Credit Card Issuing (United States) — NAICS 522210

An investor's primer. Relevant to both public-market and private investors.

NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) code 522210 covers firms whose main business is issuing credit cards and lending to the people who carry them. In plain terms: these are the lenders behind the card in your wallet — the companies that decide your credit limit, set your interest rate, and get paid back (or write off the loss) when you spend and borrow.

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1. Overview

A credit card issuer is a lender first and a payments company second. It extends a revolving line of credit, funds each purchase up front, earns interest when a customer carries a balance, collects fees, takes a small cut of every swipe, and absorbs the loss when a borrower defaults. It is one of the most profitable forms of consumer lending in the country — and one of the most cyclical.

The U.S. carries a record ~$1.28 trillion in credit card balances as of Q4 2025, the highest since the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (NY Fed) began tracking the figure in 1999.[1] Card lending is enormously concentrated: a handful of issuers control most of it.

Why an investor cares. Card issuing throws off high returns on the loans it makes, but those returns swing with the economy — losses rise fast in a downturn and margins compress when funding costs climb. It is a bet on the U.S. consumer, on interest rates, and on underwriting skill. The central question is not card spending alone; it is whether interest, interchange, and fee income exceeds funding costs, rewards, credit losses, servicing, technology, marketing, and compliance.

Public vs. private ways in. For public-market investors this is an unusually clean sector: a few large-cap pure-plays plus card divisions buried inside the big banks. For private investors, direct entry is hard — issuing requires a bank charter and billions in capital — but private capital participates heavily through asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by card receivables, private-credit funds that buy or finance card portfolios, and fintech / "card-as-a-service" lenders that partner with a chartered bank. These routes differ materially in liquidity, disclosure, leverage, and loss exposure. (Tickers, scale, and valuation detail are in Sections 4 and 10.)

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2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. NAICS 522210 comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing credit by issuing credit cards; "credit card banks" are explicitly included.[2] The economic activity is consumer and small-business lending on a revolving line, plus the fee and interchange income that comes with running the account.

Anatomy of a transaction. A single card purchase involves four parties:

• the issuer, which underwrites the customer, funds the receivable, and bears the credit risk;
• the cardholder, who either pays in full or revolves (carries) the balance;
• the merchant and its acquiring bank, which accept and settle the payment;
• the payment network (Visa, Mastercard, American Express, Discover), which routes the transaction and sets the rules.

The issuer is not necessarily the network. Visa and Mastercard are primarily network-and-processing businesses that take no credit risk. American Express combines issuing, merchant acquiring, and its own network (a "closed loop"). Discover's network and issuing assets became part of Capital One when that acquisition closed in May 2025.[2][6]

What it excludes (adjacent NAICS codes — important, because the boundaries hide most of the real money):

• 522110 Commercial Banking — diversified deposit-taking banks. Chase, Bank of America, Citi, Wells Fargo, and U.S. Bank are the largest card issuers in America, but at the enterprise level they are classified here, not in 522210. This is the single biggest reason the federal 522210 statistics undercount the industry (see Section 3).[2]

• 522320 Financial Transactions Processing, Reserve, and Clearinghouse Activities — the payment networks and processors (Visa, Mastercard, merchant acquirers) that move the money and set interchange rates. They are the "rails," not the lenders. An issuer uses a network; it is not one — unless it owns both, which after 2025 only Capital One/Discover and American Express do.[2]

• 522220 Sales Financing, 522291 Consumer Lending (other unsecured consumer credit), 522292 Real Estate Credit, 522390 Other Credit Intermediation-related services (loan servicing), and 522130 Credit Unions — all other consumer credit that isn't card-issuing.[2]

Ownership mix. The industry is a blend of (a) monoline card lenders and dedicated "credit card banks" (Capital One, Synchrony, Bread, and the card arms of American Express and the former Discover), (b) the card divisions of large deposit-taking banks, and (c) member-owned credit unions (Navy Federal, USAA, and others) that issue heavily but sit outside 522210. Nearly all issuing runs through a federally regulated bank charter. The federal statistics do not provide a public-versus- private ownership split, so none is reported here.

