Other Technical and Trade Schools (U.S.) — NAICS 611519

1. Overview

This industry is the business of teaching people a skilled job in a short, structured program that ends in a certificate or diploma — welding, HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) repair, truck driving, medical assisting, real-estate licensing, broadcasting, and similar hands-on trades. These are for-work, not for-a-four-year-degree, programs. They typically run from a few weeks to about two years and lead to a job-specific credential rather than a bachelor's degree. [1]

This is a workforce-training market, not simply a stock-market sector, and there are two ways to get exposure. The public route is narrow but real: a small number of listed trade-school operators. The private route is much larger — the industry is overwhelmingly thousands of small, privately held or private-equity-owned schools, plus training programs run inside employers themselves, and it also touches equipment and real-estate financing and student-receivable credit.

Why it matters now: the United States has structural shortages in exactly the trades these schools feed — welders, electricians, HVAC and diesel technicians, truck drivers, and allied-health workers. That has turned a once-sleepy, scandal-scarred corner of "for-profit education" into one of the faster-growing pockets of the education economy, with the two publicly traded pure-plays both posting double-digit revenue growth in 2025. [3][8]

Whether an investment works rests on five operating variables that recur throughout this primer: student starts, retention and completion, employment outcomes, funding eligibility, and utilization of campuses, laboratories, and instructors.

2. What it is, and how it is structured

Scope. NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) 2022 code 611519 covers schools offering job-specific vocational or technical courses that lead to a certification. The official example list includes truck- and bus-driving schools, bartending schools, broadcasting schools, modeling schools, real-estate schools, graphic-arts schools, computer-repair training, specialized skilled-trades instruction, and nonacademic healthcare training. [1]

What it deliberately excludes — this matters, because the "trade school" idea is split across several codes:

• Cosmetology and barber schools → 611511
• Aviation and flight training → 611512
• Registered apprenticeship programs (often union- or employer-run) → 611513
• Business and secretarial skills → 611410; general computer training (except repair) → 611420; professional and management development → 611430
• Regular passenger-car driver's-ed schools → 611692 (but truck and bus instruction stays in 611519)
• Degree-granting career colleges → junior colleges 611210 and colleges 611310 [1]

That last exclusion is the important one. Many well-known "trade schools" actually grant diplomas and associate degrees, so their revenue is split across 611519 and the degree-granting codes. The pure 611519 code captures only the non-degree, certificate slice.

Ownership mix. The federal statistics file does not provide an ownership breakdown, so this is a qualitative read: the field is dominated by for-profit operators — independent single-campus schools, regional chains, private-equity roll-ups, and carrier- or employer-owned training arms — alongside a minority of nonprofits and public technical colleges (which mostly land in different codes). Federal data confirm the field is extraordinarily fragmented: roughly 3,590 firms and a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard market-concentration score running 0 to 10,000) of just 83.8 — near the bottom of the scale, meaning no one comes close to controlling it. [3]

3. How big it is

Federal ground-truth statistics for NAICS 611519. County Business Patterns (CBP) figures are for 2023; Economic Census (EC) concentration and firm figures are for 2022.

Two readings of the concentration ratios: the market is genuinely fragmented (the top four firms hold only 13.2% of receipts), yet the top fifty together account for nearly half — so scale advantages exist even though no single operator dominates. The $21 million Small Business Administration (SBA) threshold is a government-contracting classification, not an industry revenue ceiling. [5]

What the federal file does not contain: there is no industry-wide student enrollment, average tuition, completion rate, placement rate, profitability, or ownership-mix figure in the ground-truth data, so this primer does not state one.

