Public Reference

Industry Primers

Bottom-up NAICS industry primers written for both public-market and private investors. Leaf industries are researched from the ground up; every group, subsector, and sector above them reads as a contrast across the industries beneath it.

2122 industries · 24 sectors · NAICS 2022

Researched with AI assistance from official U.S. statistics and independent sources, with citations on every page. Figures are not individually verified against pinned evidence — primers marked Evidence-verified are. Industry research, not investment advice. Methodology.

IndustryNAICS 56162Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services

Security Systems Services — U.S. Industry Primer (rollup)

North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 2022 code 56162. A general-audience rollup primer for both public-market and private investors — covering the two child industries beneath it and how they differ. Figures for this level come from our ingested federal statistics; company-level detail is synthesized from the child primers.


1. Overview

NAICS 56162 bundles two trades that share a shelf but not an economic model. The first, Security Systems Services (except Locksmiths) — code 561621 — sells, installs, and above all monitors electronic alarms, cameras, and access-control systems, and is built on a recurring monthly subscription. The second, Locksmiths — code 561622 — is a local, hands-on service trade: lockouts, rekeying, car keys, safes, and commercial door hardware, paid job by job.

For an investor the interesting fact is how lopsided the pairing is. On our federal data the two industries together take in about $33.9 billion a year, but roughly 92% of that revenue sits in the alarm-and-monitoring child, and only about 8% in locksmithing.[2] Yet locksmiths account for nearly two-fifths of the firms.[2][7] In one sentence: 56162 is a large recurring-revenue security business with a big, low-revenue tail of small locksmith shops attached.

That split drives everything below. The monitoring child is where scaled capital, private equity (PE — investment firms that buy companies using pooled money and debt), and the industry's only real public stocks live; it is valued on the durability of its subscription base. The locksmith child is a classic main-street trade — thousands of owner-operators, almost no public exposure, and value tied to labor, response time, and reputation. The two overlap only where a locksmith moves upmarket into electronic access control and starts to look like a small integrator.


2. What's inside — the two child industries and how they differ

The distinctive value of this level is the contrast between the children. They differ on size, growth, ownership, concentration, and how you would actually invest.

561621 — Security Systems Services (except Locksmiths) 561622 — Locksmiths
What it is Sell + install + monitor burglar/fire alarms, video, access control; plus pure remote "central-station" monitoring[1] Lockouts, rekeying, key cutting, auto key/transponder programming, safes, commercial door hardware[1]
Share of level — revenue ~92% (~$31.3B of $33.9B)[2] ~8% (~$2.63B)[2]
Share of level — firms ~61% (6,161 of ~10,049)[2] ~39% (3,895)[2]
Share of level — employment ~89% (128,462 of 144,585)[3] ~11% (16,123)[3]
Revenue per firm ~$5.1M (capital-scaled) ~$0.7M (owner-operator)
Direction of travel Growing; mid-single-digit, driven by recurring monitoring + smart-home upsell[9] Flat-to-slightly-declining (~$2.9B total market); value mix-shifting toward auto and access control[8]
Who owns them Barbell: a few large capitalized players (ADT, Vivint/NRG, Brinks Home, SimpliSafe), PE roll-up platforms, and a long tail of independent dealers — some public exposure Overwhelmingly sole proprietors, mobile one-person operators, and franchise networks; PE only at the commercial-access edge — no public pure-play
Concentration (top-4 firms' revenue share) Concentrated top over a fragmented tail: CR4 ≈ 34.7%[6] Effectively none: CR4 ≈ 6.5%, HHI ≈ 17.5[7]
Economic engine Recurring Monthly Revenue (RMR) annuity; ~80% monitoring gross margin; priced as a multiple of RMR[6] Billable technician hours; high-margin auto/commercial work subsidizes low-margin key cutting[7]
How to invest Public: ADT, Alarm.com. Private: buy/build RMR books, PE integrator platforms, RMR-backed lending[6] No stock; adjacent public exposure via lock/hardware makers. Private: own/franchise a shop, roll up commercial access-control[7]

Shares blend two federal programs: revenue, firm counts, and concentration are 2022 Economic Census; employment is 2023 County Business Patterns. They are internally consistent but not additive across programs. "CR4" = combined revenue share of the four largest firms; "HHI" = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a 0–10,000 concentration scale.

The one-line takeaway. Locksmiths are a large count of firms but a small slice of revenue; alarm-and-monitoring is the opposite — fewer firms, most of the money, and the only investable public window. A dollar invested "in 56162" is, in economic terms, about 92 cents of subscription-security business and 8 cents of local locksmith trade.

