Oil and Gas Pipeline and Related Structures Construction (U.S.)

NAICS 2022 code 237120 — a Histometrics industry primer

1. Overview

This is the industry that physically builds and repairs America's oil and gas plumbing: buried transmission, gathering, and distribution lines; the compressor and pumping stations that push product along them; storage tanks and tank farms; and the processing plants, petrochemical plants, and refineries tied into them. The firms in this code are contractors — paid to build, expand, rehabilitate, and repair infrastructure. They are not the pipeline companies that own the systems and collect fees on the oil and gas moving through them; that is a separate midstream business (NAICS 486, Pipeline Transportation), covered in its own primer.[1]

Why it matters right now: pipeline construction is where the current surge in U.S. natural-gas demand — liquefied natural gas (LNG, gas super-cooled to a liquid for ocean shipment) exports, gas-fired power for data centers, and industrial reshoring — turns into physical spending. It is also one of the most cyclical, permit-sensitive, and politically exposed corners of construction: a single administration change or court ruling can freeze a multi-billion-dollar project overnight.

The two ways to reach the industry:

• Public-market investors cannot buy a pure pipeline-construction stock. They buy diversified infrastructure contractors — Quanta Services, MasTec, Primoris, Centuri — where pipeline is one reporting segment among several. A more indirect route is owning the midstream companies whose capital budgets fund this construction.
• Private investors reach it through the large privately held builders (Michels, Kiewit, Bechtel), private-equity-backed regional contractors, private credit for equipment and bonding, or by owning the pipeline assets themselves through infrastructure funds.

Section 4 lays out both routes. The recurring lesson across both: more pipeline demand does not automatically mean higher contractor profit — margins hinge on permits, labor, cost control, and disciplined execution.

2. What it is and how it is structured

Scope (what's in). NAICS 237120 covers establishments primarily engaged in constructing oil and gas lines, mains, refineries, and storage tanks — new build, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and repair.[1] In practice:

• Oil and gas gathering, transmission, distribution, and service lines
• Pumping, compressor, and metering stations
• Natural-gas processing plants, petrochemical plants, and refineries
• Oil and gas storage tanks and tank farms
• Route clearing, trenching, welding, coating, testing, restoration, and integrity/rehabilitation work

Owners typically hire engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) firms, general contractors, or specialist subcontractors to do the work.

What it excludes (and where it goes). The code is narrower than "anything energy":

• Building electric power and communication lines → NAICS 237130 (Power and Communication Line Construction).[1]
• Water and sewer lines → NAICS 237110.
• Operating pipelines / transporting oil and gas for a fee → NAICS 486 (Pipeline Transportation) — the midstream owners who commission this construction.
• Oil-rig operation and wellhead oilfield work → NAICS 213112 (Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations).
• Non-petrochemical industrial buildings → NAICS 236210 (Industrial Building Construction).
• Pipeline inspection services → 541990; machinery repair → 811310. Gas work performed by a utility on its own system is classified in the utilities subsector, not here.

Ownership mix. This is an almost entirely private-sector, for-profit contracting industry — little government ownership and few nonemployer sole proprietors, so federal business statistics capture it reasonably well (unlike, say, road building, which is dominated by public agencies). The work is done across three overlapping tiers: (a) publicly traded diversified contractors that run pipeline as a segment; (b) large privately held specialty and heavy-civil builders; and (c) hundreds of smaller regional pipeline and tank contractors, many union-staffed, that scale up and down with project flow. Because a single company can hold establishments in several NAICS codes, public-company revenue rarely maps cleanly to 237120.