The undercount caveat — read this before quoting the $6.96 billion. That figure counts only standalone, non-degree schools filing under this exact code in 2022, and it materially understates how much America actually spends to "learn a trade":

1. Big operators book most revenue elsewhere. The listed pure-plays — Universal Technical Institute and Lincoln Educational Services — took in a combined ~$1.35 billion in 2025, roughly a fifth of the entire code's 2022 receipts on their own, and much of that sits in degree/diploma codes, not 611519. [3][8]
2. Employers train in-house. Trucking carriers run their own Commercial Driver's License (CDL) academies, and utilities and manufacturers run lineworker and technician programs. That spend never shows up as a "school." [12]
3. Community colleges and apprenticeships deliver a large share of trades training — and sit in codes 611210 and 611513, not here. [1]
4. Methodology gaps. CBP focuses on establishments with paid employees and excludes most government employees; the Economic Census generally excludes government-owned establishments. Public technical colleges, single-instructor shops, and schools without paid employees can therefore fall out of the totals entirely. [4]

For a sense of the wider space, the industry-research firm IBISWorld pegs the broader "Trade & Technical Schools" category (which folds in cosmetology, flight, and apprenticeship) at roughly $19.1 billion in 2025 and growing about 11% a year — useful context, but not comparable to the $6.96 billion 611519-only figure. [11]

4. The investable universe

Direct public exposure is thin. Three listed operators give the cleanest read, though all report broader business scopes than 611519 — investors should read segment- and program-level disclosures rather than treat any ticker as a pure industry proxy. Tickers and market caps are as of early 2026.

Adjacent public companies (mostly degree-granting or online — not 611519, listed for context): Perdoceo Education (Nasdaq: PRDO), Adtalem Global Education (NYSE: ATGE, health professions), Strategic Education (Nasdaq: STRA), American Public Education (Nasdaq: APEI), and Stride (NYSE: LRN, K-12/career online). Real-estate and insurance license-prep sits partly inside Kaplan, owned by Graham Holdings (NYSE: GHC). There is no dedicated trade-school ETF (exchange-traded fund).

Major private and other owners — where most of the industry actually lives:

• StrataTech Education Group (Tulsa Welding School, The Refrigeration School) — private-equity backed; The Halifax Group disclosed an investment in 2019. [15]
• Education Affiliates (Fortis, All-State Career, commercial-driving brands) — private-equity sponsored (JLL Partners). [13]
• International Education Corporation (UEI College, United Education Institute, U.S. Colleges, Sage Truck Driving Schools) — employee-owned, with a history of acquisition-led expansion. [14]
• Ancora Education (Miller-Motte, Platt) — acquired by Lindenwood Education System, a nonprofit, in April 2025 (previously private-equity/Marblegate-owned); Ancora operates five postsecondary brands across 17 campuses. [16]
• Penn Foster Group — online/at-home career diplomas — owned by Bain Capital. [17]
• 160 Driving Academy — among the largest U.S. CDL trainers, 150+ locations — private-equity backed. [18]
• TransForce Group / U.S. Truck Driving School — backed by Palladium Equity Partners. [18]
• Carrier-captive CDL schools — e.g., Roadmaster, owned by trucking carrier Werner Enterprises. [12]

5. How the money works

The unit is a student seat filled in a program. Revenue is essentially number of enrolled students × tuition and fees per student, and everything in the operating model bends toward filling and keeping seats.

Where the cash comes from. For for-profit schools, the dominant funding source is federal Title IV student aid — Pell Grants and federal student loans that flow to the school as tuition. This is the single most important fact about the industry's economics: it is, in large part, a federally financed business. Students also pay with personal funds, veterans' benefits, state funding, employer assistance, and workforce grants; public-company filings show supplementary revenue from textbooks, supplies, and manufacturer or dealer training. Federal law caps the aid dependence through the 90/10 rule — a for-profit school must get at least 10% of revenue from non-federal sources — so operators actively cultivate cash-pay, employer-sponsored, and GI Bill students to stay compliant. [6][20][22]

Revenue is generally earned as instruction is delivered, not when tuition is billed, so cash flow is sensitive to federal-aid disbursement timing, student withdrawals, receivables, refunds, and institutional credit programs. [6][8]

The operating metrics owners and analysts actually watch:

• New student starts and average active/full-time students — the growth engine; both UTI and Lincoln report these every quarter. [3][8]
• Revenue per student — driven by program mix (a two-year diesel-tech diploma bills far more than a four-week CDL course).
• Persistence/retention and completion — students who drop out stop paying and hurt the outcome metrics that gate federal eligibility.
• Graduate placement (job) rates — the outcome that sells the next class and, increasingly, keeps the federal money flowing.
• Campus capacity utilization — the margin lever (below).

