Consumer Goods Rental (United States)

NAICS 2022 industry group 5322 — an investor's rollup primer for public-market and private investors

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1. Overview

NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) 5322 — "Consumer Goods Rental" — is the four-digit slice of the government's classification that covers renting stuff to households: appliances and electronics, furniture, medical equipment, boats and bikes, tuxedos, and (what's left of) movie discs. It books about $22.2 billion of employer revenue across roughly 8,651 firms, 15,762 locations, and 115,060 workers [1][2]. It sits inside Sector 53, "Real Estate and Rental and Leasing."

The group has just two children, and they could hardly be less alike:

• 53221 — Consumer Electronics & Appliances Rental (~25% of the group): the rent-to-own business — televisions, refrigerators, washers and dryers rented weekly to households that can't easily get a credit card or bank loan [3].
• 53228 — Other Consumer Goods Rental (~75% of the group): a grab-bag of five unrelated rental businesses — furniture and party/event rental, home-health equipment, recreational gear, formalwear, and video discs — stapled together because none fits anywhere else [4].

The single most important thing to carry into everything below: despite the sector name, none of this is a real-estate business, and there is no REIT anywhere in the group. (REIT = real estate investment trust, a pass-through landlord that must distribute ~90% of taxable income and is valued on FFO/AFFO — funds from operations / adjusted — and price-to-NAV — net asset value.) These firms rent movable personal property — appliances, sofas, oxygen machines, boats, garments — not income-producing buildings. So the real-estate toolkit the sector name invites — REITs, NOI (net operating income = a property's rent minus its operating costs), cap rates (capitalization rate = the income yield a property throws off relative to its price), FFO, NAV — applies to no operator in either child. The correct lenses are rental-and-leasing: how many times you can re-rent a physical asset before it wears out (fleet economics), and — in rent-to-own — the credit spread you earn lending to a subprime customer.

Why the group is worth an investor's time is the contrast between its two halves. They point in opposite directions on almost every axis that matters — concentration, ownership, how you invest, and, most fundamentally, how the money is actually made. This primer lays those differences side by side, then treats the group as a whole. The headline: under one four-digit code sit three different economic engines — a subprime consumer lender (rent-to-own), a fleet-rental operator (furniture, recreational, formalwear, video), and a Medicare-reimbursement network (home-health equipment) — and the group's single published concentration number describes none of them.

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2. What's inside — and how the two children differ

This is where the analysis lives. The table compares the two children on the axes an investor cares about. Federal revenue and firm figures are 2022 Economic Census; direction and ownership are synthesized from the child primers [1][6][7].

Shares are of the group's ~$22.2B employer receipts [1]. Read the table as three sharp contrasts.

1. Concentration runs to opposite extremes. Rent-to-own (53221) is one of the most concentrated industries in the whole economy — its top four firms take 81.5% of revenue [6]. "Other consumer goods" (53228) is the opposite — its top four take just 24.3%, and two of its slices (furniture, recreational) sit near the theoretical floor of fragmentation [7]. The group's blended concentration therefore describes neither child (Section 3).

2. The economics are three different businesses under one roof. Line up the group's biggest sub-slices by revenue and the point is stark: furniture/party rental (~$7.2B, ~32% of the group), home-health equipment (~$5.9B, ~26%), and rent-to-own electronics/appliances (~$5.5B, ~25%) are the three heavyweights — and each runs on a completely different engine [1][6][7]:

• Rent-to-own earns a credit spread on households excluded from mainstream finance; its profit turns on non-payment losses, not on renting an asset many times.
• Furniture, recreational, formalwear, and video are fleet-rental — buy an asset once, rent it repeatedly, resell it used; profit turns on utilization and residual value.
• Home-health equipment is a reimbursement annuity — the "rent" on an oxygen machine or hospital bed is a price Medicare sets, not a market rate, so it behaves like a healthcare network with policy risk in place of demand risk.

3. Ownership and investability diverge just as hard. The two truly clean listed pure-plays in the entire group are both in the smaller child (rent-to-own's Upbound and PROG Holdings). In the larger child, only home health offers listed operators; furniture, recreational, formalwear, and video are private-market, indirect, pending, or (for video) uninvestable. Public exposure clusters exactly where concentration is highest — rent-to-own and home health — while the fragmented consumer slices stay private.