3. How big it is

Federal statistics for NAICS 237120 (U.S.). These come from different programs and reference years and should not be summed into one market-size number:

Average pay works out to roughly $89,000 per employee[3] — well above construction-sector norms, reflecting skilled, often unionized field labor (welders, equipment operators, laborers) and heavy overtime on remote projects. The SBA size standard is a procurement threshold — the receipts ceiling below which a firm counts as "small" — not a market-size estimate.[4]

Concentration. The measured industry is fragmented. The four largest firms account for just 21.6% of receipts, the top eight 32.1%, the top 20 44.6%, and the top 50 57.4%.[2] The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration gauge where under 1,500 is "unconcentrated") is only 173.6 — a highly competitive market.[2]

Undercount caveat. The $44.07 billion federal figure is genuine but has two seams. First, the biggest pipeline megaprojects are often built by giant diversified contractors (Kiewit, Bechtel) whose primary establishment classification sits elsewhere, so real pipeline spending gets booked under other NAICS codes. Second, County Business Patterns covers only employer establishments and excludes nonemployer firms and gas work performed inside utilities — and receipts are not the same as pipeline-owner capital spending. A private data provider, IBISWorld, pegs the broader market nearer $49 billion for 2026, above the census figure, partly for these reasons.[5] Treat the census number as the conservative, definitional core.

4. The investable universe

There is no pure-play public pipeline-construction stock. Public investors buy diversified infrastructure contractors and get pipeline as one segment. (Revenue figures are from company filings; these trade as large- and mid-cap stocks and valuations move around, so pricing is deferred to Section 10.)

Adjacent listed contractors — MYR Group (MYRG), Argan (AGX), Dycom (DY) — lean toward power lines, power plants, and telecom rather than oil and gas pipe, so they are weak proxies for this specific industry.

Major private and other builders. Much of the actual pipe is laid by privately held firms reachable only through private markets, credit, or as project counterparties:

• Michels Corporation / Michels Pipeline — repeatedly ranked the top U.S. pipeline/utility contractor by Engineering News-Record (ENR).[11]
• Kiewit Corporation — heavy-civil giant (~$13.8B total revenue, 2023) that takes on pipeline megaprojects.[12]
• Bechtel — perennial ENR No. 1 overall contractor, active on LNG and pipeline work.[11]
• Mears, Precision Pipeline, Miller Pipeline, and other regional specialists — several private-equity-backed. Henkels & McCoy, a major pipeline/utility contractor, is now a MasTec subsidiary.[8][17] Some large specialists have been absorbed by the public consolidators (e.g., Price Gregory and Sheehan Pipeline into Quanta).[6]

Pipeline owners (demand side, not contractors). These commission the construction; their capital budgets are this industry's demand. Public owners include Kinder Morgan (KMI), ONEOK (OKE), Williams (WMB), Energy Transfer (ET), and Enbridge (ENB).[34] Large private/unlisted owners include:

Private routes in therefore include: buying or lending to the contractors directly; PE infrastructure funds and platforms; project finance tied to long-term shipper/utility commitments; and — the more liquid adjacency — owning the midstream companies whose capital spending drives the work.

5. How the money works

Owners here make money the way all heavy-construction contractors do — winning work, executing on or under bid, and keeping crews and equipment utilized — with an oil-and-gas twist around contract structure and cyclicality.

Backlog is the headline metric. Backlog is signed, not-yet-built work and the leading indicator of future revenue. Primoris, for example, reported record total backlog of $11.9 billion at year-end 2024, split into $6.1 billion of "fixed" (defined-scope) work and $5.8 billion of Master Service Agreement work.[9]

Contract types drive margins differently:

• Fixed-price / lump-sum (big greenfield pipelines): the contractor names one price for the whole job. Beat your cost estimate and the savings are yours; miss it and you eat the overrun.[29] Most upside and most risk — weather, rock, permitting delays, and inflation all land on the builder.
• Unit-price, time-and-materials, or cost-plus contracts: more flexible when scope is uncertain, usually with less margin upside.
• Master Service Agreements (MSAs): time-and-materials frameworks with pre-agreed labor and equipment rates for recurring maintenance, integrity, and replacement work.[9] Lower margin but far more stable — the "annuity" that keeps crews busy between megaprojects (at the cost of some customer concentration and renewal risk).