Where they touch. The two codes are drawn to be mutually exclusive — 561621's own definition says "except Locksmiths"[1] — but in the field they blur as locksmiths add electronic access control and alarm firms add locking hardware. Both also sit next to, but outside, the much larger manned-guarding industry (NAICS 561612, Security Guards and Patrol Services), which is human patrol rather than electronic systems and is not part of this level.[1]


3. How big it is

Federal statistics for NAICS 56162 as a whole (from our ingested ground-truth file):

Metric Value Source (year)
Receipts / revenue $33.94 billion Economic Census (2022)[2]
Firms 10,049 Economic Census (2022)[2]
Establishments (employer) 11,112 County Business Patterns (2023)[3]
Paid employment 144,585 County Business Patterns (2023)[3]
Annual payroll $9.83 billion County Business Patterns (2023)[3]
First-quarter payroll $2.43 billion County Business Patterns (2023)[3]
SBA small-business size standard $25 million avg. annual receipts (both children) SBA (2023)[5]

Concentration at the level (share of receipts, 2022 Economic Census):[2] top 4 firms (CR4) 32.0%; top 8 (CR8) 37.5%; top 20 (CR20) 46.3%; top 50 (CR50) 54.7%. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is suppressed in the federal data for this level, so we do not state a value.

Read those level-wide numbers with care: they are a blend of a concentrated child (561621, CR4 ≈ 34.7%) and an almost perfectly fragmented one (561622, CR4 ≈ 6.5%).[6][7] The level CR4 of 32% is close to the monitoring child's because that child supplies the overwhelming majority of revenue; the thousands of tiny locksmiths barely move the top-firm shares. The picture is a concentrated head over a very long tail — the setup that fuels roll-up acquisitions (Section 8).

The undercount caveat — both children understate, for different reasons. County Business Patterns (CBP) and the Economic Census count only businesses with paid employees on a payroll; they exclude no-employee sole proprietors, most self-employed operators, and government in-house security.[4]

  • In locksmithing the undercount is structural and large. The trade is dominated by single-person mobile operators with no payroll. The Census Bureau tracks these separately in its Nonemployer Statistics program,[10] and commercial databases list on the order of 14,000+ locksmith establishments nationally — roughly three-to-four times the 3,961 employer establishments in the federal count.[7] Independent research puts the total locksmith market (employers plus sole proprietors) near $2.9 billion.[8]
  • In alarm-and-monitoring the undercount comes from scattered revenue. Do-it-yourself (DIY) hardware and equipment sales land in retail/manufacturing, install-only work lands in electrical contracting (NAICS 238210), enterprise integrators straddle several codes, and in-house corporate and government security never appears as industry receipts.[1] Third-party analysts sizing the broader "alarm monitoring / home security" market put it in the tens of billions of dollars, growing mid-single digits.[9]

Treat the $33.9 billion as the employer core of a genuinely larger activity — and treat outside market-research totals as estimates, not official statistics.


4. Investable universe — where value concentrates

Almost all of the investable public value in 56162 concentrates in one corner of one child: scaled electronic monitoring. Locksmithing offers no direct public exposure at all. Tickers and multiples appear only here and in Section 10.

In 561621 (the revenue engine), there are two genuine public routes:

Company Ticker Fit What you're buying
ADT Inc. NYSE: ADT Closest listed pure-play; largest U.S. residential + small-business monitor RMR growth, customer attrition, install economics, leverage[6]
Alarm.com Holdings Nasdaq: ALRM Cloud platform sold through independent dealers, not direct to consumers Software-as-a-service (SaaS) subscriptions, renewal rate, partner growth[12]

Beyond those, security is a small, non-separable slice of much larger companies — NRG Energy (NYSE: NRG, owns the Vivint smart-home brand), Johnson Controls (NYSE: JCI), Securitas (Nasdaq Stockholm: SECU B), and the DIY-hardware arms of Amazon (Ring) and Alphabet (Nest). None is a targeted way in.[6]

The large owners in 561621 that you cannot buy on an exchange define the competitive field: Brinks Home (Monitronics), SimpliSafe (PE firm GTCR), Everon (former ADT Commercial, also GTCR), and integrator platforms such as Convergint (Ares, Leonard Green, Harvest Partners), Pavion, Vector Security, and Pye-Barker.[6]