One thing unites both children: they rent depreciating personal property, so the machinery underneath is fleet- and credit-based, never property-based. There is no building as the earning asset, hence no occupancy, no NOI, no cap rate, no REIT anywhere in the group.

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3. Size (this level's federal figures)

Ground-truth federal figures for the group (our ingested statistics; prefer these) [1][2]:

County Business Patterns (CBP) counts employer locations, employment, and payroll; the Economic Census (every five years) is the authoritative revenue and firm-count source. The two children add up cleanly — establishments (4,436 + 11,326 = 15,762) and employees (22,867 + 92,193 = 115,060) tie out exactly, and revenue nearly so ($5.54B + $16.70B ≈ $22.24B). Firm counts don't perfectly sum (434 + 8,249 = 8,683 vs. 8,651) because a firm active in both children is counted once at the group level [1][6][7].

Concentration — and why the single group number is a trap. The group's published figures:

The HHI — the standard antitrust concentration gauge, which squares and sums each firm's market share and runs from near 0 (perfectly fragmented) to 10,000 (monopoly), with regulators treating anything below 1,500 as "unconcentrated" — is 313.1, which reads as a fragmented, competitive industry [1]. (Unusually, Census published the group HHI even though it suppressed both children's HHIs; we report only what the government released and never state a suppressed value.) But that low, tidy number is a blend that describes neither child. It averages a hyper-concentrated rent-to-own business (CR4 81.5%, a near-duopoly at the top) against a sprawling, fragmented "other goods" business (CR4 24.3%) — and the fragmented child, at 75% of revenue, dominates the average. Treat the group's 33.2% CR4 as a statistical artifact, not a description of how any of these markets actually behaves.

The undercount — read this before quoting a market size. Federal employer statistics classify each location by its primary activity, so they systematically miss rental revenue earned inside businesses coded as something else — and here the miss runs both ways:

• Understated by small owners (the fragmented consumer tail). Like every industry full of individually owned, pass-through businesses — the same reason official statistics understate small residential landlords — this group is full of tiny operators the employer surveys skip. Separate Nonemployer Statistics add roughly 1,700 no-employee rent-to-own filers (~$155M) and, in "other goods," a nonemployer tail of 25,000+ establishments and well over $1.2 billion in furniture, recreational, and formalwear rental [5]. Counting them, the group's true footprint is likely north of $23–24 billion across 40,000+ locations, most with no payroll.
• Understated by big operators (rent-to-own and home health). The largest rent-to-own chains' furniture, computer, and phone rentals are coded outside 53221, and "virtual" lessors that originate a lease inside a retailer's checkout are counted under retail — so broader measures put the whole rent-to-own economy near $10–12 billion, not the strict $5.54B [10]. Likewise, home-health rental revenue is scattered across retail, wholesale, and health-services codes: Medicare alone spent ~$7.5 billion on durable medical equipment in 2022 — more than the entire 532283 Census figure — because that spend spans several NAICS cells [16].

Net: read $22.2 billion as an honest floor on the employer-classified core, not a ceiling on the real "consumer goods rental" economy, which — counting the broader rent-to-own and home-health footprints plus the nonemployer tail — is meaningfully larger.

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4. The investable universe

There is no REIT and no single stock that is this group. Public value concentrates in exactly two of the group's slices — rent-to-own and home health — which happen to be the two most concentrated. Everywhere else, exposure is pending, indirect, a proxy, or nonexistent. Per house style, tickers and valuation appear only here and in Section 10.

The two clean listed pure-plays — rent-to-own (53221). These are the only names that are a child of this group and nothing else. Both are small-caps and ordinary taxable corporations, not REITs, with modest dividends [8][9]:

Yields are point-in-time snapshots (mid-July 2026), not forecasts; reserve them for the investing sections. The #3 operator, The Aaron's Company (~1,210 stores), was taken private by fintech IQVentures in October 2024 (~$504M enterprise value) and delisted; below the leaders is a fragmented base of independents and franchisees represented by APRO (Association of Progressive Rental Organizations) [6].

