Administration of Housing Programs (U.S. NAICS 925110): An Investor's Primer

1. Overview

The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 925110 covers government establishments that plan and administer housing programs — the federal, state, and local bodies that fund rental subsidies, run public housing, and finance affordable homes. The headline example is the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the roughly 3,300 local public housing agencies (PHAs) that deliver its programs on the ground.[1][10]

Here is the honest framing: this industry is not itself investable. It is a government function — there is no stock ticker for "Administration of Housing Programs," no profit line, and no earnings call. What matters is that this small government activity — a federal department with fewer than 9,000 employees[33] — directs an enormous flow of money into the private housing economy every year: roughly $77 billion of annual HUD spending,[7] about $29 billion a year of tax-credit equity raised from corporations,[17] and $146 billion of combined annual mortgage-purchase capacity at the two housing finance giants.[20] The industry is the faucet; the returns are earned by the companies standing under it.

• Public-market ways in (all indirect): government-services contractors that run HUD's systems and administer programs; banks that buy Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC); affordable-housing lenders and advisers; the government-sponsored mortgage enterprises; and tax-exempt housing bonds held in municipal-bond funds.
• Private-market ways in: affordable-housing development and ownership, tax-credit equity funds, Section 8-backed multifamily property, project debt and preferred equity, and firms that administer voucher programs under contract to PHAs.

Editorial judgment: the strongest business positions belong to firms with scale in compliance, data, capital formation, and program administration — not to the government agencies themselves.

2. What it is and how it's structured

Official definition. NAICS 925110 "comprises government establishments primarily engaged in the administration and planning of housing programs."[1] It sits inside sector 92, Public Administration — the part of the economy that is government-run by definition.[2]

What it includes: HUD headquarters and field offices; state Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs); and local/regional PHAs that administer public housing and the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV, or Section 8) program. A PHA typically handles eligibility, waiting lists, leasing, annual income recertification, landlord relations, subsidy payments, inspections, and reporting.[1][13] The core activities are policy administration, funding allocation, compliance, and planning.

What it explicitly EXCLUDES — important, because the money largely flows to these adjacent codes:[1]

• Operating government-owned rental housing → NAICS 531, Real Estate. Physically owning and running the buildings is real estate, not administration.
• Buying, pooling, and repackaging mortgages for the secondary market → NAICS 522294, Secondary Market Financing. This is where Fannie Mae's, Freddie Mac's, and Ginnie Mae's securitization activity lives — legally separate from "housing administration," even though it is the backbone of affordable-housing finance.
• Building inspection and code enforcement → NAICS 926150, Regulation, Licensing, and Inspection.
• Urban planning and community/rural development (including the Community Development Block Grant) → the sibling code NAICS 925120.

Ownership mix. Overwhelmingly public. HUD is federal; HFAs are state-chartered authorities; PHAs are local public bodies. A thin layer of private contractors performs the actual work under contract — firms that run voucher and project-based programs for PHAs and HUD, and consultancies that build HUD's data and grants platforms. Those contractors, plus the private owners and financiers around them, are the only commercially owned slices of this ecosystem.

3. How big it is

The critical caveat: federal business statistics barely register this industry. The usual sources for industry size — the Census Bureau's Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB), the Economic Census, and Nonemployer Statistics — exclude Public Administration (NAICS 92) almost entirely, because these are government establishments, not businesses.[3][4][5] Our ground-truth statistics file for 925110 contains no ingested Census or Small Business Administration (SBA) metrics at all — exactly what you would expect for a government-only code. A commercial business directory lists only about 830 "establishments" under 925110[6] — a number that captures the handful of private contractors and misses the entire government reality. So the standard "firms / payroll / revenue" measures are not meaningful here, and no revenue, employment, or receipts figure is reported (none is available; none is inferred). The right way to size this industry is by the government dollars it moves.

