Truck, Utility Trailer, and RV Rental and Leasing (NAICS 532120)

A Histometrics industry primer for public-market and private investors

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1. Overview

This industry rents and leases vehicles on wheels — without a driver: box trucks and tractor-trailers, utility trailers, and recreational vehicles (RVs, motorized or towable homes-on-wheels). Think of the U-Haul truck you drive yourself, the fleet of delivery trucks a bakery leases from Ryder instead of buying, and the motorhome a family rents for a national-park trip. The moment a driver is supplied, the activity becomes transportation, not rental — so "without a driver" is the defining line. [1]

A note that shapes everything below: NAICS 532120 lives inside the U.S. Census Bureau's Sector 53, "Real Estate and Rental and Leasing," but it is not a real-estate industry. It owns depreciating machines, not land and buildings. The tools investors use for landlords and property trusts — REITs (real estate investment trusts), cap rates (capitalization rates, a property's income divided by its price), NOI (net operating income), and FFO/AFFO (funds from operations / adjusted, the cash-earnings measure REITs report instead of net income) — do not apply here and can mislead you if you import them. Both independent research reports underpinning this primer stress the same point. [5][6] The economics that do govern this business are the classic rental-and-leasing levers: how much of the fleet is out earning (utilization), the rate charged, and — decisively — what the trucks fetch when they are eventually sold (residual value). All three are highly sensitive to interest rates and used-vehicle prices.

Why an investor cares. It is a large ($37 billion), mature, cash-generative industry sitting at the intersection of freight, e-commerce, household moves, and leisure travel — with a durable secular tailwind (companies outsourcing truck ownership) layered over a sharp cycle.

The catch — ways in are narrow. The two largest operators by fleet are private or family-controlled. Public-market investors realistically have two pure-ish windows (U-Haul and Ryder) plus a handful of diluted ones; there is no U.S.-listed pure-play RV-rental company at all. [6] Private investors, by contrast, have many direct routes — buying a fleet, joining a leasing cooperative, becoming a U-Haul dealer, or hosting an RV on a peer-to-peer app.

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2. What it is and how it is structured

Inside the code (illustrative activities): [1]

• Consumer / do-it-yourself (DIY) truck and utility-trailer rental — the U-Haul, Penske, and Budget Truck model.
• Commercial truck and tractor-trailer short-term rental (un-driven).
• Full-service commercial leasing — multi-year contracts that bundle the vehicle plus maintenance, licensing, and substitute trucks (the Ryder ChoiceLease and Penske model).
• RV / motorhome rental and leasing, via corporate fleets and peer-to-peer marketplaces.
• Bus and semi-trailer rental/leasing without drivers.

Explicitly excluded — the adjacent codes investors confuse with it: [1]

That last row, 533110 (Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets), is the economic opposite of this industry and a useful contrast: franchisors and patent licensors collect royalties with almost no physical asset, generating roughly $1.47 million of revenue per employee versus about $450,000 here. [2] 532120 is balance-sheet-heavy; 533110 is balance-sheet-light. Do not confuse "rental and leasing" the label with a single business model.

Ownership mix — a concentrated core wearing a fragmented costume. From the 2022 Economic Census concentration table: the top 4 firms hold 58.9% of revenue, the top 8 hold 70.6%, and the top 50 hold 87.2%; the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard 0–10,000 concentration gauge) is 1,081 — the low end of the antitrust agencies' "moderately concentrated" band (1,000–1,800). [2] So roughly three-fifths of a $37 billion industry sits with four companies, while the remaining ~13% of revenue is split among more than 1,600 small firms. The players sort into four ownership types:

• Public operating companies (C-corporations, not REITs): U-Haul Holding and Ryder System.
• Private / family-controlled majors: Penske Transportation Solutions (the fleet-size leader) and Enterprise Truck Rental.
• Cooperative networks: NationaLease and Idealease bind hundreds of independent lessors under shared purchasing and reciprocal maintenance — a structurally important "middle." [10]
• Individuals and small independents: the long tail of local truck-rental shops, regional lessors, and — growing fast — individual RV owners renting through apps.