Major cost lines: instructors and campus staff; rent, utilities, and maintenance; training equipment, supplies, and depreciation; student-acquisition marketing; student services, compliance, and financial-aid administration; and credit losses and refunds.

Why margins move the way they do — operating leverage. A campus is a fixed-cost asset: real estate, lab equipment, and instructor payroll are largely set regardless of whether a lab bay is 60% or 90% full. Fill the empty seats and incremental tuition drops almost straight to profit; conversely, an underfilled campus is costly because facilities and core staffing cannot be cut quickly. Both public operators showed the upside in 2025: revenue grew in the mid-to-high teens, but earnings grew faster. UTI's fiscal-2025 revenue rose 14.0% to $835.6M while net income jumped ~50% to $63.0M and adjusted EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) rose 22.9% to $126.5M (~15% margin). Lincoln's 2025 revenue rose to $518.2M while adjusted EBITDA rose sharply to ~$67.1M (~12.9% margin, expanding), and it ended the year debt-free. [3][8]

Growth comes two ways: fill existing campuses (high-margin), then add campuses and programs (capital-intensive, lower-margin at first). Lincoln relocated and expanded campuses and opened a Houston location in 2025; UTI has been adding programs and campuses on top of its 2022 Concorde acquisition. [3][8]

6. What drives demand

This industry tracks labor demand more closely than traditional higher education does. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) projects, 2024–2034:

• Medical assistants to grow 12%, with about 112,300 annual openings. [30]
• HVAC and refrigeration mechanics to grow 8%, with about 40,100 annual openings. [26]
• Heavy-vehicle and mobile-equipment technicians to grow 6%, with about 21,700 annual openings. [28]
• Automotive service technicians to grow 4%, with about 70,000 annual openings. [27]
• Welders, cutters, solderers, and brazers to grow just 2%, but still generate about 45,600 annual openings, mostly from replacement demand. [29]

Note the welder figure: BLS models modest headcount growth, whereas industry associations frame a much larger structural gap — the American Welding Society has cited projected welder shortfalls in the hundreds of thousands, and the American Trucking Associations has pointed to a driver shortage on the order of 60,000–80,000. Both framings can be true at once (few net new jobs but heavy replacement need). Shortages of this kind lift graduate wages and employer willingness to sponsor training. [6]

Other durable drivers:

• Cost and return versus a four-year degree. Rising college sticker prices and debt aversion have pushed many students — especially Gen Z — toward shorter, cheaper, job-linked credentials.
• Wage inflation in the trades makes the payback on a $10,000–$40,000 program attractive when it leads to a $50,000-plus starting job.
• Structural build-out demand: infrastructure spending, manufacturing reshoring, vehicle electrification, and data-center construction all pull hard on electricians and skilled trades.
• Aging workforces, more computerized equipment, healthcare demand, and veteran retraining.
• Countercyclical tendency: when the job market softens, more adults enroll to retrain — though demand for any specific trade still tracks that industry's own cycle (construction, freight, autos).
• Policy tailwind (forward-looking): the new Workforce Pell Grant, effective July 2026, extends Pell eligibility for the first time to short programs of roughly 150–599 clock hours (about 8–15 weeks) in fields like welding, HVAC, electrical, CDL, and medical assisting. If it works as written, it enlarges the pool of federally fundable students for exactly the programs these schools run. [24]

These are occupational projections, not an industry revenue forecast. The question for any school is whether it can convert labor demand into enrollment, completion, licensing, and employment at an acceptable student cost.

7. Regulation

This is a heavily regulated, politically sensitive industry, and the rules are the business risk.

