All Other Consumer Goods Rental (NAICS 532289): An Investor's Primer

A general-audience guide for public-equity and private investors.

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1. Overview

If you have ever furnished an apartment for a one-year job posting, rented 300 chairs and a tent for a wedding, or leased a designer dress for a weekend, you have touched NAICS 532289 — "All Other Consumer Goods Rental." It is the corner of the U.S. economy that rents movable consumer goods — chiefly furniture rental (residential and corporate) and party-and-event rental (tables, chairs, tents, linens, tableware, inflatables), plus miscellaneous consumer-goods rental not classified elsewhere.[1]

A framing point that governs everything below. NAICS 532289 sits inside Sector 53, "Real Estate and Rental and Leasing," so investors instinctively reach for the real-estate toolkit — REITs (real estate investment trusts), cap rates, net operating income, funds from operations. None of it applies here. This industry owns sofas and marquee tents, not income-producing buildings. Real property is a different sector entirely (NAICS 531). There are no REITs in 532289, no property-level rents, and ordinary earnings (not FFO) are the yardstick. The correct lens is rental-and-leasing economics: how hard the rental fleet works (utilization), what it re-sells for at end of life (residual value), how it is financed and depreciated, and whether customers choose to rent rather than own. This primer uses that lens throughout.

Why an investor cares. It is a small (~$7–8 billion), fragmented, largely private, recession-sensitive, logistics-heavy business. That combination means the returns mostly accrue to private operators and private-equity roll-ups, not to a clean public stock. Public-market investors have only oblique, imperfect ways in.

Public vs. private ways in — the short version. There is no listed pure-play. Public investors can reach the category only obliquely (a subscription-rental proxy, a conglomerate that owns the market leader, adjacent rent-to-own chains). Private investors can own it directly — buying or building a furniture- or event-rental company, or backing a regional consolidation platform — which is where the economics are most attractive.

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2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope

NAICS 532289 covers establishments that primarily rent consumer goods except the categories carved out into their own codes. The Census index explicitly places furniture-rental centers and party-rental supply centers here, along with party tents, tableware, linens, carnival games, and inflatables.[1] Classification is at the establishment (individual location) level and follows each location's primary activity — so one diversified company can span several NAICS codes.[1]

What it excludes (the adjacent codes — they matter for investors)

Because 532289 is a residual "all other" code, its most investment-relevant neighbors are defined by exclusion:

The single most important boundary for investors: the large rent-to-own chains — Rent-A-Center and Aaron's — are classified in 532210, not 532289, because their primary activity is electronics/appliances lease-to-own. So the two biggest publicly measurable "furniture-you-rent" firms are not counted in 532289's revenue. This is the chief reason the official figure looks small next to the popular sense of "furniture rental."[1]

Ownership mix

This is an owner-operator and family-business industry, not an institutional one. Of ~5,300 employer establishments (2023), the legal-form counts skew to pass-throughs: roughly 2,920 S-corporations, 1,009 partnerships, 730 C-corporations, and 657 sole proprietorships.[3] Add the ~15,800 nonemployer sole proprietors (below) and the picture is overwhelmingly small business.[4] The one national-scale operator — CORT — is private (owned by Berkshire Hathaway). The consolidators are private-equity roll-ups in event rental, and venture-backed startups in furniture subscription. Pure-play public representation is negligible.

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3. How big it is

All core figures below come from the U.S. Census Bureau (our authoritative ingested statistics).

Sources: 2022 Economic Census[2]; 2023 CBP[3]; SBA[8].

Scale in plain terms. About $7.2 billion of revenue is generated by ~4,200 firms across ~5,300 locations, employing ~44,000 people at roughly $50,000 average pay — consistent with a warehouse-, delivery-, and setup-crew labor model.[3] Revenue grew about +38% from the 2017 Economic Census ($5.2 billion), but much of that reflects post-pandemic price inflation and the rebound of the events channel rather than pure volume growth — a Census historical revenue series shows the industry dipping in 2020 and recovering through 2022.[5][6] A newer (single-source) 2023 federal estimate puts employer revenue near $7.57 billion, directionally confirming continued growth.[7]

The undercount caveat — read this before trusting the headline. Census employer statistics materially understate the economic footprint here, for two reasons:

1. Nonemployers. On top of the employer figures sit roughly 15,800 nonemployer sole proprietors with about $0.79 billion in receipts (2022) — tiny furniture- and party-rental operators with no payroll. Counting them lifts the total to roughly $8 billion and total establishments to ~21,000.[4]
2. Misfiled by code. The biggest "furniture rental" dollars — the rent-to-own chains — sit in 532210, not here. So "how much America spends renting consumer goods" is much larger than 532289's line.