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3. How big it is

Headline federal figures (our ground-truth ingested statistics):

Reading the numbers.

• Capital-intensive, not labor-intensive. Revenue per employee runs around $450,000 — several times a typical service business — because the "product" is a depreciating multi-ton machine, not a person's time. Payroll is only about 14% of revenue ($5.14B of $37.28B); fleet depreciation, interest, and maintenance dominate the cost stack. [2][3]
• The 2022 revenue reading was cyclically elevated. Economic Census receipts jumped from roughly $22.5 billion in 2017 to $37.28 billion in 2022 (+66%). [2] Much of that reflects the pandemic surge in DIY moving plus extraordinary inflation in both new-truck prices and used-vehicle resale values in 2021–2022 — a boom that reversed hard in 2024–2025 (see §5 and §9). More current, narrower Census surveys (the Quarterly Services Survey, a different and smaller universe of taxable establishments) put revenue near $33 billion for 2025, with 2026 Q1 running about 1.2% below the prior-year quarter — a soft current signal, not a same-basis decline from the 2022 peak. [21]

The undercount caveat — important here. Federal business statistics count employer firms and establishments. They badly understate the industry's true footprint of owners and locations in three ways:

1. U-Haul's ~23,000+ independent dealers are commission agents distributing U-Haul-owned equipment — counted under U-Haul, not as ~23,000 establishments. The "6,386 establishments" figure therefore understates the number of places you can actually rent a truck by an order of magnitude. [5]
2. Peer-to-peer RV hosts are individuals renting their own vehicles; one platform alone (RVshare) reports roughly 60,000 owner-hosts. [12] These non-employer individuals are essentially invisible in employer statistics — the equipment-world analogue of the small-landlord undercount that dogs residential real-estate data.
3. The non-employer tail of sole-proprietor rental operators is excluded entirely.

So treat 1,693 firms / 6,386 establishments as the institutional core, not the full population of people earning money in this activity.

Asset stock — the fleet is this industry's "square footage." No federal source counts every rentable vehicle, so scale is visible through the majors' disclosures (different dates/definitions; not additive):

• U-Haul: ~204,800 trucks, 136,600 trailers, 42,000 towing devices (fiscal year-end March 2026). [5]
• Penske Transportation Solutions (private): 430,000+ vehicles under lease, rental, or maintenance. [7]
• Ryder: 184,900 owned/leased revenue vehicles at end-2025, plus 44,100 customer-owned vehicles it maintains. [6]
• XTRA Lease (Berkshire Hathaway): ~90,000 trailers. [9]
• Cruise America: 4,000+ Class C motorhomes. [11]

Those operators alone command well over 800,000 vehicles and trailers — the practical asset base of the industry.

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4. The investable universe

Public exposure is genuinely scarce, and every listed name is impure. What follows is drawn from the two reports' company research; market capitalizations and current dividend yields move daily and are not fixed in the source filings — verify them live before acting.

Major private and institutional owners (not investable in public equity):

• Penske Transportation Solutions — the fleet leader; owned Penske Corporation 41.1%, Penske Automotive Group 28.9%, Japan's Mitsui & Co. 30.0%. [7]
• Enterprise Truck Rental — a division of privately held Enterprise Mobility (the Taylor family). [5]
• Cruise America — private, employee-owned; the largest corporate RV-rental fleet. [11]
• NationaLease / Idealease — cooperative networks aggregating hundreds of independent full-service lessors. [10]
• RVshare (KKR-backed) and Outdoorsy — venture/PE-backed peer-to-peer RV marketplaces. [12]

Bottom line: the fleet-size leader (Penske) is private, RV rental has no public pure-play, and even U-Haul and Ryder are conglomerated. Public investors buy this industry as an industrial with an embedded leasing annuity and a used-vehicle trading book — not as a yield vehicle and emphatically not as a REIT.