Using cited federal budget and program data (these are program flows, not revenue attributable to NAICS 925110):

• HUD annual budget (FY2026 enacted): ~$77.3 billion in discretionary appropriations, up about $7.2 billion from FY2025.[7]
• Housing Choice Vouchers / tenant-based Section 8: ~$38.4 billion — the single largest HUD program. HUD's implementation guidance breaks the fiscal-year-2026 total into about $34.56 billion for housing-assistance-payment renewals and $2.84 billion for PHA administrative fees.[7][9]
• Project-based rental assistance (project-based Section 8): ~$18.5 billion, up from $16.9 billion in FY2025.[7]
• Public Housing Fund: ~$8.3 billion.[7]
• Households served: roughly 2.3 million households (about 5 million people) through vouchers,[11] and about 970,000 households in public housing.[10]
• Delivery network: roughly 3,300 housing agencies operate public housing, and about 2,000–2,100 PHAs administer the voucher program.[10][11]
• Federal workforce: HUD itself employed about 8,843 people as of September 2024 — the administrative core, tiny relative to the dollars it moves.[33]
• State HFAs, cumulatively, have delivered more than $800 billion of financing and helped fund over 8.2 million affordable homes and apartments over five decades.[15]

Bottom line: as a "business," 925110 is negligible; as a channel for public capital into housing, it is one of the largest in the country.

4. The investable universe

There is no public pure-play — the NAICS definition is limited to government establishments. The realistic universe is companies whose economics are driven by these programs; housing-specific revenue is usually not disclosed separately. This section reserves tickers and scale, per house style. ("OTC" below means over-the-counter — traded off the main exchanges.)

Broader human-services contractors (e.g., Maximus, NYSE: MMS) touch government benefits administration but have limited direct housing exposure — treat them as tangential, not a housing thesis.

Major private and non-public players (not directly investable via shares):

• PHAs and state HFAs — the issuers of housing bonds and the on-the-ground administrators. Their bonds, not their equity, are the investable product.
• LIHTC syndicators and equity funds — Enterprise Community Investment, National Equity Fund, Boston Financial, WNC, Merchants Capital, and Raymond James Affordable Housing pool corporate tax-credit equity into funds (a private-fund route for institutions).
• Affordable-housing owner/operators — April Housing (a Blackstone portfolio company overseeing one of the largest LIHTC portfolios),[28] The Michaels Organization (describes itself as the nation's largest private-sector affordable owner),[29] Dominium (40,000+ apartments across 19 states),[30] WinnCompanies (125+ communities),[31] plus Related Affordable, McCormack Baron Salazar, and Preservation of Affordable Housing.
• Private voucher administrators — Nan McKay & Associates (~100,000 vouchers under contract),[32] CVR Associates, and CGI (public), which run PHA programs under contract.

5. How the money works

Because owners here are almost all governments (which do not earn profit), the economics that matter to investors are the returns of the private counterparties the programs create. The basic cash flow: Congress appropriates → HUD allocates to PHAs or property-level programs → PHAs administer eligibility, leasing, inspections, and payments → landlords receive housing assistance payments (HAP) while tenants pay their permitted share → contractors, owners, lenders, and tax-credit investors earn fees, rent, interest, or investment returns.[13][14] There are four distinct money models:

1. The tax-credit model (LIHTC — the core of private affordable-housing finance). The federal government does not write checks for most new affordable construction; it hands states about $12 billion a year of tax-credit authority,[16] which states award to developments. Developers sell those credits to corporate investors for cash equity up front, cutting the debt a project needs. Corporations — overwhelmingly banks, which supplied roughly 80% of 2024 equity — buy the credits to lower their tax bills and earn Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit from regulators.[17] The investor's return is the stream of tax credits (claimed over 10 years) plus depreciation, priced as a yield over a long compliance period.[18] In 2024, roughly $28.9 billion of LIHTC equity was placed, about 71% through syndicated funds and 29% invested directly.[17] The federal "cost" is about $13.6 billion a year of forgone tax revenue, and the program has financed 3.5 million+ units since 1986.[16]

2. The subsidy-cash-flow model (Section 8). Voucher and project-based Section 8 payments are, from a property owner's view, government-backed rent. A landlord (or REIT — real estate investment trust) holding Section 8-heavy property earns rents that are stable and counter-cyclical but capped by HUD's Fair Market Rents and subject to inspection, renewal, and annual-appropriations risk.[13] The appeal is credit-quality income; the constraint is limited upside and heavy compliance.