The asset stock. For a rental business the meaningful capital gauge is the rental fleet (the depreciable pool of furniture, tents, chairs, linens), not square footage. No federal source publishes a national fleet count or fleet value for 532289 — both research reports searched and found none, so any nationwide "fleet value" is an estimate. The only disclosed proxies are company-level: CORT reports passing its 100-millionth furniture delivery (2022), and Rent the Runway carries its rental garments as a "rental product" asset (net ~$86 million).[9][10]

Geography. Revenue tracks population and event density — Sun Belt and large-metro states (California, Florida, Georgia) lead — reflecting corporate relocation and the wedding/events economy.

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4. The investable universe

There is no listed pure-play 532289 company. Exposure is oblique, and — an honest caveat — the two research reports did not carry current market caps or dividend yields, so the table gives verified operating metrics and flags what is unavailable rather than inventing prices.

For fleet-economics comparison only (not 532289): the large equipment-rental publics United Rentals (URI) and Herc Holdings (HRI) disclose the exact KPIs — fleet original cost, utilization, rental rates, used-equipment proceeds — that a furniture or party operator should track, and are a useful template for reading any rental business.[21]

Major private / institutional owners. The center of gravity is private: CORT Business Services (Berkshire Hathaway; the national furniture-rental leader, ~1,800+ employees, 100+ U.S. locations, service reach in 80+ countries)[10][11]; party/event roll-ups such as Bright Event Rentals (backed by Trivest; merged with PEAK Event Services) and Curated Events (backed by Kaulig Capital), plus long-standing operators like Party Rental Ltd.[15][16]; and venture-backed furniture-subscription entrants (Feather, Fernish, Oliver Space).[17]

Bottom line: if you want this industry in a brokerage account, your choices are a speculative small-cap (RENT), an immaterial slice of a giant (Berkshire/CORT), or an adjacent rent-to-own name (UPBD). The real, direct exposure is in the private market.

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5. How the money works

Forget rent rolls and cap rates. An owner in 532289 makes money by buying an asset once and renting it many times, then selling it used — an equipment-leasing model applied to sofas and tents. The core levers:

(a) Utilization — the engine. Two versions matter:

• Time (physical) utilization — the share of units out on rent versus idle in the warehouse.
• Dollar utilization — annual rental revenue as a percentage of the fleet's cost. A well-run item should earn back a large fraction of its purchase cost each year, so that after two or three rental cycles it is paid off and anything after is margin.

Party rental adds brutal seasonality: tents and linens earn almost everything in wedding/graduation/holiday season and sit idle the rest of the year, so peak-season utilization must subsidize a long idle tail. A very high utilization rate can even be unhealthy — it may mean the operator lacks inventory to win attractive new bookings. Census publishes no utilization data for 532289; these are company-level metrics.

(b) Rental rates and lifetime yield. The operator prices to recover the item's cost, financing, storage, cleaning/refurbishment, delivery and pickup, and breakage — then a spread. The honest measure of a rental asset is not one month's rent but its lifetime contribution: cumulative rent + ancillary fees (delivery, damage waivers, cleaning) + resale proceeds, minus purchase cost, maintenance, transport, storage, loss, financing, and labor. An asset with a strong monthly rate can still destroy value if it needs constant pickup, cleaning, and repair.

(c) Residual / resale value — the second profit engine. This is distinctive and central. A furniture-rental firm runs a two-sided model: rent the item to earn a yield, then sell it used. CORT institutionalizes this with dedicated clearance centers; Rent the Runway sells garments as they age out of its rental library. When used-goods prices fall, this leg of the profit model compresses — the mirror-image risk (see §9).