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5. How the money works

REIT economics do not apply. These are taxable C-corporations, not pass-through property trusts. They are not required to distribute ~90% of taxable income, they do not report FFO/AFFO, and they are not valued on cap rates or price-to-NAV (net asset value) in the REIT sense. (The one place property valuation touches the industry is U-Haul's large self-storage arm — a genuinely real-estate-like business that a careful analyst values separately on storage NOI and REIT-style multiples, then adds to the fleet and insurance operations. But U-Haul itself is not a REIT.) [5]

Two business models, very different risk shapes. [6]

Short-term rental (consumer + commercial) — Revenue ≈ available units × time utilization × rental rate, plus mileage and add-ons. Time utilization is the share of fleet-days actually earning; dollar utilization is revenue against the fleet's cost. This is high-operating-leverage and cyclical: trucks must be bought before demand is known, so when demand softens, revenue drops while depreciation, interest, and registration keep running. Ryder's commercial-rental utilization slipped from 75% (2023) to 70% (2024–25). [6]

Full-service lease (commercial) — Multi-year contracts (typically 3–7 years for trucks, ~10 for trailers) bundling the vehicle, maintenance, licensing, and substitute trucks for a predictable monthly payment. This is the annuity core: vehicles are bought after a contract is signed, and cash flows are locked in. Ryder's ChoiceLease produced $3.51 billion in 2025 (60% of its fleet-management revenue) versus a smaller, jumpier $937 million rental book. [6] Leases smooth the cycle; rental amplifies it.

The three levers that actually move earnings:

1. Fleet depreciation — the largest cost, and a judgment call. Firms depreciate each vehicle toward an estimated residual (resale) value. Set that residual too high and you under-charge depreciation today — then take the pain later.
2. Residual / resale value — the defining swing factor. These firms sell their used trucks; the gain or loss versus book value flows straight to earnings. When used-vehicle prices fell in 2024–2025 after the 2021–22 spike, the hit was severe and industry-wide. In fiscal 2026, U-Haul's moving-equipment rental revenue still grew 2.3%, yet Moving & Storage operating earnings fell from ~$646 million to ~$350 million as rental-fleet depreciation rose and equipment disposals swung from a small gain to a $104.5 million loss. [5] At Ryder, 2025 used-truck and used-tractor prices fell 15% and 11%, and the company estimates a 10% cut in residual assumptions would add ~$340 million of depreciation over the fleet's life. [6] The lesson both reports converge on: rental revenue can grow while economic profit shrinks if the fleet is getting costlier to maintain or worth less at disposal.
3. Fleet financing / interest. Fleets are debt-financed, heavily through asset-backed securities (ABS, bonds secured by the vehicles) and secured fleet loans. The cost of that debt is a direct function of interest rates — the industry's central rate-sensitivity channel. U-Haul's interest expense rose to ~$365 million in fiscal 2026 on more debt at higher rates; Ryder carries ~$7.6 billion of debt against ~$3.1 billion of equity. [5][6]

Rental-vs-ownership penetration — the secular tailwind. The durable growth story is outsourcing: companies that once bought and maintained their own trucks increasingly convert to full-service lease to shed maintenance, licensing, technician-shortage, and residual-value headaches. Ryder estimates only about 1 million of roughly 11 million U.S. commercial (Class 3–8) trucks are rented or leased from third-party managers — implying large untapped conversion room (a directional company estimate, not a federal statistic). [6] Every fleet that converts is a permanent revenue transfer into this industry.

