Consumer Electronics & Appliances Rental (NAICS 532210)

A Histometrics industry primer for public-market and private investors

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1. Overview

This industry rents televisions, refrigerators, washers, dryers, stereos and similar consumer durables to households — almost always through a rent-to-own (RTO) or lease-to-own (LTO) arrangement in which the customer pays weekly, bi-weekly or monthly, can return the item at any time with no further obligation, and eventually owns it after a set number of payments or an early buyout. It serves people who cannot easily get a credit card, retailer financing, or a bank loan.

The single most important thing an investor should know up front: this is not a real-estate business, and almost none of the real-estate toolkit applies. There is no land or building as the productive asset, so there is no rent-and-occupancy, no net operating income (NOI, a property's rental income minus operating costs), no capitalization rate (cap rate, the yield a property throws off relative to its price), and no real-estate investment trust (REIT, a pass-through landlord that must distribute ~90% of taxable income and is valued on funds from operations, FFO/AFFO, and price-to-net-asset-value, NAV). The two large public companies here are ordinary taxable corporations, valued on earnings, cash flow and enterprise value / EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization). The right lens is rental-and-leasing economics — merchandise cost and depreciation, how much of the "fleet" is on rent, and how much of it is lost to non-payment.

Ways in. Public-market investors have two meaningful listed choices — Upbound Group and PROG Holdings — plus two small-caps. Private investors can own or franchise a store, buy a regional chain, take an operator private (as one buyer did with Aaron's in 2024), or lend against the lease-and-merchandise portfolio.

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2. What it is, and what it is not

Official scope. NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) 2022 code 532210, "Consumer Electronics and Appliances Rental," covers establishments primarily renting consumer electronics and appliances — televisions, audio equipment, refrigerators, washers/dryers, water heaters — including appliance rental centers and RTO shops whose main product line sits in that set.[1]

The classification trap that matters most. NAICS codes an establishment by its primary activity, so a single store's whole business gets filed under one code. That fractures the real "rent-to-own" economy across several codes:

The big chains — Rent-A-Center, Acima, Aaron's, Progressive Leasing — rent furniture, electronics, appliances and phones under one contract, so much of their activity is coded outside 532210, and "virtual" lessors originate leases inside a retailer's checkout with no rental store at all (counted under retail). Keep this in mind whenever a size figure is quoted (Section 3).[1] Note also what is excluded and genuinely different: home-health/DME rental (532283) is where Medicare and CMS (the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services) reimbursement rules bite — not here; and 533110 intangible-asset licensing is a separate, asset-light, high-margin royalty business, not part of this industry.

Two operating models run through everything below:

• Store-based RTO (Rent-A-Center, Aaron's): the operator buys merchandise wholesale, stocks a store, and handles delivery, service, collections, returns and re-leasing. Higher fixed cost, but lower loss rates and richer per-customer economics.
• Virtual LTO (Acima, Progressive Leasing): the lessor sits inside a partner retailer's checkout, buys the item the shopper selected, and leases it to them — no showroom of its own. It scales fast across thousands of retail doors but buys merchandise closer to retail price, depends on those retail partners, and runs higher losses. This is where the growth and the investor attention are.

Ownership mix. A barbell: a highly concentrated top (two public firms plus one large private one) sitting on a long, fragmented tail of independent single-store operators and franchisees.

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3. How big it is

Our authoritative federal figures describe the strict 532210 statistical cell:

Concentration is unusually high. In 2022 the top 4 firms took 81.5% of industry revenue, the top 8 85.8%, the top 20 90.6%, and the top 50 94.5%.[3] (The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index — a standard concentration gauge — was suppressed by Census for this cell, so we do not report it.[3, ground truth]) A four-firm share above 80% signals a national market dominated by a few chains sitting atop a long tail of small firms.