(d) Depreciation and fleet financing. Rental goods are capitalized and depreciated over their useful lives, and typically debt- or lease-financed. These two lines — depreciation and interest — are the largest non-labor costs, and they make the industry interest-rate sensitive through financing cost (not through cap rates).

A concrete illustration (Rent the Runway, the one company that discloses the full cycle). In its latest fiscal year it bought $75.9M of rental product, took $59.9M of depreciation and write-offs, and recovered $28.4M selling used items — against $329.8M of revenue and $107.5M gross profit (32.6% margin). Garments are depreciated over ~3 years to a 20% salvage value.[9]

The single most important investor lesson. Both research reports stress it: EBITDA overstates owner economics in this industry, because the fleet physically wears out and must be replaced. If $1 of "EBITDA" requires ongoing inventory purchases just to stand still, the real yield is free cash flow after maintenance fleet capital expenditure, not EBITDA. Underwriting EBITDA as if it were distributable cash is the classic mistake here.

(e) Rental-vs-ownership penetration — the demand lever. The whole industry lives on the spread between renting and owning. Renting wins when mobility is high (frequent movers won't haul furniture), events are one-off (no one buys 300 chairs for one wedding), capital is better deployed elsewhere (corporates staying flexible), or novelty is the point (fashion rental). No federal "rental penetration" rate exists for this category.

(Note on the asset-light cousin, NAICS 533110 — royalty/licensing of patents and trademarks — mentioned only to keep the taxonomy honest: it is a high-margin intangible-royalty business with no physical fleet, and is out of scope for 532289.)

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6. What drives demand

1. Mobility and temporary living. Corporate transferees, students, military households, traveling healthcare/tech workers, disaster recovery, and home staging favor renting over buying-and-hauling. Corporate relocation is CORT's historic backbone. Mobility has softened — the Census reports 11.8% of Americans moved in 2024 (down from 12.1%) — a modest furniture-rental headwind.[18]
2. The events economy. Weddings, festivals, conventions, graduations, and holidays drive party/tent/tabletop rental. This demand is highly seasonal and discretionary — it collapsed in 2020 and rebounded sharply, a major reason 2022 receipts jumped.[5]
3. Corporate/office flexibility and hybrid work. Shorter office leases and pop-up workspaces push companies to rent rather than buy furniture.
4. Short-term rental and staging. Airbnb hosts, home stagers, and model-home operators furnish on rental; CORT has pushed into short-term-rental furnishing.[17]
5. "Access over ownership," sustainability, and subscription familiarity. Younger, urban consumers increasingly prefer subscription access and the reuse/circularity narrative — a plausible tailwind, though no federal data quantifies its revenue contribution.
6. Affordability and thin credit. Lease-to-own demand rises when households need goods but lack cash or credit — the Fed reports only 63% of adults could cover a $400 emergency with cash in 2025. That expands the customer base and raises default/charge-off risk.[19]

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7. Regulation

The regulatory surface here is consumer-finance and consumer-protection law, not real-estate law.

• Consumer Leasing Act (CLA) / Regulation M (12 CFR Part 1013). Requires clear written disclosure of lease terms, limits balloon payments, and governs lease advertising. It covers consumer personal-property leases longer than four months at or below an inflation-indexed dollar cap — $73,400 for 2026 (up from $71,900 in 2025).[14]
• State rent-to-own / rental-purchase statutes. Most states regulate lease-to-own transactions (total cost to own, when the purchase option vests, reinstatement rights, fee caps). These bear most heavily on the rent-to-own adjacency (532210) but touch furniture-rental-with-purchase-option offers; there is no comprehensive federal rent-to-own statute, so national operators need state-by-state compliance.[15]
• Subscriptions / auto-renewal. Online subscription rental falls under the Restore Online Shoppers' Confidence Act (ROSCA) — disclosure, express consent, easy cancellation. The FTC's 2024 "click-to-cancel" rule was vacated in 2025, but negative-option rulemaking remains a live, shifting compliance area.[16]
• Product safety and resale. Upholstered furniture made or reupholstered after mid-2021 must meet a federal smolder-resistance standard (16 CFR Part 1640), and recalled products cannot legally be resold — a direct constraint on the clearance/resale channel.[17]
• Sales/use tax and local permitting. Rental receipts are generally taxable, and event operators face local permitting and fire-code rules for tents and temporary structures.
• Not applicable (stated to prevent mis-transfer): fair-housing law, landlord-tenant law, rent control, zoning, REIT tax rules, and Medicare/CMS durable-medical-equipment reimbursement (that governs 532283, a different code).