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6. What drives demand

1. Freight and business activity — commercial rental and lease demand tracks manufacturing, retail, inventories, construction, and freight tonnage; rental is the most cyclical piece and can weaken before the broader economy. The 2023–24 freight recession cut rental utilization. [6]
2. E-commerce and last-mile logistics — U.S. retail e-commerce reached ~$1.23 trillion in 2025 (up ~5%) and ~17% of retail sales, supporting demand for vans, box trucks, and trailers — though route density and insourcing keep the link loose. [19]
3. Private-fleet outsourcing to full-service lease (the secular driver above). [6]
4. Household moves — DIY truck and trailer rental tracks relocation. Mobility is a mild headwind: only 11.8% of Americans moved in 2024 (down from 12.1%), and interstate moves fell to 2.1% — partly because high mortgage rates freeze home sales. [18]
5. New-truck price and availability — when OEM (original-equipment manufacturer) trucks are scarce or expensive (the 2021–22 chip shortage; pre-buying ahead of emissions rules), firms buy fewer, hold longer, and raise rates — inflating near-term pricing and residuals, then normalizing. [5]
6. RV travel and outdoor recreation — RV rental follows leisure demand, fuel prices, and discretionary income. Industry wholesale RV shipments (a proxy for the rentable installed base) rose 2.5% to 342,220 units in 2025 off a 2023 trough — but the trade group's mid-2026 forecast calls for ~314,000 units (down ~8%), a cautionary near-term signal. [13]

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7. Regulation

This is transportation, consumer-finance, environmental, and liability law — not fair-housing, rent-control, or REIT-tax law. Key regimes:

• The Graves Amendment (49 U.S.C. §30106) — the industry's most important legal shield. It preempts state "vicarious liability" laws, so a rental/leasing company is not automatically liable for a renter's negligence merely by owning the vehicle (its own negligence is not protected). This federal protection is foundational to renting large fleets to strangers. [14]
• FMCSA / DOT commercial-vehicle rules — the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's obligations attach to a vehicle's use, weight, and cargo, not to whether it is rented. A CDL (commercial driver's license) is generally required above 26,001 lbs or for 16+ passengers or placarded hazmat; a consumer moving a household is not automatically a commercial carrier. In full-service leasing the lessor typically handles licensing, permitting, and compliance (including ELD — electronic logging device — rules, with a short-rental exception). [16]
• 12% Federal Excise Tax (FET) on the first retail sale of heavy trucks and trailers (IRS Publication 510), which raises fleet-acquisition cost and supports lease-vs-buy economics and residuals. [15]
• Consumer-leasing rules — routine daily/weekly/monthly rentals fall outside the CFPB's Regulation M (which covers longer consumer leases); states police damage waivers, insurance add-ons, fees, and deposits. There is no single national peer-to-peer RV statute — hosts and platforms navigate state-by-state insurance and tax rules. [16]
• Emissions (EPA / CARB) — tightening federal (EPA) heavy-duty standards from model-year 2027 and California Air Resources Board rules drive fleet-replacement timing and cost, pre-buy surges, and residual/technology uncertainty. Federal greenhouse-gas policy shifted in 2026 and parts remain under reconsideration — treat the powertrain path as regulatory uncertainty, not a fixed EV-adoption schedule. [17]

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

• A stable oligopoly at the core. Consumer moving is a U-Haul-led near-monopoly on brand and location density (23,000+ outlets), with Penske and Budget Truck as challengers. Commercial full-service leasing is a Ryder / Penske / Enterprise trio plus the NationaLease/Idealease cooperatives. CR4 of 58.9% and a stable HHI near 1,081 confirm a moderately concentrated, slow-consolidating structure. [2][10]
• Scale is a real moat. Fleet-purchasing leverage with OEMs, a national maintenance and branch network (essential for one-way rentals and guaranteed substitute vehicles), cheap ABS funding, and proprietary data on residual values and utilization all reward size. This is hard for new entrants to replicate in the asset-heavy segments.
• Cooperatives, not mergers, consolidate the tail. Independent lessors gain scale virtually through NationaLease and Idealease rather than being acquired — keeping the fragmented middle viable against the majors. [10]
• Peer-to-peer disruption — but only in RVs. Asset-light marketplaces (RVshare, Outdoorsy) let individual owners rent out their vehicles, shifting acquisition and residual risk onto hosts while the platform earns booking, insurance, and payment fees. This segment is being genuinely reshaped; owned corporate fleets (Cruise America) still hold the majority. [12] The truck side has not been similarly disrupted — insurance, maintenance liability, and one-way logistics are far harder to crowdsource than a parked RV.

