Construction Sand and Gravel Mining — An Investor's Primer

U.S. industry, NAICS 2022 code 212321. NAICS is the North American Industry Classification System, the government's standard code for an industry. Figures are marked by source: our ingested federal business statistics (U.S. Census Bureau) for the business economy, and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, the federal minerals-data agency) for physical production and reserves. Where the two measure different things, both are shown and labeled.

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1. Overview

Construction sand and gravel is the loose, natural granular rock — pit sand, pea gravel, road-base stone — that gets bound into concrete and asphalt or spread as fill and roadbed. Together with crushed stone it forms the U.S. construction-aggregates industry, the literal foundation of every building, road, bridge, and runway.

Why an investor should care: it is a large, steady, cash-generative business with an unusual moat. The product is heavy and cheap, so it cannot travel far before freight prices it out of the market — a ton is worth only about $14.50 at the pit but trucking it 30–50 miles can add 50–100% to the delivered price [1]. That single fact turns thousands of ordinary pits into local mini-monopolies: each one effectively owns the ground within a short haul of its customers. The result is a commodity that behaves less like oil or copper and more like a toll road — producers set price locally rather than taking a global benchmark, and U.S. prices have risen every year even as tonnage fell [1].

Public vs. private ways in. There is no pure sand-and-gravel stock and no sand-and-gravel exchange-traded fund (ETF, a basket security that trades like a share). Public investors buy the large "aggregates" producers — Vulcan Materials, Martin Marietta, CRH — where sand and gravel rides inside a broader crushed-stone-and-aggregates segment. Private investors dominate the long tail: thousands of small, family- or private-equity-owned pits, plus landowners who collect a per-ton royalty (a payment for the right to mine their ground) without operating anything.

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2. What it is, and what it is not

In scope (NAICS 212321). Establishments primarily engaged in operating construction-grade sand and gravel pits, dredging such deposits, and washing, screening, or sizing the material at the pit [2]. The output is natural aggregate for construction — distinct from manufactured or specialty sand.

Adjacent codes deliberately excluded — these boundaries matter because they separate very different economics [2]:

• 212322 Industrial Sand Mining — high-purity silica for glass, foundries, and hydraulic-fracturing ("frac") sand. Higher value, driven by energy and manufacturing, not construction. Frac-sand and oilfield-service names are not exposure to this industry.
• 212311/212312/212313/212319 Crushed Stone — the hard-rock half of aggregates (~1.5 billion tons a year). A direct substitute, but a separate industry; most majors mine both.
• 327310 Cement, 327320 Ready-Mix Concrete, 324121 Asphalt Paving — these are manufacturing codes. A pit that also runs a concrete plant reports those sales downstream, not under 212321.
• 237310 Highway Construction / 238910 Site Preparation — the use of aggregate (construction), not its extraction.
• 213115 Support Activities for Nonmetallic Minerals — contract pit-development and drilling done for others.

Two consequences follow. First, USGS tracks the commodity "sand and gravel (construction)," which maps cleanly to 212321. Second, the big public companies report a combined aggregates segment (crushed stone + sand and gravel), so a pure-212321 public financial statement does not exist — sand and gravel is usually a minority of a diversified producer's tons.

Ownership mix. A barbell: a short head of vertically integrated multinationals (Vulcan, Martin Marietta, CRH, CEMEX, Heidelberg, Amrize) rolling up a long tail of thousands of small independents — many family-run, increasingly private-equity-backed — plus foreign-parented operators and passive mineral/royalty owners. Details in §4 and §8.

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3. How big it is

Two federal yardsticks measure two different things. Keep them separate.

3.1 The business economy — U.S. Census Bureau (our ground-truth stats)

The Census counts employer businesses classified to 212321:

Implied average pay is about $79,000 per employee (our calculation: $2.01 billion ÷ 25,397) [3]. The industry is dominated by small sites: roughly 85% of establishments have fewer than 20 employees, and essentially none have 250-plus [6].

