (MD), Bed-and-breakfast zoning ordinances (owner-occupancy, ~5-room limits, permits, occupancy tax), 2024. https://www.marincounty.gov/departments/cda/planning/long-range-planning-initiatives/short-term-rental-str

30. Association of Lodging Professionals (ALP) & Select Registry, trade body and curated marketing network (member vetting/marketing, not ownership). https://selectregistry.com/about-select-registry

31. U.S. SEC filings, Hilton (HLT), Wyndham (WH), Marriott (MAR), Hyatt (H), Host Hotels (HST), Apple Hospitality REIT (APLE) (branded-hotel franchisors and lodging REITs; adjacent 721110, no clean 72119 line). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar
32. U.S. SEC, AutoCamp Hospitality Group Inc. Form C (Regulation Crowdfunding; outdoor-hospitality units may fall partly in adjacent camp codes 721211/721214), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&company=autocamp&type=C