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9. Risks

Both underlying reports agree the two dominant risks are residual value and interest rates, in that order.

1. Residual-value risk (the defining risk). Earnings hinge on selling used trucks at or above depreciated book value. When used prices fall — as in 2024–25 after the 2021–22 spike — disposal gains collapse and depreciation must be raised, hitting earnings before a single extra vehicle is even sold. This is structural and correlated across the industry, not idiosyncratic. [5][6]
2. Interest-rate sensitivity (via financing, not cap rates). Fleets are funded with secured debt and ABS, so higher rates raise the cost of capital, compress lease spreads, and lift the carrying cost of the fleet — and indirectly weaken residuals (used-truck buyers finance too) and dampen freight. The U.S. federal-funds target was 3.50%–3.75% in mid-2026, well above the near-zero era in which much of the outstanding fleet was underwritten. Refinancing/maturity risk sits at the debt level (ABS rollovers), not at a property-mortgage level. [6][20]
3. Freight-cycle cyclicality. Commercial rental is directly geared to freight demand and is the most volatile revenue line. [6]
4. New-vehicle cost and availability shocks. Supply-chain disruptions and emissions-driven cost inflation force firms to overpay for fleet, depressing later per-unit returns. [5]
5. Oversupply / used-truck glut. A wave of fleet renewals or a demand air-pocket can flood the used market, depressing residuals everywhere at once.
6. EV / technology transition. Emissions mandates push electric trucks whose long-run resale values, maintenance profiles, and charging needs are unproven — injecting fresh residual-value uncertainty into a business that lives on residual accuracy. [17]
7. Liability, insurance, and catastrophe risk. Despite the Graves Amendment shield, firms carry large insurance programs (U-Haul owns captive insurers); accident, litigation, and rising insurance costs are real, and RVs add weather/seasonality risk. [5]
8. Governance / control-structure risk (equity-specific). Family/insider control at U-Haul (dual-class, ~50% voting held by the Shoen family) and Penske limits minority-shareholder influence and can widen a valuation discount. [5]

For a private operator, add concentration risk (a few customers, one OEM, one repair shop, one lender) and, for peer-to-peer hosts, dependence on a single platform's search ranking, fees, and insurance.

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10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public-market routes

• U-Haul Holding (UHAL / UHAL.B) — the purest listed proxy for consumer DIY truck and trailer rental, wrapped around a large owned self-storage and real-estate portfolio and captive insurers. Analyze it on EV/EBITDA (enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization), P/E (price-to-earnings), and a sum-of-the-parts / price-to-book lens — valuing self-storage separately and adding the fleet and insurance. This SOTP-vs-net-asset gap is the nearest honest analogue to REIT "price-to-NAV," and bulls argue UHAL trades below the private-market value of its parts. Watch the UHAL-vs-UHAL.B (voting vs. non-voting) spread and apply a governance discount. [5]
• Ryder System (R) — the listed proxy for full-service commercial leasing + rental + logistics. Judge it on P/E, EV/EBITDA, ROIC (return on invested capital), leverage (net debt/EBITDA), and its dividend, watching ChoiceLease growth (annuity) against commercial-rental utilization (cyclical) and used-vehicle sale gains as the earnings swing factor. It behaves like a cyclical industrial with a leasing-annuity ballast, not a yield play. [6]
• Diluted windows: PAG (28.9% of private Penske Transportation Solutions, mostly an auto retailer), Avis Budget/CAR (Budget Truck, undisclosed), Berkshire/BRK (XTRA Lease, negligible), and foreign-listed Tourism Holdings/THL (El Monte RV). [7][8][9][22]
• Metrics that do not apply: FFO/AFFO, the ~90% distribution rule, REIT pass-through taxation, and cap rates. Do not analyze these companies like landlords.