The undercount — read this before quoting a market size. Federal employer statistics understate the true consumer-durables rental economy in two ways. First, Census does not capture the owner-operator tail well: separate 2022 Nonemployer Statistics show 1,702 businesses with no employees and $154.7M of receipts filed under the five-digit 53221 grouping[5] — real activity largely invisible in the employer counts, and much of it franchisees and small pass-through entities. Second, and larger: because the big chains' furniture, computer and phone rentals are coded elsewhere (Section 2), the strict $5.535B "532210" figure captures only part of the rent-to-own business investors actually care about. Broader measures show this clearly — a Census Annual Services Survey series puts the wider industry near $9.7 billion, IBISWorld similarly ~$9.7 billion, and the rent-to-own trade association (APRO) sizes the whole RTO sector at roughly $11–12 billion, ~5,500 stores and ~40,000 employees serving several million households a year.[6][8][9] Treat the $5.535B as the honest, narrow federal anchor and the $10–12B range as the broader economic footprint.

Asset stock (the "fleet"). There is no official national count of rental TVs or active agreements. The best proxy is public-company balance sheets: at year-end 2025 Upbound carried about $1.32 billion of net rental merchandise (~$1.20B on rent, ~$0.11B held for rent) and PROG about $0.61 billion — a combined ~$1.9B that is a derived sum for two firms, includes products outside 532210, and excludes all private operators.[10][11]

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4. The investable universe

Public exposure is narrow — effectively two names of any size, both small-caps, both ordinary corporations (not REITs), with modest dividends.

Dividend yields are point-in-time snapshots reported mid-July 2026, not forecasts; market caps are approximate.[10][11][27][28][30]

• Upbound Group (formerly Rent-A-Center; renamed 2023) is the sector's largest company. FY2025 segments: Acima (virtual LTO) $2,512M, Rent-A-Center (staffed stores) $1,897M, Brigit (fintech, acquired Jan 2025) $206M, and Mexico $79M; Rent-A-Center runs 1,722 company-owned + 353 franchised U.S. stores. Gross merchandise volume (GMV — the retail value of goods put on lease) was ~$2.01B (+8.6%). It carries ~$1.6B of debt.[10]
• PROG Holdings is the parent of Progressive Leasing, the largest virtual lessor (~96% of PROG revenue), operating across ~24,000 retail-partner locations and e-commerce sites. Progressive's GMV was ~$1.76B (down 8.6% on tighter underwriting and a partner bankruptcy); adding its Four buy-now-pay-later unit brings total GMV near $2.5B. PROG spun out of Aaron's in 2020, pays a small dividend, buys back stock, and bought Purchasing Power in Jan 2026.[11]
• Katapult and FlexShopper are small, higher-risk digital LTO platforms; FlexShopper in particular has had a delayed annual report and governance/liquidity concerns.[27][28]

Private and institutional owners. The Aaron's Company — the #3 operator (~1,210 stores; last public-year revenue ~$2.14B in 2023) — was taken private by fintech IQVentures on Oct 3, 2024 at $10.10/share (~$504M enterprise value) and delisted, removing the third listed pure-play.[12][13] Below the leaders sits a fragmented base of independents and franchisees (Buddy's Home Furnishings, Rent One, American Rental, Majik and others), represented nationally by APRO.[9][10]

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5. How the money works

The transaction. A customer takes home a fridge, TV, sofa or laptop with no credit check and no long-term commitment, paying in small, frequent installments. They can return it anytime (ending the deal), keep renewing, or reach ownership by finishing the schedule (typically ~7–30 months) or exercising an early-purchase / "same-as-cash" option at a discount.[10] Because the operator holds title until the final payment, the deal is legally a lease, not a credit sale — the fulcrum of the whole industry (Section 7).

The margin. The full rent-to-own price commonly runs about 2–3× the cash retail price; expressed as an implied annual percentage rate (APR — the annualized cost of the financing), one study of Rent-A-Center contracts found a 43%–468% range, except where state law caps it.[27] That spread has to cover four things: non-payment losses on a subprime customer base, merchandise depreciation, service (free repairs, loaners, reinstatement), and the cost of financing the fleet.