The one listed slice inside "other goods" — home-health equipment (532283). Small- to mid-cap operating companies, valued on EV/EBITDA (enterprise value to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) and free cash flow, not yield [13][14]:

• AdaptHealth (AHCO, Nasdaq) — closest public pure-play; sleep/respiratory/diabetes; ~$3.25B revenue, ~4.3M patients [13]
• Accendra Health (ACH, NYSE) — ex-Owens & Minor; Apria + Byram; home-medical pure-play, ~$2.76B [14]
• Quipt / Viemed / Inogen (QIPT / VMD / INGN) — smaller specialized respiratory/oxygen operators [13]
• Lincare — the largest U.S. respiratory operator, but buried inside industrial-gas giant Linde (LIN) [14]

The pending window — formalwear (532281). Tailored Brands (Men's Wearhouse + Jos. A. Bank; controlled by credit fund Silver Point) filed in July 2026 for an estimated ~$500M IPO under proposed Nasdaq ticker MENW — a menswear retailer with an embedded high-margin rental segment, and the first meaningful public window into formalwear rental in years [15].

Indirect and proxy — recreational (532284) and furniture/party (532289). No pure-plays. Recreational is reachable only through diversified parents where rental is a small line — Brunswick (BC; Freedom Boat Club), Lyft (LYFT; Citi Bike), Vail Resorts (MTN) — plus EPR Properties (EPR), an experiential REIT that is the one true real-estate route in the whole group (you own the property and collect rent, not the fleet) [17]. Furniture's national leader, CORT, is immaterial inside Berkshire Hathaway (BRK); Rent the Runway (RENT) is the closest listed read on rental-subscription economics [18].

No universe at all — video (532282). Every scale operator is gone (Redbox liquidated 2024; Netflix-DVD ended 2023); the only "exposure" is owning the streamers that killed it [7].

Major private / institutional owners across the group: Aaron's (IQVentures) and the APRO franchisee tail in rent-to-own; Rotech (300+ locations) in home health; CORT (Berkshire) and PE event-rental roll-ups in furniture/party; Jim's Formal Wear (employee-owned via an ESOP — employee stock ownership plan), The Black Tux, and Generation Tux in formalwear; the merged Boatsetter/Getmyboat marketplace and PE roll-ups like Christy Sports in recreational [6][7][14][18]. Bottom line: in a brokerage account, rent-to-own (UPBD, PRG) and home-health operators (AHCO et al.) are the only clean listed exposure; everything else is a private-market game or an indirect thematic tilt.

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5. How the money works (shared economics, three divergent engines)

Start with what does not apply. Because there is no building as the earning asset, none of the real-estate machinery describes any operator here: no occupancy, no NOI, no cap rate, no FFO/AFFO, no price-to-NAV. Both children own depreciating goods, and that depreciation is a real economic cost of earning revenue — unlike building depreciation, which FFO adds back because buildings hold value. So across the whole group, EBITDA overstates owner economics, because the fleet (or merchandise) physically wears out and must be replaced. The honest yield is free cash flow after maintenance fleet/merchandise capital expenditure, and underwriting EBITDA as distributable cash is the classic mistake in every corner of this group [7][20].

Now the three engines that share the roof:

Engine 1 — the consumer-credit spread (rent-to-own / 53221). A customer takes home a fridge, TV, or laptop with no credit check and no long-term commitment, paying small weekly or monthly installments; they can return it anytime or reach ownership by finishing the schedule (typically ~7–30 months) [8]. The full rent-to-own price commonly runs 2–3× the cash retail price — a spread that must cover non-payment losses on a subprime base, merchandise depreciation to near-zero salvage, service, and the cost of financing the fleet. The single most important profit driver is charge-offs (merchandise losses), not utilization or resale value — in 2025, store-based Rent-A-Center lost ~4.7% of revenue to charge-offs, virtual Acima ~9.5% [8][9]. This is a subprime consumer lender wearing rental clothing; its whole legal structure rests on the deal being a terminable lease, not a credit sale (Section 7).

Engine 2 — fleet rental (furniture, recreational, formalwear, video within 53228). Buy an asset once, rent it many times, resell it used. Four levers govern it [7]:

• Utilization — days on rent ÷ days available, and rental revenue ÷ the asset's original cost. Most of this half is acutely seasonal (weddings/proms, summer/winter peaks), so peak-season utilization must subsidize a long idle tail.
• Rental rate — high relative to asset cost because demand is peaky and often experiential.
• Residual (resale) value — a genuine profit lever and risk: furniture and recreational operators run assets a few seasons and sell them used (the used-boat market alone turned over ~$10.2B in 2024), while formalwear has fashion risk and video discs trend to zero [7][19].
• Rent-vs-own penetration — renting wins when the asset is expensive, bulky, or used a few days a year; it collapsed in video because the real choice became stream vs. rent a disc.