In 561622 (the fragmented tail), there is no publicly traded locksmith-service company. Public-market investors can only touch the trade indirectly, through the lock, key, and access-control manufacturers whose products flow through locksmiths — ASSA ABLOY (Nasdaq Stockholm: ASSA B / OTC: ASAZY), Allegion (NYSE: ALLE), Fortune Brands Innovations (NYSE: FBIN), dormakaba (SIX: DOKA), and Hillman Solutions (Nasdaq: HLMN).[7] These are a bet on hardware and smart-lock adoption, not on local service labor. The actual service market is franchises (Pop-A-Lock, FlyLock), kiosk operators (KeyMe), a PE commercial-access consolidator (Cobalt Service Partners), and thousands of independent shops.[7]

Bottom line for a stock-picker: effectively all listed exposure to this level runs through 561621, and only ADT and Alarm.com are meaningful pure-ish plays. Everything on the locksmith side is either a hardware proxy or private.


5. How the money works

The two children make money in nearly opposite ways — which is the single most important thing to understand about this level.

561621 — the subscription annuity. Forget one-time hardware margins; this business is valued on Recurring Monthly Revenue (RMR) — the sum of all contracted monthly monitoring fees at a point in time. Owners grow by creating RMR (signing accounts) and buying RMR (acquiring account books), and an account book trades at a multiple of monthly RMR, typically 25× to 50× in market practice.[6] The multiple is driven mostly by attrition (customer churn): low churn supports high multiples; above ~15% annual attrition, institutional buyers walk. The unit economics run: spend on the order of $1,200 to acquire a residential account, earn an average of roughly $40–$60/month at a monitoring gross margin around 80%, then keep churn low enough that lifetime value exceeds the upfront cost.[6] A software variant (Alarm.com) skips consumers entirely and sells a cloud platform to thousands of dealers as SaaS, at high renewal rates.[12] Low attrition is everything — it sets both the cash flow and the price a buyer will later pay for the book.

561622 — billable hours, mix over scale. A locksmith business is a low-capital, labor-driven service model; the economics turn on service mix, response time, and reputation, not RMR. Revenue runs from low-margin key cutting (eroded by self-service kiosks), through premium-priced emergency lockouts, up to the high-margin lines that matter: automotive key/transponder programming and commercial access control (increasingly sold with recurring maintenance contracts).[7] The dominant cost is skilled technician labor; capital needs are a van, tools, and key-programming machines. High-margin auto and commercial work subsidizes the commodity key cutting.

Why the contrast matters to a rollup investor. In 561621 you underwrite an annuity — RMR, attrition, acquisition cost, and payback. In 561622 you underwrite a labor business — technician utilization, jobs per van, average ticket, and repeat commercial contracts. The only place the two models converge is recurring commercial access-control service, which is why that segment is where locksmith roll-ups and alarm integrators increasingly compete for the same contracts.


6. Demand drivers

Some drivers move both children; others split them.

Shared drivers:

  • Housing turnover and moves. New owners and landlords rekey (locksmith) and install/transfer alarm service (monitoring); a move is both a prime install moment and a top churn risk. Both lines are therefore sensitive to mortgage rates and home-sales volume.
  • Crime and fear of crime. Perceived risk lifts alarms, cameras, safes, and lock upgrades alike.
  • Commercial construction and tenant turnover. New buildings and office/multifamily churn drive access-control installs, master-key work, and monitored fire-and-security systems.

Divergent drivers:

  • Monitoring (561621) rides the smart-home wave. Cameras, video doorbells, smart locks, and app control expanded the category from "alarm" to "connected home," pulling in tech buyers and raising revenue per user through add-ons; AI-assisted video verification enables premium tiers.[12] DIY kits (SimpliSafe, Ring) lowered the entry price and enlarged the market while pressuring incumbent pricing.
  • Locksmithing (561622) rides the vehicle fleet and electronics. More cars, aging vehicles, and ever-more-electronic keys shift work toward high-value transponder programming; basic key cutting faces the most commoditization.[8]

Both are relatively recession-resistant at the emergency/monitoring core (a lockout or a live alarm does not wait for the cycle) but cyclical at the new-install edge, which tracks construction and rates.


7. Regulation

Both children are regulated primarily at the state and local level — there is no single national license for either — but the load differs sharply.