• Title IV eligibility and accreditation. To receive federal aid, a school must have state authorization, recognized accreditation (national career accreditors such as ACCSC — Accrediting Commission of Career Schools and Colleges — or COE, the Council on Occupational Education, are common here), eligible programs, and compliant administrative systems. New proprietary or vocational schools face a two-year operating rule before they can expand eligibility, and losing accreditation or Title IV eligibility is close to an extinction event. [20]
• Financial Value Transparency (FVT) and Gainful Employment (GE). Finalized in 2023 and effective July 1, 2024, these rules require non-degree programs (and for-profit degree programs) to pass a debt-to-earnings test and an earnings-premium test — roughly, graduates must not spend more than 8% of annual (or 20% of discretionary) earnings on loan payments, and must out-earn a typical high-school graduate in their state — with public disclosure of costs and outcomes. Programs that fail can lose Title IV access. [21]
• The 90/10 rule. No more than 90% of a for-profit school's revenue may come from federal funds; a 2021 change (American Rescue Plan) tightened this by counting all federal sources — including GI Bill and Department of Defense (DoD) tuition assistance — inside the 90%. Failing two consecutive fiscal years can end Title IV eligibility. [22]
• Cohort Default Rates (CDR). A school whose former borrowers default above 30% for three straight years, or 40% in one year, can lose Title IV eligibility; for-profit default rates have historically run higher than nonprofit two- and four-year schools. [23]
• Program-specific and state rules. CDL schools must meet the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) Entry-Level Driver Training (ELDT) standards; real-estate, insurance, and allied-health programs answer to state licensing boards and clinical-site rules; schools are licensed state by state. Veterans can use Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) GI Bill benefits at approved trade and career-training programs. [25]

The rules swing with the political cycle: for-profit-education regulation typically tightens under Democratic administrations and loosens under Republican ones, and the sector still carries reputational scar tissue from the mid-2010s collapses of Corinthian Colleges and ITT Technical Institute.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The industry is about as fragmented as an industry gets — the top four firms hold just 13.2% of revenue and the top 50 under half. [3] Competition is local (students pick a nearby campus) and outcome-driven, and these schools compete not only with each other but with community colleges, state technical systems, union apprenticeships, employer training, online providers, and high-school career programs. Winning factors: employment and licensing outcomes, employer relationships and job referrals, program price and completion speed, scheduling convenience, facility and equipment quality, accreditation and funding access, and marketing efficiency.

Consolidation is the through-line, but it is slowed by real friction — accreditation, state approvals, instructor availability, clinical capacity, and student-outcome requirements all make rapid roll-ups hard:

• Public consolidators buy scale and adjacency — UTI acquired allied-health chain Concorde in 2022 to diversify beyond automotive; Lincoln has been expanding largely organically by opening and relocating campuses and adding high-demand programs (HVAC, electrical, welding). [3][8][19]
• Private-equity and platform roll-ups are active across CDL and trades — StrataTech, Education Affiliates, International Education Corporation, 160 Driving Academy, and TransForce are buy-and-build platforms; a nonprofit (Lindenwood) acquiring Ancora in 2025 shows the field is consolidating from multiple directions. [14][15][16][18]
• Employer-captive training competes on a free/paid-to-train model: carriers like Werner (Roadmaster) train drivers directly and hire graduates, often before they finish. [12]
• OEM and employer partnerships (original-equipment-manufacturer-sponsored programs, guaranteed-interview pipelines) are a durable moat for the branded operators.

9. Risks

• Regulatory and funding risk is the dominant one: tighter Gainful Employment or 90/10 rules, changes to Pell or federal loan availability, changes to veterans' benefits or state authorization, or a hostile Department of Education can cut off the federal revenue that funds most of the industry. [20][21][22]
• Outcome and reputation risk: schools with weak completion, placement, licensing, or debt-to-earnings results can lose eligibility program by program and trigger regulatory and press scrutiny — the sector's past scandals keep it under a magnifying glass.
• Enrollment and affordability: students may defer training, choose lower-cost public alternatives, or fail to finance tuition.
• The demographic cliff: the number of U.S. 18-year-olds is set to decline for several years from the mid-2020s, shrinking the traditional-age applicant pool.
• Cyclicality: trade-specific demand tracks its end market — a freight recession hits CDL enrollment; a construction slowdown hits the building trades — and a weak job market also hurts graduate placement and loan repayment.
• Instructor and facility risk: skilled instructors are scarce, and labs and equipment need continuing investment.
• Program obsolescence: electric vehicles, automation, software, and changing licenses can make curricula outdated.
• Execution, capital intensity, and acquisition risk: campus expansion ties up cash in real estate and equipment and dilutes margins if seats fill slowly; buyers can inherit regulatory liabilities, weak campuses, or accreditation problems.
• Geographic concentration: many private operators depend on a limited set of metropolitan labor markets and state rules.