Private routes

• Direct fleet ownership — buy trucks, trailers, or RVs and run a local rental/leasing business; returns hinge on the same three levers as the majors (utilization, maintenance discipline, disciplined resale) without their financing scale or ABS access.
• U-Haul dealer/franchise — act as a commission rental agent with minimal capital (asset-light entry). [5]
• Leasing cooperatives — join NationaLease or Idealease for purchasing scale and a maintenance network — the practical way to compete with Ryder and Penske. [10]
• Peer-to-peer RV hosting — list an owned RV on RVshare or Outdoorsy for rental income, accepting seasonality, wear, insurance complexity, and platform fees (often 20–25% of the booking). [12]
• Private credit / PE — exposure chiefly through fleet-financing ABS, equipment-finance lending, and PE ownership of regional lessors and RV platforms. This is equipment/asset-finance risk priced off used-vehicle residuals and rates — not property risk.

Whatever the route, the discipline is identical: model realistic utilization, rate, maintenance, financing, and — above all — a conservative resale value, and stress every one of them.

Outlook (forward-looking judgment, grounded in the sourced facts above)

• Working through a boom hangover. The 2021–22 revenue/residual surge has reversed; elevated depreciation and shrinking (now negative) disposal results compressed fiscal 2025–26 earnings at both U-Haul and Ryder. Expect a trough-to-normalization path as used-truck prices stabilize and freight recovers — but the near-term signals are mixed to soft (2026 Q1 industry revenue ~1.2% below prior year; RV shipments forecast to fall ~8% in 2026). [5][6][13][21]
• The secular tailwind is intact. Outsourcing from owned fleets to full-service lease should keep the annuity book growing faster than the volatile rental book, gradually de-risking the majors' earnings mix. [6]
• The EV/emissions transition is the wild card — potentially reshaping fleet economics and residual values over the next decade, with scaled incumbents best positioned to absorb it. [17]
• Rates and freight are the swing variables — a sustained decline in interest rates would lower fleet-financing costs and support residuals; a freight recovery would restore rental utilization. Both are macro-dependent.

Net: a mature, moderately concentrated, capital-intensive rental-and-leasing industry with a cyclical, residual-value-driven earnings profile and a durable outsourcing tailwind — currently digesting the aftermath of a pandemic-era boom. The investable substance is real but narrow in public equity (essentially U-Haul and Ryder), with the largest fleet operator locked away in private hands and no listed RV pure-play at all.

