U.S. Gold and Silver Ore Mining — An Investor's Primer

NAICS 2022 code 212220 — Gold Ore and Silver Ore Mining (United States)

NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, the federal code that defines an industry. This primer draws on U.S. Census, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and company data. Business figures are Census; physical production and reserves are USGS; both are labeled. Forward-looking statements are written as judgments, not facts.

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1. Overview

This is the business of digging gold and silver out of the ground in the United States — mining the ore and processing it on site into doré (rough gold-silver bars) or concentrate. It is a small industry by headcount but valuable: roughly 137 firms and 195 establishments employing about 15,700 people [5][6], producing metal worth on the order of $17 billion of gold and $1.4 billion of silver in 2025 [1][2].

The one fact that governs everything here: these companies are price-takers. They sell into deep global markets (London and COMEX) at a gold or silver price they cannot influence. Their production volume barely moves year to year, so almost all the swing in their revenue and profit comes from the metal price, not from how much they dig. When gold roughly doubled from about $1,800/oz in 2021 to a record ~$3,300/oz average in 2025, industry cash flows exploded — on essentially flat output [1][3]. The same leverage works in reverse on the way down. An investor in this sector is, above all, taking a view on the price of gold and silver.

Ways in. Public-market investors can buy producer shares (leveraged bets on the metal price), royalty/streaming companies (smoother, higher-margin exposure), or exchange-traded funds (ETFs) that hold either miners or physical metal. Private investors own operating companies and junior explorers directly or through private equity (PE), or buy mineral and royalty rights — a claim on a mine's revenue without operating it. Section 4 lays out the specific names; Section 10 covers how to choose among them.

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2. What it is, and what it is not

Scope. Code 212220 covers establishments that (a) develop a gold or silver mine site, (b) mine ore valued chiefly for its gold or silver, and (c) beneficiate it — crush, grind, concentrate, and leach the ore, up to producing doré or concentrate at the mine [7]. It is a primary-extraction classification: it stops at the mine gate.

Edition note. The 2022 NAICS revision merged the two older codes — 212221 Gold Ore Mining and 212222 Silver Ore Mining — into the single code 212220 [7]. Some federal datasets still publish the combined industry under the five-digit code 21222.

What is excluded (and where it goes instead):

• Refining and minting. Turning doré into 99.5%+ bullion is downstream manufacturing (NAICS 331410), not mining.
• Jewelry and fabrication — separate manufacturing codes.
• Mining support services — contract exploration drilling, mine-development, and geophysical work sit in NAICS 213114 and 541360, not here. (This is the mining analogue to "oilfield services.")
• Base-metal mines — copper, lead, zinc, and nickel mining (NAICS 212230) and other metal ores (212290). This matters: most U.S. silver, and about 7% of U.S. gold, is recovered as a byproduct at copper and lead-zinc mines that are classified outside 212220 [1][2]. So this code understates total U.S. gold and silver supply.

A key data caveat. Census counts a mine by its primary business; USGS counts a commodity wherever it is recovered. USGS silver and gold figures are therefore broader than the 212220 establishment universe [1][2].

Ownership mix. A barbell. A dozen-odd large, publicly traded, often foreign-domiciled multinationals produce the overwhelming majority of output, sitting above a long tail of small private operators, junior explorers, and Alaskan placer miners. A separate class of royalty and streaming financiers owns economic interests in mines without operating any. Roughly 74% of industry revenue comes from just the top four firms (see Section 3) [5].

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3. How big it is

Business figures (U.S. Census — the authoritative source for this industry's business statistics)

CBP (County Business Patterns) and the EC (Economic Census) are different programs with different timing, so the firm/revenue year (2022) and the establishment/employment year (2023) do not line up perfectly; treat them as recent snapshots, not a clean time series.

Two derived figures give a feel for the business: average payroll of about $112,000 per employee (a capital-intensive, high-wage, skilled workforce), and roughly $80 million of revenue per firm (2022) — a handful of very large complexes averaged with many tiny exploration and placer outfits [5][6].