3. The spread/fee model (HFAs and the GSEs). HFAs raise low-cost, tax-exempt bonds and re-lend the proceeds as below-market mortgages, earning a thin spread plus issuance fees. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) — earn guarantee fees on the affordable multifamily loans they buy and securitize (2025 purchase cap of about $73 billion each, with at least half required to be mission-driven affordable housing).[20] For a bond investor the return is tax-exempt yield on high-quality paper; for the GSEs it is fee income on guaranteed volume.

4. The contract-services model. Firms like CGI, ICF, and Nan McKay earn government contract revenue — margins on technical assistance, software, and outsourced program administration. The economics are ordinary government-services margins, driven by contract wins and HUD's appropriations.[23][24][32]

What to watch, by business model (useful for private and public underwriting alike): contractors — funded backlog, recompete/win rates, contract mix, utilization, and cash conversion; housing owners — occupancy, collections, net operating income (NOI), debt-service-coverage ratio (DSCR), leverage, HAP renewal dates, and compliance; listed property owners — funds from operations (FFO) and adjusted FFO (AFFO) on top of property cash flow; lenders/advisers — affordable-housing transaction volume, fee revenue, AUM, financing spreads, and GSE/HUD exposure.

6. What drives demand

• Federal appropriations. Every dollar in this system ultimately depends on the annual HUD budget. Vouchers, public housing, and project-based Section 8 are only as large as Congress funds them each year.[7]
• Rents and the "affordability gap." As market rents outrun low-income wages, more households qualify for and need assistance, and existing dollars cover fewer units. HUD has warned that per-unit voucher costs at many PHAs are rising faster than market-based funding factors, straining budgets.[11][12]
• Persistent structural need among low-income households, older adults, people with disabilities, veterans, and the homeless.[13]
• The tax code. LIHTC volume rises and falls with the value of the credit and with corporate tax rates (a higher rate makes credits more valuable, lifting equity pricing).[16]
• Interest rates. Higher rates raise the cost of the tax-exempt bonds HFAs issue and the mortgages the GSEs finance, squeezing production; lower rates expand it.[15][20]
• Bank regulation (CRA). Because banks buy tax credits partly to earn CRA credit, changes to CRA rules directly move the LIHTC equity market — the single biggest swing factor in affordable-housing finance.[17]
• Aging stock and capital needs. Public housing carries a large deferred-maintenance backlog, pushing agencies to recapitalize with private money (see Section 8).[21]

Editorial judgment: demand is structurally durable, but need does not automatically become investable revenue — appropriations, program rules, and local execution decide how much reaches contractors and owners.

7. Regulation

This industry is regulation — a government administrative function — so the "regulatory" questions are really about statute, appropriations, and oversight:

• HUD administers the enabling statutes (the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 for public housing and Section 8; the National Housing Act; Section 202 elderly and Section 811 disabled housing) and sets Fair Market Rents, income limits, and inspection standards.[13]
• Congressional appropriations set the size of every program annually — the binding constraint on the whole system.[7]
• The Fair Housing Act applies to private, public, and federally assisted housing alike.[34]
• The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) regulates Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks, and sets their affordable-housing goals and multifamily purchase caps.[20]
• The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and state allocating agencies govern LIHTC (Section 42 of the tax code); states publish annual Qualified Allocation Plans that decide which projects win credits, and owners face a long compliance period with recapture risk.[16][18]
• Bank regulators — the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) — administer the CRA, whose rules shape bank appetite for LIHTC equity.[17]

Regulatory complexity is a barrier to entry, but it is also an operating cost: errors can trigger payment delays, corrective action, contract loss, penalties, or tax-credit recapture. Policy risk is unusually direct here — a single budget bill or CRA rule change can reprice an entire investment category.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The defining structural trend is the privatization and recapitalization of public housing. Facing a maintenance backlog it cannot fund through appropriations, HUD's Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) lets PHAs convert aging public housing into long-term project-based Section 8 contracts, which can then attract private debt and tax-credit equity while preserving affordability restrictions.[22] By 2024, nearly 230,000 units — almost one-fifth of all public housing — had been converted, against a statutory cap of 455,000; over 82% of that cap was used or reserved.[21] This is, in effect, a decade-long transfer of the housing stock from direct government operation into public-private ownership structures — expanding the pool of Section 8-backed, tax-credit-financed real estate that private investors can own.