The fleet metrics — the rental-and-leasing analogues to occupancy and NOI:

• Utilization — the share of merchandise on rent (earning) versus idle (a cost). Upbound's on-rent merchandise was ~91% of its on-rent-plus-held-for-rent book at year-end 2025 — a rough dollar proxy; neither leader discloses a clean time-utilization figure.[10]
• Depreciation and residual value — unlike car or heavy-equipment rental, operators here depreciate merchandise toward zero salvage (Progressive straight-line over ~12 months; Upbound zero salvage, with faster write-down for smartphones and goods aged past 180 days). Returned items earn their keep mainly by being re-leased, not resold. So residual value is not the thesis — this is a key contrast with vehicle/equipment fleets.[10][11]
• Charge-offs / merchandise losses — the single most important profit driver. In 2025 store-based Rent-A-Center lost ~4.7% of revenue to charge-offs; virtual Acima ~9.5% (roughly double, because thin-touch online origination is riskier); Progressive's write-off provision was 7.5% of lease revenue (its 6–8% target). Upbound booked ~$366M of merchandise losses and repairs and held a ~$98M loss reserve.[10][11]
• GMV growth — the top-of-funnel volume metric investors watch for the virtual model.

Asset intensity differs by model. Store-based RTO is labor- and property-intensive but lower-loss; virtual LTO is far lighter on fixed cost and scales through retail partners, trading that for higher losses and dependence on a handful of merchants. Cash timing matters: merchandise is bought and paid for before the rental revenue is collected, so a growing operator consumes cash — investors should watch merchandise purchases and working capital, not just EBITDA. PROG bought ~$1.70B of lease merchandise in 2025 against ~$1.59B of depreciation.[11]

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6. What drives demand

• Exclusion from mainstream credit is the core driver. The customer base is largely near-prime, subprime, thin-file or unbanked. The FDIC's (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) 2023 survey found 4.2% of U.S. households unbanked (5.6M), 14.2% underbanked (19.0M), 15.7% with no mainstream credit, and 5.8% using at least one nonbank alternative financial service (a category that includes rent-to-own).[24] The Federal Reserve's 2024 survey found 45% of adults lacked a three-month emergency fund — so a broken appliance can force a no-down-payment rental.[25]
• Immediate need for a durable good with no down payment, no credit check, and the right to walk away.[10]
• Macro cross-currents. The model is countercyclical on volume but procyclical on credit: downturns push more households toward RTO (demand up) while straining their ability to pay (losses up). That tension defines the business.[11]
• Channel expansion. For virtual LTO, growth is largely a function of adding retail partners and e-commerce integrations — e-commerce was ~23% of Progressive's GMV and ~27% of Rent-A-Center's lease revenue in 2025.[10][11]
• Adjacent competition/complements from buy-now-pay-later (Affirm, Klarna, Afterpay), which is why the incumbents built or bought their own (PROG's Four, Upbound's Brigit).[10][11]

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7. Regulation — the defining risk and the moat

Everything rests on one legal characterization: an RTO/LTO agreement is a terminable lease, not a credit sale. That keeps it outside the Truth in Lending Act's (TILA) APR-disclosure regime and outside state usury (interest-rate) caps. If a court or regulator recharacterized these deals as credit, usury ceilings could compress or erase the margin.[10]

• State law dominates. About 46–47 states plus DC and Puerto Rico have specific rental-purchase statutes that treat RTO as a lease and require plain disclosures (total of payments, cash price, cost to own) instead of an APR. Roughly 11 states cap total payments at ~2.0–2.4× the cash price; a handful are outliers (New Jersey treats RTO as an installment sale with an ~30% cap; some Minnesota, New Jersey and Wisconsin court decisions have treated it as credit).[10][27]
• Federal Consumer Leasing Act / Regulation M applies only to leases with an initial term longer than four months; because most RTO contracts are month-to-month (renewable), they generally fall outside it. The CFPB's (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) 2023 Tempoe action — ~$36M in penalties/relief and a permanent ban — targeted an operator that used a five-month initial term.[20][23]
• FTC (Federal Trade Commission) deception enforcement. The landmark case: Progressive Leasing's $175M settlement in 2020 over misleading "same as cash" marketing when customers often paid roughly double the sticker price — still the sector's largest consumer-protection penalty and the template for disclosure norms.[19] Separately, in 2020 the FTC challenged reciprocal customer-contract-purchase agreements among Rent-A-Center, Aaron's and Buddy's on competition grounds.[23]
• CFPB jurisdiction is contested — and recently receded. The CFPB sued Acima (Upbound) in 2024 alleging its lease-purchase product was disguised credit, then dismissed the suit with prejudice in May 2025 — a favorable turn for incumbents. But the New York Attorney General's 2024 suit against Acima (alleging disguised loans) remains open, and Upbound's legal accruals jumped to ~$70M at year-end 2025 from ~$11M a year earlier.[10][22]
• Self-regulation. In 2026 APRO launched a 50-state Model Lease Agreement Library to standardize compliant contracts and pre-empt federal intervention.[29]

Net: regulation is the industry's biggest existential risk (recharacterization → usury caps) and, once state statutes exist, a barrier to entry that legitimizes the model. The 2025 CFPB retreat lowered — but did not remove — the near-term tail risk.