  • 561621 is a licensed, standards-driven industry. Most states license alarm-company operators, managers, and installers; municipalities require an alarm permit per monitored premises; and monitoring stations are certified against UL 827, the central-station alarm standard (redundancy, backup power, staffing).[6] The distinctive operational issue is false alarms: cities charge per-response fines and can impose "verified response" (no police dispatch unless independently confirmed) or mandate Enhanced Call Verification. Fire detection adds building- and fire-code compliance, and connected cameras add privacy/data-security exposure.[6]
  • 561622 is far more lightly and unevenly regulated. Only a minority of states require a statewide locksmith license (the trade association counted 13 as of January 2025), and roughly half impose none at all, though many cities require a local permit.[7] The one hard national gate is automotive: to program late-model car keys a locksmith must be a registered Vehicle Security Professional through the National Automotive Service Task Force (NASTF) Secure Data Release Model, which controls access to manufacturer immobilizer data.[7] Consumer-protection enforcement targets "scam locksmith" and bait-and-switch advertising.[7]

Neither child is a government-revenue-dominated industry; our federal data quantify no public-purchaser share for either.


8. Consolidation

Both children consolidate — but for opposite reasons and at opposite speeds.

  • 561621 is a roll-up industry by design. Because value is quantified as RMR and account books are portable, contracts trade continuously: bulk account purchases (Brinks Home has bought portfolios of tens of thousands of accounts at a time), dealer programs that fund independents and then buy the RMR they create, and PE platforms that bolt on regional integrators (Convergint, Everon/GTCR, Pavion, Pye-Barker).[6] The capital structure of the child is overwhelmingly private-equity and strategic, not public float — ADT itself is PE-controlled (Apollo), with State Farm and Google as minority holders.[6] Consolidation is genuinely value-creating here when it improves density and retention, and value-destroying when it adds debt faster than durable cash flow.
  • 561622 consolidates only at the edges. With CR4 near 6.5% and an HHI around 17.5, the locksmith trade is effectively unconcentrated,[7] and the residential/mobile core resists national roll-up — it is a relationship-and-response-time business. Consolidation is happening along two narrow vectors: franchising (Pop-A-Lock, FlyLock) and PE-backed roll-ups of commercial door and access-control service, where recurring contracts and route density create real scale (e.g., Cobalt Service Partners, which reported its 14th acquisition).[7] That commercial-access vector is precisely where locksmith roll-ups converge on the same territory as alarm integrators.

At the level, then, consolidation pressure is concentrated in the revenue-heavy monitoring child; the locksmith count keeps the level's firm total high and fragmented, but contributes little to where the money moves.


9. Risks

Affecting the whole level:

  • Measurement risk. Employer-only statistics undercount both children (heavily for locksmiths), so both the true size and the true fragmentation of 56162 are hard to pin down.[4][7]
  • Housing and rate sensitivity. Move-driven installs, rekeys, and commercial construction all soften when home sales and building activity slow.
  • Technology disruption cutting both ways. Smart locks and DIY hardware erode legacy mechanical and pro-install revenue, while electronic access control and connected monitoring raise the skill floor and shift value upmarket. The net effect is a mix shift, not a simple up or down.
  • Cybersecurity and privacy. Connected cameras, access logs, and stored key/master-key codes are sensitive data with real breach exposure.

Concentrated in 561621:

  • Attrition/churn — the core risk; a small rise in churn simultaneously shrinks cash flow and compresses the RMR multiple.[6]
  • Big Tech price competition — Amazon (Ring) and Google (Nest) can subsidize hardware and bundle, pressuring subscription pricing.
  • Leverage — many players carry substantial debt against their RMR annuity; refinancing and integration risk matter.
  • False-alarm/verified-response ordinances degrade the core police-dispatch value proposition and add cost.[6]

Concentrated in 561622:

  • OEM lockout of the aftermarket — automakers tightening key-security gateways could restrict independents' access to the best-margin automotive line.[7]
  • Owner-dependence and succession — an aging owner-operator base and reputation-bound goodwill limit scalability (but supply acquisition targets).
  • Reputation/fraud — scam operators and lead-gen middlemen depress trust and pricing at the low end.[7]

10. How to invest and the outlook

The investing conclusion follows directly from the split: for public-market exposure, this level is essentially a monitoring-and-alarm play; for private-market exposure, both children are open, but by very different playbooks.