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3. How big it is

Our ground-truth federal figures for NAICS 522210:

The concentration numbers tell the core story: the four largest firms in the code book 63% of revenue, the top twenty book 99%, and the top fifty essentially all of it — one of the most concentrated consumer-finance industries in the country. The HHI of ~1,246 looks only "moderately" concentrated on paper (the U.S. antitrust agencies treat 1,000–1,800 as moderate) because the code splits card issuing away from the banks that dominate it — meaningful share exists below the largest few. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) size standard of $850 million in assets means almost nothing here: this is a big-balance-sheet business, and "small" card issuers are rare.

The undercount caveat — read this before quoting the numbers. The $161.6 billion of receipts and 75,504 employees dramatically understate U.S. credit card issuing. The largest issuers — JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank — run their giant card books inside enterprises classified as Commercial Banking (522110), so most of that activity does not land in 522210.[2] The code mainly captures the monolines and dedicated "credit card banks." (A separate, smaller undercount — County Business Patterns omitting nonemployer and very small operators — is minor here, because regulated issuing requires substantial capital, systems, and staff.) The true scale of the activity is better seen in the balance data: roughly $1.28 trillion of card balances outstanding,[1] and the 50 largest Visa/Mastercard issuers alone held about $1.02 trillion of card receivables at year-end 2025.[7] Treat 522210's receipts as one slice of a much larger pie, and note that these figures measure firm revenue — not card accounts, balances, or purchase volume.

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4. The investable universe

There are more pure ways to own credit card issuing in the public market than in most lending niches, because several large issuers are essentially standalone card companies. The list below is representative, not exhaustive.

Public pure-plays and near-pure-plays (approximate scale; see citations):

Discover Financial Services is no longer a separate stock — Capital One completed its ~$35 billion acquisition of Discover on May 18, 2025, giving Capital One a rare "closed-loop" network (the Discover, PULSE, and Diners Club rails) alongside its lending — the same issuer-plus-network model American Express has long run.[6]

Card operations inside the big banks (card is a large segment, not the whole company): JPMorgan Chase (JPM) — the single largest issuer by purchase volume at more than $1.34 trillion in 2024;[11] Citigroup (C); Bank of America (BAC); Wells Fargo (WFC); U.S. Bancorp (USB).[12] Buying these is a bet on a diversified bank, not on card issuing alone.

Not issuers — don't confuse them. Visa (V) and Mastercard (MA) are payment networks (NAICS 522320); they earn fees on transaction volume and take no credit risk. They are the toll booths, not the lenders.

Private and member-owned owners. Large privately held and member-owned institutions issue heavily but are not publicly traded: First National Bank of Omaha (FNBO), a family-led private bank; USAA Federal Savings Bank; and member-owned credit unions such as Navy Federal, Pentagon Federal (PenFed), and BECU. Their card portfolios are not directly comparable with public-company disclosures. Barclays' U.S. consumer bank and Goldman Sachs have also run large co-brand programs. Private capital's main routes in are buying or financing credit card ABS and whole-loan portfolios, and backing fintech issuers that rent a partner bank's charter.[13]

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5. How the money works

Card issuing is a spread-lending business with a payments kicker. Owners make money on four lines and lose it on two.

Revenue

1. Net interest income / net interest margin (NIM). The biggest driver. The issuer borrows cheaply (mostly deposits and ABS) and lends at high card APRs (annual percentage rates). Roughly half of active cardholders — about 111 million people — carry a balance month to month, and they pay interest on it.[14] The average APR across all accounts was about 21% at the end of 2025, and closer to 22–24% for accounts actually accruing interest.[14][15] Federal Reserve research finds the lending function accounts for roughly 80% of issuer profitability, with fees around 15%.[16]

2. Interchange. A small slice of every purchase (about 2.3% on an average Visa/Mastercard credit transaction) flows from the merchant to the issuer.[17] This is the reliable, low-risk fee that funds most rewards programs; U.S. merchants paid a record ~$198 billion in total card processing fees in 2025.[17]

3. Cardholder fees. Annual fees (especially on premium rewards cards), late fees, cash-advance, balance-transfer, and foreign-transaction fees.