Concentration is extreme. Census reports that the top 4 firms earned 74.4% of industry revenue, the top 8 earned 87.4%, the top 20 earned 97.3%, and the top 50 earned 99.6% (2022) [5]. (Census suppressed the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI, a standard concentration statistic, so we do not report a value for it.) The establishment count is dominated by small players; revenue and production are dominated by a few giants.

Physical production and reserves (USGS — real units)

USGS (U.S. Geological Survey) measures the metal itself, including byproduct output from mines outside 212220, so these figures are broader than the Census business data above. (1 metric ton of gold = 32,151 troy ounces.)

Gold, 2025 (USGS estimates): [1]

• U.S. mine production ≈ 160 metric tons (~5.1 million troy oz), worth ~$17 billion — a 32% jump in value over 2024 driven by price, not volume.
• Produced at 40+ lode mines in 12 states, plus Alaskan placers. Nevada ≈ 64%, Alaska ≈ 22%. The top ~25 operations yield ~94% of U.S. gold.
• U.S. reserves ≈ 3,000 t (~96 million oz) — a ~19-year "static reserve life" at current output, absent new discovery.
• The U.S. is the world's 5th-largest gold producer (behind China, Russia, Australia, Canada).

Silver, 2025 (USGS estimates): [2]

• U.S. mine production ≈ 1,100 metric tons (~35 million troy oz), worth ~$1.4 billion.
• From only 4 primary silver mines plus 31 base- and precious-metal mines that produce silver as a coproduct/byproduct, across 12 states (Alaska and Nevada led).
• U.S. reserves ≈ 23,000 t. The U.S. imports most of the silver it uses — net import reliance was 77% in 2025. Silver is a structurally import-dependent metal.

Why the Census and USGS dollar figures differ: Census receipts (~$10.9 B) are 2022 business revenue, when gold averaged ~$1,800/oz; USGS's ~$18 billion of 2025 physical value reflects both far higher prices and byproduct metal recovered outside this NAICS code. Both are correct for what they measure.

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4. The investable universe

Few of these are pure U.S. plays — most are global portfolios, and several of the largest U.S. mines are owned by companies domiciled or listed abroad. Every producer share below is a leveraged bet on the metal price: a roughly fixed cost sits under a variable price, so earnings amplify the metal's moves in both directions. Production and cost figures are sourced; market-cap tiers are broad, approximate, and move sharply with the metal price — treat them as order-of-magnitude, not quotes.

The largest U.S. mine is a joint venture, not a company: Nevada Gold Mines (NGM) is owned 61.5% by Barrick (operator) and 38.5% by Newmont, and produced roughly half of all U.S. gold in 2025 [10][9].

Major private, PE, and foreign owners. Beyond the listed names: Waterton Global, a mining PE manager (~$1.75 B of assets), owns the Spring Valley development project in Nevada [17]; the Donlin gold project in Alaska is 60% NOVAGOLD / 40% funds managed by Paulson, with Alaska Native corporations (Calista, The Kuskokwim Corp.) holding subsurface and surface interests [16]; AngloGold Ashanti (UK/South Africa) is developing Nevada's Expanded Silicon. Foreign domicile is the norm, not the exception, for large U.S. output.

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5. How the money works

Gold and silver miners sell a globally priced commodity at a price they cannot set. So the model is simple to state and brutal in practice:

Payable revenue = metal recovered × market price − treatment, transport, and contract deductions, where metal recovered = ore tonnes × grade × recovery rate.

The cost curve — AISC. The industry's standard yardstick is all-in sustaining cost (AISC): cash mining and processing costs, site overhead, royalties, and the sustaining capital needed to keep output flat, expressed per ounce sold. FY2024 examples: Newmont ~$1,358/oz, Barrick ~$1,451/oz [9][10]. With gold at $2,400–3,300/oz in 2024–25, those producers earned roughly $1,000–1,900/oz of margin — an unusually fat part of the cycle.

Why the leverage is so violent. Because much of the cost base is fixed, a modest price move swings cash flow far more. Illustratively, at ~$1,620 AISC, gold at $3,300 leaves a ~$1,680/oz spread; gold at $2,000 leaves only ~$380 — a 77% collapse in margin from a 39% price fall [1][10]. This is why high-cost producers offer the biggest upside in a bull market and the greatest impairment and dilution risk in a downturn.