Concentration is low at the national level. The 2022 Economic Census puts the four largest firms at just 13.5% of revenue, the top 8 at 22.2%, top 20 at 34.7%, and top 50 at 48.1%, with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard 0–10,000 concentration score; below 1,500 is "unconcentrated") of just 90 [4]. In plain terms: nationally, this is one of the most fragmented mining industries there is. (That national picture is misleading about competition, because the real market is a 50-mile haul zone — see §8.)

3.2 Physical production and reserves — USGS

USGS canvasses the physical commodity, including small non-employer pits the Census misses, so its universe is larger [1]:

• 2025 (estimate): ~870 million metric tons worth about $12.6 billion, from roughly 3,400 companies, 6,500 pits, and 200+ distribution yards across all 50 states; mine-and-mill employment (including office staff) ~41,900 [1].
• Price up, volume down. Tonnage fell ~10% from its 2023 peak while average value rose ~16% — the industry's signature pattern of resilient local pricing through a soft-volume stretch [1].
• Leading states (2025): Texas, California, Arizona, Minnesota, Michigan, Utah, Washington, Colorado, New York, Wisconsin — together ~54% of output [1].
• Reserves. USGS publishes no national reserve tonnage. Resources are "plentiful"; what is scarce is permitted, specification-quality material near demand — reserves are "controlled largely by land use and environmental" limits, not geology [1].

Why the two sources differ — and the undercount. The Census $8.27 billion / 2,282 establishments describes employer businesses' revenue; USGS's ~$12.6 billion / ~6,500 pits values total physical output, including non-employer and captive production and pits run inside larger enterprises. One firm can own many pits. These are not errors to reconcile — they answer different questions, and the Census figures materially undercount the full physical industry. For scale context, all U.S. construction aggregates (sand and gravel + crushed stone) run roughly 2.3–2.4 billion tons and ~$39–40 billion a year [1][7].

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4. The investable universe

There is no pure play. Public exposure comes through diversified aggregates and building-materials producers, in which construction sand and gravel is bundled with crushed stone, asphalt, ready-mix concrete, and sometimes cement. All are leveraged to construction volumes and local aggregate pricing — cyclical, not defensive.

Market-cap figures are approximate, early-2026 order-of-magnitude values (not from the underlying federal sources) and move daily; treat them as scale, not precision.

Major private, foreign, and royalty owners. Summit Materials was taken private by Quikrete in February 2025 (~$11.5 billion) [13]. Large operators are frequently foreign-parented — CRH (Ireland), CEMEX (Mexico), Heidelberg (Germany), Amrize (Swiss-domiciled), CalPortland (Japan's Taiheiyo Cement), Colas (France's Bouygues). Prominent private/family names include Teichert, Fisher Industries, Rogers Group, Miles Sand & Gravel, and L.G. Everist [14]. For passive exposure, Natural Resource Partners (a listed mineral-rights partnership) holds some aggregate royalties but is diversified across coal and other minerals — there is no aggregates royalty/streaming pure play comparable to the precious-metals royalty companies [15].

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5. How the money works

Sand and gravel is nominally a commodity, but its economics are governed by freight, not by a world price. Internalizing this is the whole game.

The freight-limited local-pricing model. Because the product has a high weight-to-value ratio, transport cost can approach or exceed the value of the material itself. Vulcan reports that ~80% of its aggregate tons move directly from pit to customer by truck, another ~15% by truck after first reaching a distribution yard by rail or water, and less than 5% direct by rail or water [8]. Truck freight runs roughly $0.08–$0.20 per ton-mile [16], so hauling ~$14.50 material even 30–50 miles can add 50–100%+ to the delivered price. Beyond a short radius, the product prices itself out. The practical effect: each pit serves a small local market, the low-cost supplier is usually the one closest to the job (not the cheapest to dig), and producers with permitted reserves near a city earn outsized margins. Unlike a copper or oil producer, an aggregates operator is a local price-maker, not a global price-taker — which is why prices have compounded through the cycle [1][8][9].