Key economic levers: crew and equipment utilization (idle spreads — the assembly line of machines and welders that lays pipe — are pure loss); execution/productivity (feet welded per day, tie-in efficiency, rework avoided); change-order and claims recovery (scope disputes can flip a job from profit to loss); and labor cost and availability (much of the workforce is unionized — the Laborers' International Union of North America, LIUNA, and the pipeliners' union, the UA — and megaprojects hire and release thousands of workers within months). Cash flow can lag reported revenue because contractors must fund mobilization, payroll, materials, retainage, and bonding up front.

Margins are thin: Quanta's underground/pipeline segment ran about 5.7% operating margin in 2024.[6] This is a volume-and-execution business, not a high-markup one. There is no clean industrywide capacity-utilization series in the federal data — the useful gauges are backlog quality and conversion, fixed-price vs. recurring mix, gross margin and operating cash flow, crew/equipment utilization, safety performance, customer concentration, and net debt.[3]

6. What drives demand

Construction volume follows the capital budgets of the pipeline and energy companies that own the systems, which in turn follow gas and oil economics.

• Natural-gas demand growth — the dominant near-term driver. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) expects roughly 44.9 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of new natural-gas pipeline capacity to come online in 2026–27, about 70% of it already under construction, much of it originating in Texas.[18] Three forces pull at once: LNG exports, gas-fired power, and industrial reshoring.
• LNG exports. EIA forecasts U.S. LNG exports to grow nearly 30% by 2027 as new liquefaction trains ramp — driving feedgas pipeline and connector work to the terminals.[19]
• Gas-fired power and data centers. EIA expects gas consumption for power generation to hit a record in summer 2027, driven partly by data centers and large manufacturing — feeding new plants and the laterals that supply them.[20]
• Shift in project type. Rather than only long-haul greenfield lines, a growing backlog of brownfield compression upgrades, loops along existing rights-of-way, and short laterals to connect power plants, LNG terminals, and data centers is forming — smaller, faster-permitting jobs.[21] Williams' Northeast Supply Enhancement, the first major new gas pipeline into the New York region in over a decade, signals a thaw even in historically hard-to-permit corridors.[22]
• Integrity, safety, and replacement. Aging pipe and federal safety mandates create steady MSA-style replacement, methane-reduction, and rehabilitation work that is far less cyclical than new build.
• Oil production and takeaway in the Permian and other basins drives gathering and crude-line construction; refinery, petrochemical, NGL, and storage investment adds facility work.
• Commodity prices (indirectly). Low oil and gas prices can cut producer and midstream capex; strong export, power, or industrial demand can support pipeline investment even when prices are not unusually high.[21] Potential carbon-dioxide and hydrogen infrastructure is a longer-dated, policy-dependent add-on.

7. Regulation

Permitting is the single biggest external variable in this industry, and it differs by pipeline type.

• Interstate natural-gas pipelines must obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act of 1938.[23] FERC weighs a project's benefits against its harms, sets the route, and acts as lead agency for environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). A FERC certificate also confers eminent domain — the power to force land sales along the route — itself a major source of litigation.[24]
• Pipeline safety (design, pipe quality, welding, bending, coating, testing, documentation, integrity) is set by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), part of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), with state partners. FERC has no safety jurisdiction and defers to PHMSA.[23][25]
• Water and land crossings trigger Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 404 dredge-and-fill permits from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, plus construction-stormwater rules administered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state agencies, and Endangered Species Act reviews — historically the choke points where courts have vacated permits mid-construction.[26]
• Worker safety on site follows Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) construction standards (29 CFR 1926) alongside PHMSA's pipeline-specific rules.[27]
• Oil and intrastate pipelines are generally not FERC-certificated for siting; they are permitted mainly at the state level, which shifts the political and legal risk profile. FERC does regulate interstate oil pipeline rates via an index formula (set at the Producer Price Index for Finished Goods minus 0.55% for July 2026–June 2031) — but that affects owner economics, not contractor pricing.[28]

For contractors, the practical effect is that they carry no permitting risk on their own balance sheet, but their revenue timing is hostage to whether their customers' projects clear FERC, the courts, and the Corps.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The measured industry is competitive and unconcentrated (top-4 share 21.6%, HHI 173.6),[2] yet consolidating at the top. Competition turns less on proprietary technology than on skilled welding crews, equipment fleets, safety and quality records, bonding capacity and balance sheet, geographic coverage and local permitting knowledge, customer prequalification, and a track record under recurring MSAs. Barriers to entry are moderate for small MSA/local work but high for megaprojects, which only a handful of firms can bond and staff.