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

• Structurally fragmented. With a top-4 firm share of just 9.3%, top-8 at 14.7%, top-20 at 24.0%, top-50 at 35.1%, and a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI — a standard concentration gauge) of 43.5 (versus the 1,500 the DOJ/FTC treat as merely "unconcentrated"), 532289 is one of the least-concentrated industries in the economy. In plain terms: no one dominates, and even the top 50 firms are barely a third of the market.[2]
• Local vs. national. Competition is mostly local — this is a logistics business where transport cost, delivery windows, and warehouse proximity cap the service radius. National scale matters only for corporate relocation, government contracts, national apartment accounts, and multi-city events. CORT is the exception that proves the rule.
• Consolidation, where it happens. The active institutional thesis is private-equity regional roll-ups in event rental — combining local operators to gain route density, shared inventory across markets, purchasing power, and central booking technology (Bright/PEAK, Curated Events).[15][16] In furniture, the disruption came from venture-backed subscription startups (Feather, Fernish, Oliver Space) — with mixed results, given capital-intensive unit economics.[17]
• A data footnote worth knowing: the American Rental Association has petitioned to give event rental its own NAICS code in the 2027 revision, which would eventually break historical comparability of this series.[20]

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9. Risks

(a) Interest-rate sensitivity — real, but through financing, not cap rates. There are no cap rates to expand. Rate risk hits through fleet financing cost: the industry buys or debt-finances depreciating inventory, so higher rates raise the cost of every new sofa, tent, or garment, squeezing dollar-utilization returns and thinly-capitalized small operators. An operator with short-duration floating-rate debt and long fleet-payback periods is especially exposed; Rent the Runway's need to recapitalize its debt is a live example.[9]

(b) Residual-value risk. The rent-then-resell model depends on used-goods prices. A glut of cheap new furniture, retailer liquidations, style shifts, sanitation concerns, or recalls erodes the resale leg and can force write-downs of fleet carrying value. Strong EBITDA alongside persistently weak disposal proceeds is a red flag that useful lives are overstated or replacement is being deferred.

(c) Cyclicality and discretionary demand. Party/event rental is discretionary and event-driven — it fell hard in 2020 and is exposed to recessions, weather, and wedding/event budgets. Corporate furniture rental tracks office demand, relocation volume, and hiring.

(d) Utilization and oversupply. Idle inventory still incurs storage, insurance, depreciation, interest, and obsolescence while earning nothing. Capital-flush entrants (the 2018–2022 furniture-subscription wave) can overbuild fleets ahead of demand.

(e) Labor and logistics. Delivery, setup, teardown, cleaning, and route density are the operational core; wage inflation, driver shortages, fuel, and damage-in-transit pressure a low-margin, ~$50k-average-wage cost base.

(f) Loss, damage, and reverse-logistics cost. Every cycle risks breakage, staining, and shrink; this hidden margin drain has sunk several under-scaled subscription models.

(g) Consumer-credit and single-name risk. Lease-to-own exposure brings late payments, repossession, and charge-offs — worse in downturns. And the market leader (CORT) is buried inside Berkshire with no standalone disclosure, so public-market investors have little transparent, direct exposure.

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10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes

Because the REIT toolkit (dividend yield, price-to-FFO/AFFO, net asset value, price-to-NAV) does not apply, public investors face a thin, oblique menu:

• Rent the Runway (RENT) — the only listed pure subscription-rental play; a small-cap, high-volatility turnaround valued on revenue and subscriber growth, Adjusted EBITDA, and free cash flow — not FFO. Still loss-making and recently recapitalized; speculative and execution-dependent.[9]
• Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A/BRK.B) — the cleanest ownership of category leader CORT, but exposure "in name only" given CORT's immateriality to Berkshire.[10][11]
• Upbound Group (UPBD) — publicly investable rent-to-own that captures much "furniture-you-rent" spend, valued on lease-portfolio yield, charge-offs, and same-store lease revenue — but technically 532210.[12]
• Metrics to actually use for any name here: revenue and subscriber/same-store growth, dollar and time utilization, gross margin after rental-asset depreciation, EBITDA margin, free cash flow after fleet capex, net debt/EBITDA, and resale recovery vs. book value — never cap rates, NOI, FFO, or NAV.