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

• A virtual-LTO duopoly. Upbound's Acima and PROG's Progressive Leasing dominate retail-embedded lease-to-own; the defining move was Rent-A-Center's $1.65 billion acquisition of Acima (2021), converting a store chain into a virtual-first platform.[10]
• Corporate reshuffling. Aaron's split into PROG + The Aaron's Company (2020); Rent-A-Center became Upbound (2023); Aaron's went private (2024) — leaving just two listed pure-plays.[12][13][14]
• Merchant concentration is a real vulnerability for virtual lessors. Progressive's top three retail partners produced 54.8% of consolidated revenue and its top ten 77.0% in 2025; a partner bankruptcy plus tighter underwriting drove its 8.6% GMV decline. Losing one big merchant can move the whole P&L.[11]
• Scale advantages (underwriting data, compliance, fraud detection, logistics, purchasing) favor the leaders and help explain the 81.5% four-firm concentration; independents compete on local service and underserved rural markets rather than price.[3][9]
• Encroachment from buy-now-pay-later and card "second-look" financing keeps pressure on both ends.

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9. Risks

1. Consumer-credit / charge-off risk — the dominant risk. Unlike real estate, the central risk is customer default, not vacancy or cap-rate expansion. Loss rates (Acima ~9.5%, Progressive ~7.5% of lease revenue) swing with the health of a stretched subprime base; recessions raise demand but degrade collections.[10][11]
2. Regulatory recharacterization — the tail risk. Any move to treat RTO/LTO as "credit" would impose usury caps and TILA disclosure and compress the core margin. The 2025 CFPB dismissal reduced but did not eliminate it; state actions (NY AG) continue.[22]
3. Interest-rate sensitivity — real, but not cap-rate-driven. These firms carry floating-rate debt (Upbound had ~$1.1B of variable-rate debt; a 25-basis-point move shifts pretax interest ~$2.8M), so higher rates raise funding cost and pressure the stock. But there is no building to refinance at a higher cap rate and no property NAV to mark down — the rate channel runs through funding cost and consumer wallets, the opposite of how it hits a REIT.[10]
4. Residual-value / obsolescence risk. Electronics depreciate fast and returned goods must be re-leased or cheaply resold; zero-salvage accounting is conservative but signals residual value is thin. (This is the fleet analogue of a car-rental company's used-vehicle exposure, but weaker.)[10][11]
5. Merchant / channel concentration for virtual lessors (above).[11]
6. Cyclicality is nonlinear — more eligible customers in a downturn, but worse collections; the outcome depends on underwriting discipline, not the direction of the economy.
7. Reputational, fraud and cyber risk — "predatory lending" framing invites periodic enforcement, and thin-touch online origination raises identity-fraud and data-privacy exposure.[10]
8. Dividend risk — Upbound's ~7% yield is high partly because the market prices in earnings, legal and leverage pressure; treat it as risk-bearing, not bond-like.

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10. How to invest, and outlook

Public routes. Effectively two liquid names — Upbound Group (UPBD) and PROG Holdings (PRG) — plus two micro-caps (KPLT, FPAY) for the risk-tolerant. Value them on price/earnings, EV/EBITDA, free cash flow after merchandise investment, and GMV growth versus loss trends — not FFO, AFFO, cap rate or price-to-NAV, none of which exist here; and do not add merchandise depreciation back as if it were real-estate depreciation, because the goods genuinely wear out and must be replaced. UPBD offers the broadest store-plus-virtual exposure but more leverage, legal exposure and business-mix complexity; PRG is a purer virtual model with less physical infrastructure but heavy merchant concentration and recently increased acquisition debt. Both pay dividends (UPBD ~7% yield; PRG ~1.2% plus buybacks) rather than high mandated payouts — there is no REIT distribution rule.[10][11][30]

Private routes.