Engine 3 — the reimbursement annuity (home-health equipment / 532283). The "rent" on an oxygen concentrator or hospital bed is an administered Medicare price, not a market rate, layered with a high-margin resupply stream (CPAP masks, oxygen tubing). Oxygen rents up to 36 months, standard capped-rental items up to 13 months, after which title logic changes [16]. This is a healthcare-reimbursement network built on depreciating devices — policy risk replaces demand risk, and it barely behaves like a rental shop at all.

Asset-light variants appear at the edges (mostly in recreational): membership clubs (members fund the fleet via dues), franchising (royalties), and peer-to-peer (P2P) marketplaces (own no assets, take a commission) — all of which push return on capital up by not owning the fleet [7]. The through-line for investors: every dollar of value in this group is earned either by lending to a customer, by re-renting a depreciating asset, or by billing an insurer — never by owning appreciating real estate.

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6. Demand drivers

Drivers differ so much between (and within) the children that the only honest summary is a split one — but a common theme runs underneath: access over ownership, for very different reasons.

• Exclusion from mainstream credit (rent-to-own). The core driver: the FDIC's (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) 2023 survey found 4.2% of U.S. households unbanked and 15.7% with no mainstream credit, and the Federal Reserve found 45% of adults lacked a three-month emergency fund — so a broken appliance can force a no-down-payment rental. The model is countercyclical on volume, procyclical on credit: downturns push more households toward rent-to-own (demand up) while straining their ability to pay (losses up) [11].
• Demographics (home health). The 65-and-older population passed 61 million (18% of the U.S.) in 2024 and is rising, with chronic respiratory disease and sleep apnea affecting tens of millions — largely non-discretionary demand and the group's most durable tailwind [19].
• Weddings and events (formalwear + party rental). ~2 million U.S. marriages a year drive tuxedo and tent/table/chair rental — highly seasonal and, for party rental, discretionary [7].
• The experience economy (recreational + furniture). A ~$697 billion outdoor-recreation economy and younger, mobile consumers who rent bulky gear rather than buy and store it; corporate relocation and office flexibility feed furniture rental [19].
• Technology substitution — negative (video). Streaming took demand to zero: subscription video-on-demand hit ~$52 billion in 2024 while physical discs fell to ~1.6% of home entertainment [19].

So one four-digit code contains a subprime-credit engine, a recession-proof demographic compounder, a couple of pro-cyclical experience plays, a seasonal events business, and a category killed by technology.

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7. Regulation

None of the real-estate regulatory apparatus applies — no REIT tax rules, fair-housing or landlord-tenant law, rent control, or zoning touches either child. The regimes that do matter are child-specific, and the two heaviest are the two that govern the group's public exposure:

• Consumer-finance recharacterization (rent-to-own — the existential regime). Everything rests on one legal fact: a rent-to-own agreement is a terminable lease, not a credit sale, which keeps it outside the Truth in Lending Act's (TILA) APR-disclosure rules and outside state usury (interest-rate) caps. About 46–47 states have rental-purchase statutes treating it as a lease; roughly 11 cap total payments at ~2.0–2.4× cash price. If a court or regulator recharacterized these deals as credit, usury ceilings could compress or erase the margin — the industry's defining tail risk. Federal touchpoints: the FTC's (Federal Trade Commission) $175M Progressive Leasing settlement (2020) and the CFPB's (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) 2024 suit against Acima, dismissed with prejudice in May 2025 (a New York Attorney General suit remains open) [8][12].
• Medicare/CMS reimbursement (home health — the other heavy regime). For home-health equipment, payment policy is the regulatory regime: CMS (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services) fee schedules, the DMEPOS competitive-bidding program (durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies — with a new round due by January 2028), a 2026 enrollment moratorium, accreditation, and surety bonds dominate the economics [16].
• The lighter, child-specific regimes in "other goods": EPA's dry-cleaning solvent phase-out (formalwear), the Video Privacy Protection Act and first-sale doctrine (video), Coast Guard and e-bike permit rules (recreational), and the Consumer Leasing Act / Regulation M for longer personal-property leases (furniture/party) [7]. Sales/rental tax on tangible personal property applies across the board.