The direct administrative market is fragmented across thousands of local PHAs and government buyers. Vendors compete on housing-program expertise, accurate/timely eligibility and payment processing, integration with HUD and PHA systems, cybersecurity, inspection and compliance capacity, and local procurement relationships. Program administration is slowly consolidating as smaller PHAs outsource voucher operations to specialist firms.[24][32]

On the finance side, the LIHTC equity market is concentrated among a handful of large, CRA-motivated banks, giving those investors pricing power in weak markets and tying affordable-housing capital availability to a few institutions' balance sheets.[17] Private housing ownership is more scalable than public administration — owners can acquire portfolios, centralize compliance, and spread technology and resident-service costs — and RAD plus LIHTC create recurring acquisition and recapitalization opportunities. Editorial judgment: consolidation is selective, not universal; local politics, zoning, resident protections, public-ownership requirements, and fragmented procurement all limit any single national winner.

9. Risks

• Appropriations / political risk (the dominant risk). Programs are funded year-to-year. The FY2026 President's budget proposed eliminating HUD's main rental-assistance programs and replacing them with a smaller, time-limited state block grant (~$36 billion); Congress rejected that and instead increased funding.[8][7] HUD's own 2026 budget-management guidance nonetheless assumed an estimated 99% HAP proration and warned that some PHAs faced shortfalls.[12] The episode shows the whole system can be restructured by legislation — a tail risk with no analog in most private industries.
• Interest-rate and tax-rate risk. Higher rates cut HFA and GSE production; a lower corporate tax rate would reduce LIHTC equity pricing and the pace of new construction.[16][20]
• CRA / bank-appetite risk. With ~80% of tax-credit equity from banks, any pullback — regulation, capital rules, or a banking downturn — starves the pipeline.[17]
• GSE conservatorship uncertainty. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been in federal conservatorship since 2008; the terms of any future release are unresolved and make their equity highly speculative, while their affordable-housing mandates could change.[20]
• Compliance and execution risk for owners and vendors — inspections, income recertification, rent caps, fair-housing rules, and tax-credit compliance make returns stable but administratively heavy; local PHA staffing, technology, or slow inspections can reduce leasing and collections.[13][34]
• Property, financing, and concentration risk — insurance, taxes, utilities, repairs, and deferred capital can overwhelm regulated rent growth; a contractor may depend on a few contracts, and an owner on one subsidy type or locality.
• Cyber and reputational risk — programs handle sensitive household income and identity data, and tenant harm can create political and legal consequences even when financials look fine.

10. How to invest and the outlook

There is no direct play — you invest around the industry, not in it. Start with the closest exposure rather than assuming a broad government contractor or real-estate firm is a housing-program investment; check housing-specific contract revenue, backlog, recompete exposure, margins, cash conversion, and customer concentration.

Public-market routes

• Tax-exempt housing bonds via municipal-bond funds or direct HFA bonds — the cleanest, most direct exposure: high-quality, tax-advantaged income tied to state housing finance.[15]
• Government-services contractors (CGI, ICF, Leidos) as a bet on HUD's administrative and program-administration spending — isolate the housing-specific slice.[23][24][25]
• Affordable-housing finance/advisory firms (Walker & Dunlop, CBRE) — isolate affordable-housing volume, LIHTC AUM, and GSE/HUD exposure before valuing them.[26][27]
• Large banks with LIHTC franchises (U.S. Bancorp, Bank of America, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo) — but affordable housing is a small, CRA-driven slice of a diversified bank, not a thesis on its own.[17][19]
• The GSEs (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) as a leveraged, speculative bet on the affordable-mortgage system and conservatorship resolution — high risk, not income.[20]
• Ginnie Mae-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities (held broadly in bond funds) — the government guarantee underpinning FHA/VA/rural lending, a low-risk fixed-income exposure to government housing programs.