• Own or franchise a store — buy an independent from the fragmented tail or franchise a Rent-A-Center/Aaron's unit; economics resemble a specialty-retailer-plus-consumer-finance small business. Underwrite it on vintage cash-on-cash returns (payments collected per lease cohort after losses), not reported revenue.
• Take-private / private equity — the model IQVentures validated with the ~$504M Aaron's buyout; the durable, cash-generative, countercyclical-demand profile suits PE ownership.[12][13]
• Private credit — lend against eligible leases and merchandise, sizing advance rates to customer concentration, vintage performance, recovery value and state-law enforceability (borrowing-base eligibility tends to deteriorate exactly when losses rise).
• Adjacent real estate — leasing a storefront or warehouse to an operator is a retail-real-estate investment (roughly NAICS 531120), not direct participation in 532210; the tenant's credit and merchandise-loss exposure matters only through rent coverage.

Outlook. Structural demand is durable — a large, credit-excluded population sustains a baseline, and the model gains customers when mainstream credit tightens. The sector is roughly flat-to-modest in growth (broad estimates ~$10–12B), with virtual LTO continuing to take share from staffed stores and buy-now-pay-later adjacencies as the growth options. Company momentum diverged in 2025 — Acima's GMV rose 8.6% while Progressive's fell 8.6% on a partner loss and tighter underwriting — underscoring that execution and merchant relationships now matter more than any single macro story. The regulatory overhang eased with the 2025 CFPB dismissal, but recharacterization remains the defining bear case. The swing factor is the subprime consumer: watch charge-offs (7%+ of lease revenue), GMV, and merchant concentration as the leading indicators — not interest rates in isolation.[10][11][22]