4. Partner / rewards economics. Co-brand and private-label deals with retailers, airlines, and hotels share economics with the partner. Rich rewards are a cost, funded mainly out of interchange and annual fees; the premium model (American Express, Chase Sapphire, Capital One Venture) trades higher rewards spend for affluent, high-spending, low-loss customers.

Costs and losses

5. Funding cost. What the issuer pays for deposits, unsecured debt, and securitization. In an ABS deal, receivables are placed in a separate vehicle that issues bonds backed by customer payments.[18] When the Fed raises rates, funding gets more expensive and squeezes NIM.

6. Credit losses — the swing factor. When a borrower stops paying, the balance is charged off. The net charge-off (NCO) rate is the metric that makes or breaks a card lender. It peaked in the second half of 2024 at the highest level since 2011, then eased to about 4.1% by Q4 2025; the 30+ day delinquency rate ran near 2.9% in early 2026, down from a 3.2% peak but still above the ~2.6% pre-pandemic norm.[26]

The metrics investors actually watch: net interest margin, net charge-off rate, delinquency (early-warning) trends, receivables and purchase-volume growth, the share of balances that revolve (the "revolve rate"), risk-adjusted yield, return on receivables, reserve build (money set aside for expected losses), rewards cost per dollar spent, and funding mix. The key measure is the spread after credit losses and rewards — not the headline interest rate. A card issuer can post booming revenue and still destroy value if it under-priced risk two years earlier; losses show up on a lag.

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6. What drives demand

Card use is nearly universal: in 2024, 81% of U.S. adults had a credit card, and 46% of cardholders carried a balance at least once during the prior year.[19] The CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) reported roughly $3.6 trillion of consumer-card purchase volume and balances above $1.2 trillion in 2024 — a measure of market activity, not directly comparable with NAICS receipts.[20]

• Consumer spending and employment. Card volume tracks how much people buy and whether they have jobs. Rising wages and low unemployment mean more spending and more borrowing; a weak labor market means both spending and repayment deteriorate.

• The propensity to revolve. Issuers earn most when customers carry balances. Tight household budgets, higher prices, and depleted savings push more people to revolve — good for near-term interest income, worse for future losses.

• Interest rates. They cut both ways: high rates lift the APRs issuers charge but also raise their own funding costs and eventually strain borrowers.

• Card penetration and e-commerce. The long shift from cash and checks to cards — accelerated by online, mobile, and digital-wallet commerce — has structurally grown transaction volume and interchange.

• Rewards competition and underwriting appetite. Generous rewards and loose underwriting win share and grow balances in good times; both reverse hard when issuers pull back to protect credit quality.

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7. Regulation

Card issuing is one of the most heavily regulated consumer-finance activities in the U.S.

• Truth in Lending Act (TILA) / Regulation Z. The backbone. Reg Z governs disclosures, account-opening terms, billing statements, rate changes, advertising, and billing-error rights. The CARD Act (Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009) amended TILA — it curbed retroactive rate hikes, required clearer disclosures, and required penalty fees to be "reasonable and proportional" to the violation.[21]

• Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The primary federal supervisor for large issuers' consumer practices. In March 2024 the CFPB finalized a rule capping late fees at $8 for issuers with more than one million accounts; banking trade groups sued, and a federal court in Texas vacated the rule in April 2025, with the CFPB conceding it had exceeded its CARD Act authority. Late-fee limits reverted to the prior safe harbors (roughly $30–$41). Investors should not model the proposed $8 cap as current law, though late fees remain a recurring political target.[22]

• Other consumer statutes. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and fair-lending rules; the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) privacy rules; Bank Secrecy Act / anti-money-laundering (BSA/AML); and prohibitions on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (UDAAP).[18]