Private-market routes

• LIHTC equity funds — the primary institutional vehicle; corporate investors (mostly banks) earn a tax-credit-driven return, typically arranged by a syndicator.[17]
• Affordable / Section 8-backed multifamily — direct ownership (or joint ventures, mezzanine debt, preferred equity) in property with government-backed rent, often paired with tax credits; stable, counter-cyclical income with capped upside.
• RAD recapitalizations — participating in the conversion of public housing into privately financed, Section 8-backed assets.[21]
• Housing software, compliance, inspection, and administrative-services companies serving PHAs and owners.

Private underwriting should focus on subsidy contracts and renewal dates, tenant-income mix, property condition and capital needs, insurance, local PHA quality, debt maturity, tax-credit compliance, and exit liquidity.

Outlook (forward-looking, editorial judgment). The base case is durable demand, recurring but politically exposed funding, and uneven growth. Demand for assistance is structurally rising as rents outpace low-income incomes, and the FY2026 outcome — bipartisan increases to vouchers and project-based Section 8 despite a proposed overhaul — suggests continued political support for the core programs.[7][8] The clearest near-term drivers to watch are the annual HUD appropriations fight (the master switch), the trajectory of corporate-tax and CRA rules (which set LIHTC equity pricing), interest rates (HFA and GSE production), and the eventual resolution of GSE conservatorship. The best opportunities are likely in modernization, contract administration, compliance technology, property preservation, and recapitalization; the main bear case is a policy shift that cuts federal assistance or pushes costs onto financially weak PHAs and owners. This is resilient social infrastructure, not a conventional high-growth sector — value it through cash-flow durability and policy risk rather than headline housing demand. The likeliest path is not a new investable sector but a continued, gradual shift of the affordable-housing stock into public-private structures that private capital can own and public investors can lend to — meaning the returns keep accruing to the contractors, banks, bondholders, and property owners standing under the government faucet, not to the administrators running it. These are judgments, not guarantees, and every one turns on future appropriations and tax policy.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau / NAICS Association, "NAICS Code 925110 — Administration of Housing Programs" (2022 definition and cross-references). https://www.naics.com/naics-code-description/?code=925110
2. U.S. Census Bureau, "NAICS 2022: Sector 92 — Public Administration." https://www.census.gov/naics/resources/archives/sect92.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, "About Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB)" (excludes public administration). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb/about.html
4. U.S. Census Bureau, "County Business Patterns — About / FAQs" (CBP excludes Public Administration, NAICS 92). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/about/faqs.html
5. U.S. Census Bureau, "Economic Census" / "Nonemployer Statistics" (both exclude government-operated establishments). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
6. SICCODE.com, "NAICS Code 925110 — Administration of Housing Programs" (commercial business-directory establishment count, ~830). https://siccode.com/naics-code/925110/administration-housing-programs
7. Bipartisan Policy Center, "Appropriations Update: Final FY2026 THUD Funding Summary," 2026. https://bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/appropriations-update-final-fy2026-thud-funding-summary/
8. Congressional Research Service, "Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): FY2026 Budget Request Fact Sheet" (R48567), 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48567
9. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Implementation of the FY2026 Funding Provisions for the Housing Choice Voucher Program" (PIH-2026-12; ~$34.56B HAP renewals, ~$2.84B admin fees). https://www.hud.gov/sites/default/files/hudclips/documents/PIH-2026-12.pdf
10. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Public Housing Program" (~970,000 households; ~3,300 housing agencies). https://www.hud.gov/helping-americans/public-housing
11. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "The Housing Choice Voucher Program" (~2.3 million households / ~5 million people; ~2,000+ PHAs). https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/the-housing-choice-voucher-program
12. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "2026 Budget Management Letter" (~99% HAP proration; PHA shortfall warning). https://www.hud.gov/sites/default/files/PIH/documents/2026-Budget-Management-Letter.pdf
13. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Housing Choice Voucher Tenants" / "Programs of HUD" (how HAP works; eligibility and rules). https://www.hud.gov/helping-americans/housing-choice-vouchers-tenants
14. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Public Housing Operating Fund" (administrative fees to PHAs). https://www.hud.gov/hud-partners/public-housing-operating-fund
15. National Council of State Housing Agencies (NCSHA), "About HFAs" and "Housing Bonds" ($800B+ financing; 8.2M homes). https://www.ncsha.org/about-us/about-hfas/
16. Tax Policy Center, "What is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and how does it work?" (~$12B annual credit authority; ~$13.6B forgone revenue; 3.5M+ units since 1986). https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-low-income-housing-tax-credit-and-how-does-it-work
17. CohnReznick, "2024 LIHTC Equity Market Volume Survey" ($28.9B equity closed; ~80% bank/CRA; ~71% syndicated). https://www.cohnreznick.com/insights/2024-lihtc-equity-market-volume-survey
18. Internal Revenue Service, "Instructions for Form 8609" (LIHTC allocation and compliance). https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i8609
19. U.S. Bank, "U.S. Bancorp Impact Finance" ($21.8B LIHTC equity since 1988; ~133,000 units). https://www.usbank.com/corporate-and-commercial-banking/solutions/credit-and-financing/impact-finance.html
20. Federal Housing Finance Agency, "2025 Multifamily Loan Purchase Caps for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac" ($73B each; $146B total; ≥50% mission-driven). https://www.fhfa.gov/news/fact-sheet/2025-multifamily-loan-purchase-caps-for-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac
21. Local Housing Solutions / HUD, "The Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD)" (~230,000 units converted by 2024; 455,000 cap). https://www.localhousingsolutions.org/housing-policy-library/the-rental-assistance-demonstration-rad/
22. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "About RAD Public Housing." https://www.hud.gov/hud-partners/rad-program-details
23. ICF International, "HUD Selects ICF for Community Development and Technology Services" (NASDAQ: ICFI HUD contracts), 2023. https://investor.icf.com/news-releases/news-release-details/hud-selects-icf-community-development-and-technology-services
24. CGI Inc., "Consulting, Outsourcing and Technology Services for the Affordable Housing Industry" (13 HCV programs; 85,000+ vouchers; >¼ of HUD project-based contract administration), 2024. https://www.cgi.com/sites/default/files/2024-02/cgi-federal-consulting-technology-services-affordable-housing-fact-sheet_02_24.pdf
25. Leidos, "FHA Resource Center / Rental Housing Customer Service" (HUD FHA Resource Center support). https://careers.leidos.com/jobs/17795727-rental-housing-customer-service-representative
26. Walker & Dunlop, "Reports First Quarter 2026 Financial Results" ($15.9B LIHTC funds within $18.5B AUM at 3/31/2026). https://www.walkerdunlop.com/news/walker-dunlop-reports-first-quarter-2026-financial-results
27. CBRE, "Affordable Housing" (LIHTC and Section 8 sales, valuation, financing, advisory). https://www.cbre.com/services/property-types/alternatives/affordable-housing
28. April Housing (Blackstone portfolio company), "Affordable Housing in America." https://www.aprilhousing.com/
29. The Michaels Organization, "Portfolio." https://tmo.com/portfolio/
30. Dominium, "About Dominium" (40,000+ apartments across 19 states). https://www.dominiumapartments.com/about-dominium.html
31. WinnCompanies, "Home" (125+ communities owned/managed). https://www.winncompanies.com/
32. Nan McKay & Associates, "HCV and Public Housing — Program Management" (private HCV administrator, ~100,000 vouchers). https://nanmckay.com/hcv-and-public-housing/program-management
33. USAFacts, "What does the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) do?" (~8,843 employees, Sept 2024). https://usafacts.org/explainers/what-does-the-us-government-do/agency/us-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/
34. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Housing Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act." https://www.hud.gov/helping-americans/fair-housing-act-overview