The common thread: the two regulatory forces that can move most of this group's earnings — consumer-finance recharacterization and Medicare fee policy — are external price/legal risks, not property regulation. That is the opposite of how regulation hits a real-estate business.

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8. Consolidation

The consolidation story is as divergent as the economics:

• Rent-to-own — already consolidated at the top. CR4 of 81.5% is the fingerprint. The defining move was Rent-A-Center's $1.65 billion acquisition of Acima (2021), converting a store chain into a virtual-first platform and cementing a virtual lease-to-own duopoly (Acima + Progressive Leasing). Corporate reshuffling since — Aaron's split (2020), Rent-A-Center → Upbound (2023), Aaron's taken private (2024) — has left just two listed pure-plays [6][8][9].
• "Other goods" — three different regimes at once. Home health is a relentless, reimbursement-driven roll-up (scale is the only margin lever when prices are capped externally — AdaptHealth grew via 100+ deals — though top-end M&A now hits an antitrust ceiling). Formalwear consolidated at the top years ago. Recreational and furniture/party are among the least-consolidated industries in the economy, nationalizing only at the margin (P2P marketplace mergers, PE resort and event-rental roll-ups). Video is terminal — consolidation ran its full arc into liquidation [7].

The group-level CR4 of 33.2% therefore describes a blend, not a shared trend — a hyper-concentrated rent-to-own child and a concentrated healthcare slice, averaged against two ultra-fragmented consumer slices [1].

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9. Risks

The signature real-estate risks — vacancy, oversupply, cap-rate expansion, mortgage-refinancing walls — do not apply at the property level to either child, because there is no property portfolio. The real risk stack is credit-, fleet-, and reimbursement-specific:

1. Two dominant, different engines of risk. For ~25% of the group (rent-to-own), the dominant risk is consumer-credit / charge-off — customer default on a stretched subprime base — plus the regulatory-recharacterization tail. For the ~26% in home health, the dominant risk is Medicare reimbursement policy — a fee cut or widened competitive-bidding round can compress revenue on a fixed cost base overnight (the functional equivalent of cap-rate risk, but set by regulators, not markets). Neither is a property risk, and an investor must underwrite which engine they are buying [8][12][16].
2. Residual-value / obsolescence risk (universal). Every operator owns depreciating assets whose resale value can collapse — fashion (formalwear), format death (video), technology and recalls (electronics, home-health devices), soft used-asset prices (boats, furniture) [7][8].
3. End-market direction risk (the group's defining split). The label hides a demographic compounder (home health), a subprime-credit play (rent-to-own), a couple of experience-economy growers, a slow decliner (formalwear), and a corpse (video) — in one four-digit code [7].
4. Seasonality and weather (formalwear, recreational, party rental) — peak-sized fleets sit idle off-season, and a rainy summer or cancelled-events shock can erase a season against fixed costs [7].
5. Interest-rate risk — financial, not real-estate. There is no cap-rate or mortgage channel and no property NAV to mark down. Rate risk enters through fleet/merchandise financing and corporate leverage (rent-to-own carries floating-rate debt; home-health platforms run ~2.5–3.0× leverage), and through cooler discretionary demand — the opposite of how rates hit a REIT [7][8].
6. Thin margins and small scale. Outside the concentrated slices, average revenue is ~$1–2M per firm, leaving the fragmented tail little cushion for the fleet-replacement capex that EBITDA conveniently ignores [1].
7. Substitution and platform risk — streaming ended video; buy-now-pay-later competes with rent-to-own; direct-to-consumer sellers attack home-health resupply; P2P marketplaces can commoditize recreational operators [7][8].