Grade, recovery, and mine method matter as much as price. Grade (grams of gold per tonne, g/t) sets how much rock you must move per ounce, but it cannot be read alone: Barrick's Nevada reserve grades run from 6.07 g/t at high-grade underground Turquoise Ridge down to 0.58 g/t at the large open-pit Phoenix mine, which is only economic because of copper byproduct credits [10]. Strip ratio, depth, hardness, and recovery can outweigh headline grade.

Reserves are not resources — never add them. Reserves (proven and probable) are economically mineable today under SEC rules; resources (measured, indicated, inferred) are geologically defined but not yet proven economic [11]. Higher metal prices can convert resources into reserves and vice versa — companies set a "reserve price" assumption (recently ~$1,500–2,200/oz gold across the majors) that itself moves the reserve base [10][11].

Depletion and capital intensity. Ore is a wasting asset: a mine costs hundreds of millions to billions up front and depletes over 10–20 years. A producer can report strong free cash flow while quietly liquidating its orebody, so reserve replacement — through exploration or acquisition — is an economic necessity, not a nicety. Compare annual depletion against reserve additions before trusting current cash flow.

Royalties and mineral rights. A royalty or stream is a claim on a mine's revenue or ounces off the top, senior to the operator's costs — which is why royalty companies enjoy steadier, higher margins than miners. Common forms: a gross/net-smelter-return (NSR) royalty (a percentage of revenue), a net-profits interest (NPI), and a stream (upfront cash for the right to buy future metal at a fixed price). On U.S. federal land, hardrock miners pay no federal production royalty at all (Section 7) — a structural cost advantage over oil, gas, and coal [24].

Byproduct accounting can flatter costs. When a mine sells multiple metals, credits from the others can push the "reported" cost of the primary metal near — or below — zero. Hecla's polymetallic Greens Creek reported a negative silver AISC in 2025 because gold, lead, and zinc revenue exceeded the costs allocated to silver [12]. The mine did not run for free; if base-metal prices fall, that reported silver cost jumps even with no operational change.

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6. What drives demand

Gold is a monetary metal more than an industrial one. USGS puts 2025 global gold use (excluding ETFs) at roughly 40% jewelry, 24% physical bars, 21% central banks and institutions, 7% coins, 7% electronics [1]. Its price is driven by real interest rates, the U.S. dollar, inflation and geopolitical risk (gold competes with bonds — low real yields lift it), by central-bank buying (a large, growing source as reserve managers diversify away from the dollar), and by investment flows through ETFs, bars, and coins. Jewelry, still ~40%, is price-elastic and fell sharply as prices spiked in 2025 [1].

Silver is a hybrid — about half industrial. USGS puts 2025 U.S. silver use at roughly 25% electrical/electronics, 19% other industrial/photography, 18% physical bars, 15% photovoltaics (solar), 14% coins/medals, 6% jewelry, 3% brazing/solder [2]. Its industrial half ties it to solar, electrification, grids, data centers, and electronics, where silver's unmatched conductivity makes it hard to substitute — but very high prices push manufacturers to "thrift" silver out of solar cells. The Silver Institute reported 2025 as the fifth straight year of global market deficit [22]. Net result: silver has beta to both the monetary/gold trade and the industrial cycle, and is more volatile than gold in both directions.

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7. Regulation

The General Mining Law of 1872 still governs hardrock (gold, silver, copper) mining on U.S. federal public land. Its defining feature: unlike oil, gas, and coal — which require federal leases and pay royalties — hardrock mining on public land pays no federal production royalty, and a claimant may stake an unpatented claim and mine without a lease [23][24][25]. GAO found hundreds of authorized hardrock operations on federal land yielding no federal production royalty [24]. This is a material, U.S.-specific cost advantage — and a standing political risk, as an ~8% federal royalty has been proposed for decades.