• Rate caps. There is no generally applicable federal APR cap for ordinary consumers. The Military Lending Act (MLA) generally caps the military APR at 36% for covered servicemembers and dependents, and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) can limit interest to 6% on qualifying pre-service debt.[24]

• Interchange and the Credit Card Competition Act (CCCA). Debit interchange is already capped under the 2010 Durbin Amendment; credit interchange is not. The proposed CCCA (reintroduced 2025) would require issuers with $100 billion or more in assets to enable a second, non-Visa/Mastercard network for routing — a direct threat to interchange revenue and the rewards it funds. It had not become law as of mid-2026, but has drawn cross-party support and remains a live risk.[23]

• Prudential oversight. Because issuers are chartered banks, they answer to the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and/or the FDIC on capital, reserves, liquidity, third-party risk, and safety-and-soundness; credit unions answer to the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). The Capital One–Discover merger required Fed and OCC approval.[6][18]

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

Competition runs on four linked fronts: underwriting (who prices risk best and avoids the borrowers who default), rewards and customer acquisition (who offers the most attractive points/cash back), scale in servicing, fraud control, and technology, and increasingly network ownership (who can capture both the lending spread and the interchange toll). Large issuers spread fixed technology and compliance costs across huge portfolios; smaller issuers compete on member relationships, specialized underwriting, and focused partnerships.

The defining recent move is vertical integration. American Express has always owned its network and its cardholders (a closed loop that yields rich data and captures interchange in-house). Capital One's 2025 purchase of Discover buys the same structure — issuer plus network — and vaults it to the largest U.S. card issuer.[6] That deal signals where scale players want to go: owning the rails, not just renting them. Further combinations are possible, but integration, antitrust review, technology migration, and credit-quality risk make large transactions hard.

The industry is already top-heavy (CR8 of 86.5%[4]), and the top ten issuers generate roughly 82% of purchase volume.[11] At the other end, private-label and co-brand issuing — Synchrony and Bread — is a distinct competitive lane built on exclusive retail, health-care, and travel partnerships: the retailer or brand controls customer access while the issuer supplies underwriting, funding, and servicing. Consumers routinely hold several cards, which limits issuer exclusivity and raises the value of rewards, account integration, and wallet placement. Fintechs and "card-as-a-service" platforms compete for younger customers by renting a partner bank's charter, but face the same credit-loss math as everyone else.

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9. Risks

• Credit cycle / recession. The dominant risk. Card loans are generally unsecured; unemployment, falling income, borrower overextension, or weaker underwriting can rapidly increase charge-offs. A downturn can double loss rates and wipe out a year of earnings, and losses lag the booking of loans, so aggressive growth today can mean pain in two years.[18]

• Interest-rate and funding risk. Rising deposit, debt, or securitization costs compress net interest margin; a rate cut can squeeze the APRs issuers earn.

• Regulatory / political risk. Fee caps (late fees, the recurring push for APR caps) and the CCCA's threat to interchange could each dent a major revenue line. Interchange in particular underwrites the rewards arms race — cap it and the whole rewards model has to re-price.[22][23]

• Rewards inflation and partner risk. Aggressive cash-back and travel benefits can consume the economics of otherwise attractive spending; losing an anchor co-brand partner is a material event for a private-label issuer.

• Consumer-health risk. Record balances and record APR margins mean a stretched consumer; if savings stay depleted and wage growth stalls, delinquencies re-accelerate.[14][15]

• Technology and fraud risk. Account takeover, identity theft, cyberattacks, AI-enabled fraud, and outages create direct losses and reputational damage.

• Network / payment-rail disruption. Account-to-account payments, digital wallets, and "pay-by-bank" products could reduce card usage or issuer control over the customer.

• Concentration and integration risk. A few issuers, networks, funding channels, and large partners account for much of the ecosystem; and large mergers (Capital One–Discover) carry execution risk even after closing.