No AISC, no lifting cost — use the price-cost spread. Metals miners quote all-in sustaining cost (AISC) and oil producers quote lifting and finding-&-development (F&D) cost; aggregates has no standardized equivalent, because companies treat freight, depletion, and internal transfers differently. The useful gauge is the freight-adjusted price-cost spread per ton. Vulcan's 2025 aggregates numbers illustrate it: freight-adjusted selling price $21.98/ton, cash gross profit $11.33/ton, against a freight-adjusted cash cost of $10.65/ton [8]. That cash cost is not a corporate break-even — it excludes overhead, interest, tax, and growth capital — but the widening spread is the earnings engine.

Reserves, reserve life, and depletion. Reserves are the strategic asset and are added mainly by acquisition, not exploration — the scarce input is permission, not rock. Vulcan holds ~16.6 billion tons; Martin Marietta reports ~85 years of reserve life [8][9]. As pits are mined they deplete; the U.S. tax code grants a modest 5% percentage-depletion allowance for sand and gravel (Internal Revenue Code §613), a real but small cash-tax benefit [17].

Operating leverage and capital intensity. Much of the cost base is fixed (plant, permits, equipment, reclamation), so incremental tons and price flow disproportionately to profit — margins expand in up-cycles and compress hard in downturns even if price holds. The business is capital-intensive to build but cash-generative to run: Vulcan's 2025 aggregates capital spending was ~$622 million [8]. A greenfield pit can take years of permitting before first revenue, which is why buying a permitted site — even at a rich headline price — is often cheaper than building one.

Royalties and mineral rights. Landowners who lease pit rights collect a per-ton or percentage-of-sales royalty — commonly around $0.50–$1.10 per ton, or ~5–15% of sales value, often structured as "the greater of" a fixed per-ton amount or a percentage [15][18]. This is the aggregates analog of an oil-and-gas mineral-royalty interest: a claim on gross tonnage with no operating cost or equipment exposure. It still carries volume, permit, title, and operator-credit risk. A crucial diligence point is whether a deed's general "mineral" reservation even conveys common sand and gravel — under some state law it does not.

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6. What drives demand

Demand is a levered bet on U.S. construction activity. The 2025 end-use split (USGS) [1]:

• Portland-cement concrete aggregate — ~42%
• Road base and coverings — ~20%
• Construction fill — ~12%
• Asphaltic (bituminous) concrete — ~9%
• Other (drainage, riprap, railroad ballast, filtration, snow/ice control, landscaping) — ~17%

The macro levers:

1. Public infrastructure — the most durable leg. Highways and heavy-civil work are the most aggregate-intensive construction there is, and public funding is steadier than private. The 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) provided roughly $350 billion for federal highway programs across fiscal years 2022–2026 [19]. Its highway authorization expires after FY2026, making reauthorization the single biggest demand-swing variable into 2027 [1][19].
2. Residential construction. Rate-sensitive and the main recent drag — high mortgage rates cut 2024–2025 housing demand and, with it, aggregate volumes [1].
3. Private non-residential. Warehouses, manufacturing reshoring, semiconductor and battery plants, energy, and — increasingly — data centers, which USGS explicitly flags as 2026 demand support [1].
4. Population shift and weather. Sun Belt migration steers where demand grows; rain, freeze, and storms are real short-term volume disruptors [1].

Long-run, U.S. aggregate consumption is mature — no secular growth story — but it is replacement- and population-driven and infrastructure-backstopped, a long, gently cyclical plateau rather than terminal decline.

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7. Regulation

This is mostly private-land, state- and locally permitted mining. The federal leasing regime that dominates hardrock metals and oil-and-gas matters far less here.