Land and permitting. Most Western mines sit on land run by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) or the U.S. Forest Service. A major new mine needs a plan of operations, review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act permits, Endangered Species Act consultation, tribal and historic-preservation review, state permits, and reclamation bonding [23][25]. GAO found federal plan reviews averaging roughly two years but ranging past 11; a later analysis cited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) found ~4.6 years from first record to authorization — and neither figure covers the full discovery-to-production path [23]. The Ninth Circuit's Rosemont decision complicates placing waste and tailings on unpatented claims, forcing some projects to redesign. Permitting delay is the sector's biggest non-price risk.

Environment and safety. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and states enforce the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and CERCLA/Superfund liability (legacy-mine cleanup is a large tail risk); acid drainage, cyanide handling, and tailings-dam stability are the recurring hazards [26]. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) regulates worker safety, inspecting underground mines at least four times a year, and is also the source of federal mine-and-mill employment counts [27].

Taxes. No federal royalty, but a 15% percentage-depletion allowance for domestic gold and silver, plus state levies: Nevada's Net Proceeds of Minerals tax (up to 5%) and a gold-and-silver excise tax; Alaska's mining-license tax (up to 7%) plus a 3% royalty on state land [29][30].

Critical-minerals policy. On November 7, 2025, silver was added to the federal Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals; gold was analyzed but not added [28]. The designation can unlock permitting priority and federal support — a modest tailwind for U.S. silver projects.

ESG. Water use, tailings safety, cyanide, biodiversity, and Indigenous/community consent are persistent pressure points that add cost and delay.

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The industry consolidates at the top and fragments at the bottom. Because mines deplete, majors must continually replace reserves, and buying ounces is often cheaper and faster than finding them — so M&A is structural. Landmark deals: Newmont–Newcrest (2023, ~$19.2 billion), which created the clear global No. 1 [33]; the formation of Nevada Gold Mines (2019), folding Barrick's and Newmont's Nevada assets into one JV [10]; and a steady run of precious-metals tie-ups — Coeur–SilverCrest (2025) and –New Gold (2026), SSR–Cripple Creek & Victor (2025), and Royal Gold–Sandstorm (2025) [11][15][20].

Competitive advantage in a price-taker business comes from being low on the cost curve (high grade, scale, good geology and jurisdiction), holding long reserve life, and having the balance-sheet strength to buy assets cheaply in down-cycles — which is precisely the royalty model's edge (Franco-Nevada deploys capital counter-cyclically, debt-free) [19]. Adjacent deposits also invite consolidation because they can share mills, power, water, tailings, permits, and staff. The main consolidation risk is overpaying at the top of the cycle or using acquisitions to paper over weak organic reserve replacement.

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9. Risks

1. Commodity-price cyclicality — the central risk. Revenue and margins are dominated by prices the miners cannot control, and operating leverage magnifies every move. The 2021→2025 doubling of gold and silver flowed almost entirely to the bottom line — and would reverse just as fast [1][2].
2. Cost inflation. Labor, diesel, explosives, steel, tires, cyanide, grinding media, and power can rise faster than general inflation; Barrick's 2024 AISC overshot its guidance [10]. High prices also raise royalties and taxes.
3. Permitting and political delay. Multi-year (sometimes decade-plus) NEPA/permitting timelines and litigation (Rosemont) can strand capital [23].
4. Depletion and reserve replacement. With a ~19-year static U.S. gold reserve life and declining grades, failing to replace reserves is a slow-motion existential risk that drives expensive M&A [1].
5. Policy risk. Mining-law reform (a federal hardrock royalty), severance-tax changes, and ESG constraints could raise costs.
6. Operational and concentration risk. Mines are hazardous, single-asset operations, and U.S. output is extraordinarily concentrated — one JV (Nevada Gold Mines) is ~half of U.S. gold, and Nevada plus Alaska are ~86% [1][10]. One incident (e.g., Hecla's 2023 Lucky Friday fire) can dent a producer's year.
7. Byproduct exposure (silver). Credit-driven "negative" silver costs mask exposure to other metals' prices; silver's industrial half also ties it to the economic cycle and to solar thrifting/substitution [12][22].

One risk these metals largely escape: unlike coal and oil, gold and silver face little energy-transition / stranded-asset risk. Silver is arguably a transition beneficiary through solar and electrification.