Private-market routes (where the money actually is)

• Direct ownership. Buy or build a furniture- or party-rental company. With ~4,200 employer firms plus ~15,800 nonemployers and an SBA size standard of $12.5 million in receipts, almost the entire industry qualifies as small business — accessible via SBA-financed acquisition, a search fund, or a startup.[8]
• Private-equity roll-ups. Consolidate fragmented regional event-rental operators for route density, shared inventory, and purchasing scale — the live institutional thesis.[15][16]
• Private credit / franchise. Lend against rental fleets, or participate through franchise/partner models.
• Underwrite like an equipment-leasing deal: demand a SKU-level fleet register (cost, age, condition, location), utilization by asset class, disposal proceeds by vintage, damage/loss history, debt advance rates and covenants — and, above all, the fleet purchases required just to maintain revenue. The most common private-investor error is treating accounting EBITDA as distributable cash.

Outlook

(Forward-looking synthesis — judgment grounded in the sourced data, not a Census forecast; no credible federal forecast for 532289 exists.)

• Steady, GDP-plus growth — not hypergrowth. The +38% receipts jump from 2017 to 2022 was largely a post-pandemic events rebound plus inflation and won't repeat at that pace; expect mid-single-digit nominal growth tracking events spending, corporate relocation/office flexibility, and secular "access-over-ownership" adoption.
• Structure stays fragmented; consolidation accelerates at the margin. HHI 43.5 won't move materially, but PE roll-ups in event rental and shakeout among furniture-subscription startups will slowly lift regional concentration.
• Rates and residuals are the swing factors. The near-term earnings path hinges on financing costs (fleet capex is rate-sensitive) and used-goods prices (the residual profit leg). Rate cuts plus a firm secondhand market are the bull case; sticky rates plus weak resale are the bear case.
• Subscription is both the growth frontier and the risk frontier. RTR's return to subscriber growth and positive EBITDA margin, and CORT's push into short-term-rental furnishing, show the model working at scale — but reverse logistics, refurbishment, and residual recovery remain the make-or-break variables that have already broken several under-capitalized entrants.

Bottom line. NAICS 532289 is a small (~$8 billion), fragmented, mostly private, logistics-and-fleet business best understood through rental economics — utilization, residual value, financing cost, and rent-vs-own penetration — not the real-estate/REIT lens. Public investors have almost no clean pure-play (RENT is the exception; leader CORT is buried inside Berkshire). Private operators and PE roll-ups are where the returns accrue, and the winning operator is simply the one who can answer, for every asset: how much has it earned, how often has it moved, what did servicing it cost, and what can it still be sold for?