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10. How to invest & outlook

Public-market investors

• Do not use REIT tools on any operator. No FFO/AFFO, NOI, cap rate, or price-to-NAV applies — there is no REIT and no income property in the group. Value operators on EV/EBITDA and free cash flow after fleet/merchandise capex, and do not add merchandise depreciation back as if it were building depreciation, because the goods genuinely wear out [8][20].
• The two clean listed pure-plays are in rent-to-own: Upbound Group (UPBD) and PROG Holdings (PRG) — small-cap taxable corps carrying a subprime-credit and legal-overhang discount; Upbound's ~7% yield is risk-bearing, not bond-like. Two micro-caps (KPLT, FPAY) for the risk-tolerant [8][9].
• Home-health operators are the only clean listed exposure inside "other goods" and the group's other growth engine: AdaptHealth (AHCO) as the closest pure-play, with Accendra (ACH), Quipt (QIPT), Viemed (VMD), Inogen (INGN) — priced with a reimbursement-risk discount, never as yield vehicles [13][14].
• Emerging and indirect windows: the Tailored Brands IPO (Nasdaq: MENW, pending) is the one opening into formalwear; recreational and furniture are thematic tilts via Brunswick (BC), Lyft (LYFT), Vail (MTN), Rent the Runway (RENT), and Berkshire (BRK, for CORT in name only) [15][17][18]. EPR Properties (EPR) is the sole genuine real-estate route — an experiential REIT where the full property toolkit applies, because you're buying the landlord, not the rental business [17]. Video is un-investable as a going concern [7].

Private investors

• Most of the group's value lives here. Own or franchise a rent-to-own store (underwrite vintage cash-on-cash returns, not reported revenue); pursue home-health roll-ups (returns from purchasing scale and reimbursement-backed leverage — underwrite payer mix and transferable Medicare enrollment); or run PE roll-ups of event/party rental and resort recreational operators for route density [6][7][14].
• Underwrite like a lender or an equipment-leasing deal, not a real-estate deal. In rent-to-own, that means private credit against eligible leases and merchandise, sizing advance rates to customer concentration, vintage performance, and state-law enforceability. In "other goods," demand a SKU-level fleet register, utilization by asset class in peak and off-peak, disposal proceeds by vintage, and — above all — the fleet capex required just to hold revenue flat [6][7].
• The real-estate angle, where any, is the building — own the storefront or warehouse and lease it to an operator (a conventional net-lease deal on tenant credit), which is a Sector-531 real-estate investment separate from the rental economics [17].

Outlook

The group's future is a weighted average of two divergent halves, and both heavy sub-slices point up. In "other goods" (~75%), the two heavyweights — home-health equipment and furniture/party — should keep growing on demographics and events/access-over-ownership, while recreational grows low-to-mid single digits, formalwear shrinks slowly (with the Tailored Brands IPO as its swing catalyst), and video drifts to a small nostalgia floor. Rent-to-own (~25%) is roughly flat-to-modest, with virtual lease-to-own continuing to take share from staffed stores and a regulatory overhang that eased with the 2025 CFPB dismissal but never fully cleared. Expect the group's blended concentration to stay low as a statistical artifact. The two swing factors that move most of the group's earnings are the subprime consumer (watch rent-to-own charge-offs and GMV — gross merchandise volume) and Medicare policy (watch fee schedules and competitive bidding) — not interest rates in isolation, and never a cap rate.