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10. How to invest, and outlook

Public-market routes

• Producer equities (NEM, B, KGC, CDE, HL): the most torque to the metal price — a fixed cost under a variable price means earnings and cash flow amplify the metal in both directions. Dividends and buybacks follow a classic boom-bust pattern — generous when prices are high, cut or suspended when they fall — so treat them as outputs of the cycle, not bond-like commitments.
• Royalty & streaming companies (FNV, WPM, RGLD): the same price exposure with higher, steadier margins and no operating-cost or capex risk. They hold senior claims on revenue/ounces, carry little debt, and deploy capital counter-cyclically (FNV has raised its dividend 17+ years straight) — the choice for price upside with less operational volatility, though they can trade at demanding valuations [19][20].
• ETFs: miner baskets give leveraged exposure — large-cap gold miners (GDX), juniors (GDXJ), silver miners (SIL); physical-metal funds (IAU for gold, SLV for silver) give unlevered exposure with no operating risk but no yield. Note the popular miner ETFs hold global, not pure-U.S., portfolios [32].
• Trade-off in one line: producers = most torque (up and down); royalties = smoother, higher-quality cash flow; physical metal = pure, unlevered price exposure.

Private-market routes

• Direct or PE ownership of operators, developers, and junior explorers — the most control and leverage, but also the most geological, capital-call, permitting, environmental, and closure risk, plus illiquidity and single-asset concentration.
• Mineral and royalty rights — buying an NSR or net-profits interest on a producing or development property gives price-linked, cost-insulated cash flow, mirroring the public royalty model at smaller scale.
• Diligence is everything in private deals: verify title and claim validity, water rights, every royalty/stream/offtake obligation, whether reported ounces are reserves or merely resources, the reserve-price assumption, all capital (initial, sustaining, closure), permit status and litigation, tribal agreements, and reclamation-bond adequacy. Contract language (allowable deductions, audit rights, area-of-interest clauses) often matters more than the headline royalty percentage.

Outlook (forward-looking — treat as judgment, not fact)

Prices sit at historic extremes entering 2026. Market trackers show gold peaking around $5,400–5,600/oz in late January 2026 before correcting toward ~$4,000/oz by mid-2026, and silver spiking above $121/oz in late January 2026 [31][21][22]. Sell-side forecasts remain aggressive but disagree widely: the World Bank projected 2026 averages near $4,700 gold / $70 silver, while J.P. Morgan has floated ~$6,000 gold / ~$81 silver — these are speculative [31].

At these prices, U.S. producer margins are exceptionally wide, funding dividends, buybacks, and reserve-replacing M&A; expect continued consolidation while prices hold. But volume growth will be modest — U.S. gold output has drifted down (187→160 t over 2021–25) despite soaring prices, constrained by depletion, falling grades, and slow permitting [1]. The value story is a price story, not a volume story. Structural tailwinds — central-bank gold buying, silver's solar/electrification demand, its new critical-mineral status, and a persistent supply deficit — support the case [1][2][22][28]. The central caveat stands: today's record margins are a cyclical peak, the same operating leverage cuts both ways, and an investor here is, above all, taking a view on the gold and silver price.