• Mine safety — MSHA (federal). Every U.S. pit is regulated by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) under the Mine Act, with mandatory inspections, Part 46 miner training, and citation authority; public companies disclose MSHA citations in their filings [8][20]. A 2024 MSHA rule tightened the respirable crystalline-silica exposure limit to 50 micrograms per cubic meter (8-hour average), requiring monitoring, dust controls, and medical surveillance [21]. Sand-and-gravel surface mining is statistically among the safer mining segments, though not risk-free — MSHA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) recorded on the order of 4–6 fatalities in the segment in 2024 (the two agencies count differently, so the figures are not interchangeable) [22][23].
• Federal land — BLM. Common-variety sand and gravel was removed from the 1872 General Mining Law in 1955; on Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land it is a "saleable" mineral material sold at fair market value under the Materials Act, not a stakeable claim [24]. Because the industry sits mostly on private and state land, BLM is a minor factor.
• Environment — EPA and states. Clean Water Act Section 404 governs dredge-and-fill in wetlands and waterways (critical for in-stream and floodplain pits); EPA effluent guidelines and NPDES stormwater permits (the federal water-discharge permit program) also apply; reclamation and bonding are largely state-administered [25][26].
• Local zoning — the binding constraint. Because deposits are only valuable near demand, local zoning and conditional-use permitting — not resource availability — decide whether a pit can open. NIMBY opposition and multi-year entitlements are the industry's chief chokepoint, and USGS repeatedly notes they push new pits farther from cities, tightening urban supply and supporting price [1].
• Royalties and severance. No federal production royalty on private-land output; some states levy severance/extraction taxes. Landowner royalties are private contracts (§5).
• ESG. Far lower process emissions than cement, but exposed to diesel use, dust/silica, water, land disturbance, and reclamation obligations.

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

Local, not national, competition. The national HHI of 90 [4] says the industry is atomized — but that understates real market power, because the relevant market is a ~50-mile haul zone, where two or three producers with permitted reserves can behave as a de facto oligopoly. This local concentration, not national share, is what underpins pricing power, and it is why antitrust review of aggregate mergers focuses on local overlap (divestitures are common).

Consolidation at the top, fragmentation at the bottom. The majors grow almost entirely by buying reserves and small operators, because greenfield permitting near demand is so hard. Recent landmark deals: Quikrete's ~$11.5 billion take-private of Summit Materials (closed 2025); Holcim's spin-off of its North American business as Amrize (2025); Martin Marietta's $2.05 billion purchase of Blue Water Industries operations (2024); and, announced in June 2026, CRH's ~$8.5 billion acquisition of Arcosa and Martin Marietta's ~$13.5 billion combination with Lhoist North America [11][12][13][27][28]. Meanwhile ~85% of establishments remain sub-20-employee independents [6] — a deep pipeline of roll-up targets. Barriers to entry are high and rising (permitting difficulty, reserve scarcity near demand, capital intensity), which protects incumbents — a genuine moat for public and private owners alike.

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9. Risks

Lead risk — construction-cycle (volume) cyclicality. Unlike metals and oil, where price is the swing factor, here volumes swing with construction. A housing or commercial downturn cuts tons, and operating leverage magnifies the earnings hit — as the ~10% national volume decline from 2023 to 2025 showed [1]. Local prices have historically been sticky-to-rising, softening the blow, but in oversupplied local markets a deep recession can pressure price too. This is a cyclical, not defensive, business.

Other material risks:

• Interest-rate sensitivity — transmitted through housing and private construction [1].
• Public-funding cliff / political risk — the IIJA highway authorization expires after FY2026; the size and timing of reauthorization is a real demand swing [1][19].
• Cost inflation — diesel (the main variable cost), labor, trucking capacity, and equipment; freight spikes can strand reserve-poor markets [8][16].
• Permitting and zoning — the defining threat to supply growth; multi-year entitlements and NIMBY opposition can block new pits and sterilize owned reserves (development over a deposit, or lost permits, can matter more than physically running out) [1].
• Reserve depletion and replacement — reserves deplete and must be replaced, increasingly via expensive M&A near growing metros [8][9].
• M&A overpayment and valuation — scarce permitted assets can be excellent businesses but poor investments at prices that assume perpetual pricing power; the majors trade at premium multiples that embed continued price gains and infrastructure spending — a de-rating risk if either falters.
• Environment, safety, weather — CWA §404, dust/silica, reclamation, and weather-driven quarterly noise [1][21][25].