Public-market routes (almost entirely 561621):

  • ADT (NYSE: ADT) — the direct large-cap bet on U.S. residential/small-business monitoring; watch RMR growth, gross attrition (~13%), payback, and leverage. Concentrated ownership limits float.[6]
  • Alarm.com (Nasdaq: ALRM) — the "arm-the-dealer" SaaS play on the fragmented dealer channel; watch SaaS growth, renewal rate (~95%), and dealer count. Capital-light, less hardware-cyclical.[12]
  • Lock/hardware makers (ASSA ABLOY, Allegion, Fortune Brands, dormakaba, Hillman) — the only public way to touch the locksmith side, and only as a proxy for hardware and smart-lock adoption, not service labor.[7] Size the position to the segment that actually touches locks.
  • Diversified names (NRG/Vivint, Johnson Controls, Securitas, Amazon, Alphabet) offer only a small, non-separable slice.[6]

Private-market routes (where most of the value and most of the firms sit):

  • In 561621: buy or build a dealer/account book and sell it at 25–50× RMR (attrition discipline is the whole game); back PE integrator platforms; or lend against RMR as a specialty-credit niche.[6]
  • In 561622: buy or build a local shop or mobile route (low capital, succession-driven deal supply), franchise with an established brand, or — the most scalable path — roll up regional commercial door/access-control service, the one locksmith segment with recurring contracts and route density.[7]

Metrics to track differ by child: RMR growth, attrition, acquisition cost, payback, and recurring-service gross margin for monitoring; technician utilization, average ticket, service mix (auto/commercial over key cutting), and recurring commercial contracts for locksmiths. Use enterprise value to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EV/EBITDA) alongside — not instead of — retention and cash-flow analysis.

Outlook. Expect the level's growth to be carried by 561621 — recurring monitoring, cloud video, AI verification, and smart-building integration supporting steady mid-single-digit demand — while 561622 stays roughly flat near $2.9–3.0 billion, with value migrating from mechanical key work toward automotive electronics and commercial access control.[8][9] The winners in both children share a profile: high retention or repeat-contract density, strong local service execution, disciplined pricing, and conservative leverage. The structural swing factors are the same two that run through every section above — whether Big Tech and DIY commoditize the recurring fee faster than smart-home and access-control complexity re-professionalize the work, and whether consolidation adds durable cash flow rather than just debt. On the numbers we have, an investor "buying 56162" is overwhelmingly buying the security-subscription business; the locksmith tail is a large count of small firms that matters more for private main-street ownership than for the level's economics.


Sources

  1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS — 56162 Security Systems Services and its children 561621 / 561622: definitions and cross-references (238210, 561611–561613, wholesale/retail), 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=56162&year=2022
  2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — receipts, firm counts, and concentration ratios (CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50), NAICS 56162 (via Histometrics ingested federal statistics). https://data.census.gov/table/ECNSIZE2022.EC2200SIZECONCEN
  3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 — establishments, employment, and payroll, NAICS 56162 (via Histometrics ingested federal statistics). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
  4. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns Methodology (employer-only coverage; excludes nonemployers and most government). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
  5. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 561621 and 561622: $25 million), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
  6. Child primer 561621 — Security Systems Services (except Locksmiths), synthesizing: 2022 Economic Census concentration (CR4 34.7%); ADT and Alarm.com SEC filings and results; RMR-multiple brokerage guidance (25–50×, ~$1,200 CAC, ~80% margin); UL 827; SDM systems-integrator reporting; ADT/Apollo/State Farm/Google ownership. (See that primer's Sources 2, 6–11, 16–19, 23–28.)
  7. Child primer 561622 — Locksmiths, synthesizing: 2022 Economic Census concentration (CR4 ~6.5%, HHI 17.5); lock/hardware manufacturers (ASSA ABLOY, Allegion, Fortune Brands, dormakaba, Hillman); Pop-A-Lock/FlyLock franchises; Cobalt Service Partners roll-up; NASTF key-data regime; ALOA state-licensing count; commercial-database establishment estimate (~14,000+). (See that primer's Sources 1–2, 6–18, 21, 26.)
  8. IBISWorld, Locksmiths in the US — Market Size (2025 ≈ $2.9bn; fragmented, no firm >5% share), 2025. https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/market-size/locksmiths/4833/
  9. Global Growth Insights / Market Research Future, Alarm Monitoring / Home Security Systems Market — size and growth estimates, 2025 (third-party estimate; not official statistics). https://www.globalgrowthinsights.com/market-reports/alarm-monitoring-market-121074
  10. U.S. Census Bureau, Nonemployer Statistics (program covering no-payroll sole proprietorships), 2024. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/nonemployer-statistics.html
  11. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, ADT Inc. 2025 Form 10-K and Q4/FY2025 results (RMR ~$359M/month; gross customer revenue attrition ~13.1%; revenue payback ~2.3 yrs). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=ADT&type=10-K
  12. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Alarm.com Holdings, Inc. 2025 Form 10-K (SaaS & license = 68% of revenue; SaaS/license renewal rate 95%; service-provider partner model). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001459200&type=10-K