• Private-market opacity. Private issuers and credit funds may disclose less on vintages, delinquencies, reserves, and servicing quality than public filers.

The Federal Reserve's May 2026 Financial Stability Report noted that credit-card delinquencies eased in the fourth quarter of 2025 but remained elevated relative to the prior decade.[25]

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10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes.

• Pure-play issuers: American Express (AXP), Capital One (COF), Synchrony (SYF), Bread Financial (BFH). These give the most direct exposure to card economics — and the fullest exposure to the credit cycle. Investors here watch net charge-off and delinquency trends, receivables growth, net interest margin, and reserve build; valuation is typically framed on price-to-earnings and price-to-tangible- book, and several of these names pay dividends.

• Networks (adjacent, lower credit risk): Visa (V) and Mastercard (MA) capture card growth with no loan losses — a different, higher-multiple bet on transaction volume rather than lending.

• Diversified banks with big card arms: JPMorgan (JPM), Citi (C), Bank of America (BAC), U.S. Bancorp (USB) — card is one engine among many, so analyze the card segment separately from the parent. A cheap-looking bank stock can still be expensive if card losses are understated or card growth depends on weak underwriting.

Private-market routes. Direct issuing is effectively closed to private investors without a bank charter and heavy capital. The practical entries are credit card ABS (bonds backed by pools of card receivables), private-credit funds that finance or acquire card portfolios and provide warehouse lines to fintech issuers, and equity in fintech / card-as-a-service platforms that partner with a sponsor bank. Key diligence questions: who owns the receivables, who services them, how losses are allocated, what triggers early amortization, how concentrated the pool is by borrower and partner, and how much liquidity exists under stress.

Near-term drivers to watch (forward-looking). (1) The credit-loss trajectory — charge-offs and delinquencies eased through 2025 off their 2024 peak; whether that holds is the single biggest swing factor for issuer earnings.[25][26] (2) Interest rates — the direction of funding costs versus card APRs sets net interest margin. (3) The CCCA and interchange politics — a genuine threat to the fee income that funds rewards, still unresolved in Congress.[23] (4) Consolidation — Capital One's absorption of Discover resets the competitive map and may prompt further scale moves.[6] The structural tailwind — the long shift of spending onto cards — remains intact; the cyclical question is simply how well issuers priced the risk they took on during the last few years of rapid balance growth. The strongest franchises should combine low-cost funding, differentiated customer relationships, disciplined underwriting, and resilient servicing. These are judgments about an uncertain future, not settled facts.

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Sources

1. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Household Debt and Credit (Q4 2025 balances ~$1.28T), reported via CNBC, 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/12/new-york-fed-credit-card-debt-stands-at-1point25-trillion.html

2. U.S. Census Bureau, "North American Industry Classification System — Credit Card Issuing (522210)": definition ("credit card banks" included) and cross-references to 522110, 522320, 522220, 522291, 522292, 522390, 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=522210&year=2022

3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns: 2023 (NAICS 522210 establishments, employment, annual and first-quarter payroll). https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2023/econ/cbp/2023-cbp.html

4. U.S. Census Bureau, Economic Census: Establishment and Firm Size / Concentration: 2022 (NAICS 522210 firms, receipts, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI). https://api.census.gov/data/2022/ecnsize.html

5. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Small Business Size Standards" (NAICS 522210: $850M in assets), 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards

6. Capital One Financial Corp., Form 8-K, "Completion of Acquisition of Discover" (closed May 18, 2025; closed-loop network via Discover/PULSE/Diners Club), 2025; context via Virginia Business, "$35B Capital One–Discover merger closes," 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/927628/000119312525122059/d934475d8k.htm

7. Nilson Report, "Top 50 US Mastercard and Visa Credit Card Issuers – 2025" (~$1.02T receivables at YE2025), 2026. https://nilsonreport.com/articles/top-50-us-mastercard-and-visa-credit-card-issuers-2025/