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public route. The cleanest listed exposure is the pure-plays — UTI (NYSE: UTI) and Lincoln Educational Services (Nasdaq: LINC) — with Legacy Education (NYSE American: LGCY) a much smaller, healthcare-heavy option. UTI and Lincoln are profitable and growing double-digits, with early-2026 market caps of roughly $2.1B and $1.3B; Lincoln ended 2025 debt-free with meaningful liquidity. [3][8][10] Broader (but less trade-specific) exposure runs through the adjacent degree/online names in Section 4 — different businesses, not trade-school bets. With no dedicated fund, the public expression is effectively a two- or three-stock decision plus a view on the regulatory cycle. Metrics to track: new student starts and average active students; retention, completion, placement, and licensing; revenue per active student; marketing cost per start; Title IV and veterans-benefit dependence; receivables, refunds, and credit losses; facility utilization and capital spending; new-campus ramp time; and acquisition integration and regulatory approvals.

Private route — where the scale is:

• Buy or build individual schools or regional chains — the fragmented, cash-generative, real-estate-light economics are why private equity has moved in. Underwrite each campus and program separately: verify accreditation, state authorization, funding eligibility, student debt and outcomes, employer demand, instructor availability, lease and equipment obligations, and litigation. Attractive targets often have strong local employer ties but lack centralized marketing, compliance, curriculum, or technology.
• Back a platform roll-up (welding, CDL, allied health) alongside sponsors like those in Section 4.
• Employer-integrated training — carriers, utilities, and manufacturers investing in captive academies as a workforce-supply strategy rather than a standalone profit center.
• Online/high-margin niches — real-estate and insurance license prep and at-home career diplomas (Penn Foster, Kaplan, and similar) run asset-light with software-like margins.

Outlook (forward-looking judgment, not fact). The demand backdrop is the most favorable it has been in a generation: durable trades shortages, a cultural and cost-driven shift toward vocational credentials, and bipartisan enthusiasm for career and technical education. The single biggest near-term catalyst is Workforce Pell, live from July 2026, which could enlarge the federally fundable pool for short trade programs. Against that sit two real headwinds — the demographic decline in college-age students, and the ever-present risk that the next turn of the regulatory wheel tightens the federal-aid rules the business runs on. The strongest returns are likely to accrue to operators that pair credible employment outcomes with efficient student acquisition and high campus utilization. On balance the tailwinds look structural and the headwinds cyclical or policy-dependent — which is why the two public operators have been valued as growth stories rather than the melting ice cubes the sector was a decade ago. That thesis lives or dies on graduate outcomes and the politics of federal student aid. This is a favorable workforce-services niche, not a risk-free secular-growth story. [3][8][24]