The one-line takeaway: NAICS 5322 staples together a subprime rent-to-own lender (~25% of revenue) and a grab-bag of five personal-property rental businesses (~75%) — none of them real estate, no REIT anywhere — running on three different engines: a consumer-credit spread, fleet utilization, and Medicare reimbursement. The group's single published concentration number (CR4 33.2%, HHI 313.1) is a blend that describes neither child. Buy the child — better yet, the sub-industry — not the code.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau — 2022 Economic Census, Concentration by Largest Firms, NAICS 5322 and children 53221 / 53228 (group receipts $22.237B; 8,651 firms; CR4 33.2%, CR8 39.8%, CR20 46.2%, CR50 54.1%; group HHI 313.1; child receipts and concentration ratios). Ingested as Histometrics ground-truth statistics for NAICS 5322. https://data.census.gov/
2. U.S. Census Bureau — County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 5322 and children (15,762 establishments; 115,060 employees; $5.718B annual payroll; $1.303B Q1 payroll). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau — NAICS 2022 Manual, Industry Group 5322 and Industry 53221 (scope, hierarchy, adjacent codes). https://www.census.gov/naics/
4. U.S. Census Bureau — NAICS 2022 Manual, Industry 53228 and children 532281 / 532282 / 532283 / 532284 / 532289 (scope and boundaries incl. 458110, 532210, 533110). https://www.census.gov/naics/
5. U.S. Census Bureau — Nonemployer Statistics 2022, NAICS 53221 and 53228 children (rent-to-own ~1,702 filers / ~$155M; furniture/party ~15,800 / ~$788M; recreational ~8,885 / ~$369M; formalwear ~587 / ~$33M). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/nonemployer-statistics.html
6. Histometrics — NAICS 53221 primer, Consumer Electronics & Appliances Rental (rent-to-own) (operating models, concentration CR4 81.5%, ownership, Aaron's take-private, APRO tail). Synthesized child primer.
7. Histometrics — NAICS 53228 primer, Other Consumer Goods Rental (five child industries, child-level receipts/concentration, fleet economics, reimbursement annuity, regulation, consolidation). Synthesized child primer.
8. Upbound Group, Inc. — Form 10-K, FY2025 (Acima/Rent-A-Center segment revenue, GMV, charge-offs, depreciation policy, debt, dividend, state-law summary). U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933036/000093303626000008/upbd-20251231.htm
9. PROG Holdings, Inc. — Form 10-K, FY2025 (Progressive Leasing revenue/GMV, write-offs, merchant concentration, dividend). U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1808834/000180883426000012/prg-20251231.htm
10. APRO (Association of Progressive Rental Organizations) 2025 State of the Rent-to-Own Industry; IBISWorld; Census Annual Services Survey (broader rent-to-own economy ~$10–12B). https://www.rtohq.org/
11. U.S. FDIC — 2023 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households (4.2% unbanked; 15.7% no mainstream credit); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System — Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2024 (45% lack a three-month emergency fund). https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/household-survey; https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/
12. U.S. FTC — Progressive Leasing $175M settlement (2020); CFPB Acima action (filed 2024, dismissed with prejudice 2025); New York State Attorney General Acima suit (2024). https://www.ftc.gov/; https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/acima-allred/
13. AdaptHealth Corp. — Form 10-K, FY2025 (revenue ~$3.245B; ~4.3M patients; patient-equipment depreciation; FCF), with Viemed/Quipt/Inogen FY2025 10-Ks. U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1725255/000162828026011213/ahco-20251231.htm
14. Owens & Minor / Accendra Health, Inc. — Form 10-K, FY2025 (Patient Direct $2.762B; Apria/Byram; Rotech deal terminated 2025); Linde plc 2025 Annual Report (Lincare). U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/75252/000110465926018169/omi-20251231x10k.htm
15. U.S. SEC — Tailored Brands, Inc. Form S-1 (July 2026; rental ~15% of ~$2.53B sales, ~30% of EBITDA; Silver Point control) and IPO filing (proposed Nasdaq: MENW). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2045151/000121390026077111/ea0285017-05.htm
16. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) — Payment Basics: Durable Medical Equipment (~$7.5B Medicare DME spend CY2022; 13-month capped rental; 36-month oxygen cap); Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services — DMEPOS Competitive Bidding and Provider Enrollment Moratoria. https://www.medpac.gov/; https://www.cms.gov/medicare/payment/fee-schedules/dmepos-competitive-bidding
17. Brunswick Corporation Form 10-K FY2025 (Freedom Boat Club); Vail Resorts Form 10-K FY2025; Lyft / Citi Bike; EPR Properties 2025 Year-End Results (experiential REIT). U.S. SEC EDGAR / company filings. https://www.sec.gov/; https://investors.eprkc.com/
18. Rent the Runway, Inc. Form 10-K FY2025; CORT (a Berkshire Hathaway company) and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2025 Form 10-K (CORT not separately disclosed). https://www.sec.gov/; https://www.cort.com/about-cort/
19. U.S. Census Bureau Older Adults Outnumber Children (65+ = 61.2M / 18.0% in 2024); U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Outdoor Recreation Economic Statistics 2024 ($696.7B, 2.4% of GDP); Digital Entertainment Group 2024 year-end report (SVOD ~$52.2B; physical discs ~1.6% of home entertainment). https://www.census.gov/; https://www.bea.gov/
20. Nareit / IRS — REIT distribution requirement (~90% of taxable income) and glossary of FFO, AFFO, NOI, cap rate, NAV (cited to explain non-applicability across NAICS 5322). https://www.reit.com/investing/reit-basics