8. American Express Co., Form 10-K FY2025 (billed business, U.S. consumer card member loans), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4962/000000496226000080/axp-20251231.htm

9. Synchrony Financial, Form 10-K FY2025 (period-end loan receivables ~$101B), 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1601712/000160171226000006/syf-20251231.htm

10. Bread Financial Holdings, company overview / investor materials (~$18B receivables), 2025. https://investor.breadfinancial.com/

11. Nilson Report via GlobeNewswire, "JP Morgan Tops Nilson Report Ranking of US Credit Card Issuers" (JPMorgan ~$1.344T purchase volume 2024; top 10 ≈82% of purchase volume), 2025. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/03/06/3038338/0/en/JP-Morgan-Tops-Nilson-Report-Ranking-of-US-Credit-Card-Issuers.html

12. Company SEC filings, Forms 10-K FY2025: JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Capital One (COF). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar

13. Private and member-owned issuers: First National Bank of Omaha (fnbo.com/about-us); USAA Federal Savings Bank (usaa.com); Navy Federal Credit Union (navyfederal.org); Pentagon Federal Credit Union (penfed.org); BECU (becu.org). Company/institution disclosures, current.

14. LendingTree, "2026 Credit Card Debt Statistics" (~111M revolving; average APR ~21% across accounts),

15. https://www.lendingtree.com/credit-cards/study/credit-card-debt-statistics/

16. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, "Credit card interest rate margins at all-time high" (APR ~22–24% on accounts accruing interest; margins at record highs), 2025. https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/credit-card-interest-rate-margins-at-all-time-high/

17. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FEDS Notes, "Credit Card Profitability" (lending ≈80% of profitability, fees ≈15%), 2022. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/credit-card-profitability-20220909.html

18. The Motley Fool, "Average Credit Card Processing Fees and Costs in America" (avg credit interchange ~2.3%; ~$198B total card processing fees in 2025), 2026. https://www.fool.com/money/research/average-credit-card-processing-fees-costs-america/

19. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, "Comptroller's Handbook: Credit Card Lending," Version 2.0, 2021 (funding/securitization, credit risk, ECOA/FCRA/GLBA/BSA-AML/UDAAP, supervision). https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-handbook/files/credit-card-lending/pub-ch-credit-card.pdf

20. Federal Reserve Board, "Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2024" (81% of adults had a credit card; 46% of cardholders carried a balance), 2025. https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2025-economic-well-being-of-us-households-in-2024-banking-and-credit.htm

21. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, "The Consumer Credit Card Market" (~$3.6T purchase volume; balances above $1.2T in 2024), 2025. https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/the-consumer-credit-card-market-2025/

22. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, "12 CFR Part 1026 — Truth in Lending (Regulation Z)" and CARD Act background, 2026. https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1026/

23. Holland & Knight, "CFPB Credit Card Late Fees Rule Vacated by Texas District Court" (rule vacated April 2025; reversion to prior safe harbors), 2025; see also CFPB, "Credit Card Penalty Fees." https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/04/cfpb-credit-card-late-fees-rule-vacated-by-texas-district-court

24. U.S. Senate (Durbin/Marshall), "Credit Card Competition Act" (applies to issuers with $100B+ assets; reintroduced 2025; not yet enacted), and Payments Dive coverage, 2025–26. https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-marshall-introduce-bipartisan-credit-card-competition-act

25. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, "Military Lending Act" (36% military APR cap; SCRA 6% on qualifying pre-service debt), 2025. https://www.consumerfinance.gov/consumer-tools/military-financial-lifecycle/military-lending-act-mla/

26. Federal Reserve Board, "Financial Stability Report," May 2026 (card delinquencies eased in Q4 2025 but remained elevated relative to the prior decade). https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20260508.pdf

27. Federal Reserve (FRED series CORCCACBS / DRCCLACBS) and WalletHub, "Credit Card Delinquency Rates and Charge-Offs" (net charge-off ~4.1% Q4 2025; delinquency ~2.9% early 2026), 2026. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CORCCACBS