What is not a major risk here (unlike coal or oil): energy-transition / stranded-asset risk is minimal. Roads, foundations, and utilities need bulk aggregate under essentially every decarbonization scenario, and the industry is arguably a beneficiary of transition capex (grid, renewables, EV plants, data centers). Import competition is negligible (~4 million tons, ~1% of consumption, ~90% from Canada) [1].

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10. How to invest, and outlook

Public routes

• Producer equities — the primary vehicle. Vulcan (VMC) and Martin Marietta (MLM) are the closest to pure-play aggregates compounders — large-cap, investment-grade, with the local-pricing-power / reserve-annuity model. CRH, Amrize, Knife River, Eagle Materials, CEMEX, and Heidelberg add diversified building-materials exposure [8][9][10][11].
• The equity character — a quieter dividend/buyback pattern than most miners. Because local prices are resilient, capital returns need not follow the sharp boom-bust payout swings of oil and metals producers; the historical pattern has been steadily growing dividends and buybacks (Vulcan returned ~$260 million in dividends and ~$438 million in repurchases in 2025) [8]. The trade-off is that these trade as premium-priced "quality cyclicals," so multiples can compress if volumes or infrastructure funding disappoint.
• Funds and royalties. No pure sand-and-gravel ETF exists; the closest indirect routes are infrastructure ETFs such as PAVE (Global X U.S. Infrastructure Development) and IFRA (iShares U.S. Infrastructure), where materials are only ~13–22% of holdings, so aggregate exposure is diluted [29][30]. There is no listed aggregates royalty/streaming pure play [15].

Private routes

• Direct / private-equity ownership of operators. The fragmented long tail is a fertile buy-and-build arena: acquire regional pits, assemble defensible haul-zone positions, and price up. Underwrite pit by pit — permitted reserve quality, remaining permit life, haul distance, local competition, and reclamation liabilities — because consolidated earnings can hide a poor reserve or an expiring permit.
• Mineral and royalty interests. Owning the reserve-bearing land and leasing pit rights yields a capital-light, operating-cost-free per-ton or percentage royalty [15][18]. Lower risk and lower upside than operating; illiquid; key diligence is title (does the deed actually convey the sand and gravel?), volume/reserve life, permitting status, and operator credit. Owning the land outright also carries post-mining development optionality once a pit is reclaimed.

Outlook

• Near term (2025–2026): volumes soft-to-flat (~870 million tons in 2025, down from ~880 million) on weak residential demand and lower highway spending, but price kept rising to ~$14.50/ton — the pattern is expected to persist [1].
• The pivotal variable is the IIJA cliff after FY2026 and its reauthorization, alongside a rate-driven housing recovery [1][19].
• New structural tailwinds: USGS flags manufacturing reshoring, energy, and data-center construction as 2026 supports — aggregate-intensive megaprojects that partly offset residential softness [1].
• Supply keeps tightening near cities as zoning pushes pits outward, structurally supporting price and rewarding owners of permitted reserves near growth [1]. Consolidation continues.

Bottom line. Construction sand and gravel is a mature, cyclical-but-pricing-resilient business with a genuine local moat, minimal energy-transition risk, and a long infrastructure-and-population demand runway. Public exposure is a premium "quality cyclical"; private exposure ranges from operating roll-ups to passive mineral royalties. Watch three levers — the construction/rate cycle, the post-IIJA federal funding path, and permitting — because those move volumes, while price has, so far, largely taken care of itself.