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Data notes and honest gaps

• Revenue basis: the $37.28 billion headline is 2022 Economic Census receipts — cyclically elevated and our ground-truth figure. [2] The two source reports differed here: one used the same Economic Census figure; the other used the narrower Service Annual Survey (~$32.2B, 2022) and could not machine-extract the Economic Census table in its environment. We resolve to the Economic Census per our ground-truth statistics.
• Market caps and dividend yields for the listed names are not fixed in the source filings and move daily — the table gives segment revenue, fleet, and income character instead; verify live prices before acting.
• Fleet totals are summed from company disclosures with differing dates and definitions, not a federal fleet census; the "800,000+ units" aggregate is an estimate built from sourced company numbers. [5][6][7]
• Undercount: federal employer statistics exclude the ~23,000 U-Haul commission dealers (counted under U-Haul), ~60,000+ peer-to-peer RV hosts, and the non-employer tail — so establishment and firm counts describe the institutional core, not the full population of owners.
• No suppressed federal metric was invented. Where a figure (e.g., a comprehensive federal fleet count, or a public-vs-private revenue split) does not exist, we say so rather than estimate.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS Definition — 532120 Truck, Utility Trailer, and RV Rental and Leasing, 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=532120&year=2022&details=532120
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census — NAICS 532120 receipts, firms, and concentration by largest firms (revenue $37,280,090K; firms 1,693; CR4 58.9%; CR8 70.6%; CR50 87.2%; HHI 1,081), 2024–2025. https://data.census.gov/table/ECNBASIC2022.EC2253BASIC?codeset=naics~532120
3. U.S. Census Bureau, 2023 County Business Patterns — NAICS 532120 (establishments 6,386; employment 81,850; annual payroll $5,140,163K), 2025. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
4. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards (13 CFR 121.201) — NAICS 532120: $47.0M average annual receipts, effective 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
5. U-Haul Holding Company, Fiscal 2026 Annual Report (year ended March 31, 2026) and 2026 Proxy Statement — fleet ~204,800 trucks / 136,600 trailers; Moving & Storage operating earnings ~$646M→$350M; disposals swung to a $104.5M loss; interest expense ~$365M; ~2,400 stores + 23,000+ dealers; Shoen-family control. U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000004457
6. Ryder System, Inc., Form 10-K for FY2025 — Fleet Management revenue $5.845B (ChoiceLease $3.510B; commercial rental $937M); utilization 70%; used truck/tractor prices −15%/−11%; 10% residual sensitivity ≈ $340M; ~184,900 revenue vehicles; ~$7.6B debt. U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/85961/000008596126000007/r-20251231.htm
7. Penske Automotive Group, Inc., Form 10-K for FY2025 — Penske Transportation Solutions ownership (Penske Corp 41.1%, PAG 28.9%, Mitsui 30.0%); PTS fleet 430,000+; equity-method income. U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1019849/000162828026012830/pag-20251231.htm
8. Avis Budget Group, Inc., Form 10-K for FY2025 — owns Budget Truck; truck economics not separately reported. U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723612/000072361226000012/car-20251231.htm
9. XTRA Lease (Berkshire Hathaway), Company profile — ~90,000 over-the-road trailers, ~50 U.S. locations. https://www.xtralease.com/about
10. NationaLease / Idealease, Full-service lease vs. rental; cooperative-network scale, accessed 2026. https://www.nationalease.com/; https://www.idealease.com/
11. Cruise America, Company operating model / affiliate network — 4,000+ Class C motorhomes, 100+ North American locations. https://www.cruiseamerica.com/
12. RVshare and Outdoorsy, Peer-to-peer RV marketplace disclosures — RVshare ~60,000 owner-hosts; KKR-led $100M+ investment (2020); Outdoorsy host fees 20–25%. https://rvshare.com/; https://www.outdoorsy.com/
13. RV Industry Association, RV Shipment Reports and RoadSigns Forecast — 2025 shipments 342,220 (+2.5%); summer-2026 forecast ~314,000 (−~8%). https://www.rvia.org/reports-trends/rv-shipment-reports
14. U.S. Code, 49 U.S.C. §30106 — Rented or Leased Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility (Graves Amendment). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title49-section30106
15. Internal Revenue Service, Publication 510: Excise Taxes — 12% federal retail excise tax on heavy trucks/trailers, 2025. https://www.irs.gov/publications/p510
16. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, CMV / CDL / ELD applicability guidance; CFPB Regulation M (12 CFR 1013), 2025–26. https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/registration/do-i-need-usdot-number; https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1013/
17. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Heavy-Duty Criteria-Pollutant Standards (MY2027); California Air Resources Board, Clean Truck Check, 2026. https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines; https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/clean-truck-check-overview-fact-sheet
18. U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Mobility / Migration, ACS 2024 — 11.8% of Americans moved (2.1% interstate). https://www.census.gov/topics/population/migration/guidance/acs-1yr.html
19. U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales, 2025–2026 Q1 — ~$1.23T in 2025; ~17% of retail. https://www.census.gov/retail/ecommerce.html
20. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary policy implementation note, June 2026 — target range 3.50%–3.75%. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260617a1.htm
21. U.S. Census Bureau, Service Annual Survey / Quarterly Services Survey, NAICS 53212 — taxable-establishment revenue ~$33.0B (2025); 2026 Q1 ~1.2% below prior-year quarter (different, narrower universe than the Economic Census). https://www.census.gov/services/qss.html
22. Tourism Holdings Ltd., Financial and investor information — owns El Monte RV / Road Bear (global figures). https://www.thlonline.com/financialinvestorinformation