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Sources

1. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 — Gold (2025 data). https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-gold.pdf
2. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 — Silver (2025 data). https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-silver.pdf
3. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 — Gold (2024 data). https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2025/mcs2025-gold.pdf
4. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 — Silver (2024 data). https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2025/mcs2025-silver.pdf
5. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census, Summary Statistics (Table EC2200BASIC), NAICS 212220 — firms, revenue, concentration ratios (CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50). https://data.census.gov/table/ECNBASIC2022.EC2200BASIC
6. U.S. Census Bureau, 2023 County Business Patterns, NAICS 21222 profile — establishments, employment, annual and Q1 payroll. https://data.census.gov/profile/21222_-_Gold_Ore_and_Silver_Ore_Mining?codeset=naics~21222
7. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definitions: 212220 Gold Ore and Silver Ore Mining, and "NAICS Changes" (2024). https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=21222&year=2022; https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2024/11/naics-changes.html
8. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards (effective March 17, 2023; NAICS 212220 = 1,500 employees). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
9. Newmont Corporation, FY2024 and FY2025 results and Form 10-K (SEC EDGAR). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1164727/000116472726000010/nem-20251231.htm
10. Barrick Mining Corp., FY2024/FY2025 results, 2025 Annual Report & Annual Information Form; NYSE ticker change GOLD→B (2025). https://s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_financial/annual_reports/2025/Barrick_Annual_Report_2025.pdf; https://www.barrick.com/English/news/news-details/2025/barrick-Is-now-B-on-the-NYSE/default.aspx
11. Coeur Mining, Inc., FY2024/FY2025 results and Form 10-K (SEC EDGAR). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/215466/000021546626000004/cde-20251231.htm
12. Hecla Mining Co., FY2024/FY2025 results, reserves, and Form 10-K (SEC EDGAR). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/719413/000119312526055059/hl-20251231.htm
13. Kinross Gold Corp., 2025 Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year Results (2026). https://www.kinross.com/news-and-investors/news-releases/
14. Northern Star Resources, "Pogo Operations" (2026). https://www.nsrltd.com/our-assets/pogo-operations/
15. SSR Mining Inc., 2025 Form 10-K (Cripple Creek & Victor, Marigold). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921638/000092163826000035/ssrm-20251231.htm
16. NOVAGOLD Resources, 2025 Form 10-K (Donlin; Paulson 40%; Calista and The Kuskokwim Corporation interests). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1173420/000117184326000374/ng20251130_10k.htm
17. Waterton Global Resource Management / Solidus Resources — Spring Valley project. https://www.watertonglobal.com/firm/
18. Wheaton Precious Metals — company and Spring Valley gold stream (2025). https://www.wheatonpm.com/
19. Franco-Nevada Corp., 2024/2025 Annual Report; U.S. Global Investors, "Royalty and Streaming Companies Lead Gold Sector." https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1456346/000110465926032133/fnv-20251231xex99d1.htm
20. Royal Gold, Inc., 2025 Form 10-K (Cortez royalties; Sandstorm acquisition). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/85535/000008553526000008/rgld-20251231.htm
21. World Gold Council, Gold Demand Trends: Full Year 2025 and AISC guidance note. https://www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demand-trends-full-year-2025
22. The Silver Institute / Metals Focus, World Silver Survey 2026. https://silverinstitute.org/
23. Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Mining Industry and the Rosemont Decision (R48166, 2024). https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48166
24. U.S. Government Accountability Office, hardrock mining reports (GAO-20-461R; GAO-16-165; GAO-21-299). https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-461r
25. Bureau of Land Management, "Mining Claims and Sites on Federal Lands"; General Mining Act of 1872. https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/mining-and-minerals/locatable-minerals/mining-claims
26. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Hardrock Mining Framework (RCRA Bevill; CWA/CAA/CERCLA). https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-10/documents/hardrock_mining_framework_0.pdf
27. Mine Safety and Health Administration, mine-safety inspection rules and injury/worktime data. https://www.msha.gov/data-reports
28. Federal Register, Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals (90 FR 50494, Nov. 7, 2025 — silver added, gold not). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/07/2025-19813/final-2025-list-of-critical-minerals
29. Nevada Legislature, NRS Chapters 362 and 363D — Net Proceeds of Minerals tax and gold/silver excise tax. https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-363D.html
30. Alaska Department of Natural Resources, mining-license tax and state-land production royalty. https://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/cdn/pdf/factsheets/production-royalty.pdf
31. Price forecasts and trackers: World Bank, Commodity Markets Outlook (April 2026); J.P. Morgan Global Research gold/silver forecasts; market price trackers. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/CMO-April-2026.pdf; https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/commodities/gold-prices
32. ETFs: VanEck Gold Miners (GDX), Global X Silver Miners (SIL), iShares Gold Trust (IAU) and Silver Trust (SLV). https://www.vaneck.com/us/en/investments/gold-miners-etf-gdx/overview/
33. Newmont–Newcrest acquisition (~$19.2 billion, 2023), confirmed in Newmont FY filings [9].