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, NAICS 2022 — 532289, All Other Consumer Goods Rental (definition, index items, cross-references), 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=532289&year=2022
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Basic Statistics & Concentration, NAICS 532289 (receipts $7,214,792K; firms 4,232; CR4 9.3%, CR8 14.7%, CR20 24.0%, CR50 35.1%; HHI 43.5), released 2024–2025. https://data.census.gov/table/ECNBASIC2022.EC2253BASIC
3. U.S. Census Bureau, 2023 County Business Patterns, NAICS 532289 (establishments 5,321; employees 43,881; annual payroll $2,185,038K; Q1 payroll $446,679K; legal-form and size detail), 2023. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
4. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Nonemployer Statistics, NAICS 532289 (15,828 establishments; receipts $788,102K), 2024. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/nonemployer-statistics.html
5. U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Economic Census, NAICS 532289 (receipts $5,226,480K — basis for the ~+38% 2017→2022 change), 2019–2020. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census/year/2017.html
6. U.S. Census Bureau / Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), Total Revenue for All Other Consumer Goods Rental, Employer Firms (Service Annual Survey: 2019 $5.35bn; 2020 $4.38bn; 2021 $5.48bn; 2022 $6.83bn; legacy 532299 identifier). https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/REVEF532299ALLEST
7. U.S. Census Bureau, 2023 Annual Integrated Economic Survey (AIES), NAICS 532289 (employer revenue ~$7.569bn), 2023. https://data.census.gov/table/AIESNONEMP2023.AIES00NONEMP?codeset=naics~532289
8. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards Matched to NAICS Codes — 532289 = $12.5 million average annual receipts (recently adjusted upward for inflation), 13 CFR 121.201. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
9. Rent the Runway, Inc., Fiscal 2025 Form 10-K & Q4/FY results (year ended Jan 31, 2026: revenue $329.8M; ~143,800 active subscribers; gross profit $107.5M / 32.6% margin; Adj. EBITDA ~$24.9M; net rental product $86.0M; rental-product purchases $75.9M, resale $28.4M, depreciation/write-offs $59.9M; recapitalization). U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1468327/000146832726000020/wdq-20260131.htm
10. CORT (a Berkshire Hathaway company), About CORT (national furniture-rental leader; 100+ U.S. locations; service in 80+ countries; 1,800+ employees; 100-millionth delivery in 2022; clearance/resale channel). https://www.cort.com/about-cort/
11. Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2025 Form 10-K (CORT as a leading national rent-to-rent furniture provider; not separately disclosed). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000119312526083899/brka-20251231.htm
12. Upbound Group, Inc. (Rent-A-Center, Acima), 2025 Form 10-K (~$4.7bn consolidated revenue; ~2,075 Rent-A-Center locations; 35,000+ Acima retailer locations; primarily NAICS 532210). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933036/000093303626000008/upbd-20251231.htm
13. The Aaron's Company, Inc., 2023 Form 10-K and IQVentures merger-closing announcement (revenue ~$1.55bn in 2023; taken private Oct 3, 2024 at $10.10/share, ~$504M enterprise value). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1821393/000182139324000012/aan-20231231.htm
14. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau & Federal Reserve, Consumer Leasing Act / Regulation M, 12 CFR Part 1013 and 2026 dollar-threshold release ($73,400 for 2026; $71,900 for 2025; consumer personal-property leases >4 months). https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1013/; https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20251215a.htm
15. Bright Event Rentals / Trivest, Partnership with Trivest and acquisition of PEAK Event Services (PE-backed event-rental roll-up), 2024; and state rent-to-own statute framework (per Upbound 10-K). https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240319307679/en/
16. Kaulig Capital, Curated Events portfolio profile (multi-market event-rental platform); Federal Trade Commission, Negative Option / ROSCA materials (2024 "click-to-cancel" rule vacated 2025). https://www.kauligcapital.com/portfolio-companies/curated-events/; https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/rules/negative-option-rule
17. Global Insight Services / Future Market Insights (secondary vendors), Furniture Rental Service Market (Feather, Fernish, Oliver Space; CORT–Airbnb short-term-rental furnishing — scope differs from Census, use directionally); U.S. CPSC, Upholstered Furniture Standard (16 CFR 1640) and resale of recalled products. https://www.globalinsightservices.com/reports/furniture-rental-service-market/; https://www.cpsc.gov/FAQ/Upholstered-Furniture
18. U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey migration data, 2024 (11.8% of Americans moved in 2024, down from 12.1% in 2023). https://www.census.gov/topics/population/migration/guidance/acs-1yr.html
19. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2025 (63% could cover a $400 emergency expense with cash). https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2026-economic-well-being-of-us-households-in-2025-executive-summary.htm
20. American Rental Association, Comment Letter on Proposed 2027 NAICS Classification for Event Rental, 2025. https://cloud.ararental.org/Portals/0/XF/GovernmentAffairs/ARA_CommentLetter_2027NAICSproposal.pdf
21. United Rentals, 2025 Form 10-K and Herc Holdings, 2025 Form 10-K (equipment-rental KPIs — fleet original cost, utilization, rental rate, used-equipment proceeds — as a template for reading any rental fleet). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047166/000106770126000007/uri-20251231.htm