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau — NAICS 2022, Code 532210, Consumer Electronics and Appliances Rental (definition, inclusions, exclusions and adjacent codes). https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=532210&year=2022&details=532210
2. U.S. Census Bureau — 2022 Economic Census, Real Estate and Rental and Leasing, Summary Statistics (EC2253BASIC), NAICS 532210 (receipts $5.535B). https://data.census.gov/table/ECNBASIC2022.EC2253BASIC?codeset=naics~532210
3. U.S. Census Bureau — 2022 Economic Census, Concentration by Largest Firms (EC2200SIZECONCEN), NAICS 532210 (434 firms; CR4 81.5%, CR8 85.8%, CR20 90.6%, CR50 94.5%; HHI suppressed). https://data.census.gov/table/ECNSIZE2022.EC2200SIZECONCEN?codeset=naics~532210
4. U.S. Census Bureau — County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 532210 (4,436 establishments; 22,867 employees; $1.015B payroll). https://data.census.gov/table/CBP2023.CB2300CBP?codeset=naics~532210
5. U.S. Census Bureau — Nonemployer Statistics 2022, NAICS 53221 (1,702 businesses; $154.7M receipts). https://data.census.gov/table/NONEMP2022.NS2200NONEMP?codeset=naics~53221
6. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) / U.S. Census Annual Services Survey — Estimated Revenue for Consumer Electronics and Appliances Rental, Employer Firms (~$9.66B, 2022). https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/REVEF53221ALLEST
7. U.S. Small Business Administration — Table of Small Business Size Standards (13 CFR §121.201); NAICS 532210 = $47.0M average annual receipts. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
8. IBISWorld — Consumer Electronics & Appliances Rental in the US (NAICS 532210) (industry revenue ~$9.7B). https://www.ibisworld.com/classifications/naics/532210/consumer-electronics-and-appliances-rental/
9. APRO (Association of Progressive Rental Organizations) — 2025 State of the Rent-to-Own Industry (sector ~$11–12B; ~5,500 stores; ~40,000 employees; households served). https://www.rtohq.org/rent-to-own/industry-reports/2025-review/
10. Upbound Group, Inc. — Form 10-K, fiscal year ended Dec 31, 2025 (segment revenue, store counts, GMV, merchandise, charge-offs, depreciation policy, debt, dividend, legal accruals, state-law summary). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933036/000093303626000008/upbd-20251231.htm
11. PROG Holdings, Inc. — Form 10-K, fiscal year ended Dec 31, 2025 (Progressive Leasing revenue/GMV, write-offs, merchant concentration, merchandise, debt, dividend, Four/Purchasing Power). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1808834/000180883426000012/prg-20251231.htm
12. The Aaron's Company, Inc. — Form 10-K, fiscal year ended Dec 31, 2023 (last full public year; ~$2.14B revenue; store counts). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1821393/000182139324000012/aan-20231231.htm
13. The Aaron's Company / IQVentures — Completion of Acquisition (take-private, $10.10/share, ~$504M enterprise value, Oct 3, 2024). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1821393/000182139324000136/mergerclosingannouncement-.htm
14. PROG Holdings, Inc. — Form 10-K, FY2020 (tax-free separation of Aaron's Holdings into PROG Holdings and The Aaron's Company). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1808834/000180883421000012/prg-20201231.htm
15. Upbound Group, Inc. — Form 10-Q, quarter ended Mar 31, 2026 (Q1 2026 revenue, charge-offs, same-store sales). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933036/000162828026029049/upbd-20260331.htm
16. PROG Holdings, Inc. — Form 10-Q, quarter ended Mar 31, 2026 (Q1 2026 GMV, revenue, write-offs, increased debt post-Purchasing Power). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1808834/000180883426000066/prg-20260331.htm
17. U.S. Federal Trade Commission — Survey of Rent-to-Own Customers (2000; historical penetration and product mix). https://www.ftc.gov/reports/survey-rent-own-customers
18. — (reserved; see 24)
19. U.S. Federal Trade Commission — Progressive Leasing Will Pay $175 Million to Settle FTC Charges (April 2020). https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2020/04/rent-own-payment-plan-company-progressive-leasing-will-pay-175-million-settle-ftc-charges-it
20. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau — Regulation M (Consumer Leasing Act), 12 CFR Part 1013 (four-month initial-term threshold; 2026 dollar threshold). https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1013/
21. — (reserved; Reg M 2026 threshold, see 20)
22. New York State Attorney General — AG James Sues Predatory Lender Acima (2024); CFPB Acima action filed 2024, dismissed with prejudice 2025. https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2024/attorney-general-james-sues-predatory-lender-cheating-thousands-new-yorkers; https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/acima-allred/
23. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau — CFPB Orders Tempoe to Provide $36 Million in Relief (2023); U.S. FTC — In the Matter of Rent-A-Center, Inc. (2020 competition consent orders). https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-leasing-company-tempoe-to-provide-36-million-in-penalties-and-relief/
24. U.S. FDIC — 2023 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households (4.2% unbanked; 14.2% underbanked; 15.7% no mainstream credit; 5.8% used nonbank AFS). https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/household-survey
25. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System — Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2024 (45% lack a three-month emergency fund). https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2024-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202505.pdf
26. Nareit / IRS — Funds From Operations and Form 1120-REIT instructions (why FFO/AFFO and the ~90% distribution rule do not apply to these C-corporations). https://www.reit.com/glossary/funds-operation-ffo; https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1120rei
27. Katapult Holdings, Inc. — Form 10-Q, quarter ended Sep 30, 2025 (nine-month revenue $217.9M); rent-to-own APR range (43%–468%; NJ 30% cap) via NerdWallet/Forbes Advisor. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1785424/000162828025051372/kplt-20250930.htm; https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-finance/the-true-cost-of-rent-to-own-and-alternatives/
28. FlexShopper, Inc. — Preliminary 2024 Financial Results (2024 operating income $22.8M; delayed 10-K). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1397047/000121390025036054/ea023966001ex99-1_flex.htm
29. PR Newswire — Rent-to-Own Industry Launches 50-State Model Lease Agreement Library (APRO + Hudson Cook, 2026). https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rent-to-own-industrys-national-standards-raised-with-launch-of-50-state-model-lease-agreement-library-302689110.html
30. MarketBeat / company disclosures — UPBD and PRG dividend history and yield (UPBD $0.39/qtr, ~7.0% forward yield; PRG $0.14/qtr, ~1.2%, both mid-July 2026). https://www.marketbeat.com/stocks/NASDAQ/UPBD/dividend/; https://www.marketbeat.com/stocks/NYSE/PRG/dividend/