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau. "2022 NAICS: 611519 Other Technical and Trade Schools" (definition, inclusions, exclusions). https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=611519&input=611519&year=2022
2. U.S. Census Bureau. County Business Patterns 2023 (establishments, employment, payroll), NAICS 611519. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/data/datasets.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau. 2022 Economic Census, Sector 61 — Educational Services (receipts, firm count, concentration ratios, HHI), NAICS 611519. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2022/econ/economic-census/naics-sector-61.html
4. U.S. Census Bureau. "Understanding NAICS / Economic Census methodology" (government-establishment exclusions; establishments with paid employees). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census/year/2022/guidance/understanding-naics.html
5. U.S. Small Business Administration. "Table of Size Standards," NAICS 611519 ($21 million receipts) (2023). https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
6. Universal Technical Institute, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2025 (campus counts by division; funding and revenue-recognition detail). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1261654/000126165426000006/uti-20251231.htm
7. Universal Technical Institute, Inc. "Reports Fiscal Year 2025 Fourth Quarter and Year-End Results" (revenue $835.6M, net income, adjusted EBITDA). PR Newswire / investor.uti.edu. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/universal-technical-institute-reports-fiscal-year-2025-fourth-quarter-and-year-end-results-302620846.html
8. Lincoln Educational Services Corp. Form 10-K and Q4/Full-Year 2025 results (revenue $518.2M, adjusted EBITDA, 22 campuses/12 states, debt-free year-end). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286613/000114036126007380/ef20060592_10k.htm
9. Legacy Education Inc. Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2025 (four California institutions; healthcare focus). https://ir.legacyed.com/sec-filings/all-sec-filings/content/0001493152-25-014945/form10-k.htm
10. StockAnalysis.com. Market-capitalization data for UTI and LINC (2026). https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/uti/; https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/linc/
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12. Roadmaster Drivers School / Werner Enterprises. "CDL Training" (carrier-owned truck-driving school model) (2025). https://www.roadmaster.com/; https://www.werner.com/cdl-training/
13. Education Affiliates. "About Education Affiliates" (Fortis, All-State Career; JLL Partners sponsorship). https://www.edaff.com/about.php
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15. StrataTech Education Group / The Halifax Group. "About StrataTech" and "Halifax Group Invests in StrataTech Education Group" (2019). https://stratatech.com/about-us/; https://thehalifaxgroup.com/halifax-group-invests-in-stratatech-education-group/
16. Ancora Education / Lindenwood Education System. "Ancora Education Announces New Chief Executive Officer" (April 2025 acquisition; five brands, 17 campuses). https://www.ancora.com/newsroom/ancora-education-announces-new-chief-executive-officer/
17. Bain Capital Double Impact. "Penn Foster Group" portfolio profile (2025–2026). https://www.baincapitaldoubleimpact.com/portfolio/penn-foster
18. Higher Ed Dive / PitchBook. Private-equity roll-ups of career-school platforms (160 Driving Academy; TransForce/Palladium Equity Partners) (2019–2026). https://www.highereddive.com/news/private-equitys-role-in-the-rise-and-fall-of-for-profit-colleges/554077/
19. Universal Technical Institute. "Completion of Concorde Career Colleges Acquisition" (2022). https://investor.uti.edu/2022-12-01-Universal-Technical-Institute-Expands-Platform-of-Workforce-Solutions-Offerings-with-Completion-of-Concorde-Career-Colleges%2C-Inc-Acquisition
20. U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid. "Institutional Eligibility — Title IV" (2025–2026 FSA Handbook, Vol. 2, Ch. 1; two-year rule, accreditation). https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/fsa-handbook/2025-2026/vol2/ch1-institutional-eligibility
21. U.S. Department of Education, FSA. "Final Regulations: Financial Value Transparency and Gainful Employment" (2023 final rule, effective July 1, 2024). https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/library/federal-registers/2023-10-10/final-regulations-financial-value-transparency-and-gainful-employment
22. NASFAA (National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators). "Deep Dive Into the 90/10 Rule and Changes of Ownership Regulations" (2021 American Rescue Plan change) (2021–2024). https://www.nasfaa.org/news-item/27747/Deep_Dive_Into_Proposed_90_10_Rule_and_Changes_of_Ownership_Regulations
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24. U.S. Department of Education. "Final Rule to Create New Workforce Pell Grant Program" (effective July 2026; 150–599 clock-hour programs) (2026). https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/us-department-of-education-issues-final-rule-create-new-workforce-pell-grant-program
25. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. "How to Use GI Bill Benefits" (approved trade/career-training programs) (2025). https://www.va.gov/education/about-gi-bill-benefits/how-to-use-benefits/
26. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Heating, Air Conditioning, and Refrigeration Mechanics and Installers," Occupational Outlook Handbook (2024–2034 projections). https://www.bls.gov/ooh/installation-maintenance-and-repair/heating-air-conditioning-and-refrigeration-mechanics-and-installers.htm
27. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Automotive Service Technicians and Mechanics," Occupational Outlook Handbook. https://www.bls.gov/ooh/installation-maintenance-and-repair/automotive-service-technicians-and-mechanics.htm
28. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Heavy Vehicle and Mobile Equipment Service Technicians," Occupational Outlook Handbook. https://www.bls.gov/ooh/installation-maintenance-and-repair/heavy-vehicle-and-mobile-equipment-service-technicians.htm
29. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Welders, Cutters, Solderers, and Brazers," Occupational Outlook Handbook. https://www.bls.gov/ooh/production/welders-cutters-solderers-and-brazers.htm
30. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Medical Assistants," Occupational Outlook Handbook. https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/medical-assistants.htm