On the contractor side, the public diversified players have been rolling up pipeline specialists to add scale and stabilize earnings — Quanta absorbed Price Gregory and Sheehan Pipeline; MasTec built its Pipeline Infrastructure segment through acquisitions including Henkels & McCoy.[6][8] The logic: bolt cyclical megaproject capability onto a base of recurring utility and MSA work; scale lets a firm self-perform more, spread equipment across regions, bid larger, and cross-sell energy and utility services.

The owner side keeps consolidating too, which concentrates who commissions the work: ONEOK completed its EnLink acquisition and Kinder Morgan closed its Outrigger purchase in 2025, while private capital has assembled large platforms such as Tallgrass and Colonial.[32][33][15][16]

The flip side of megaproject concentration is fragility: Welded Construction, once a top pipeline builder, went bankrupt in 2018 after a dispute tied to the Rover pipeline — a reminder that a single bad fixed-price job can sink even a large specialist.

9. Risks

• Extreme cyclicality / boom-bust. Work arrives in lumpy megaproject waves and vanishes in permitting freezes. When TC Energy cancelled Keystone XL in 2021, roughly 1,000 mostly union construction jobs disappeared almost immediately.[30]
• Permitting and litigation risk. The Mountain Valley Pipeline ran from an initial ~$3.5 billion budget to roughly $7.85 billion and finished years late after a decade of court challenges — it took an act of Congress to force completion.[31] Contractors on such jobs face stop-start mobilization and margin erosion.
• Fixed-price execution risk. On lump-sum contracts, cost overruns from weather, geology, or delay — plus liquidated damages and weak change-order recovery — fall on the builder.[29]
• Quality and safety failures. PHMSA's documented construction issues — defects in pipe, welding, coating, bending, fittings, testing, or documentation — can delay commissioning and force costly remediation; spills and environmental liabilities carry reputational damage.[25]
• Political / regulatory whiplash. Federal posture toward pipelines swings sharply between administrations, making multi-year project pipelines hard to underwrite.
• Commodity-price exposure. A gas or oil price crash can freeze the customer capex that funds construction.
• Labor and materials. Skilled welders and operators are scarce during booms; wage inflation and steel/pipe-cost volatility compress margins.
• Backlog and concentration. Poor backlog quality, project cancellations, and customer concentration can hit revenue quickly; heavy leverage or working-capital needs after acquisitions add financial risk.
• Cyber and physical security. Pipeline infrastructure is a critical-infrastructure target — the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware shutdown is the cautionary example — raising security costs across construction and operation.
• Long-term energy transition. Decarbonization and electrification pose a structural question mark over new fossil pipeline volumes over a multi-decade horizon — partly offset by the same firms' pivots into power, renewables, and carbon-dioxide/hydrogen pipelines.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public routes. Buy the diversified contractors — Quanta Services (PWR), MasTec (MTZ), Primoris (PRIM), and the more utility-oriented Centuri Holdings (CTRI) — accepting that pipeline is a slice of a broader infrastructure book (which also cushions cyclicality). The key gauges are backlog trends and conversion, fixed-price vs. recurring MSA mix, gross-margin stability, operating cash flow, safety and claims history, customer concentration, and leverage — not headline revenue. Focus on the share of revenue genuinely tied to pipeline and related energy work. A more indirect public route is owning the midstream owners (Williams, Kinder Morgan, Energy Transfer, ONEOK, Enbridge), whose capital decisions are this industry's demand — though owner returns depend more on contracted capacity, tariffs, throughput, rate treatment, and leverage than on construction margins.