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Sources

1. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 — Sand and Gravel (Construction), February 2026. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-sand-gravel.pdf
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Manual / NAICS Search — Construction Sand and Gravel Mining (212321), 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=212321&input=212321&year=2022
3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023 — NAICS 212321 (establishments, employment, annual payroll; our ingested ground-truth statistics). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
4. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — Summary Statistics & Concentration, NAICS 212321 (firms, receipts, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50 revenue shares, HHI; our ingested ground-truth statistics). https://data.census.gov/table/ECNBASIC2022.EC2200BASIC
5. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 212321 = 500 employees), effective 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
6. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2022 — NAICS 212321 establishment-size distribution, 2024. https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2022/econ/cbp/2022-cbp.html
7. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 — Stone (Crushed), February 2026. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-stone-crushed.pdf
8. Vulcan Materials Company, 2025 Form 10-K, filed 2026, U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1396009/000162828026009546/vmc-20251231.htm
9. Martin Marietta Materials, 2025 Form 10-K, filed 2026, U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/916076/000119312526059193/mlm-20251231.htm
10. CRH plc, 2025 Form 10-K, filed 2026, U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/849395/000162828026009043/crh-20251231.htm
11. Holcim, Completion of the Spin-off of Holcim's North American Business (Amrize), June 2025. https://www.holcim.com/investors/listing-north-america-business-us
12. CRH plc, CRH to Acquire Arcosa for $8.5 Billion, June 2026. https://www.crh.com/media/press-releases/2026/crh-to-acquire-arcosa/
13. Summit Materials, Summit Materials Completes Merger with QUIKRETE (~$11.5 billion), February 2025, U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1621563/000095010325001807/dp224739_ex9901.htm
14. Rock Products (from USGS final production data), USGS Releases Updated "Top 100 Producers of Construction Sand and Gravel," 2024. https://rockproducts.com/2024/02/06/usgs-releases-updated-top-100-producers-of-construction-sand-and-gravel/
15. Natural Resource Partners L.P., 2025 Form 10-K (royalty-lease structures), filed 2026, U.S. SEC EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1171486/000143774926006147/nrp20251231_10k.htm
16. Aggregate Markets, Aggregate delivery cost per mile/ton (freight-cost benchmarks). https://aggregatemarkets.com/en/blog/delivery-ordering/aggregate-delivery-cost-per-mile-ton-guide
17. Office of the Law Revision Counsel, 26 U.S.C. §613 — Percentage Depletion (gravel and sand, 5%). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:26+section:613+edition:prelim)
18. Rock Associates, Sand & Gravel and Quarry Royalty Rates. https://www.rockassociates.com/post/sand-gravel-and-quarry-royalty-rates
19. Federal Highway Administration, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) Funding, updated 2026. https://highways.dot.gov/iija/funding
20. Mine Safety and Health Administration, Part 46 Training Guide (IG 37). https://www.msha.gov/sites/default/files/Training_Education/IG%2037.pdf
21. U.S. Department of Labor / MSHA, Final Rule Reducing Miners' Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, April 2024. https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/msha/msha20240416
22. Mine Safety and Health Administration, Mine Injury and Worktime Quarterly, Jan.–Dec. 2024 (Final), Table 2. https://arlweb.msha.gov/STATS/PART50/WQ/2024/table2.pdf
23. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Fatal Occupational Injuries by Industry, 2024, Table A-1. https://www.bls.gov/iif/fatal-injuries-tables/fatal-occupational-injuries-table-a-1-2024.htm
24. Bureau of Land Management, Saleable Mineral Materials. https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/mining-and-materials/saleable-minerals
25. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Permit Program under Clean Water Act Section 404. https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/permit-program-under-cwa-section-404
26. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Mineral Mining and Processing Effluent Guidelines. https://www.epa.gov/eg/mineral-mining-and-processing-effluent-guidelines
27. Blue Water Advisors, Blue Water Industries to Sell Certain Aggregates Operations to Martin Marietta ($2.05 billion), February 2024. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2024/02/12/2827414/0/en/Blue-Water-Industries-to-Sell-Certain-Aggregates-Operations-to-Martin-Marietta.html
28. Martin Marietta Materials, Martin Marietta to Combine with Lhoist North America in $13.5 Billion Transaction, June 2026. https://ir.martinmarietta.com/news-releases/news-release-details/martin-marietta-combine-lhoist-north-america-135-billion
29. Global X, U.S. Infrastructure Development ETF (PAVE) — holdings, 2026. https://www.globalxetfs.com/funds/pave
30. iShares, iShares U.S. Infrastructure ETF (IFRA) — holdings, 2026. https://www.ishares.com/us/products/294315/ishares-us-infrastructure-etf