Private routes. Direct exposure to the largest builders (Michels, Kiewit, Bechtel) comes mainly through private equity, private credit, or as a project partner/supplier; PE infrastructure funds also back regional contractors and own the assets outright. Private underwriting should emphasize permits, easements, anchor/shipper contracts, utilization, fee structure, capital and debt-service needs, environmental liabilities, insurance, bonding, and contractor claims history.

Near-term outlook. The demand backdrop is the strongest in years: EIA points to ~44.9 Bcf/d of new gas pipeline capacity slated for 2026–27, about 70% already under construction, driven by LNG exports, gas-fired power for data centers, and industrial load.[18] The mix is tilting toward faster-permitting brownfield compression, loops, and laterals rather than contentious long-haul greenfield lines — favorable for construction throughput[21] — and even hard corridors are thawing, as Williams' Northeast Supply Enhancement shows.[22] The persistent risks — permitting reversals, fixed-price overruns, and the long-term transition question — have not gone away. The most defensible businesses are diversified contractors with recurring programs, scarce execution capacity, strong safety records, and conservative bidding. For the next several years, the volume of work available to skilled pipeline builders looks set to expand; whether that converts into profit still comes down to permits, labor, cost, and execution.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS 237120 — Oil and Gas Pipeline and Related Structures Construction" (definition, inclusions, and cross-references to 237130, 486, 213112, 236210, 541990, 811310), 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=237120&input=237120&year=2022
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Concentration of Largest Firms (EC2200SIZECONCEN, NAICS 237120): receipts $44.07B, 1,790 firms, CR4 21.6%, CR8 32.1%, CR20 44.6%, CR50 57.4%, HHI 173.6, 2022. (Histometrics federal statistics extract.) https://api.census.gov/data/2022/ecnsize/groups/EC2200SIZECONCEN.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 (NAICS 237120): 2,156 establishments, 167,820 employees, $14.856B annual payroll, $3.429B Q1 payroll, 2023. (Histometrics federal statistics extract.) https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
4. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 237120: $45 million receipts), effective 2023. (Histometrics federal statistics extract.) https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
5. IBISWorld, "Oil & Gas Pipeline Construction in the US — Industry Analysis / Market Size," 2026. https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/industry/oil-gas-pipeline-construction/1977/
6. Quanta Services, "Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Results" (Underground Utility & Infrastructure segment revenue ~$4.7B and ~5.7% operating margin), 2025. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/quanta-services-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2024-results-302381157.html
7. Quanta Services, Inc., Form 10-K FY2024 (segment descriptions and revenue), 2025. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1050915
8. MasTec, Inc., Form 10-K FY2024 (Pipeline Infrastructure segment revenue ~$2,133.6M; Henkels & McCoy), 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/15615/000001561525000021/mtz-20241231.htm
9. Primoris Services Corporation, "Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results" (revenue ~$6.4B; total backlog $11.9B; fixed $6.1B / MSA $5.8B), 2025. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250224368407/en/Primoris-Services-Corporation-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2024-Results
10. Centuri Holdings, Inc., Annual Report / Form 10-K (gas-utility and energy-infrastructure construction), 2025–2026. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1981599
11. Trenchless Technology / Engineering News-Record, "Michels Named Top Pipeline, Power Contractor" (ENR Top Contractor rankings; Bechtel No. 1 overall), 2024–2025. https://trenchlesstechnology.com/michels-named-top-pipeline-power-contractor/
12. Construction Dive, "The top commercial contractors of 2024" (Kiewit ~$13.8B revenue), 2024. https://www.constructiondive.com/news/top-commercial-contractors-2024/717484/
13. Berkshire Hathaway Energy, "Natural Gas" (~20,900 miles of pipeline; ~15% of U.S. natural-gas consumption transported), 2026. https://www.brkenergy.com/energy/natural-gas.aspx
14. Loews Corporation, "Boardwalk Pipelines" (gas and NGL systems, ~14,275 pipeline miles), 2026. https://www.loews.com/subsidiaries/boardwalk-pipelines/default.aspx
15. Blackstone, "Blackstone Infrastructure Partners to Acquire Controlling Interest in Tallgrass Energy," 2019. https://www.blackstone.com/news/press/blackstone-infrastructure-partners-enters-into-definitive-agreement-to-acquire-controlling-interest-in-tallgrass-energy/
16. Brookfield Infrastructure, "Acquisition of Colonial Enterprises" (~5,500 miles refined-products pipeline), 2025–2026. https://bip.brookfield.com/
17. Henkels & McCoy (a MasTec company), "About Us," and Mears / Michels Pipeline company pages, 2026. https://www.henkels.com/about-us
18. U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Most planned natural gas pipeline capacity additions in 2026 and 2027 originate in Texas" (~44.9 Bcf/d, ~70% under construction), 2026. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67707
19. U.S. Energy Information Administration, "U.S. natural gas exports to grow nearly 30% by 2027 as LNG facilities ramp up," 2026. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67484
20. U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Natural gas for power generation flat this summer, record high expected in 2027," 2026. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67725
21. Fortune, "Data centers and gas demand make boring pipelines great again" (brownfield/loops/laterals shift; commodity-price context), 2026. https://fortune.com/2026/04/11/data-centers-gas-demand-make-boring-pipelines-great-again/
22. Marketplace, "New pipelines are helping bring natural gas to customers abroad" (LNG export growth; Williams Northeast Supply Enhancement), 2026. https://www.marketplace.org/story/2026/06/30/new-pipelines-are-helping-bring-natural-gas-to-customers-abroad
23. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Natural Gas Pipelines" (Section 7 Natural Gas Act certificate; safety deferred to PHMSA), 2025. https://www.ferc.gov/natural-gas/natural-gas-pipelines
24. Congressional Research Service, "Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines: Process and Timing of FERC Permit Application Review" (NEPA lead agency; eminent domain), 2024. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R43138
25. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, "Pipeline Construction" and "Typical Construction Issues," 2026. https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/pipeline-construction/pipeline-construction
26. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "CWA Section 404 Permit Program" and "Stormwater Discharges from Construction Activities," 2026. https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/permit-program-under-cwa-section-404
27. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, "29 CFR 1926 — Safety and Health Regulations for Construction," current. https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1926/1926.20
28. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Oil Pipeline Index" (PPI-FG minus 0.55%, July 2026–June 2031), 2026. https://www.ferc.gov/general-information-1/oil-pipeline-index
29. Autodesk Construction / Digital Builder, "A Guide to Lump Sum (Fixed Price) Construction Contracts," 2024. https://www.autodesk.com/blogs/construction/lump-sum-fixed-price-construction-contracts/
30. Newsweek, "Over 1,000 Jobs Cut by Company Building Keystone XL Pipeline After Biden Ends Project," 2021. https://www.newsweek.com/over-1000-jobs-cut-company-building-keystone-xl-pipeline-after-biden-ends-project-1563530
31. Christian Science Monitor, "This pipeline was snarled in court. Then Congress stepped in" (Mountain Valley Pipeline ~$3.5B → ~$7.85B; congressional completion mandate), 2023. https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2023/0621/This-pipeline-was-snarled-in-court.-Then-Congress-stepped-in
32. ONEOK, "ONEOK Completes Acquisition of EnLink Midstream," 2025. https://ir.oneok.com/news-and-events/press-releases/2025/01-31-2025-140247526
33. Kinder Morgan, "Kinder Morgan Closes on Acquisition of Outrigger Energy II Gathering and Processing System," 2025. https://ir.kindermorgan.com/news/news-details/2025/Kinder-Morgan-Closes-on-640-Million-Acquisition-of-a-Natural-Gas-Gathering-and-Processing-System-From-Outrigger-Energy-II/default.aspx
34. Kinder Morgan (KMI), ONEOK (OKE), Williams (WMB), Energy Transfer (ET), and Enbridge (ENB), company operations pages, 2025–2026. https://kindermorgan.com/